Explaining Water Governance in Egypt: Actors, Mechanisms and Challenges by Lasheen, W
1 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPLAINING WATER GOVERNANCE IN EGYPT: ACTORS, MECHANISMS 
AND CHALLENGES 
 
A thesis submitted by  
 
WESAM MAHMOUD MOHAMED LASHEEN 
 
To the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in 
 
Politics  
 
 
January 2019  
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for 
the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
                                                                             ..................................... 
(Signature) 
 
 
  
2 | P a g e  
 
ميحرلا نمحرلا الله مسب 
 ِ َّاللَّ ُلَْضف َناَكَو ۚ َُملَْعت ْنَُكت َْمل اَم َكَمَّلَعَو"
"اًميِظَع َكَْيلَع 
ميظعلا الله قدص 
113-ةيلآا ءاسنلا ةروس 
"And Allah has revealed to you the Book and 
wisdom and has taught you that which you did not 
know. And ever has the favor of Allah upon you been 
great". 
SURAH AN NISA 113 
  
3 | P a g e  
 
Dedication 
I dedicate this thesis to my beloved husband, my greatest supporter, my 
strongest motivation, Ahmed. Without your devotion and selflessness, I could not 
have done it. I could not be more proud to be your wife.  I also dedicate this thesis 
to my wonderful children, Adham, Sara and Hazem without whom, I could have 
finished this thesis two years earlier! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 | P a g e  
 
Abstract 
This thesis adopts a governance theoretical framework to analyse and explain 
the complex and non-linear nature of water governance arrangements in Egypt. 
Drawing on empirical data collected from fieldwork with key water stakeholders 
in Egypt, and using a documentary analysis of the major water policy documents, 
the thesis examines the interplay dynamics between water agents and structures 
at national, regional and international levels. The work rests on the observation 
that water governance arrangements in Egypt have changed over the last two 
decades to denote an ever-growing role for non-state actors. The historic 
domination and monopoly of state actors in water policy decisions is no longer 
suitable for addressing the emerging water challenges. Consequently, the water 
crisis in Egypt is perceived as a governance issue that calls for the collaboration 
of state and non-state actors.  
In order to inform the ontological, epistemological and methodological basis of 
the thesis, the governance analytic framework is combined with theoretical 
insights from structure-agency accounts. By combining theoretical and empirical 
enquiry, this work attempts to contribute to and advance beyond the existing 
literature in three ways. First, it offers one of the first attempts to organise an 
empirical in-depth case study analysis of the water governance arrangements in 
Egypt using a multi-level structure-agency framework. Second, it provides a 
systematic examination and mapping-out of the new water governance systems 
in Egypt. Third, it presents a rigorous evaluation of the impact of water 
governance regimes at the regional and international levels on water policy 
decisions at the national level.  
Following on from the case study analysis, and guided by the developed 
theoretical framework, this research has concluded that the Egyptian water 
governance is dominated by powerful and influential government water bodies. 
Therefore, any attempt to change existing governance arrangements has to be 
very carefully planned, taking into account the interaction between water policy 
agents and the existing water structure. Thus, this thesis will appeal to a diverse 
audience, including public policy and water governance scholars as well as water 
experts and policy makers. 
Key words: water governance, water policy-making, Egyptian water sector, 
water governance in Egypt. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OUTLINE 
Water governance permeates all aspects of human activity, and affects the 
availability of water which in turn has a significant bearing on a country’s 
developmental plans. Inadequate water supply water has been identified by 
many internal organizations including UNESCO (2009) as one of the determining 
factors that can interfere with a country’s ability to form and implement sound 
agriculture, health, energy, and industrial policies. Consequently, many 
developing countries including Egypt have infused water reforms and altered the 
existing water governance arrangements in order to allow more participation of 
water stakeholders. New water governance models were borrowed from other 
countries and successful water reforms worldwide have been presented by 
international donors as blueprints for reforming water governance. In this 
context, it can be argued that a comprehensive understanding and explanation 
of water governance reforms and the change in water policies in countries like 
Egypt calls for a multilevel governance framework within which the relationships 
and interaction between water policy actors and existing water structures at 
national, regional, and international levels can be examined. Such an 
understanding of water governance reforms would contribute to the current 
policy debate on water sectors’ reforms by allowing a more in-depth and 
comprehensive treatment of the water crisis. Additionally, framing the water crisis 
from a governance perspective would help exploring the role of non-state water 
actors in water policy decisions. This in turn may open new horizons to address 
the issue of water scarcity in a more collaborative and innovative way.       
Following on from the above, this introductory chapter provides an overview of 
the research.  The background of the project will be presented first, followed by 
an explanation of the research questions and the methodological underpinnings 
of the study.  The analytical and theoretical framework of the research is 
discussed in section three. Section four focuses on the empirical case study and 
aims to provide a short introduction to water governance in Egypt and to identify 
the key actors involved in the policymaking and implementation processes. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the organisation of the rest of the study. 
1.1 Research Background  
Water has increasingly become a scarce resource. Such scarcity has been even 
more complicated by environmental issues, including climate change and 
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droughts in many parts of the world (Golia, 2008). This has raised many concerns 
regarding how efficient water governance and regulatory regimes should be to 
overcome the challenges associated with water scarcity. Coordination between 
different stakeholders involved in water policymaking and implementation 
appears to be one of the major issues that requires immediate action to enable 
a water governance system to function properly.  
In response to these demands, water governance and regulation systems have 
witnessed major changes in their structures and functions over the last three 
decades. A shift has occurred away from what was known as the traditional mode 
of water government wherein governments and their apparatus were in full 
control of service provision as well as regulatory issues towards a new model in 
which the state plays the role of the regulator and rule-maker while services 
provision has become the responsibility of the private sector in collaboration with 
other state and non-state actors. These changes have resulted in new 
arrangements between governments and private actors. In this context, the 
water sectors in many countries, including Egypt, have experienced the growing 
role of private sector participation in service provision. Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) as an enabling tool provided by the neo-liberal ideas of 
reform, have become a common practice in building new water projects (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004).  
A matter of concern in the recent reforms in water governance and regulatory 
regimes is the degree of similarity between developed and developing countries 
with regard to the adopted institutional arrangements and regulatory functions. A 
universal model of reform based on more empowerment and inclusion of private 
actors as well as a clear separation of service provision and regulatory functions 
has swept the world. This issue raises fundamental questions about the driving 
forces behind these reforms and the way in which such models of reforms have 
been transferred from the developed to the developing countries. Another 
important issue is the relevance and suitability of the transferred models to the 
new environment and context wherein they have been transplanted (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 2000; Rose, 2002).  
Following on from these observations, this study argues that to fully understand 
why and how models are transferred among countries and to be able to explain 
disparities with regard to the ways in which these models work across the world, 
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we need to investigate the structure-agency interplay dynamics (Giddens, 1984; 
Hay, 2002; Weaver and Gioia, 1994). In other words, structures in terms of 
existing contextual factors, as well as agency, as reflected in the roles played by 
global and domestic actors in policymaking and implementation, should be fully 
considered for the reason that the interplay dynamics between these two 
elements (structures/agency) determine, to a large extent, the channels of 
transfer in addition to the ways in which the transferred models work in practice. 
As Common (2010: 53) puts it, ‘even where powerful policy transfer mechanisms 
are at work through international agencies and consultancy activity, at best, 
policies are partially adapted to suit local political, economic and social contexts’. 
From this perspective, in order to understand how water governance and 
regulation work in Egypt, and why Egyptian policymakers are adopting the 
existing model, we need first to unpack the impact of global governance 
structures and to identify the major players in these systems. Then, we need to 
look at the domestic level to find out how national structures are constructed in 
the light of global governance structures and whether policymakers at the 
national level learn from their counterparts or simply imitate and copy best 
practices from other contexts. Investigating the interplay of dynamics between 
national and global levels will help our understanding of whether what is going 
on in the water sector in Egypt is a matter of structure, agency, or a mix of these 
two elements.                       
1.2 Research Questions and Methodology  
Using a governance perspective on the water crisis and applying a multilevel 
structure-agency framework of analysis, this research examines water 
governance and regulatory reforms in Egypt. The main research question is how 
to explain water governance arrangements in Egypt through the analysis of 
existing water structures as well as relationships and interaction between water 
structures and water agents? In this context, the study is primarily driven to 
address the following questions:                   
 What dynamics drives the reforms in water governance and regulatory 
regimes in Egypt? 
 Why and how has the claimed universal model mentioned above been 
transferred to Egypt?  
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 How relevant is the new model of reform to the Egyptian context?   
 What are the challenges facing the reform model, and how may these 
challenges be overcome?  
  What lessons can be learnt with regard to service delivery and good 
governance in the Egyptian water sector?  
 To investigate these questions, a set of qualitative research method techniques 
was utilised (Neuman, 1997; Hartley, 2004). Given the novelty of the study and 
the particularity of the case under examination, the water sector in Egypt was 
analysed as a single country case study. One of the main reasons for this is that 
the project aims at providing an in-depth analysis and a vivid picture of 
governance and regulatory regimes in this sector in order to identify their roots 
in addition to the recent changes and how they were enacted by policymakers 
(Yin, 1981; 2003).  More methodological justifications for focusing on a single-
case and not a multiple-case approach are provided in the methodological 
section of the study. Furthermore, the obvious limitations of the single-case 
approach in terms of the ability to generalise the results are also discussed.  
Existing water governance arrangements in the Egyptian water sector were 
examined from a structure-agency perspective in an attempt to underline the 
interplay dynamics between the current water structures and agents.  The 
contention here is that the way in which water agents interact within the 
established water structures affect water policy decisions including those related 
to hosting certain water reform models.  
Documentary analysis was another methodological tool to investigate the case 
under consideration (Neuendorf, 2002). Official policy documents produced by 
the Egyptian government, as well as other state actors (e.g., regulatory agencies, 
ministries, competition authorities), were collected and analysed to find out the 
official position regarding the driving forces of reform and the justifications for 
adopting a specific model. Documents produced by other non-state actors, 
including private sector institutions and international organisations (e.g., OECD, 
EU), were also examined as another source to check and counter-check the data 
gathered from the official governmental documents.  
In order to triangulate the data collected and to get a complete picture about the 
dynamics of the governance and regulatory regimes in the Egyptian water sector 
approximately 32 semi-structured elite interviews were conducted with different 
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stakeholders (Weiss, 1992). These included representatives from the ministries 
involved in regulating the sectors, the regulatory agency, the private service 
providers, and the civil society organisations working in the water sector. The 
semi-structured elite interview technique was used in order to give the 
respondents the chance to fully reflect on the discussed issues. Shorthand notes 
were taken during the interview and then they were fully elaborated in extended 
reports straight after each interview. Over the following few months, the 
researcher worked on establishing contacts in the mentioned organisations as 
well as building up and deepening the theoretical framework of the study.   
1.3 The Theoretical Framework of the Study 
This study adopts a structure-agency framework of analysis to explain the recent 
reforms in the water sector in Egypt (Giddens, 1984) (see chapters 4, 7, and 8). 
The water crisis and associated policy decisions and reform initiatives are 
conceptualised and analysed as from a governance perspective (see chapters 
2, 3 and 6). New governance systems and the associated trends towards 
liberalisation and privatisation of the utility sectors have been introduced to help 
public organisations to better run their business and exploit their resources. 
Although it is quite understandable to see such models spreading and 
transferring from one European country to the other because of the similarities 
among those countries, the diffusion of these modes of governance and their 
tools in the context of the developing countries required more investigation 
(Rogers 1995, Gilardi, 2010, Badran, 2012). We needed to understand first how 
the overall contextual and structural factors have facilitated the transfer and the 
diffusions of these models (Stone, 2001).  We also needed to understand the 
level of agency in this process by reflecting on the role played by policymakers 
at the national level as well as the interaction between the structural elements 
and the agency, which may result in a process of policy learning. 
In this context, the study provides an exploration of the dynamic linkages 
between governance structures, policy agents and water reforms with a 
concentration on the recent reforms in the water sector in Egypt. Using a 
governance perspective and a structure-agency framework assisted in 
emphasising the dialectical interrelationship between the studied factors. It also 
helped to achieve the theoretical and empirical objectives of the research. At a 
theoretical level, the study aims to provide an explanation of the structure and 
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agent relationship that is useful for public policy analysis in general and for the 
analysis of policy transfer and utility reforms in particular.  At a more practical 
level, the study attempts to produce a framework of analysis that will offer some 
guidelines for more systematic empirical research. In other words, the empirical 
objective of this study is to develop a model for analysing the crucial attributes of 
the structure and agents in the Egyptian water sector, which will assist in 
explaining the process of policy transfer from other countries as well as the extent 
to which the new model fits the Egyptian reality.  
For the abovementioned purposes of the study, water reforms in Egypt are 
conceived as a governance structure that includes new arrangements and 
relationships between governmental and nongovernmental actors. These new 
arrangements provide new market orientated mechanisms, and tools in an 
attempt to change the culture as well as the performance of water utilities.    
Taken together, these elements provide a new paradigm for public management 
and a new governance system that acknowledges the growing role of private 
actors in the process of policymaking. Many of the suggested elements can be 
seen in the context of water reforms in Egypt. The water policymaking model in 
the Egyptian water sector is gradually moving away from the sole dominance of 
government water actors to allow an increasing level of participation by private 
water stakeholders. Market mechanisms are emphasised and competition has 
been gradually introduced in a more decentralised fashion of making water policy 
decisions (see chapters 7 and 8).    
As is the case with all definitions in social sciences, the concept of governance 
has no authoritative definition. Stoker, (1998:18) for instance, has highlighted five 
different meanings of governance: Governance as a set of institutions and actors 
from within and beyond governments; governance as a means to demarcate the 
blurry boundaries of accountability and responsibility between state and non-
state actors when dealing with social and economic problems; governance as a 
reflection of power relations and power dependence among actors and 
institutions working collectively to address societal issues;  governance as a new 
mode of governing relying on independent, self-steered networks of actors; And 
finally, governance as a manifestation of the growing roles of non-state actors 
and the inadequacy of the traditional command-and-control approach of 
government. As put by Bevir (2013:1) governance refers to ‘all processes of 
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governing, whether undertaken by a government, market, or network; whether 
over a family, tribe, corporation, or territory; and whether by laws, norms, power, 
or language’. As such, governance goes beyond the limits of governments and 
their apparatuses to include all forms of societal rules and practices.    
In the context of this research, governance is conceptualised in accordance with 
the World Bank’s definition as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources’ (World Bank, 1992: 
1). In this sense, understanding the notion of governance and how it has evolved 
is a prerequisite to unpacking and understanding the reform processes in public 
utilities and to reflect on the role of the actors involved in forming and 
implementing policies in these sectors. It is worth mentioning in this regard that 
the global dimension of governance is as important as the national dimension. 
At the global level, governance can be regarded as ‘a multilevel system in which 
local, national, regional, and global political processes are inseparably linked’ 
(Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006: 192). Reforms in the water sector in many 
countries, including Egypt, are primarily driven by the agenda of international 
actors such as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, and others. This is why it is 
crucial to understand how national and international levels of governance interact 
and how such interactions can facilitate or hinder the policy transfer processes 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Rose, 2002).  
In this context, an important question to examine at the meta-theoretical level 
would be this: could agency change structures? In other words, to what extent 
can the process of policy or model transfer from one context to another be 
explained based on structural elements and how free policymakers are in 
adopting certain models. The work of Giddens (1984) provides a critical account 
of the concepts of structures and agents as well as the dialectical relationship 
between these two terms. This debate will be highlighted in more detail in the 
theoretical section of the study; however, for now the structure can be 
understood as patterns of relations between policy actors at national and 
international levels and agency is conceived as the freedom of those actors to 
act and to take decisions within the existing structures.     
As noted by Evans and Davies (1999), the question of policy transfer is a 
question of structure and agency. They argue that the policy transfer approach 
operates at the meso-level, but in order to develop valid conclusions, such an 
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approach should be linked with questions at the macro and micro levels. As such, 
using the policy transfer approach links the discussions of water governance at 
national and international levels with the role of structural and agency variables. 
It also connects such theoretical and conceptual discourse with the process of 
policy transfer in the examined empirical case of water governance in Egypt. In 
this context, policy transfer is conceived as the conscious adoption of a public 
policy from another jurisdiction. This, according to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 
2000), includes processes such as policy diffusion, emulation, policy learning 
and lesson drawing. These processes are sometimes confused with policy 
transfer itself; however, a distinction should be made between them. Rogers 
(1995: 11) defines diffusion as ‘the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a 
social system’. That means, policy diffusion can occur without any policies being 
adopted but policy transfer becomes an observable process once organisations 
and actors pick up a policy idea or model.  
The main theoretical drivers of the study (governance, structure-agency 
dilemma, and policy transfer) briefly discussed in this section will be fully 
examined and elaborated on in the chapters to follow (see chapters 2, 3, and 4). 
With the main concepts of the study identified, the next section of this short 
outline will shed light on the case study and reasons it was selected.  
1.4 Water Governance Reforms in Egypt (The Case Study)  
The water governance reforms in Egypt are examines by analysing the Egyptian 
water sector as a single case study (see chapter 5). Considering the limitations 
of single case research in terms of the ability of the researcher to generalise the 
results, in the context of this project, the single case approach was particularly 
useful taking into consideration the novelty of the reforms in the Egyptian water 
sector and the need to produce in-depth analysis and thick description of the 
water governance system in Egypt (see Geertz, 1973). To this end the literature 
on research methods indicates the single case approach can be a useful tool. 
The water sector itself is important especially if we consider the challenges facing 
water resources in Egypt. Over the years, the increasing population as well as 
the growing gap between the water demand and the supply sides have 
complicated the water governance system and called for new ways to manage 
the scarce water resources available to Egypt. The picture is even more complex 
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if one considers the characteristics of the water resources system in Egypt and 
its high dependency on one source, which is the River Nile. According to the 
1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan, Egypt’s share in the River Nile water is 
55.5 billion cubic metres per year. This treaty denoting Egypt’s share of the water 
is challenged by other countries in the Nile basin namely Ethiopia which face 
water challenges and increasing demand for water (see chapter 6). The high rate 
of the population growth in the region in general, in addition to other challenges 
faced by individual countries such as civil wars in Sudan and Burundi, famines 
in Tanzania, besides regional and internal conflicts involving countries such as 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, have pushed the Nile basin countries to 
call for reducing Egypt’s share of water, which adds to the challenges facing the 
Egyptian government (El-Fadel et al., 2003).  
The recently announced project by the Ethiopian government in 2013 for the 
establishment of a massive dam on the River Nile, known as the ‘Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance dam’, that was planned to be completed by 20171, adds 
to the challenges facing water governance in Egypt as it will certainly reduce 
Egypt’s share of the Nile River water. Such a great challenge calls for more 
effective and efficient ways to deal with the increasingly reduced share of the 
Nile water and requires that the Egyptian government revise the existing 
governance system and design new governance mechanisms to rationalise 
water management practices (Paisley and Henshaw, 2013; Tawfik, 2016). In 
spite of the technical difficulties which resulted in a delay in completing the dam 
on time, the threat is still there for the Egyptian water policy-makers as it is a 
matter of time until the full completion of the project in 2021-2022 (Getachew, 
2018). Consequently, efforts to reform current water governance arrangements 
should be continues in order to face future water challenges.     
In response to water challenges, a reform process of the water sector has been 
enacted and new governance measures adopted to improve the way in which 
water policies in Egypt are made and implemented. The following figure provides 
a visualisation of the active actors involved in the process of making and 
enforcing water policies in Egypt: 
                                                          
1 Due to technical difficulties, the project is now expected to be completed in 2021-2022, 5 years 
beyond the original accomplishment date.  
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Figure 1.1: Actors Involved In the Water Governance System in Egypt 
As the figure indicates, the new governance arrangements are more complex 
and involve different governmental and non-governmental actors. The role of the 
donor community is crucial to understand the driving forces behind the reform 
process. The whole process was triggered by the donors’ dissatisfaction 
regarding the performance of the sector. This issue will be discussed in full detail 
in the chapters to follow (especially chapters 7 and 8).        
The reforms highlight the importance of market-oriented mechanisms such as 
the liberalisation of the sector and the introduction of competition among its 
players. In this respect, the institutional framework has been changed and a 
separation between policymaking and policy implementation processes, along 
with another separation between technical/service delivery and regulatory 
functions, was adopted as a method to improve water policy and the governance 
system in Egypt. A Holding Company for Water and Wastewater (HCWW) was 
created in 2004 and an economic regulator of the sector was instituted under the 
name of the Egyptian Water Regulatory Agency (EWRA) in 2006.    
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These new reforms have put more emphasis on the role of the private sector as 
a crucial partner in service delivery and policymaking. In this respect, the 
government has created a designated unit under the name of the Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) Central Unit in the Ministry of Finance.  The main objective 
of this unit is to promote private sector participation and investments in 
infrastructure projects. New wastewater treatment plants in Cairo and Alexandria 
were built based on Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreements between the 
government and the private sector. The new regulatory agency has also been 
assigned duties to encourage private investment in the sector’s infrastructure.   
At the policymaking level, greater emphasis has been placed on the importance 
of adopting a participatory model which acknowledges the legitimate role of all 
interested stakeholders, not only consumers. To this end, the government has 
established Water Users Associations (WUAs) to look after the consumers and 
to make sure that their rights are not violated by the private companies.    
A great deal of similarity can easily be spotted between the reforms in the water 
sector in Egypt and water sector reforms elsewhere in the world including in 
developed and industrialised economies such as the European countries (El-
Bedawy, 2014). Given the differences in the contextual factors (socio-economic, 
political, and legal) between Egypt and these developed countries valid 
questions then would be why and how have these reform models been 
transferred into the Egyptian context  and what are the possibilities for these 
models to succeed in a different context. To answer this question the study 
adopts a multilevel governance analytic framework that looks at the water crisis 
in Egypt as a governance issue which calls for the collaboration of state and non-
state actors at national, regional and international levels. Such a theoretical 
framework has been enhanced by including insights from the structure-agency 
theory. The reason for this is that a comprehensive understanding and 
explanation of water governance arrangements and reforms in the context of 
importing countries such as Egypt requires a full investigation of the interaction 
and relationships between water policy agents and existing water structures at 
all levels. This treatment of water governance would help understanding the 
ways in which water reforms and governance arrangements were transferred 
into the context of the importing countries including Egypt in addition to the roles 
played by water policy agents and decision-makers at all governance levels. This 
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line of thought is further explicated throughout the different chapters of this work 
as indicated in the next section.    
1.5 The Organisation of the Study  
The study is divided into a theoretical framework and an empirical case study 
analysis (see Figure 1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2: The Organisation of the Study 
As the figure indicates, the theoretical framework consists of four chapters 
covering the theoretical and conceptual building blocks in this thesis. The 
introductory chapter provides an overview of the study and gives the reader a 
quick snapshot about the statement of the problem, the research question and 
the methodology of the research. These research elements will be further 
explored and discussed in chapter five on data and methods. The following three 
chapters are divided thematically to cover the different issues related to 
27 | P a g e  
 
governance in general and water governance in particular, including policy 
transfer and structure-agency discourse. The aim is to define the theoretical and 
conceptual underpinnings of the research. In this context, chapter two 
investigates the notion of governance and explains the added value of the 
governance approach as an analytical framework.  
Chapter three is devoted to discuss the applications of governance in water 
sectors. The discussion covers several important and strategic issues in water 
management and governance as a matter of introduction to understand why 
effective water governance systems are important for managing such a vital and 
scarce resource. Chapter four explicates the long- standing dilemma of structure-
agency interrelationships. Unpacking and analysing such a debate is important 
if we are to fully capture the story behind how policies are transferred from one 
context to another and how water policy decisions in the Egyptian context are 
made in the light of existing water structures. Policy transfer will be framed as 
structure-agency phenomena. Such a conceptualisation of policy transfer will 
help explain the role of free agency and the extent to which the transfer of water 
reforms and regulatory practices is governed by existing structures. Answering 
this question is extremely helpful in understanding the mechanisms via which the 
transfer of the existing water governance system has taken place in Egypt. Taken 
together, chapters two, three and four provide the theoretical and analytical 
context of the project. 
The theoretical and analytic framework leads and guides the analysis in the 
empirical part of the study. Chapter five will detail the research design and 
strategies for data collection and analysis.  In order to contextualise the empirical 
case study, chapter six will present the recent developments and reforms in the 
water sector in Egypt. Chapter seven will focus on governance arrangements in 
the Egyptian water sector and will discuss the main actors involved in 
policymaking and the roles they play. Chapter eight will examine the relationship 
between existing water structures and the role of agency in making water policy 
decisions. This will be followed by a concluding chapter that summarises the 
main results of the analysis of the water governance in the Egyptian context and 
provides policy recommendation of how policymakers should learn from the 
experience of other countries.  
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CHAPTER 2: GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Introduction  
Following on from the research outline provided in chapter 1, the aim of this 
chapter is to set the first building stone in the theoretical framework of the study 
by providing a critical review of the literature available on governance as an 
analytical framework. Such an analysis is essential for developing a better 
understanding of the concept of water governance (see chapter 3). Examining 
the analytic power of governance is also helpful in understanding and explaining 
water governance reforms in general and the reforms of water governance in the 
Egyptian case in particular (see Onwuegbuzie et al., 2011). In that sense, such 
a critical review is an important step in contextualising the debate about water 
governance and structuring the argument of the study. The review will be guided 
by three main questions: what does governance mean? What is the difference 
between governance and the traditional government approach of policymaking? 
What is the analytical and explanatory powers of governance regarding water 
policy-making and implementation? The underlying assumption here is that 
using a governance approach to water policy research can contribute to an 
improved understanding of water policy processes, institutions, and actors in 
addition to the ways in which those elements interact around water policy issues. 
The major concepts of governance, good governance and multi-level 
governance will be explored first. Understanding the debate about governance 
is an essential step to highlight the changing nature in the relationships between 
state and non-state actors involved in water governance processes. At the 
outset, a clear distinction between two different models of water policymaking 
can be made: the traditional state-led model and the governance model. The first 
model emphasises the dominant and influential role of governments and their 
apparatus while the governance model underlines the growing role of other 
stakeholders, namely non-sate stakeholders, in water policymaking and policy 
implementation. The distinction between these models will help in identifying new 
complex governance arrangements including the New Public Management, 
which entails new demarcations of the boundaries between the state and the 
private sectors. The private sector in the context of this study will be used in its 
broad sense to include all non-state actors whose roles in governance processes 
is ever growing.                     
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2.2 The Concept of Governance  
In policy research, governance has become an important focus of attention for 
many policy scholars who have tried to utilize the concept to describe and 
analyse the shift in making and implementing public policies (Hufty, 2011: 403).   
Nonetheless, governance is still regarded as a slippery concept with no agreed 
definition. The concept is as old as human civilization (Al-Ahsan, 2017). 
However, in its modern utilisation the term governance has been coined to 
denote the birth of a new model in which the role of the state in society has 
changed from being the dominant and sometimes the sole actor in policymaking 
and policy implementation processes under what is known as the welfare state 
to becoming an actor among other non-state and non-governmental players. A 
shift has occurred in the role of the state from being a direct provider for a wide 
range of goods and services to being a regulator and rule maker responsible for 
monitoring policy games and making sure that all players in different governance 
systems are playing according to the rules (Majone, 1997).   
In spite of these general characteristics of governance, different scholars use the 
term in different ways to refer to different phenomena. The way in which the term 
is used depends to a great extent on the context in which authors use it. Rhodes 
(2007: 1258) has highlighted this issue by describing the manner in which people 
understand governance as being ‘too parochial’. The conceptualisation problem 
is even more complicated as a result of the widespread utilisation of governance 
in different scientific disciplines including public policy, public administration, 
international relations, and international law, wherein scholars tend to follow 
different traditions and use different methods.  
A glance at the literature of governance illustrates that the term governance is 
being used in two different fashions: narrow and wide. From a linguistic 
perspective, governance it is described as    ‘act, manner, office, or power of 
governing; government’, ‘state of being governed’, or ‘method of government or 
regulation’ (Kuma, 2011: 65). This linguistic definition focuses basically on the 
governance mechanisms as a mode of governing and regulating relationships. It 
says nothing about the nature of the actors involved in the governance processes 
or the roles they play in steering the governance systems.  In the same vein 
comes the definition presented by the World Bank (2008:3), which views 
governance as ‘[T]he traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
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exercised’. This definition is close to the concept adopted by the same institution 
that looks at governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources’. The focus here is 
on the authority and the way in which such an authority is being used, most likely 
by governments to allocate resources in the society.  The same meaning is 
reflected in the definitions adopted by other international organisations including 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see Weiss, 2000).  
The major problem with this narrow treatment of the concept of governance is 
that there is always an implicit assumption about the dominant role of the 
governmental actors and the way in which those actors use  the existing  
mechanisms, processes and institutions to direct and control policy processes 
and in turn resource allocation in the society (Pierre, 2000; Weiss, 2000). In this 
sense, governance is conceived as controlling, commanding, enforcing, and 
sometimes imposing policy options and solutions to solve societal problems. This 
narrow vision of governance has been challenged by scholars such as Rhodes 
(1999), who emphasises that this narrow conceptualisation with its focus on the 
role of the governmental actors is important but not sufficient for capturing and 
understanding the nature of the emergent governance arrangements between 
state and non-state actors.       
Many scholars have supported Rhodes’s reservation about the narrow treatment 
of governance and underscored the fact that governance is not only about 
governments and the way in which state actors control policy processes. For 
instance, Finkelstein (1995: 367) has argued that ‘governance does not mean 
government or we would say that instead’. Based on these insights, Dingwerth 
and Pattberg (2006: 188) have defined governance in a wider sense to refer to 
‘a specific mode of social interaction whose logic differs from that of both markets 
and governments’. As a social form of interaction, governance reflects a 
collaborative process of steering policy processes to resolve societal issues. This 
steering process includes state and non-state actors working side by side. This 
more cooperative view of governance processes highlights the interdependent 
nature of governance systems within which governmental and non-governmental 
players work together to meet society’s economic and social demands. As Stoker 
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(1998:34) puts it, governance indicates a new way of distributing power in 
society, ‘both internal and external to the state’. 
Rhodes (2007: 4) summarises the conceptual debate about governance by 
stating that ‘in much present-day use, governance refers to: a new process of 
governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which 
society is governed’.  Interdependence between state and non-state actors is the 
name of the game. No single actor can fully control interactions and mange 
relations in complex governance situations. Policy outcomes and results are 
shaped and reshaped in game-like interactive processes. No clear boundaries 
between governmental, private or other non-governmental actors.  Policy 
networks are prime manifestations of the new mode of governance, wherein 
policy actors attempt to self-manage and self-regulate themselves with little or 
no intervention from the state (Rhodes, 1999: 7-8).     
The aforementioned discussion of the concept of governance indicates that it 
goes beyond the simple one-dimensional governing processes, which are 
normally controlled by state actors. It is a holistic academic and practical 
construct, which includes varieties of arrangements and a wide array of 
relationships between state and private actors. It is a marriage between the 
public and the private spheres, which embraces government institutions, but it 
also subsumes informal, non-governmental institutions operating within the 
public realm (Weiss, 2000). It includes, in addition to the way in which decisions 
are made and implemented, a completely new rationale based on the crucial role 
played by interdependence among state and non-sate actors in shaping policy 
outcomes and solving the problems of the society. In the words of Dingwerth and 
Pattberg, governance is ‘the sum of myriad-literally millions of control 
mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, structures, and processes’ 
(Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006:192).  
In this sense, governance comes at the heart of the state-society relationship 
and captures interwoven interactions between state and civil society. The 
legitimate and growing role of non-state actors has been acknowledged and in 
many cases encouraged by governments. Consequently, ‘societal actors have 
become influential over policy and administration and have done so in ways that 
were unimaginable in earlier times’ (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 224). In this 
context, governance can be perceived as ‘the sum of the many ways individuals 
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and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs’ (Weiss, 2000: 
796). In other words, governance is a system formal and informal institutions built 
on the interdependence among state and non-sate actors working in the public 
sphere. Interactions and relationships among actors involved in these 
governance systems are the core mechanism to solve societal problems.        
2.3 ‘Good Governance’ Defined  
The discussion about ‘good governance’ is primarily of a normative nature. That 
means there is a value judgment involved in defining what constitutes ‘good’ 
governance and in turn what is considered as ‘bad’ governance practices. 
Hence, the first question t is: how can we judge governance? And what are the 
criteria upon which a government system can be classified as good or bad?  
Before answering these questions, it might be helpful if we first explain the logic 
behind the idea of good governance and the reason it is so attractive. The logic 
behind good governance is quite simple; good governance equates with good 
policy outcomes (see Figure 2.1).   
 
Figure 2.1: The Logic behind Good Governance 
As the figure shows, good governance in theory should lead to better 
management and more efficient and effective managerial strategies (Cornforth 
and Chambers, 2010: 9-11). This in turn will result in performance improvements 
and providing better value for the utilised public resources. Allocating and using 
public resources in an effective and efficient fashion using state-of-the-art 
managerial practices will facilitate achieving policy goals and realising intended 
policy outcomes. It is a straightforward rationale that one can hardly argue 
against. The applications of good governance, however, particularly in the 
context of the developing countries tell another story.           
International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the OECD, and the 
World Bank (WB) have made strenuous efforts to identify the features of a good 
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governance system.  According to the OECD, good governance ‘encompasses 
the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic 
operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled.’ (OECD, 1993; 18)The core issue 
is to have agreed-upon ground rules between the ruler and the followers or the 
ruled. These rules define the playing field and the way in which actors interact in 
the governance system. They also provide a framework for accountability, 
according to which actors can be held accountable for their actions.   
The WB defines good governance as ‘epitomized by predictable, open and 
enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued 
with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its 
actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving 
under the rule of law.’ (World Bank, 1994:7). The WB’s definition of good 
governance highlights the importance of transparency and openness in 
policymaking and implementation processes.  It also underlines the important 
role played by professional civil service and other government institutions, which 
perform their duties in an accountable manner according to the rule of law. 
Another important element in the WB’s definition of good governance 
emphasises the role of civil society organisations in conducting social affairs.  
The definition provided by the UNDP emphasises the previously mentioned 
qualities of good governance, but it also highlights the importance of the fairness 
and effectiveness as two major features of good governance systems.  From this 
angle, good governance is participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also 
effective and equitable. In addition, it promotes the rule of law. Good governance 
ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on a broad 
consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable 
are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources. 
(Johnston, 2006: 2-3). According to this view, a good governance system 
provides equal opportunities for all parties in the society to participate in decision-
making processes and to determine the way in which resources are allocated. 
Special attention is given in this regard to the weak and most vulnerable, whose 
priorities should be heard and responded to by policymakers.         
The aforementioned characterisation of good governance indicates that the aim 
of a good governance system should be to provide the enabling environment 
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within which different economic and societal actors can participate in defining 
and solving social and economic problems. To this end, transparency and 
accountability are cornerstones. Playing according to the agreed-upon rules in 
the governance system should provide the foundation for establishing trust in the 
relationships between participating actors. Such a trust building process is quite 
important for improving the performance of the governance processes and the 
quality of policy outcomes. Trust in governance systems is like the cement which 
holds the different parts of the system together. On the other hand, the lack of 
trust among involving actors would encourage opportunism, which may lead to 
a deterioration in the relationships between actors and reduce the efficiency of 
the governance processes. The poor performance of governance processes may 
render the whole governance system dysfunctional (The Independent 
Commission on Good Governance in Public Services, 2005: 17). 
Measuring good governance has become a major concern for many international 
bodies and academic scholars. Several measures have been developed with 
different criteria, each looking at good governance from a certain perspective. 
According to the UN, a good governance system should reflect the following 
criteria: a high level of participation, a high level of consensus among actors, a 
high level of system accountability, a high level of system transparency, a high 
level of responsiveness, a high level of effectiveness and efficiency, a high level 
of fairness and inclusiveness and finally, following the rule of law. These 
indicators of good governance systems ensure that the system is effectively 
fighting corruption and minimising corrupt practices. They also guarantee that 
weak voices and opinions are expressed and reflected in policy choices in a 
sustainable manner, which takes into account the rights of future generations 
(UNESCAP, www.unescap.org).           
The World Bank has focused most of its efforts in the area on capacity building 
for public organisations and enhancing accountability, transparency and rule of 
law (World Bank 1991:87). These issues are very important, especially for the 
developing countries. Strengthening the capacities of the public-sector 
organisations is a prerequisite for achieving economic development. In this 
regard, a package of reforms has been introduced to improve the performance 
of the public sectors. Most of these reforms have been in the areas of financial 
management, human resources, and economic efficiency. Restrictions have 
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been imposed on the ability of public organisations to borrow and restructuring 
proposals have been put in place to improve the financial as well as the overall 
performance of government organisations. On other occasions, competition has 
been introduced in the public sector by liberalising state monopolies in different 
economic sectors and privatising previous incumbents and state-owned 
enterprises. These reforms have been introduced to all economic sectors 
including water sectors in developing countries. In Egypt, water reforms have 
been driven by the elements of neo-liberal agenda including the withdrawal of 
the state from monopolizing water decisions and opening up the water sector for 
the participation of the private sector in developing water infrastructure projects 
in addition to following a more participative mechanisms for making water 
decisions that enable the involvement of all water stakeholders (see chapters 7 
and 8). 
Increasing accountability in public organisations in terms of holding public 
officials answerable and responsible for the results of their organisations has 
been another major concern for the WB. In this regard, new contractual 
relationships have been developed to replace the old bureaucratic hierarchical 
relations in governments.  According to these contracts, public managers are 
responsible for delivering pre-identified objectives and in case they fail to do their 
jobs, they might be sacked from their posts.  In addition to accountability, a good 
governance system from the viewpoint of the WB should be predictable and 
transparent. The system procedures should be standardised, institutionalised 
and publicly announced to all actors. A set of objective rules applicable to all 
participants without any discrimination reflects another important feature of good 
governance systems.  The absence of these rules increases the chances of 
corruption, favouritism, nepotism, and other forms of misconduct.  
The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance (2001) indicates that 
five principles that underpin good governance. These principles are: openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. By focusing on public 
service, the Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services 
(2005) has identified six major criteria for measuring good governance. These 
criteria are summarised in table 2.1. As the table illustrates, good governance is 
first and foremost about the clarity of objectives, roles, responsibilities and 
processes. The concept also calls for a change at the level of organisational 
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cultures towards more participatory and transparent decision-making processes 
with a broad involvement of stakeholders.    
Criteria Indicators 
Clear purpose and outcomes 
for public organisations  
 Identifying  clear goals and objectives  
 Delivering high quality service 
 Delivering value for money for taxpayers  
 
Clear distribution of roles, 
functions, and responsibilities  
 Identifying clear functions for involved actors 
 Identifying clear responsibilities of each party and 
monitoring their implementation  
 Demarcating relationships between state and non-
state actors 
A new organisational culture 
built on shared ethos 
 Upholding organisational values and norms  
 Leading by example 
 
Transparent decision-making 
processes  
 Explaining how decisions are taken 
 Communicating  high quality information 
 Developing and implementing an effective risk 
management system 
 
 
Capacity building  
 Focusing on the required skills, knowledge and 
experience  
 Allocating responsibilities and evaluating 
employees’ performance 
 Striking a balance between continuity and renewal 
in membership of governing bodies 
 
 
Stakeholder participation and 
accountability  
 Considering formal/informal forms of accountability  
 Constructing a dialogue engaging effectively with 
the stakeholders 
 Holding staff responsible for their actions  
 
 
Table 2.1: Criteria for Good Governance 
Source: the Good Governance Standard for Public Services (2004: 7-23) 
This discussion of good governance reveals that in spite of the differences in the 
ways different measures look at what constitutes a good governance system, the 
majority of these measures agree upon criteria such as transparency, 
accountability, stakeholder participation and rule of law (Anokye, 2013). With 
these principles in place, governance systems are expected to effectively and 
efficiently allocate the resources available in order to resolve societal issues. The 
prioritisation process of these issues and the way in which societal problems are 
defined does not necessarily reflect the objectives of dominant actors but it takes 
into account the demands and inputs of less represented and institutionally 
vulnerable actors. By representing the unrepresented and by taking account of 
the needs of the weak groups in the society, governance systems are regarded 
as superior models for resource allocation, achieving economic efficiency and 
fighting corruption and other forms of misconduct. 
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2.4 Conceptualising Multi-Level Governance 
As Stubbs (2005: 66) notes, ‘the concept of multi-level governance has become 
extraordinarily fashionable in recent years’. The aim of this section is to examine 
the notion of Multi-Level Governance (MLG) and to illustrate the diverse ways in 
which this concept is understood and utilised by scholars of policy studies. As a 
process, governance can occur at national, sub-national and supra-national 
levels. In this context, a distinction can be made between national governance 
and MLG structures, functions and processes. This is not to say that this study 
supports the superficial dichotomy between national and international politics but 
to consider MLG as a bridge which links governance processes and interactions 
at the national, sub-national and supra-national levels.  Governance processes 
are by no means respective domains of unitary states. The image of nation states 
as sovereign and unitary units has given a way to the notion of differentiated 
polity in terms of ‘various interdependent governments, departments, and 
agencies’ (Bevir, 2007: 78). In this context, different state and non-state actors 
work together in autonomous, decentralised and networked forms of 
organisation to deliver diverse policy goals and provide a wide array of services 
(see Massey, 2004). This new reality of a differentiated polity denotes the 
growing and important role of non-state policy actors such as the civil society 
organisations in making and implementing policies water sectors in meta-
governance contexts. As stated by Sørensen (2006: 98) ‘[G]overnance can no 
longer take the form of sovereign rule but must be performed through various 
forms of meta-governance, regulation of self-regulation’.     
The literature of MLG shows that there is a plethora of terminology which is 
utilised by scholars to characterise this governance phenomenon. As noted by 
Hooghe and Marks (2004: 13-16), the new distribution of power among state and 
non-state actors at different levels has been accompanied by the emergence of 
new concepts trying to describe the reality of governance. In this context, 
concepts such as ‘multi-tiered’, ‘multi-perspectival’, and ‘polycentric’ governance 
in addition to Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) and 
fragmentation, and Spheres of Authority (SOAs) have become commonly used 
when describing the processes of governing at different levels. A common 
feature among all these concepts is their attempts to capture the dispersion of 
powers between different levels and among different forms of institutions. 
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In the European context, the early developments of MLG were closely associated 
with the European integration processes in the 1980s (Bache and Flinders, 
2004). Such processes were mainly about the distribution of powers and 
authorities between the EU and the member states. In the words of Benz and 
Zimmer (2010: 1), such processes ‘[---] concern the shape of the European 
multilevel polity as a whole, in particular the way in which powers are allocated, 
delimited and linked between the different levels’. A new reality was materialising 
on the ground with no sufficient theorisation to understand it. The situation was 
puzzling and for some it was confusing as it represented a shift from order to 
disorder. Marks (1992: 221) has summarised the issue by stating that: 
[I]nstead of the advent of some new political order, however distant, one finds 
an emerging political disorder; instead of a neat, two-sided process involving 
member states and community institutions, one finds a complex multi-layered, 
decision-making process stretching beneath the state, as well as above it; 
instead of a consistent pattern of policymaking across policy areas, one finds 
extremely wide and persistent variations. In short, the European Community 
seems to be part of a new political (dis)order that is multi-layered, constitutionally 
open-ended, and programmatically diverse. 
Thus, the quest at this stage was to find new approaches that can capture the 
transformations that occur at the policy and politics levels between member 
states and the newly emerging entity. The influence of International Relations 
(IR) theories was obvious in the early treatment of EU governance. The reason 
for this is the way in which the EU at this early stage was characterised. During 
the early developments of the EU, it was perceived as a new form of international 
organisation, which could be studied and analysed using the traditional IR 
theories and analytic tools applicable to other international organisations.  
An early attempt to theorise and to conceptualise the innovative EU reality was 
provided by inter-governmental theorists who underscored the central role of 
nation sates and national governments as major actors in the transformation 
process (see for example, Moravcsik, 1993). According to this view, national 
governments were conceived as ‘gatekeepers’ who are capable of accepting or 
rejecting any changes and who are in control of the consequences of the 
transformation processes. As ‘gatekeeper’, the central states were expected to 
perform the following functions (Piattoni, 2009: 6): 
39 | P a g e  
 
 To effectively keep the centre-periphery gates (thus deciding which sub-
national formations could be given the right to represent themselves in the 
EU political process as carriers of legitimately distinct interests);  
 To keep the state-society gates (thus retaining the power to select which 
social groups could be chartered as legitimate carriers of private or 
collective interests);  
 To keep the domestic-foreign gates (thus functioning as the sole 
legitimate representatives of domestic interests, whichever their level and 
nature). 
From a state-centralism perspective, the role of other non-governmental 
institutions is first and foremost to facilitate inter-governmental interactions and 
to reduce transactions costs (Trnski, 2005). This point of view has been called 
into question by Marks et al. (1996), who argued that the gatekeeping capacity 
of central states has been over estimated. The polity of the EU shows that in 
many situations, central states can be bypassed by non-governmental and non-
state actors who play growing and influential roles in decision-making processes.     
A more dynamic account of the European integration was provided by the neo-
functionalist scholars who studied the role of the nation state as interdependent 
actors interacting at the national and supra-national levels (see Stone and 
Wayne, 1997). The major contribution of the inter-governmental and the neo-
functionalist approaches was their ability to explain the emergence of the EU and 
the way in which EU institutions work (Piattoni, 2010).    
Upon the maturity of the experiment, the EU started to reflect new qualities which 
are more similar to the national political systems features than to those in classic 
international organisations. In other words, the EU had a higher status than 
international organisations but lower than nation states (Sbragia, 1992).  These 
new qualities called for new methods and theoretical perspectives to treat the 
EU and its organisations. Consequently, a theoretical shift has taken place away 
from the IR field towards public policy and public administration disciplines. Such 
a theoretical shift has paved the way for the emergence of a new but incomplete 
theory of MLG. The new theory looks at the EU as a political system consisting 
of three layers: EU, regional, and sub-national. As a political system, the EU 
reflects some features of the traditional inter-governmental relations approach 
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with national governments vertically interacting with each other across the three 
levels as well as new features where actors from different backgrounds (public 
and private) horizontally interact across different sectors.   
Building upon these theoretical insights, and considering the newly emergent 
power structures in the EU following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992, the concept of MLG was developed and introduced by Gary Marks and 
other European integration scholars such as Liesbet Hooghe in the early 1990s. 
According to their view, MLG provides a suitable analytic tool that is able to 
capture and explain power structures and the way in which these structures 
interact. In this context, MLG has been conceived as ‘a system of continuous 
negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993: 
392). The subject matter of these negotiations has focused on the ways in which 
powers and competencies should be transferred from the member states to the 
EU level. The results were a dispersion of powers and competencies at different 
levels. As stated by Benz and Zimmer (2010: 1), ‘European integration was about 
the transfer of powers from the national to the European level, which evolved as 
explicit bargaining among governments or as an incremental drift’.  
From this perspective, decision-making powers at national levels have been 
dispersed upwards to supra-national levels and downwards to sub-national. As 
a result of this process of authority devolution new forms of policy networks have 
emerged wherein supra-national, national, regional, and local levels are 
interacting together. While member states can directly intermediate relationships 
and interactions between sub-national and supranational levels before the 
implementation of Maastricht Treaty in 1992, ‘regional and local government 
would act as a third territorial layer in EU policymaking’ (Marks, 1993: 405). 
Consequently, the application of the treaty has resulted in new structures of 
powers at the EU and sub-national levels, which in turn have complicated the 
overall configuration of the governance system.     
Following on from this conceptualisation, it can be noticed that the notion of MLG 
includes two main dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The vertical dimension of 
the concept is reflected in the ‘multi-level’ nature of the system. In this context, 
the multi-level feature of the governance system denotes the transfer of powers 
between the different levels of governments in a vertical fashion either upwards 
or downwards. At the same time, the horizontal dimension of the concept is more 
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associated with the term ‘governance’, which highlights the growing and 
influential roles played by non-state actors such as private and non-
governmental institutions in policymaking and decision-making processes.   
As Jessop (2004: 65) puts it, ‘a shift to governance can enhance the capacity to 
project state power and achieve state objectives by mobilising knowledge and 
power resources from influential non-governmental partners and stakeholders’. 
Rosenau (2004: 40) summarises these two dimensions of the concept by stating 
that ‘[T]he notion of multi-levels suggests governmental hierarchies and explicitly 
posits the various levels as vertically structured in layers of authority, whereas 
the mushrooming demands for governance are also being met in a host of 
horizontal ways’.  
In an attempt to take the debate one-step further, a theoretical virtual space of 
MLG was created by Hooghe and Marks (2004), wherein different forms of inter-
governmental relations can take place. In this regard, a distinction was made 
between two ideal types of governance: type I and type II. As noted by Piattoni 
(2010: 9), the goal of this theoretical exercise was ‘to theorize the unravelling of 
the state and the emergence of new patterns of relations between different levels 
of government that had traditionally been conceived as hierarchically ordered, or 
at least nested within one another, and that were now challenging or bypassing 
these established relations without, however, completely superseding them’. 
The main features of type I and type II MLG can be summarised in Table 2.2. 
Type I Type II 
 General-purpose jurisdictions  Task-specific jurisdictions 
 Non-intersecting memberships  Intersecting memberships 
 Jurisdictions at a limited number of 
levels 
 No limit to the number of jurisdictional 
levels 
 System-wide architecture  Flexible design 
 
Table 2.2: Types of Multi-Level Governance 
Source: (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 17) 
 As the table illustrates, the type I vision of MLG conceives of the diffusion of 
powers and authorities as being distributed among a ‘limited number of non-
overlapping jurisdictional boundaries at a limited number of levels’  while type II 
characterises ‘a complex, fluid, patchwork of innumerable, overlapping 
jurisdictions’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2004:15). The closest example of type I MLG 
is federal states where powers and competences are divided between a few 
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levels of governments which are given full jurisdiction to exercise these powers 
either on geographical or on functional grounds. 
Compared to type I, type II appears more flexible and even more chaotic with 
actors being free to move from one jurisdiction to another without being strongly 
tied to organised and well-ordered systems of governance (Piattoni, 2010: 9). As 
such, type II governance is more likely to take place when the traditional 
governmental bodies find themselves bound by the rules of their stable systems 
and unable to respond in a flexible manner to the demands put on them to 
perform certain functions. As stated by Skelcher (2005: 94), ‘Type II governance 
tends to flourish specifically when there is a need for a tailored governmental 
body to address an issue that is not susceptible to policy action by a type I 
organization, for example, in the international arena and when there are 
particular functional governance problems’.     
At the same time, Conzelmann (2009) has noted that the first type focuses to a 
great extent on the role of nation states at different levels. The major concern, 
according to this view, is the way in which governments as ‘general-purpose’ 
jurisdictions interact and share powers. On the other hand, type II governance 
reflects a more complex picture where jurisdictions are defined based on 
functional and task-specific bases. In such a situation, ‘the number of such 
jurisdictions is potentially huge, and the scales at which they operate vary finely. 
Moreover, there is no great fixity in their existence. They tend to be lean and 
flexible—they come and go as demands for governance change’ (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2004: 17). 
The two types of MLG coexist in the contemporary polity of the EU; however, 
under two different forms of legitimacy. On the one hand, type I governance 
structure acquires its own legitimacy from the way in which they were formed in 
addition to the rules and regulations governing their conduct and performance. 
On the other hand, the type II governance institutions attain their legitimacy in an 
indirect fashion from type I structures on the grounds of their specialisation as 
well as their organisational, professional, and managerial skills (Pierre and 
Peters, 2000; Piattoni, 2010).  
This observation has implications for the notion of accountability and democratic 
values. While type I institutions are regarded as democratic (selected by people 
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via elections) and accountable, type II bodies are normally perceived as less 
accountable and less democratic. This issue was problematised by Skelcher 
(2005: 96) as follows: 
Type I bodies are constructed, discursively in terms of their formal authority, as 
the government for that community of citizens. The body is embedded in a 
political process that makes it the focus of the expression and allocation of 
community values. There is an infrastructure of democratic rule by elected 
representatives that provides symbolic and substantive means for securing 
legitimacy, consensus and accountability. Type II bodies, by contrast, have 
properties that lead to weak ‘democratic anchorage’.      
The conceptual and theoretical discussions of MLG reveal that it is a dynamic 
and multi-layered concept. It has territorial as well as functional aspects. In this 
context, Conzelmann, (2009: 7) defines MLG as ‘an arrangement for making 
binding decisions that engages a multiplicity of politically independent but 
otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – at different levels of 
territorial aggregation in more or less continuous negotiation/deliberation/ 
implementation, but does not assign exclusive policy competence to any of these 
levels or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority’. Consequently, MLG is 
by definition a multi-dimensional phenomenon which encompasses different 
types of institutional arrangements among different types of actors 
(governmental and non- governmental) interacting in decisions and policymaking 
arenas at different territorial and functional levels.    
The multi-dimensional aspect of the concept has been depicted by Piattoni 
(2010). According to his view, the conceptual and analytic space of MLG has 
been visualised as a three- dimensional phenomenon as reflected in Figure 2.2.  
X1 on the figure represents the centre-periphery dimension while the domestic-
international dimension is represented by X2. The state-society dimension is 
represented by X3 and O symbolises the sovereign state. The figure denotes 
shifts at three levels and in three different directions: from the centre to the 
periphery; from national to international levels; and from state to non-state actors. 
The first axis (X1) symbolises the shift from central government structures 
towards more decentralised forms. This movement has been analysed by 
regionalist accounts.  
At the same time, the second axis (X2) indicates the shift from 
sovereign/autonomous nation states towards more inter-governmental 
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cooperation at the international level. Finally, the change in state-society 
relationships and the growing role of non-state actors such as private, non-
governmental, and civil society organisations is represented by axis X 3. From 
this angle, MLG could be understood in accordance with the definition provided 
by Piattoni (2010: 1) as ‘a three-dimensional concept that crosses and 
problematises three analytical distinctions: that between center and periphery, 
that between state and society, and that between the domestic and the 
international’. In this sense, the notion of MLG includes changes at three different 
levels: politics, policymaking, and structures.   
 
Figure 2.2: Multi-Level Governance’s Analytical Space 
Source: Piattoni (2010: 13) 
To conclude this section, it is evident that the development and evolution of MLG 
are closely associated with the development and evolution of the EU. The 
concept has been presented as an analytic tool which helps to capture the 
vertical transformation and devolution of authorities and competencies from the 
centre national levels to sub-national and supra-national levels. The concept also 
captures the dispersion of such powers and competencies horizontally from state 
to non-state actors. To put it another way, the emergence and development of 
MLG can be regarded as a reaction to state-centrism and a movement away 
from state-centrist IR approaches towards more flexible and complex policy and 
public administration approaches. With the theoretical and conceptual debate 
about MLG highlighted and discussed, the question that emerges is what is the 
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difference between this concept and the concept of global governance? This 
issue will be further explored in the next section. 
The notion of MLG as described above provides a suitable analytic perspective 
to empirically examine the water governance arrangements in Egypt. The 
transboundary nature of the River Nile in addition to the existing water institutions 
at the regional and national levels call for an MLG framework of analysis that 
allows for the investigation of water governance arrangements in the Egyptian 
context. Added to this, an MLG approach will help in improving our understanding 
of how national water governance arrangements within the Egyptian water sector 
are affected by the institutions and arrangements at the regional levels. The MLG 
framework will also allow the examination of the roles of non-state actors and 
shaping and implementing water policies at all levels. 
2.5 Defining Global Governance  
The aforementioned discussion of the concept of MLG has argued that 
governance is a multi-level concept. It has the ability to connect different 
governance processes at multiple local, national, regional, and supranational 
levels. In this sense, the discussion of MLG can be further extended to include 
another form of governance at the global level known as ‘global governance’ or 
‘world governance’. As noted by François (2009), ‘global governance’ or ‘world 
governance’ is the latest version of the concept of governance. According to 
Duggett (2005: xi), ‘global governance represents a new way of thinking about 
the world we live in’. It opens new horizons and provides new tools to examine 
and reconsider the role of international institutions such as the UN as well as 
underlining the influence of the new non-state actors including global NGOs.  The 
endeavour of global governance  as expressed by Argyriades (2005: xxiii) is ‘to 
foster a new world order based upon the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts and disputes, compliance with treaty obligations and respect for 
democratic processes of multilateral decision-making’. 
In spite of the apparent novelty of global governance, the concept is not 
completely new as it can be traced back to old multi-culture empires, which 
dominated and ruled vast areas all over the globe. The Roman and the Ottoman 
empires are clear examples wherein the rulers used to think of their powers and 
authorities as extending to cover the whole world (Argyriades, 2005; Massey 
2005).  Additionally, many of the issues which concern policymakers and policy 
46 | P a g e  
 
scholars nowadays have been a subject of vibrant discussion for hundreds of 
years. As Massey argues (2005: 4), ‘the issues with which contemporary 
scholars and policymakers wrestle; the nature of government, the locus of 
legitimacy, power, and authority, the relationship of States to each other and to 
civil society, are the kinds of issues debated across different social and political 
systems for millennia’.        
The major focus of global governance as a modern construct, however, is on the 
different forms of economic and political cooperation, integration and interaction 
taking place at the global level.  Many global policy problems such as poverty 
and environmental issues go beyond the capacity of individual nation-states to 
handle (Farazmand, 2001: 449). The core idea is that under globalisation many 
policy areas have become a subject of interest for multiple state and non-state 
stakeholders (Farazmand, 1999: 509). Policy domains have become interlinked 
and interconnected to the extent that scholars and policymakers have described 
the process as ‘global public policies’ (Stone, 2008). In this context, the absence 
of a global government requires the establishment of a global governance 
structure in order to achieve policy goals.  As François (2009:7) puts it, ‘What is 
now at stake is to weigh collectively on the world’s destiny by instituting a system 
to regulate the many interactions that are beyond the reach of states’. In other 
words, in order to deal with global policy issues at a global scale, national 
governments have involved other non-state actors in the process of policy 
formulation and implementation. As such, global governance can provide a 
method for understanding the numerous ways in which public policies and in 
turn, water policies are made and implemented (Massey, 2005: 4)   
The notion of world governance as a form of state independence is therefore no 
longer sufficient to give a full description of global interactions or to account for 
the different impacts of globalisation on nation states. The ability of sovereign 
nation states to act individually to solve complex and transnational policy 
problems is severely constrained in a globalised interconnected world. Many 
changes at the global level have reinforced such doubts about the role of the 
nation states as the sole actors possessing decision-making powers. For 
instance, the formation of the European Union besides the regional integration 
in other parts of the world, including Africa has indicated the limits imposed on 
member states in such supranational entities. The emergence of these new 
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integrated entities is seen by Fraser-Moleketi and Kauzya (2005:108) as the only 
way out for African nations in order to collectively engage in the process of 
administering global governance. Such integration among nations, however, 
creates new challenges for the capabilities of individual states to form and 
enforce their respective policies independently from the rules and regulations 
that govern the actions of all other members. The role of multinational 
organisations, whether governmental or non-governmental, in addition to the 
increasing influence of international financial institutions and the multinational 
corporations, are other examples of the retreat of the state frontiers in favour of 
other national and international powers.     
These emerging conditions have encouraged many scholars to argue for new 
global governance, wherein many of the authorities which used to be invested in 
the nation states are diffused to upper global governance institutions. Rosenau 
(1995: 13) describes the process as ‘a pervasive tendency in which major shifts 
in the location of authority and the site of control mechanisms are underway on 
every continent, shifts that are as pronounced in economic and social systems 
as they are in political systems’. This process of relocation of authorities has 
been facilitated by different global forces that have paved the way for the 
emergence of global governance and created new opportunities for citizens and 
organisations to act across levels and boundaries.   As stated by Murphy (2000: 
796), ‘[A] world in which transformations in telecommunications have lowered the 
costs of political education and created opportunities for more and more 
subgroups to work with one another is a world of increasingly skilful citizens able 
to act both above and below the levels of traditional national politics’. Under such 
circumstances, and to respond to the new reality of the notion of global 
governance, the associated governance mechanisms have become paramount.   
The new global governance system is meant to include all forms of formal and 
informal cooperative arrangements in both economic and political spheres 
among state and non-state actors. In the words of Massey (2005:3), these 
cooperative and governance arrangements ‘cross the penumbra between the 
State and civil society weaving a seamless web between the two’. In this sense, 
a world governance system will ‘allow collective problems to be managed 
collectively and will take into account the interdependence that today defines 
relations among all peoples’ (Rocard et al, 2010:2). The details of the overall 
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picture of the new system are still blurred as no general agreement regarding 
how this system should look like has been reached by the interested parties. 
Consequently, Weiss (2000:808) has concluded that ‘the conceptual and 
operational challenges of global governance are formidable’. Dingwerth and 
Pattberg (2006:185) share the same opinion with Weiss, stating that ‘those who 
do ask, what is global governance? Are likely to come up with the result that 
global governance appears to be virtually anything.’  
The challenging problem in this regard is how to move beyond the notion of 
sovereignty towards a global governance system without oversimplifying the 
situation by claiming that the era of nation states has ended. To answer this 
question is basically to identify the major contours of the global governance 
system. Current scholarship exploring global governance has identified three 
major models competing with one another as potential models for world 
governance (for more details, see Rocard et al., 2010).  The first model discusses 
a multi-polar global governance system in which major global powers including 
the newly emerging powers of India, China, Brazil as well as the longstanding 
powers such the USA are taking charge of (and collectively addressing) the 
global issues. This model, as it stands, is very much power laden and based on 
the notion of the balance of powers. Nonetheless, the historical incidents inform 
us that this balance is unstable and it is deemed to be broken at some point 
because of the conflict over power among global actors (Rocard et al., 2010).      
The second model is based on the idea of collective security as adopted by the 
UN. As noted by Blin and Gustavo (2009:3), ‘Ever since it was established in the 
wake of World War II, the UN has asserted itself as one of the pillars of post-war 
world governance. It could even be said that at the institutional level, the United 
Nations constitutes the pillar of world governance: no other international 
organization comes anywhere near it in terms of size, legitimacy, and ambitions’. 
Despite being an influential actor in any form or shape of future global 
governance, the UN as it stands today is in a bad need for a deep reform to 
become more representative, more democratic and more capable of leading the 
world governance.  
The third model of global governance is represented by the EU model, which 
reflects high levels of solidarity among its members. Duggett (2005: xvi) 
describes the EU experience by stating that ‘[T]he European Union is a world-
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leading model that has redefined the language of public administration, since it 
is far beyond being an international organisation’. Although this sounds very 
appealing, the EU model is not problem-free. One issue the model is facing at 
the moment is the inability to accommodate new members. The enlargement of 
the EU poses many questions about the capacity of the existing bodies and 
institutions to accommodate new member states. Added to this, under the current 
financial crisis the possibility of the EU model becoming a global governance 
system has even become highly contested.                  
The vagueness of the concept, and the lack of agreement on its core 
components and mechanisms, have resulted in a plethora of definitions and 
conceptualisations of global governance. Reviewing these definitions, a general 
distinction can be made between global governance as a substantive issue and 
global governance as an analytic and methodological tool. At the substantive 
level, Weiss defines ‘global governance’ as ‘collective efforts to identify, 
understand or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacity of 
individual States to solve’. In this sense, the global governance system can be 
conceived as ‘the complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, 
relationships, and processes between and among States, markets, citizens and 
organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective 
interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and obligations are 
established, and differences are mediated’ (Weiss cited in the UN Economic and 
Social Council, 2006:4).  
According to Rosenau (1995: 13), ‘global governance is conceived to include 
systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to the international 
organization—in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has 
transnational repercussions.’ From this angle, global governance can be 
perceived as a system of control wherein power relations and modes of 
interactions among global policy actors are major concerns for policy analysis. 
Added to this, the multi-level nature of the concept has been underlined by 
including all forms of human interactions and activities directed to achieve certain 
policy goals and have global consequences.  
Conceiving global governance in this manner means that the concept goes 
beyond the traditional international, interstate and intergovernmental 
arrangements to include the emerging dynamics between and among state and 
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non-state stakeholders. The concept also highlights the multi-layered nature of 
these new arrangements as they may involve actors across different national, 
regional, and global levels. In the words of Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006: 192), 
‘the term global governance conceives of world politics as a multilevel system in 
which local, national, regional, and global political processes are inseparably 
linked’. Relationships between nation states and other national and global actors 
are undergoing a fundamental change. A transformation has occurred from a 
model in which states control and govern other actors to a model in which states 
govern with, or in cooperation with those actors. This transformation process 
occurs at the national and global levels. 
From an analytical and methodological point of view, global governance provides 
a new perspective to analyse and understand the global polity that goes beyond 
the classic international relational theories and analytic approaches. As Ziller 
(2005) notes, it is difficult to analyse global institutions as if they were simply a 
larger version of national ones, and to use national State-based categories for 
something that is not a State as such. Consequently, the major focus for politics 
scholars and policy analysts from a global governance perspective is how the 
different policy levels are interlinked and what the implications are of the 
interaction between national, regional, and global levels for making and 
implementing policies. In other words, applying global governance as an analytic 
tool calls for the expansion of the existing conceptual frameworks to reflect the 
interconnectedness of policymaking processes at different levels and among 
multiple actors. Such an expansion is crucial to be able to describe, analyse and 
understand what we used to call ‘international relations’ as the surrounding 
environment of nation states keeps changing at high speed.  
The trouble with global governance as an analytic tool, however, is that the 
concept of governance itself is a multifaceted and multidimensional concept. 
Adding the global element to this concept has not made it any clearer. Quite the 
contrary, it has added to the vagueness and the fuzziness of governance. 
Therefore, the potentials of global governance as an analytic and methodical tool 
have been challenged on the grounds that ‘governance’ is still in need of more 
clarification before being used analytically to explain policymaking at the global 
level. As Kleinsteuber (2004: 69) puts it, ‘governance is a concept that is in an 
experimental phase and still has to prove its usefulness in a global context’. For 
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example, from an analytic perceptive, Hufty (2009: 2-8) has distinguished 
between three different approaches of governance:  governance as a synonym 
of government, governance as a normative framework, and governance as an 
analytic framework for non-hierarchical coordination systems.  
The first approach discussed by Hufty (2009) regards governance as a method 
of control, particularly in a hierarchical fashion. Those who adopt this approach 
to governance do not make a distinction between governance and government. 
For them, the term is used to denote the mode of control in any form or shape of 
organisation. From a normative perspective, the second approach of governance 
focuses on the qualities and the features of good governing processes. The 
publications of the World Bank on good governance with the qualities previously 
discussed in this chapter provide good examples of this approach. The third 
approach of governance deals with the concept as a tool to solve coordination 
problems in non-hierarchical situations and it builds upon insights from 
organisational, international relations and political traditions.  Such diversity in 
approaches and perspectives, as well as the associated analytic tools and 
methods, adds to the complexity of governance and limits its potential as a 
plausible analytic framework at the global level.   
This is not to say the global governance concept is completely irrelevant as an 
analytic tool.  Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006: 189) have noted that global 
governance has been used by scholars who have challenged the mainstream 
international relations accounts by highlighting the importance of new 
phenomena including: global social movements; civil society; the activities of 
international organizations; the changing regulative capacity of states; private 
organizations; public-private networks; transnational rule making; and forms of 
private authority.  From an analytic point of view, Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) 
suggest that the term ‘global governance’ can be seen as ‘a heuristic device to 
capture and describe the confusing and seemingly ever-accelerating 
transformation of the international system’ (p.191). In that sense, global 
governance adds to the traditional accounts in different ways:  
First, instead of focusing on the nation states as the major actors in international 
and global arenas, global governance has emphasised the growing role and 
influence of non-state actors such as Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and Transnational Corporations (TNCs). 
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Second, global governance as an analytic framework acknowledges the interplay 
dynamics between local, national, regional, and global levels. Unlike the 
international relations analytic approach, global governance argues that 
governance processes and interaction between state and non-state actors may 
take place on a multi-level scale, wherein it would be difficult to separate and 
analyse interactions among states in isolation from the overall environment.  
Third, instead of focusing on inter-state bargaining and power relations, global 
governance recognises the very existence of different forms and systems of 
governance with no hierarchical logic to govern them.         
Finally, a global governance analytic perspective admits the emergence of new 
forms of authority outside the traditional sphere of the state. The new forms of 
authority include diverse arrangements of public-private interactions to set 
standards and to put regulations in place.   
As such, global governance represents a valuable analytic tool, which has much 
potential to go beyond the traditional existing accounts on international relations 
and to provide a rich description and a vivid picture of state and non-state actors’ 
interaction in the world polity.                              
2.6 Administering Global Governance: The Architecture and Mechanisms 
The architecture and the mechanisms of the global governance system 
represent another debatable issue in the discussion of world governance. In 
order to steer, manage, regulate and collectively solve global policy issues, there 
must be steering mechanisms as well as deriving engines to take the lead and 
to organise the efforts of global actors. As Fraser-Moleketi and Kauzya 
(2005:117) (2005) argue, coherent strategies and structures at sub-national, 
national, regional and global levels are needed for administering global 
governance.  The world governance steering mechanisms may come from 
different sources and they may also take different forms and shapes.  Rosenau 
(1995:20-23) has distinguished between three main sources of control and 
steering mechanisms: state sponsored control mechanisms, non-state 
sponsored control mechanisms and jointly-sponsored control mechanisms.   
Some of these mechanisms may exist at the sub-national levels while others can 
be found at the supranational levels. These mechanisms could be purely 
developed by the state and imposed on the rest of the participating actors in a 
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top-down fashion or they might be developed gradually by the non-state actors 
and in time, form patterns of interactions and become institutionalised. Added to 
these two forms of steering mechanisms, states may collaborate with non-state 
actors and jointly sponsor steering mechanisms at the sub-national and 
supranational levels. This multiplicity of steering and control mechanisms in 
world governance, in addition to the varying degrees of their institutionalisation 
denote that at present the global governance system is in a state of flux. The 
overall structure of the global governance as well as the architecture of the 
system is by no means a static construction. As characterised by Gustavo et al. 
(2011: 3), ‘[G]overnance architecture, however, is a complex, dynamic and 
contested series of spaces, institutions and ideas wherein multiple actors dispute 
the balance of power within constantly changing relations’. These characteristics 
of world governance, together with the fast-changing nature of interactions and 
relations among global actors make it difficult to precisely describe and agree 
upon the major contours of the global governance architecture.     
Added to the aforementioned complexity of the structural design of global 
governance, many governmental as well as private global organisations are 
responsible for making and enforcing regulation and rules. On the one hand, 
organisations such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) are examples of private non-governmental organisations 
responsible for making/enforcing regulations and standards at the global level in 
areas such as quality standards, accounting standards and computing. At the 
same time, other purely governmental organisations such as the World Health 
Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the Universal 
Postal Union are doing similar regulatory jobs (Koppell, 2007).  
The very existence of these two types of organisations working side-by-side can 
lead to confusion around their nature and the functions they perform. On the 
surface, both private and governmental organisations are doing the same job of 
setting standards and making/enforcing regulations. Nevertheless, one of them 
is closely confined to the notion of ‘governance’ (non-governmental 
organisations) while the other is more related to the traditional notion of 
government. To better understanding of the way in which the global governance 
54 | P a g e  
 
system is regulated these two aspects of governance and government need to 
be disentangled.          
The existing shortcomings of the current world governance has pushed many 
scholars to rethink and reconsider the global governance system and to call for 
reinventing the world governance architecture. This reconsideration requires a 
clearer identification of state and non-state actors as well as redefinition of the 
roles such global actors play. As put by Gustavo et al. (2011: 3), ‘[I]f we want to 
rethink the existing architecture of world governance and propose alternatives 
for new world governance, we need to identify the actors and spaces that are 
already at work in this domain’. Consequently, many projects and different vision 
have been put forward to envisage the shape and the features of the new future 
global governance.  
Examining the qualities of the new global governance system as sketched by 
Stiglitz (2004), it can be argued that a future global governance system is 
expected to provide some remedies to the problems of the exiting one. According 
to his view, a new global governance system must be legitimate, democratic, and 
representative. To develop such a system drastic changes have to take place in 
the existing governance of global institutions including the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the WB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
UN. The role of the Economic and Social Council should be strengthened to be 
capable of dealing with the complex global economic issues. There should also 
be a move from the G8 to the G24 as more representative global institution. A 
new global governance system should also be able to better manage the global 
natural resources and to handle the environment issues in a more efficient 
manner as well as producing and protecting global knowledge. To such an end, 
a global legal infrastructure should be developed to govern the overall actions 
and interactions in the system (Blin and Gustavo, 2009).  
Another proposal was presented by Gustavo et al. (2011). According to their 
views, the existing architecture of the world governance needs to be remodelled 
to become more capable of dealing with the new challenges of globalisation and 
to become more responsive to global policy issues. In this context, they have 
mentioned that ‘[W]hat is needed is to work together to devise responses to 
today's challenges, rooted in the contexts relevant to each person and each 
population. This involves recognizing the different forms of knowledge that exist 
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in all continents, among all peoples, without trying to impose one of them as the 
unquestionable reference.’ (p. 11).  In other words, what is needed is a new 
governance system, which acknowledges the diversity of human culture and 
responds to the legitimate demands of the weaker parties in the same way it 
responds to the global powers. Representation, democratisation of governance 
processes, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy are all core values upon 
which the new world governance should be instituted (see Higgott, 2005).          
2.7 The Dialectical Relationship between the Concepts of Governance 
As has been indicated, the theoretical and conceptual discussion of governance 
is a multi-level and multi-dimensional phenomenon. It represents ‘activities 
simultaneously located at several different governmental levels; that are local, 
national, regional and global’ (Massey, 2005: 3). Separating the different levels 
and several dimensions of governance is merely for analytic purposes. In 
practice, the three levels of governance (local, regional, global) as well as the 
multitude state and non-state actors involved in governance processes at these 
three levels are in a process of continuing interactions and are governed by 
dialectical relationships (see Figure 2.3).  
As the figure shows, local governance, which means the processes of 
interactions among state and non-state actors at the state level and institutional 
frameworks governing these interactions, represents the first level and the 
‘cornerstone in the architecture of the global governance. At this level, the 
everyday lives of citizens are played out and influenced by the very decisions 
and regulations made by public and private actors participating in the governance 
process via policymaking and decision-making processes. In spite of the 
importance of this local level of governance, national governance is not 
conducted in a vacuum. Different intervening global forces, factors, and 
pressures influence the daily interactions between state and non-state actors at 
the national level. The transnational features of problems such as migration, 
pandemics, climate crises and financial crises alongside the globalisation of 
many aspects of world politics have produced different sorts of pressures which 
interfere with the interactive governance processes at the state level and limit the 
ability of national players to pursue the course of action they prefer.  As described 
by Gustavo et al. (2011: 4), ‘in an era characterized by increasingly accelerated 
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globalization, financial and trade flows and the circulation of people and 
information, the global dimension conditions daily life at the local level’. 
 
Figure 2.3: Governance as Global Multilevel Concept 
In-between the local and the global levels of governance, there is an equally 
important level that the relationship between local governance and global 
governance, and that is regional governance. At the regional level, different 
organisational bodies come together and try to make regulations and decisions, 
which benefit the governance actors at the national level. To this end, the 
regional governance organisations interact with global and national governance 
actors at the same time. By doing so, regional governance agents work as the 
link which connects the national, and the global levels of governance.  
To sum up, and considering the aforementioned characterisation of governance, 
it is evident that when we talk about governance, MLG, and global governance 
we are in fact talking about the same thing; an arrangement to share and 
distribute powers among state and non-state actors. However, this phenomenon 
takes place at different territorial and geographical levels. As a governing 
process, governance may take place at the national and sub-national levels 
within the same country. It can also pass this level of interaction between state 
and non-state actors to upper levels including regional or/and global scales. In 
this case, when governance processes transcend nation states to upper regional 
and global levels of interaction, one can talk about MLG wherein national, sub-
Level 1: local 
governance
Level 2: regional 
governance
Level 3: 
global/world 
governance
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national, regional and global forces come into play and interaction between state 
and non-state actors determines the course of action to be pursed in order to 
deal with governance issues. Whether national or multilevel (global/regional), 
governance systems and processes can be characterised as being either good 
or poor.  Good governance systems and processes are built on transparency, 
accountability, legitimacy, rule of law, professional integrity and efficiency of 
public services, responsiveness to civil society and overall democratic values 
(see Makrydemetres, 2005). The absence of these qualities and features either 
at the national or the supra-national levels means that the existing governance 
arrangements are poor and need to be improved to reflect the features of good 
national, global, or regional governance. One question remains: how can global 
governance be administered? There is not an easy answer to this question. As 
noted by Fraser-Moleketi and Kauzya (2005:106), answering this question and 
identifying the strategies needed to govern and administer global governance will 
be ‘the most difficult assignment of the century’.           
2.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the different facets of the notion of governance as 
well as the steering mechanisms available for coordinating and steering 
governance systems. The analysis of governance as a framework of analysis 
has indicated that the concept has been firstly coined to underline the shifts in 
policymaking and implementation processes from state-centred modes to new 
modes, where non-state actors have become major players in policy design and 
delivery. This does not necessarily mean that moving to the new governance 
arrangements has been a smooth transition. The concept is more or less still 
challenged at different levels and different scholars are still using it in different 
ways to describe and analyse different phenomena. Nonetheless, governance 
stands at present as a major analytical approach which attempts to capture the 
transition from state-centred approaches to more private governance. Scholars 
have identified several indicators to measure good governance practices, which 
have proved to be quite useful in distinguishing poor governance practices. 
Additionally, different theoretical and analytical efforts have been made by 
scholars to refine the concept of governance and to explain its applicability for 
analysing policy issues in national, regional, and global contexts. The notion of 
global and MLG, for instance, is quite helpful in explaining how different territorial 
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and functional levels come together to solve policy issues and to harmonise 
policy practices. The EU is an example par excellence of MLG. The notion of 
global governance is also important for understanding the global challenges 
facing the whole world, such as the shortage of fresh water in addition to 
providing ways to improve existing policy practices and encourage innovations 
in policy implementation. In that sense, governance provides an analytic 
framework that goes beyond the mere description of the policy area under 
investigation to offer a methodological tool for investigating policy processes by 
focusing on actors, institutions and interaction from an integrated holistic 
perspective (Hufty, 2011: 418). In such a context, policy choices can be 
explained based on the existing institutions that govern the ways in which 
governance actors interact at all levels to solve and address policy issues.  
To conclude, this research does not introduce governance as a remedy for all 
policy problems. Instead, the study looks at governance as an analytic and 
theoretical lens via which policy scholars can unpack and analyse complex policy 
processes and systems. In other words, the discussion of governance and 
multilevel governance in this chapter is meant to contribute to the 
conceptualization and the analysis of water policy issues to be discussed in the 
following chapters. From this perspective, governance provides a powerful 
analytic tool to understand and explain changes in water governance systems 
and arrangements in the context of specific countries such as Egypt. For 
instance, a governance perspective on water policies in Egypt should provide a 
better understanding of the growing roles of non-state actors in the Egyptian 
water governance. Additionally, the transboundary nature on the River Nile 
requires a multilevel water governance analytic framework in order to 
comprehend the water politics at the national and regional levels. Furthermore, 
the notions of multilevel and global governance as previously discussed in this 
chapter would allow for an investigation of the role of the international and global 
organisations in shaping water governance arrangements in Egypt and in the 
Nile basin countries.  As such, governance provides a useful analytical 
framework for empirically investigating water governance in Egypt as fully 
explained in chapters 7 and 8.    
Having said that, the next chapter will focus on the application of governance 
approaches to understand and analyse water policies and water governance 
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systems. Such an understanding is essential for conceptualising water issues in 
the examined case study. In this regard, the water crisis and the associated water 
policies and decisions will be perceived and discussed as a governance problem 
where water state and non-state actors interact at different levels to make water 
policy decisions in the light of existing water laws and regulations in order to 
address strategic water policy issues. This conceptualisation and understanding 
of water governance arrangements provides new insights into the ways in which 
water policy issues are handled in collaborative multi-actors settings. 
Governments cannot go it alone and designing and implementing water policies 
without taking account of the opinions and water problems’ definitions provided 
by water stakeholders. This governance approach on water policies will be fully 
discussed in the next chapter to set stage for investigating water governance 
arrangements in Egypt in chapters 6, 7, and 8.                           
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CHAPTER 3: WATER GOVERNANCE: CONCEPTION AND MECHANISMS 
‘There is enough water for everyone. The problem we face today is largely one of 
governance: equitably sharing this water while ensuring the sustainability of natural 
ecosystems. At this point in time, we have not yet achieved this balance’ (The 
United Nations World Water Development Report, 2006: 3). 
3.1 Introduction  
The discussion of governance as an analytic framework in the chapter 2 has 
indicated that the concept is multifaceted and it is applicable to analyse different 
policy arenas at different levels. In this chapter, the relationship between 
governance and water management systems will be explored. The aim is to 
develop a better understanding of how water sectors are governed and the way 
in which water resources could be managed according to a good water 
governance system.  The chapter starts with a characterisation of the water crisis 
as a problem of governance. Section two focuses on defining ‘water governance’ 
and the underlying relationship between governance and water management 
systems. In section three, a governance approach to dealing with the water crisis 
was devised. The ways in which governance along with the analytic tools this 
concept provides could be used to improve the process of water policymaking 
and service delivery will be discussed. Such a theoretical discussion of water 
governance is essential to understand and analyse the water crisis in Egypt and 
to provide new solutions to water issues (see chapter 6).        
3.2 Governance and the Water Predicament  
The problem of water is first and foremost a problem of scarcity. Out of the overall 
total of the earth’s water, only 3% is fresh water. The remaining 97% of the 
earth’s water is in the oceans. The situation is becoming more problematic when 
we know that not all the 3% of the earth’s fresh water is accessible.  Two-thirds 
of this amount are frozen and one-third is groundwater.  As such, a mere 0.3% 
of the planet’s fresh water remains as accessible surface water (UNDP, 
2015:11). Considering the growing world population and resultant increasing 
demand for clean and fresh water, it has become a necessity to think of better 
methods and improved ways for using this valuable resource. As reported by the 
UNDP, about ‘900 million people lack access to safe water and over 2.7 billion 
lack access to basic sanitation’ (UNDP, 2015: 1).  
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This lack of access to safe water and basic sanitation has proved to have 
negative consequences on socio-economic development particularly in the 
poorest areas of the world. The director of the UNDP Bureau for Policy 
Development, Olav Kjorven, highlighted this issue in 2009 by stating that ‘[T]here 
is growing recognition that we are facing a global water crisis - evident in 
widespread degradation of freshwater resources, increasing water scarcity, and 
vast inequities in access to water – that undermines human development. This 
crisis disproportionately affects poor people and is largely caused by failures of 
governance’ (Kjorven, 2009: 13).  Additionally, the United Nations has raised the 
same concerns regarding the water crisis and its impact on socio-economic and 
environmental conditions by arguing that ‘Water is an essential component of 
security, and numerous key development issues influence water resources and 
the natural environment’ (United Nations World Water Development Report, 
2006: 2). In this sense, the mismanagement and poor governance of water 
resources can potentially be a major source of instability, wars, conflicts, and 
environmental degradation worldwide. In other words, poor water governance 
may result in negative consequences for people at many different levels.   
Thus, achieving effective water management and better water governance has 
become a global goal for different international actors including the UN. The 
issue has broadly been linked to the ability of countries and governments 
worldwide to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In this regard, 
Kjorven (2009: 13) has noted that ‘[E]quitable and sustainable management of 
water resources is one of the keys to human development and human security’. 
Meanwhile, the United Nations World Water Development Report 4 Volume 1 
(2012: 2) puts it another way by noting that ‘[M]anaging water well requires 
appropriate governance arrangements that move considerations of water from 
the margins of government to the centre of society’. In this context, the success 
in establishing effective water governance arrangements can be attributed to the 
ability of governments to work collectively with the rest of the societal actors in 
order to design and deliver water policy solutions. The fulfilment of that task will 
pave the way for the realization of the MDGs. An enabling environment wherein 
other societal actors, including civil society organisations and private companies, 
can undertake water delivery and treatment activities is a must for the full 
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mobilization and utilization of societal resources needed for addressing water 
issues (Solanes and Jouravlev, 2006: 8). 
Following on from the above, it has become apparent that national governments 
alone are not capable of dealing with water governance issues in an effective 
manner. In other words, ‘It is proving extremely difficult for many governments to 
effectively confront the many and intertwined issues concerning water’ (United 
Nations World Water Development Report 2006: 2).  Water governance issues 
are too complex and diverse to be handled and managed by only one societal 
actor. The effective management and governance of this vital and considerably 
limited resource calls for the collaboration of governmental and nongovernmental 
actors in all MLG settings including national, regional, and global contexts. 
Governments need to involve civil society organisations and the private sector in 
developing and delivering sound water policies and services. Added to this, such 
collaboration should not only take place at the national level but also at the 
international level. As stated plainly by the World Water Development Report 
(2006: 8), ‘[U]nless water concerns are integrated within broader national and 
international processes of trade, stability and more equitable governance, the 
chances of achieving the international water targets remain poor’.       
This global recognition of the water crisis as a governance issue has been 
reflected in the position of different international organisations. For instance, in 
2000 the Global Water Partnership (GWP) published a document entitled 
‘Towards Water Security: A Framework for Action’ in which the GWP stated that 
‘[T]he water crisis is mainly a crisis of governance. Working towards effective 
water governance requires an enabling environment and appropriate institutional 
structures that allow stakeholders to work together for effective water 
management’ (Global Water Partnership, 2000: 17). Other organisations, 
including the United Nations, have emphasised the importance of governing 
water wisely and stopping unsustainable practices in using water resources. In 
this regard, the United Nations Millennium summit in 2000 highlighted the need 
for developing and implementing water management strategies at international, 
regional, national and local levels. Such strategies are expected to rationalise 
the way in which water resources are used and to end the unsuitable exploitation 
of this vital resource. To this end all countries have been invited to establish 
governance water systems and to embark on reforming their water sectors.            
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The World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP) initiated by the UN is 
another clear example of the global recognition of the importance of water 
problems and the need for developing a new governance system to deal with 
them effectively. The WWAP was established in 2000 upon the request of 
governments within the Commission on Sustainable Development in order to 
‘assist governments in developing and implementing their national water 
management plans’ (The United Nations World Water Development Report, 
2006: 2). The programme is hosted and led by UNESCO and seeks to coordinate 
‘the UN-Water agencies in their effort for gathering, processing and 
disseminating data and information about water resources management in the 
world, while supporting capacity building efforts and knowledge creation and 
sharing within this sector’ (Minero, 2007: 2). The main goal is to ‘influence 
leaders in government, civil society and the private sector, so that their policies 
and decision-making that affect water promote sustainable social and economic 
development at local, national, regional and global scales’ (WWAP, 
www.unesco.org).  
The World Water Development Report published by WWAP represents one of 
the most comprehensive assessments to date of freshwater resources. Since 
2003, a number of reports have been published dealing with different aspects of 
water governance.  Among these, the report of 2006 entitled ‘[W]ater, a shared 
responsibility’ is of prime importance. In this report, the water crisis has been 
characterised as a governance problem and governance approaches have been 
introduced as a solution to deal with mismanagement of water resources. As the 
report puts it, ‘[I]ndeed, governance and politics are increasingly viewed as a part 
of the problem and therefore as an essential part of any solution to water crises’ 
(WWAP, 2006: 7).  The crux of the issues then resides in the way in which water 
decisions are made and the implications for such decisions for the wider 
community; for instance, deciding on who gets access to water, when and how 
has a great impact on the way in which this vital resource is allocated and used 
in a given context. These types of decisions raise a whole set of issues regarding 
equity, efficiency, and effective management of water resources. Without a 
sound and effective governance system in place there will be no guarantee that 
these decisions will be made and enforced transparently and accountably to 
serve the best interests of the wider population. 
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Framing the water crisis as a governance issue has allowed for broadening the 
water policy agenda and investigating issues such as corruption, 
democratization, power relations, and disparity between rich and poor countries. 
Consequently, this comprehensive view of the situation and broad formulation of 
the problem call for a participatory approach to tackle and solve water 
governance issues. There is no template or readymade recipe on how to proceed 
with collaboration and how to involve other stakeholders in water governance but 
as rule of thumb, governance arrangements in water sectors should facilitate 
interactive dialogues between interested societal parties including state and non-
state actors. Institutional reforms, including the establishment of reinforcing 
dispute resolution mechanisms are a crucial step in this process. Additionally, 
the whole governance exercise should be undertaken in an environment 
characterised by transparency and within a clearly identified framework of roles 
and responsibilities of participating public and private parties. These features of 
water governance will be further discussed and explored in the section to follow.                  
3.3 Understanding Water Governance  
This section will unpack the concept of water governance in an attempt to identify 
its main elements and the underlying principles of the concept. Water 
governance is an under-researched area and the concept is still in the phase of 
formation.  As noted by Karar et al., (2012: 1) there is a large body of literature 
on different aspects related to water governance including urban water delivery, 
rural water supply, irrigation management, basin level management and trans-
boundary water governance and management; nonetheless, the concept of 
water governance per se has not had as much focus. At the outset, water 
governance can be regarded as the way in which water resources are managed. 
In this sense, water governance includes a host of political, economic and social 
institutions involved in the process of making and enforcing water policies as well 
as managing water resources. This group of actors is involved in an interactive 
process to decide upon water issues such as equity, economic efficiency and the 
balance between socio-economic and eco-system considerations. The concept 
of water governance also focuses on the way in which water policies and 
regulations are made and enforced. From this angle, different governments, civil 
society organisations, and private companies have different roles and different 
responsibilities in the governance process. 
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 The literature of water governance indicates that different scholars and 
organisations focus on diverse elements of this concept in an attempt to provide 
a way in which water governance arrangements are established and 
implemented.  Knight (2009: 350) define water governance as ‘the many kinds 
of intersecting human systems that define the nature of water as a resource, that 
determine water allocation among human uses, and that use social, political, 
economic and legal systems at multiple scales to control and enforce these 
precepts’. According to The Global Water Partnership, water governance refers 
to ‘the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in 
place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water 
services, at different levels of society’ (Rogers and  Hall, 2003: 16). What can be 
understood from this definition is that water governance includes complex and 
multifaceted arrangements between actors working in different domains and at 
different levels. It also underlines a composite web of overlapping relations and 
interactions between different political, social, economic and administrative 
systems (see Karar et al., 2012). Thus, contrary to what appears to be the case 
at first glance that the concept of water governance is purely a technical issue, 
other societal aspects of this concept are as important as the technical ones. Put 
it another way, whatever technical solutions there are for water governance 
issues should be accepted at the societal level and should take into account the 
sustainability of developing and using this scarce resource. As a socio-political 
and developmental economic construct, water governance emphasises a 
number of principles including: decentralisation of decision-making and 
enhancing local governance; stakeholders’ participation; greater equity; 
liberalisation and involvement of private actors in service provision; public private 
partnerships; sustainability and meeting environmental concerns (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004; Anokye, 2013). 
Rogers (2002:1) has defined water governance as ‘the capability of a social 
system to mobilize energies, in a coherent manner, for the sustainable 
development of water resources’.  In this sense, water governance involves, 
among other things, the ability of national governments to design and to put in 
place socially accepted public policy water goals. To this end, it is imperative to 
encourage the participation of affected stakeholders at an early stage of putting 
these governance arrangements in place. In other words, affected stakeholders 
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should be involved in policy design as well as policy implementation (Anokye, 
2013). They should not be regarded as merely implementation instruments 
because their input is quite important at the design stage in order to avoid any 
problems with implementation. The importance of stakeholders’ participation has 
been highlighted by Loucks and Van Beek (2005: 294), who state that ‘[T]he 
relatively recent acknowledgement that stakeholders need to be fully included in 
the decision-making processes complicates the life of professional planners and 
managers. Important sources of information, however, come from discussion 
groups, public hearings, negotiations and dispute-resolution processes’.  That 
means making water policy decisions following a participative approach could be 
more complicated and time consuming. However, the quality of water decisions 
made in such participatory platforms where water stakeholders may have a voice 
is better compared with individual decisions being made by governmental actors, 
who will be faced with a high level of resistance in the implementation phase. In 
a more detalied fashion, Minero (2007: 7) defines water governance. Three main 
functions are implied: to determine the roles and responsibilities of involved 
actors; to develop the right institutional settings; to establish coordination 
mechanisms. As such, effective water governance should have the right 
institutions and regulatory frameworks in place. Additonally, for water 
governance arrangements to be effective, power relations should be examined 
and any power asymmetries between state and non-state actors should be 
addressed through coordination mechanisms in an accountable and dynamic 
fashion.  
From the policy and decision-making perspective, water governance can be 
defined in accordance with Solanes and Jouravlev (2006: 9) as ‘the capacity to 
both generate and implement appropriate policies’. From the same angle, 
Hooper (2005: 1) has defined water governance as a ‘suite of procedures that 
use the decision-making processes at different levels among different sectors, 
stakeholders, and jurisdictions to enact water resources management’.  
Accordingly, the degree of water governance within any society depends on the 
way in which people in this society perceive water governance issues and the 
way in which this image is translated by policymakers and politicians into 
concrete policies and action plans. Having the capacities and the skills required 
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to implement these policies in public and private organisations is another 
important factor in any effective water governance system.   
From a practical point of view, Franks (2007) has noted that many practitioners 
do not make a distinction between governance and other similar concepts 
including government and management. According to his view, it is imperative to 
make such a distinction for creating any effective water governance system. A 
‘government’ according to Franks (2007: 2) refers to ‘an agency that controls 
territory and raises taxes’ or as ‘a political means of creating and enforcing laws, 
typically via a bureaucratic structure’. Government structures normally work at 
two different levels: central and local. At the central level, governments are 
preoccupied with making water policies and monitoring their implementation. 
Local authorities and other actors are responsible for service delivery at local 
levels. This emphasis on the ‘agency’ of government institutions in terms of their 
prominent role in making and implementing water policies becomes less 
important when we look at water issues from a governance perspective.  
In spite of the prominent and undeniable role of governments and governmental 
agencies in making water policies and decisions, they can no longer act alone to 
solve water problems. They need to engage private and other non-governmental 
institutions. Having those non-state actors on board and including them in the 
decision-making processes will add to the complexity of these processes and 
further complicate the coordination problems that governments already face. 
However, the inclusion of non-state actors in policymaking processes is no 
longer avoidable if a country wants to build up a good water governance system. 
To put it another way, there are simple solutions to complex problems such as 
water issues, which by default call for the cooperation of different parties in the 
society. The United Nations World Water Development Report (2006: 2) has 
highlighted this issue by stating that: 
It is proving extremely difficult for many governments to effectively confront the many 
and intertwined issues concerning water. Not only is it difficult for departments within 
national governments to collaborate effectively, but problems are compounded when 
many management decisions have to be taken at sub-national and community 
levels, as the linkage and cooperation between different levels of government is 
often tenuous at best. The challenges for government agencies to link to NGOs and 
the private sector for resolving water issues further complicate management and 
decision-making. The task of managing water becomes even more complex when 
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rivers flow from one country to another. The building of cooperative upstream-
downstream relationships is becoming increasingly important with close to half of 
the world's people living in river basins or above aquifers that cross international 
borders.  
In this sense, water governance implies, by definition, thinking beyond 
governments and governmental arrangements. It requires more flexibility in 
understanding water issues and the way in which these should be dealt with. 
Water governance also calls for the inclusion of a wide range of actors and their 
resources and initiatives not only the governmental players. For these reasons, 
governance and government are not synonymous and they should not be used 
interchangeably. As mentioned in chapter two, governance is more about 
differentiated polity wherein state and private autonomous actors work hand-in-
hand in networked forms of organisation to deliver the intended water policy 
goals (see Bevir, 2007; Sørensen, 2006).           
‘Management’ and ‘governance’ are not the same; however, scholars in the field 
in public and business administration nowadays tend to use ‘governance’ rather 
than ‘management’ to underline and discuss managerial and administrative 
issues. For example, Laegreid and Verhoest (2010) talk about governance of 
public-sector organisations to describe the recent changes in the way that public 
organisations are being managed, including the creation of new autonomous 
bodies and the impact of this on performance. In the same vein, Franks (2007) 
has noted that business administration scholars are more inclined these days to 
use ‘governance’ instead of ‘management’. As he puts it: 
[----] we can note the increasing use of the word ‘governance ‘in a business context 
where only very recently the word ‘management’ would have been used. For 
example, we can now find references to ‘risk governance’ ‘IT governance’ and ‘data 
governance’, all instances where it seems likely that management is the more 
appropriate and relevant term. We should also note, in this connection, the use of 
governance in a business context where something more than management is being 
suggested, for example ‘corporate governance’ implying a degree of high level 
oversight designed to ensure that ‘things are done right’ and indeed ‘project 
governance’ with similar connotations. (p3)         
Such confusion regarding the way in which ‘governance’ and ‘management’ are 
used should not lead us to treat these two concepts equally when water issues 
are dealt with.  In other words, a clear distinction should be made between ‘water 
governance’ and ‘water management’. While it is true that the idea of water 
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governance has been associated with ideas on how to use water wisely and 
efficiently, water management refers in particular to ‘controlling the supply, 
distribution, use and disposal of water to achieve specific objectives’ (Franks, 
2007: 3). In this sense, water management is related to a specific aspect of water 
governance, which is the way in which water as a resource is being allocated in 
order to achieve certain goals.  
This conceptualisation of water management comprises three main levels:  
operational, organisational and constitutional. At the operational level, water 
management is first and foremost about manipulating water resources at local 
levels using mechanisms such as channels, gates and pumps. Organisationally 
speaking, water management is more concerned with planning, allocating and 
distributing water at the basin level as well as constructing water facilities and 
monitoring the enforcement of water quality regulations. The constitutional level 
of water management is reflected in Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM). According to Dixon and Easter (1986), IWRM refers to ‘[A] process of 
formulating and implementing a course of action involving natural and human 
resources in an ecosystem, taking into account the social, political, economic 
and institutional factors operating within the ecosystem in order to achieve 
specific societal objectives’ (Dixon and Easter, 1986; cited in Born and Sonzogni, 
1995: 170 ). Cardwell et al. (2006:9) define IWRM as ‘[A] coordinated, goal-
directed process for controlling the development and use of river, lake, ocean, 
wetland, and other water assets’. As such, IWRM integrates land management 
and the management of water resources in addition to environmental and social 
impacts. The constitutional level of water management as reflected in IWRM is 
the closest to the idea of water governance. It not only focuses on organisational 
and operational concerns but it also covers the impact of actions and decisions 
taken in this regard related to the sustainability of the surrounding environment 
and human development. In short, water management can be conceived as 
actions and decisions taken to manipulate water resources while water 
governance refers to the system through which these actions are put in place.  
Water governance has been conceptualised by some scholars as a political 
process (Grindle, 2004; Cleaver and Franks, 2008). The focus of this perspective 
is on the politics of water governance and the way that stakeholders are involved 
in decision and policymaking processes. Power relations and the way in which 
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stakeholders deploy the powers and the resources they have at their disposal to 
influence decisions and policy outcomes are of prime importance to the scholars 
who adopt this perspective. Grindle (2004) is concerned, for instance, with the 
way power is distributed among stakeholders. According to her view, the rules, 
which determine who holds power and the way in which authority is exercised, 
establish a level playing field for stakeholders participating in water governance. 
They provide certain actors with legitimacy and make their actions and decisions 
acceptable by the rest of stakeholders. A good example in this context would be 
the legitimate role played by governmental actors in making water policies and 
monitoring their implementation. At the same time, examining the concept of 
water governance from a political angle underscores the issue of accountability 
of participating actors and how this notion is translated into a concrete 
mechanism to hold actors responsible for their actions and decisions.           
Cleaver and Franks (2006) have also acknowledged the political nature of water 
governance and the importance of power relations and negotiators processes. 
According to their view, ‘[W]ater governance works out through dynamic political 
processes of power and negotiation, particularly at the interface between service 
providers and users. General principles must be balanced with context‐specific 
initiatives and there is a particular need to work at the messy middle between 
policy‐ making and local level practices’ (Cleaver and Franks, 2006: 1). In this 
sense, water governance can be regarded as ‘the systems and processes which 
society sets in place to manage its water resources and deliver water services’.  
This system is by definition of a complex nature and includes different types of 
actors as well as different forms of mechanisms through which those actors 
interact to deal with and to find solutions to water issues (see Figure 3.1).     
As the figure indicates, water governance systems deal with a wide range of 
social, institutional, ecological, and economic issues. At the resources level, 
water governance is concerned with material as well as non-material resources, 
which limits to some extent the ability of stakeholders to form and put in place 
the appropriate mechanisms and arrangements in order to tackle water issues. 
The stakeholders involved in water governance systems have a major role to 
play when deciding on the ways in which water resources will be used. They are 
normally engaged in interactive and ongoing negotiations processes to produce 
knowledge regarding water policy issues and the solutions that need to be 
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implemented. Negotiations and interactions lead in most of the cases to 
decisions, which are translated at some point into actions. Decisions and actions 
taken by actors always have outcomes and implications for the wider community, 
particularly for the vulnerable segments of the society such as poor people and 
women. Water decisions and policies also have implications for the natural and 
environmental systems and these implications can be seen in the short and in 
the long term and need to be factored into the decision-making equation (Franks 
and Cleaver, 2008: 164-165).             
 
Figure 3.1: Water Governance as a Political Process 
Source: Id21 insights 67 (2007:2) 
In the context of this study, water governance will be understood as a political 
process. More precisely, water governance will be used to refer to ‘the system of 
actors, resources, mechanisms and processes which mediate society’s access 
to water’ (Franks and Cleaver, 2007: 11). This broad definition will be helpful in 
investigating the different components of water governance systems (institutions, 
structures, resources, etc) along with the way in which the involved stakeholders 
use these components during interactions and negotiations in order to achieve 
their goals and objectives. By doing so, the study will be able to go beyond the 
notion of good government and good management to capture the dynamic and 
interactive nature of water governance. Added to this, a political perspective on 
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water governance will help in understanding how competing influences and 
demands are balanced in water decision-making processes without jeopardising 
the strategic direction of water policy development and implementation. A 
political perspective on water governance will also help investigate the way in 
which the behaviour of the wide range of actors involved in decision-making 
processes is regulated alongside the corrective mechanisms to undo undesirable 
trends and distortions. Accountability relationships and mechanisms, which 
represent the core of any effective governance system, will also be examined 
from a political angle. This conceptualisation of water governance is depicted in 
Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2: Conceptualisation of Water Governance 
As the figure indicates, water policy, laws and regulations form the overarching 
institutional framework for all state and non-state actors involved in water 
governance. These actors are engaged in a two-level policy game. At the first 
level, they are participating in making and designing water policies, laws and 
regulations, which form the ground rules for interactions among them. At the 
second level, state and non-state actors are also involved in policy 
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implementation and have different roles and responsibilities in managing water 
resources and delivering water services. In this sense, state and non-state actors 
are engaged in dynamic and interactive policy processes to solve water issues. 
In this dynamic environment, different forms of arrangements are put in place in 
order to deliver the intended water policy goals. Many of these arrangements 
take the shape of partnerships between state and non-state actors. In 
partnerships, hierarchical steering mechanisms do not work perfectly. In order to 
steer effectively in such collaborative settings, state actors as well as the non-
state partners should follow the network logic and search for new strategies to 
influence each other’s decisions.      
This understanding of water governance emphasises that water governance 
arrangements should not be regarded as an end. They should be seen as a 
means for achieving better, more efficient and more effective water management 
systems. In other words, water governance and the associated water 
management systems should guarantee optimal utilisation of water resources 
according to rational consumption patterns and behaviour. Costs and benefits 
should be distributed equally among stakeholders who should be able to access 
water resources as well as decision-making mechanisms in water sectors. All 
these governance arrangements and efforts must be sustainable in the sense 
that they keep the integrity of ecosystems (Iza et al., 2009).  
With the concept of water governance so identified, the following section will 
focus on the institutional context of water governance systems in terms of: water 
policies, water laws and water management.    
3.4 Institutional Components of Water Governance Systems: Water Laws, 
Policies and Administration  
The adopted definition of water governance suggests that different types of 
arrangements are found between state and non-state actors in water sectors. In 
this section, the overall institutional framework within which actors involved in 
water governance interact will be examined by focusing on three main 
components: water laws, water policies, and water management. Looking at 
these three elements and exploring the interplay dynamics among them is an 
important step to understand how water governance systems work and what 
factors may affect their performance. Added to this, the amalgamation of these 
three factors form what is called ‘water governance capacity’, which refers to ‘a 
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society’s level of competence to implement effective water arrangements 
through policies, laws, institutions, regulations, and compliance mechanisms’ 
(Iza and Stein, 2009: 7). The lack of any of these three components will affect 
the overall effectiveness of water governance systems and arrangements. Water 
laws are needed in the first place to empower water policies. At the same time, 
sound water policies require an overarching legal and regulatory framework to 
guide the process of policy formulation and implementation. Effective water 
governance is also a function of the way in which water resources are 
manipulated and controlled by water management institutions and the 
capabilities of these institutions to achieve their intended policy goals and to 
enforce water policies and regulations.         
3.4.1 Water Laws 
Water laws and regulations provide the legal framework for water policies and 
represent the underlying foundations for water management and administration. 
The main idea behind central governments designing and issuing these laws is 
to keep water resources under control and to provide the pillars for sound water 
policies and practices (Barreira, 2006). As stated by Iza et al., (2009: 18) water 
laws provide a legal framework, which ‘levels the playing field, clarifies the rules, 
and sets a country on the route to good management’. In this perspective, water 
laws represent the cornerstone and the main foundation in any water governance 
system. They put in place the ground rules for all state and non-sate actors and 
identify their roles and responsibilities in addition to accountability mechanisms. 
Consequently, a good starting point for analysing water governance 
arrangements in any given context is to examine water laws and regulations.          
Water laws take different shapes in different contexts; therefore, it is expected 
that different water laws will be found in different countries. Nevertheless, in spite 
of such a diversity of water laws, there are some similarities among them all. For 
example, Saleth and Dinar (1999) have noted that water laws in different 
countries focus on issues such as the legal status of water conflict resolution 
mechanisms, water rights and regulations plus enforcement mechanisms. This 
observation has led scholars such as Gupta et al. (2013) to conclude that water 
laws in different countries provide water managers with the same menu. That 
means the options available for water managers to select from are more or less 
similar despite the difference in water laws and regulations (Gupta, 2011). For 
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instance, when it comes to types and forms of ownership as well as rights and 
responsibilities, a great deal of similarity can be noticed.   
The quality of water laws influences the effectiveness of the overall water 
governance systems. Generally speaking, well drafted and designed water laws 
should offer ‘predictability, and a precise yet flexible structure through which 
obligations are laid down, with rights which can be enforced and protected’ (Iza 
and Stein, 2009: 7). To this end, and in order to avoid any form of overlapping 
and confusion, coordination mechanisms have to be set out clearly in water laws. 
These mechanisms help in dividing roles and responsibilities among state and 
non- state actors at all water governance levels (global, regional, national, and 
sub-national) (Gupta and Pahl-Wostl, 2013).     
3.4.2 Water Policies 
Water laws and policies are normally in the background of any water governance 
discussion. They provide ‘the skeleton that is fleshed out by institutions and 
management practices’ (Iza et al., 2009: 18). In that sense, water laws and 
regulations are usually translated into more concrete objectives and goals in 
water policies. Water policy is defined as ‘all efforts to define the rules, intent, 
and instruments with which governments manage human uses of water, control 
water pollution, and meet environmental water needs. It considers not only the 
legal and regulatory framework, but also the planning around water resource 
allocation and the implementation practices by water managers and other 
stakeholders in support of this framework’ (Morrison et al., 2010: 7). Accordingly, 
water policies cover ‘usage priorities, water tariffs, decentralisation or 
centralisation of competencies, participation, and coordination with other 
policies’ (Saleth and Dinar, 1999: 5).  
In addition to this, the scope of water policies may also extend to cover different 
water governance issues including: water supply and infrastructure 
development; water resource protection; water rights and allocation among 
sectors; water quality management; water pricing and economic instruments; 
operations and maintenance of water management systems; public participation 
in water governance and decision-making and environmental regulation, 
planning, and protected area management (Anokye, 2013). These policy issues 
and the general directions regarding how to deal with them are most likely to be 
defined at the central governmental levels. Nonetheless, the implementation of 
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these directions takes place at regional and local levels (Morrison et al., 2010: 
7). In all cases, water policies should have strategic orientations that are built 
upon a vision of water sectors in the near future and in the long term. In this 
context, ‘[A] written water policy might contain a background section explaining 
the need for the policy, a statement of purpose, a vision statement, a statement 
of scope, a set of definitions, an effective date, one or more statements of policy, 
and a section on responsibilities regarding who will carry out the policies’ (Iza 
and Stein, 2009: 7). This vision as well as the long-term policy goals set the 
directions for governance reforms in water sectors.      
3.4.3 Water Management  
Managing water wisely and effectively is the essence of any water governance 
system. The way in which water resources in a given country are managed 
determines greatly how healthy the people in this country are, how successful its 
economy is, how sustainable its natural resources are, and how good its 
relationship with neighbouring countries is.  As noted by Iza et al. (2009: 17): 
Good water management can provide clean drinking water and sanitation, the basics 
of good health, while poor water management can increase disease and suffering. 
Good water management can bring hydroelectric power to homes and industry, 
irrigation for agriculture, and improve the economy, while poor management can 
mean lack of power, desiccated crops, floods and famine. Good water management 
allows water for wildlife to maintain biodiversity, and provides opportunities for 
recreation and tourism, while poor management can result in parched ground, dried-
up lakes and silted harbours. Good water management can result in harmonious and 
mutually beneficial water agreements with neighbouring countries, while bad 
management can trigger tensions and conflict.   
In this context, it is imperative to understand what water management is and how 
it affects the water governance arrangements. Water management is defined by 
Carrey (2011: 1) as ‘the activity of planning, developing, distributing, managing 
an optimum use of water resources defined under water polices and regulations’. 
The scope and the way in which these activities are supposed to be undertaken 
are determined by water laws and policies. As noted by Iza and Stein (2009: 8), 
‘good water laws provide a structure for effective water management’. Ideally 
speaking, all the activities involved in water management are supposed to 
guarantee the efficient utilisation of water resources, equitable access and 
distribution of water among the different members of the society and the 
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sustainability of the existing water resources. As Iza and Stein (2009: 8) state, ‘a 
modern legal regime for water is comprehensive and includes efficiency, equity 
and sustainability considerations’. In practice, however, these aims are hard to 
achieve. Growing populations, increasing demands from industries and the 
agricultural sector, as well as the uncertainty of water availability caused by the 
climate change effects are typical challenges facing water managers worldwide 
and call for more innovative solutions to water issues and problems (El-Rae 
2009; Iza et al., 2009).     
To further explicate the difficulty of achieving efficiency, equity and sustainability 
in water governance we need to underscore the fact that water management and 
administration processes take place at two different levels: policymaking and 
policy implementation. At the policy level, the main concern for water 
management activities is to effectively manage water resources. At the 
implementation level, the preoccupation for water managers is to direct and 
control the delivery processes. Some organisational actors may play more than 
one role in the water management system at both levels. In this case, it is crucial 
to separate functions in order to avoid any form of conflict of interests. For 
example, those who are heavily involved in policymaking should not be 
responsible at the same time for policy implementation and water delivery. The 
reason for this is that if one policy actor is responsible for policymaking and policy 
implementation at the same time this actor will most likely design policies in 
accordance with its own directions and competencies regardless of the benefit 
these policies may bring to the wider community (Iza and Stein, 2009).  
The productivity committee in Australia (2003) has emphasised the importance 
of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms as core elements of effective water 
management. Another important managerial function in water management 
systems is to administer water rights in terms of issuing, modifying and approving 
water rights, which gives right-holder(s) a priority of access to water resources 
(Holland and Moore, 2003). Taken together, these institutional components are 
essential for understanding the notion of water governance. The general 
understanding of governance as presented in chapter 2 need to be anchored in 
the context of water crisis (see Bevir, 2013). As further explained in chapter 4, 
those institution provide the water ‘structures’ which limit or expand the ability of 
water agents to make water policy decisions.          
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3.4.4 Relationships between the Institutional Components of Water 
Governance Systems 
Saleth and Dinar (2004: 102) have explained the link between these three 
institutional components of water governance systems (see Figure 3.3). 
According to their view, the overall performance of water governance systems 
depends not only on the functionality of their individual single components but 
also on the way these components are put together and integrated.  
 
Figure 3.3: Institutional Linkages within a Water Institution 
Source: Saleth and Dinar (2004: 102) 
From an inter-institutional perspective, the linkage between water policies, law, 
and administration is quite important for understanding the way in which these 
components interact and the impact of this on the overall performance of water 
governance systems (Saleth and Dinar, 2005). In an ideal situation, water laws 
should guide and empower water policymaking. This is not to say that water laws 
always precede water policies as they may come as a part of an overall reform 
initiative in water sectors (see chapter 7). Regardless of which comes first, water 
laws or water policies, the link between these two elements is obvious. On the 
one hand, water laws provide overarching guidance for water policies. On the 
other hand, water policies represent a translation of water laws from a political 
economy perspective (Saleth and Dinar, 2000).  Both water policies and laws 
determine the scope and duties for water administration.  In this sense, water 
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policies and laws represent what Saleth and Dinar (2004) call the ‘software 
component’ of water governance while water administration provides the 
‘hardware component’.             
At the outset, the performance of water governance systems can be affected by 
several factors. From an economic point of view, the performance of a water 
governance system is affected by the transaction costs involved in interactions 
among participating actors (Saravia and Chen, 2008). The higher the transaction 
costs, the less efficient the performance of a water governance system is.  
The performance of water governance systems can also be influenced by the 
clarity of the implemented rules as well as the enforcement mechanisms (Barrett 
et al.,2005). The clearer the ground rules governing actors’ interaction, 
behaviour, and the stronger the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, the 
more efficient the performance of the governance systems. The level of formality 
of the rules in place is also an important factor as we need to bear in mind both 
formal and informal rules as particularly in many developing countries, informal 
rules may become more important than formal ones. The linkage between the 
different institutional components (water law, policy and management) and the 
way in which these components influence each other represents another 
important factor, which may interfere with the ability of water governance 
systems to achieve high performance (Bandaragoda, 2006).   
3.5 Strategic Issues in Water Governance  
Water resources can be regarded as a critical enabler, or constraint, for 
achieving economic development and meeting social needs (Muller, 2012). 
Hence, developing an effective water governance system is not an end in itself; 
it is a means to effectively handle and wisely manage different strategic policy 
issues in water sectors. In other words, the development of water governance 
systems is meant to address resilient water issues such as sustainability, climate 
change, poverty reduction and development in general. Dealing with such 
issues, which are described in this section as ‘strategic’, in the sense that any 
decision in these areas may have implications for the development of water 
sectors and the wellbeing of the people, is not an easy task. Decision and 
policymakers as well as water managers and practitioners are required to come 
up with new approaches and to use new tools in order to achieve the designed 
policy goals for water sectors. This task is even more complicated with two main 
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features of water sectors: uncertainty and complexity. These two characteristics 
render the traditional policy responses to water issues obsolete or at the best not 
effective enough to solve water problems. In the words of Head (2008: 103-104), 
many of the water issues have become ‘wicked’ in the sense that they have 
become complex and intractable with no final solutions.  Therefore, the complex 
water governance issues call for new ways to address them and new tools for 
steering interactions among involved actors. This section highlights three main 
strategic issues in water governance: sustainably, gender, and poverty.    
3.5.1 Water Governance and Sustainability 
Water is always regarded as a renewable source and therefore many people 
believe they should not worry about how much water they use. This 
misconception of water as a natural resource has led to the conclusion that 
sustainability has not been and will never be an issue when it comes to water 
usage. This section argues against this perception of water as a renewable 
source as well as de-linking water and sustainability. Conversely, in accordance 
with the conclusion of Knight et al. (2009), this section argues that water and in 
particular, fresh water should be regarded as a scarce resource and therefore it 
requires effective governance systems to ensure its sustainability.  From this 
angle, the sustainability of water is regarded as a function of the way in which 
water is perceived as a natural resource and the way in which this natural source 
is managed and controlled. In other words, ‘the nexus of water sustainability lies 
at the intersection of water availability in the physical sense and water 
governance’ (Knight et al., 2009: 350).   
In general terms, the concept of sustainability is normally used to refer to the 
current generation’s commitment to take into account future generations’ rights 
to enjoy the same amount of natural resources , if not a greater amount, when 
deciding upon the way in which these resources are deployed for the purpose of 
achieving economic development. The old resource intensive model of 
development based on the abundance of natural resources and the downplay of 
social and environmental costs in production processes has particularly resulted 
in the depletion of many natural resources in addition to the degradation of the 
environment in general. The need has become quite clear for a new model of 
development which is socially responsible and environmentally friendly; a model 
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that ‘takes into account the adverse side effects of modernization and 
fundamentally redefines its own dynamics and workings’ (Loorbach, 2010: 162). 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was a manifestation of the internationally growing 
awareness that the old model of development was no longer acceptable and that 
environmental as well as social costs had to be correctly accounted for and 
reflected in the calculations of economic development decisions. The notion of 
sustainability has now become a paramount concern for the international 
community and sustainable development has become a framework of 
governance for national states at the national level.  As Dernbach (1998: 3) 
states, sustainability and sustainable development represent ‘an internationally 
recognized normative framework for guiding and evaluating the behaviour of 
national governments and other actors’. 
In water sectors, sustainability has been perceived as ‘the use of water that 
supports the ability of human society to endure and flourish into the indefinite 
future without undermining the integrity of the hydrological cycle or the ecological 
systems that depend on it’ (Gleick, 1998: 574). This conceptualisation includes 
a commitment that ‘we leave as many choices about fresh water to future 
generations as possible, making as few permanent, irretrievable commitments 
as possible’ (Knight et al., 2009: 349). In this context, the notion of sustainability 
has been adopted by water managers and policymakers at national levels in 
order to reflect their commitment to the internationally developed and agreed 
upon model of sustainable development. Sustainable water has become a 
cornerstone in water governance systems and a widely mentioned goal for water 
policies. Knight et al. (2009: 349), for instance, regard sustainable fresh water as 
reflecting the ‘long-term maintenance of adequate volumes of fresh water and 
commitments of fresh water to vital human uses, including recognition of water’s 
place in the basket of fundamental goods and services that should be attainable 
by all humans as a right’.  
In that sense, water sustainability is first and foremost an issue of good long-term 
planning and utilisation of water resources in order to meet the basic human 
needs. Nonetheless, this simple notion of water sustainability is challenged in 
reality by the very fact that some water resources such as the ground water are 
not themselves sustainable. Furthermore, there are competing demands for 
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water including the demands for economic and business activities which may 
result in distortions in the ways in which water is allocated and may divert water 
resources to these areas before meeting the fundamental human needs. As 
Karar et al. (2012:1) put it, ‘[W]ater resource allocation for a range of productive 
purposes, from agriculture to industry to ecosystem services, is typically 
inequitable. Often it is the comparatively powerless groups which are shut out 
not just to water itself but also to the processes where allocation decisions are 
made’. Climate change, and its impact on the predictions of future water 
availability, represents another factor that should be added to the equation of 
water sustainability as it adds to the uncertainty surrounding this scarce resource 
(El-Rae, 2009). In the words of Gleick et al. (1995), to address the issue of 
sustainability in water sectors is to answer fundamental questions including how 
are all competing values to be prioritized? What is to be sustained? For how 
long? What are the benefits? Who are the beneficiaries? 
The challenges facing water sustainability call for developing new pathways and 
sustainability criteria to guide policymakers, water managers and the other 
participating actors in water governance regimes. Gleick (1998: 574) has 
identified seven criteria for sustainable water utilisation: 
 A basic water requirement will be guaranteed to all humans to maintain 
human health; 
 A basic water requirement will be guaranteed to restore and maintain the 
health of ecosystems; 
 Water quality will be maintained to meet certain minimum standards. 
These standards will vary depending on location and how the water is to 
be used; 
 Human actions will not impair the long-term renewability of freshwater 
stocks and flows; 
 Data on water resources availability, use, and quality will be collected and 
made accessible to all parties; 
 Institutional mechanisms will be set up to prevent and resolve conflicts 
over water; 
 Water planning and decision-making will be democratic, ensuring 
representation of all affected parties and fostering direct participation of 
affected interests. 
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Following on from these criteria, any decision concerning water usage and 
allocation should take account of the basic human needs and health as well as 
the needs of the surrounding environments and ecological systems. Water 
managers and decisions-makers also need to make sure that the quality of 
utilised water meets a minimum standard that maintains human health and 
wellbeing. The issue of renewability of water resources should also be 
considered to make sure that today’s decisions do not impact negatively on the 
long-term availability of water stocks and flows. Water decisions must be taken 
based on accurate, timely and up-to-date data. The quality of the decisions taken 
in this area depends to a great extent on the quality of the data used by decision-
makers. From an institutional point of view, a sustainable water governance 
system should develop adjudication and conflict resolution mechanisms, which 
facilitate the solving of disputes among actors involved in governance processes.  
As noted by Karar et al. (2012:1), people’s participation and representation ‘come 
at the centre of any biophysical-ecological intervention aimed at the use and 
sustainability of water resources’.  The issues of participation and transparency 
are quite important to ensure the accountability of decision-makers and to 
enhance the legitimacy of water decisions.  As eloquently summarised by 
Barbara Schreiner, Chair of the Board of the Water Research Commission 
(WRC) in the opening address of the International Conference on Fresh Water 
Governance for Sustainable Development, ‘[W]e cannot save the world as water 
managers, researchers and specialists alone’ (Schreiner et al., 2011: 5). In other 
words, water should be brought into the centre of the development debate and 
all types of societal actors must be involved in such a debate in order to come 
up with innovative solutions to water issues.   
Addressing the above-mentioned issues in water management and governance 
should eventually lead to the creation of a good water governance system which 
reflects the criteria for good governance discussed in chapter two. Such a system 
would ultimately produce more efficient strategies for managing water resources, 
which in turn will lead to the attainment of the intended water policy goals, and 
outcomes in an open, transparent and accountable environment (see chapter 2).    
3.5.2 Water Governance and Gender  
Different societies manage their water resources in different ways. The 
experience and day-to-day practices show that some societies are more 
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successful in managing their water resources than others. One possible 
explanation for this observation is that societies and communities diverge in their 
historical relations and bonds to water resources as well as their traditions, 
cultures and habits. As reported by the International Network for Capacity 
Building in Integrated Water Resources Management and the Gender and Water 
Alliance, ‘[T]he bonds between people and water are primal and have a long 
history that spans both ancient and contemporary cultures. Bonds with water 
reflect the cultural values and social differences embedded in societies, including 
gender differences’ (Muylwijk, 2010: 2). 
Consequently, one of the main societal and cultural aspects across which 
societies may vary is gender. In a broader sense, the term ‘gender’ refers to ‘the 
roles and responsibilities of women and men and the relationship between them’ 
(Khosla and Pearl, 2003: 3). This understanding of gender underlines the fact 
that gender is not only about sex (male or female) but it is also about social roles, 
responsibilities and behaviour. This broad conceptualisation of gender, which 
focuses on the social dimensions of the term alongside its biological meaning, 
draws our attention to the fact that the way in which we perceive ‘relations 
between men and women and how these shape access to resources, 
participation in decision-making and the exercise of power within households and 
communities’ has several implications for water governance processes (UN 
DESA and DAW, 2005: 4).    
Different societies hold diverse perceptions regarding the role and the ability of 
men and women to access, use and manage water resources. As noted by Karar 
et al. (2012: 5), ‘[A]ttitudes such as, ‘Women should – or should not – do this and 
that’ or ‘Men are supposed to do this –but not that’, may prevent either women 
or men from acting regarding water use, access or management’. Added to this, 
a number of misconceptions and stereotypes about the role of men and women 
in the society may add to the complexity of this situation. For example, there is a 
wide misconception that specific jobs such as farming and fishing are mainly 
dominated by men. However, the statistics show that in farming about 70% of 
farmers worldwide are women. Moreover, the FAO (2000) has reported that half 
of the world’s food is grown by women farmers and it amounts to 80% in some 
African countries. When it comes to fishing, women undertake different activities 
including collecting shrimp and shellfish near the coast as well as drying, 
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processing, making and repairing nets and fishing in freshwater fisheries 
(Muylwijk, 2010: 7).   
At the household level, there is a distinction and division of labour between men 
and women. Men work outside and women work inside the house and are 
supposed to look after the children and educate them. This vision of the roles of 
men and women is not acceptable for two main reasons. First, it downplays the 
role of men in educating their children about the good behaviour in using water 
resources. Second, it undermines the role of women’s knowledge and 
experience in managing water resources. In many households, women are 
responsible for managing water resources and educating children about how to 
use water wisely and in matters of hygiene. Over the years, women in different 
societies have accumulated a great inventory of wisdom in these areas, which 
could be helpful for policymakers and water managers. Regrettably, water 
managers and policymakers are most likely to ignore women’s potential 
contributions to water policies. As noted by Aureli and Brelet (2004: 6), ‘women’s 
considerable knowledge of water resources, including quality, reliability, and 
storage methods is too often not taken into account by decision makers who still 
ignore that this hidden chest of knowledge is one of the major keys to the success 
of water resources development and irrigation projects’. 
Despite the tendency of policymakers in different countries to disregard the 
potential contributions of women in water policies, the evidence shows that 
sharing women’s wisdom and experience in policy debates is quite important for 
achieving the development and implementation of sound and responsive 
policies. Women’s participation in policy projects has also been associated with 
more effectiveness in running these projects and delivering the intended policy 
goals. As reported by the Interagency Task Force on Gender and Water (2005: 
1-2), ‘A study by the International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC) of 
community water and sanitation projects in 88 communities in 15 countries found 
that projects designed and run with the full participation of women are more 
sustainable and effective than those that do not’.      
The negative attitudes, perceptions, misconceptions and stereotypes about the 
tasks women should or should not do have implications for men and women as 
well as the broader society. They may result in unfair treatment to women and 
therefore limit their contributions to the society and reduce their benefits and 
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outcomes from developmental activities. Consequently, balanced and 
sustainable water governance systems should acknowledge the contributions of 
men and women and empower the latter to play their role in accessing, using 
and managing water resources. In this regard, the Interagency Task Force on 
Gender and Water in the UN (2005:4) has reported that ‘The importance of 
involving both women and men in the management of water and sanitation has 
been recognized at the global level, at least since the 1977 United Nations Water 
Conference at Mar del Plata and during the International Drinking Water Supply 
and Sanitation Decade, 1981-1990’.         
Since then, bridging the gap between men and women in relation to water 
governance has become the quest for many international conferences and a 
main goal for different global organisations. Karar et al. (2012: 4) note that 
‘Gender equality and women’s empowerment goals are the cornerstones of the 
four Dublin Principles (1992), the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, (1992), the 2000 Millennium Development Summit and the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)’. These international efforts 
have formed the institutional basis for empowering women and underlining their 
vital roles in water governance systems. The message has been very clear that 
all forms of social inequality and discrimination against women in relation to 
access to and managing water resources must be addressed by following a 
gender-based approach to water governance.  To this end, arrangements should 
be established which ensure that ‘[W]ater resources management should be 
based on a participatory approach. Both men and women should have an equal 
voice in managing the sustainable use of water resources and sharing of 
benefits’ (Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference on Freshwater, 
2001: 11). As noted by Sülün (2018:3-4), the role of women in water-related 
areas needs to be strengthened via a gender approach to water governance that 
broadens their participation in water decision making processes.     
The gender policy framework, which has been developed at the international 
level, is translated by national governments into policies, decisions and actions 
aiming at bridging the gender gap in water sectors. These policies and strategies 
have been specifically designed to address women’s needs and enhance their 
roles in water governance systems. A gender-based approach to water 
governance is claimed to have different positive consequences including: 
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addressing the imbalance between men and women in accessing and managing 
water resources; sharing benefits from the use of water; making progress 
towards more sustainable use of water; and maximizing social and economic 
benefits from the sustainable use of water (Muylwijk, 2010: 7). In spite of these 
benefits, a gender-based approach to water governance is challenged on 
different grounds. Chief among these challenges is the notion of neutrality when 
it comes to policymaking, implementation and evaluation. Many governments 
worldwide claim that their policies, in general, and their water policies, in 
particular, are neutral in terms of their impact on men and women. This claim has 
been proven wrong in different situations, which has shown that women are 
much more vulnerable than men and therefore their needs have to be taken into 
account when making water policies and decisions. As Khosla and Pearl (2003: 
3) point out, gender should be mainstreamed in the sense of ‘assessing the 
implications for women and men of any planned action’. To put it another way, 
streaming gender in water policies implies involving women as well as men’s 
experiences and concerns in the different stages of water policies: formulation, 
implementation and evaluation. This gender perspective on water policies is 
particularly important for achieving equality between men and women. 
Gender equality has been addressed by the Interagency Task Force on Gender 
and Water (2005) at three main levels:  equal access to water supply; equal 
access to land and water for productive use; and equal access to sanitation. The 
report emphasises the importance of achieving gender equality in accessing safe 
drinking water and underlines the fact that women should be freed from spending 
a long time collecting and fetching water. In this regard, the report states that ‘[A] 
2002 UNICEF study of rural households in 23 sub-Saharan African countries 
found that a quarter of them spent 30 minutes to an hour each day collecting and 
carrying water, and 19 % spent an hour or more’ (Interagency Task Force on 
Gender and Water, 2005: 4.).  This situation has to change and women should 
spend more time in educating and training themselves in different areas to 
increase their potential contributions to the society.   
In addition to gender, equality with regard to accessing drinking water and water 
supply women should also have equal rights to men concerning access to water 
for productive activities. Some of the major obstacles that are hindering the 
achievement of this goal are landownership laws. In some countries, such as 
88 | P a g e  
 
many Latin American countries, accessing water for productive use is associated 
with landownership and because many women do not have land ownership they 
also do not have access to water for productive use. Therefore, in these 
situations where accessing water for productive activities is linked to 
landownership, the legal framework must ensure that women have equitable 
rights to land ownership. This is a precondition for fully empowering women and 
helping them increase their contributions to the society and improve their lives.      
With respect to sanitation, Fisher (2006: 6) has reported that the ‘[L]ack of basic 
sanitation and safe water is an acute problem for the women and girls who live 
in poor and overcrowded urban slums and in the rural areas of the developing 
world’. Inadequate sanitation and poor hygiene may have severe consequences 
for the society as a whole. Therefore, having equitable access to sanitation is 
quite important to improve public health and reduce the possibility of spreading 
diseases. Differences between men and women’s needs in this area must be 
taken into account when designing and planning the locations of sanitation 
facilities. For example, it is very important to provide women and girls with the 
required privacy and to locate these facilities as close as possible to their houses 
so they do not have to travel a long distance and risk being a potential subject of 
violence. Other bad social practices such as using infested water for washing 
clothes - a role associated with women in different societies- must be banned 
because of their negative health implications for women and girls as they may 
lead to them developing water-related diseases such as urinary schistosomiasis 
(Khosla and Pearl, 2003).      
Following on from the above discussion, it can be concluded that a gender-based 
or a gender-sensitive approach to water governance is essential for effective 
water management. Having the overall international institutional framework is a 
necessary but not sufficient factor for affecting and advancing gender concerns 
in water governance. In other words, translating international commitments into 
real practices on the ground takes a lot more than just signing international 
agreements (Appleton and Smout, 2003).  It requires concrete actions on the 
ground to ensure that water policies and water management systems are gender 
sensitive and that they reflect the division of roles and labour between men and 
women in all settings related to water (Khosla and Pearl, 2003).  
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3.5.3 Water Governance and Poverty  
Poverty is a multi-dimensional concept, which encompasses different forms and 
shapes of deprivation and a lack of basic human needs. In its extreme form, 
poverty may threaten people’s survival. Because of the multi-dimensionality of 
poverty, different scholars and international organisations measure it in different 
ways and by using different indicators. For instance, the UNDP’s Human Poverty 
Index focuses on three basic dimensions of deprivation including a short life (the 
number of people expected to die before 40); the lack of basic education (the 
number of people who are illiterate); and the lack of access to public and private 
resources (the number of people without access to health services and clean 
water and the number of children under five suffering from malnourishment). 
Other poverty measures use different criteria by looking at the many things that 
poor people may be short of such as income, household and productive assets, 
entitlements, social connections and support networks, personal security, and 
empowerment to participate in the political process and decisions. Added to 
these material forms of deprivation some include humiliation and stigma as non-
material indicators for measuring poverty (UNDP, 2004: 19).  
The statistics on world poverty are alarming. The UNDP (2004: 17) has reported 
that ‘[O]ne in five people on the planet, two-thirds of them women, live in extreme 
poverty. Of the world’s 6 billion people, 2.8 billion live on less than US$2 a day 
and 1.2 billion on less than US$1 a day’. Additionally, according to the United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) around 24,000 children die each day due to 
poverty (Pegram and Schreiner, 2010: 8). Water decisions and policies may have 
positive or negative impacts on poverty and the poor. The linkage between water 
and poverty is quite clear; water is an essential element in many industrial and 
agricultural activities. It has a great impact on countries’ abilities to achieve 
economic development and in turn improve the economic conditions of their 
peoples and reduce the levels of poverty. As such, the well-being of poor people 
and their ability to improve their living conditions is heavily dependent on the 
enablers in the surrounding environment and more precisely, on their ability to 
access and exploit water resources. Any changes in the surrounding 
environment impact greatly on the poor rather than the rich in the society 
because the former are more vulnerable to changes in the ecosystems.     
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The Water Governance for Poverty Reduction report by the UNDP (2004) has 
identified three main dimensions of the relationship between poverty and water:  
health, livelihoods and vulnerability. Poor people tend to use water of a poor 
quality because they do not have access to clean water. Using contaminated 
water leads to a cycle of illness which impacts negatively on the ability of the 
poor to work and to earn their living. Moreover, poor people, particularly in rural 
areas, are dependent on using water resources for agricultural and food 
production. That means any changes in the ecosystem, including a lack of 
access to water resources or any contamination of these resources, will directly 
affect the ability of those people to produce their own food. Poverty makes poor 
people more vulnerable to environmental crises, conflicts over water resources, 
and the different forms of market failure in water sectors including inappropriate 
pricing. The poor are less likely to benefit from large-scale water supply or 
sanitation services in the areas where they live. That means they have to buy 
water in small containers, which costs them anything from between 4 and 10 
times compared to that in the metered rich neighbourhoods (UNDP, 2004: 30).      
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) consider water as a critical source 
for reducing poverty and death rates in addition to improving the living conditions 
for the poor.  The aim was by 2015, the proportion of people whose income was 
less than one dollar a day as well as the proportion of people who suffered from 
hunger to be reduced by half. Meeting these targets would almost be impossible 
without developing and implementing pro-poor water policies, which deliberately 
target the poor in the society and attempt to improve their conditions by giving 
them access to water to be used for productive activities. From this perspective, 
an effective water governance system which provides an overarching framework 
for pro-poor water management and which guarantees the access and utilisation 
of water resources by poor people is a keystone in any initiative aiming at 
reducing poverty.       
Pro-poor water policies and regulations are advocated on several grounds. Many 
of the provided justifications are closely linked to the living conditions of the poor 
in the society and the fact that they are worse off and their situation and lives 
must be changed for the better. Trémolet and Hunt (2006: 3-4), for example, 
have rested their case for pro-poor water regulations on the following grounds: 
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• Poor people are served by a wide spectrum often informal operators and 
more likely not to be connected to the network due to connection charges; 
• When poor people are not connected, they often pay more for access to 
poor-quality water or intermittent services; 
• It is often hard for poor people to get their voices heard by the regulator 
and their preferences vary widely.  
For these reasons and because of the different forms of poor people’s 
vulnerability at different levels, water policymakers, water regulators and water 
managers have to take their needs and concerns into account when designing 
water policies, enforcing water regulations and taking water decisions.   
 The aforementioned discussion begs the question of how to make water policies 
and regulations work for the poor. In simple terms, pro-poor water policy and 
regulations are particularly favourable to poor people. These policies and 
regulations are expected to improve the living conditions of the poor relative to 
those better off in the society.  To this end, any regulatory and policy constraints 
to pro-poor service should be alleviated.  As put by Schreiner (2010: 3-5), a pro-
poor effort should aim to ensure that ‘(a) the poor have access to water for 
productive purposes; (b) that raw water quality is adequate, and (c) that access 
by the poor to goods and services provided by water resources is protected’. 
From this angle, pro-poor regulations and water policies are not just about 
making water available for poor people but they are also focusing on the quality 
of the provided water, which has an impact on the health of the poor. Pro-poor 
water policies should also protect the water-related products upon which poor 
people may depend for their food from being over-exploited by the rich.    
In a detailed discussion of the relationship between water and poverty and the 
ways in which water policies and regulations can work for the poor, Cleaver and 
Franks (2005) have adopted a governance perspective and come up with 
Analytical Frameworks for Water Governance. In the provided framework, the 
authors make a distinction between three main components of water governance 
systems: resources, mechanisms and outcomes. Their quest was to answer the 
question of how to make water governance systems work for the poor. According 
to their view, water governance resourced in terms of institutional resources, 
social structures, rights and entitlements, and financial resources determine the 
outcomes of water governance systems in general and for the poor in the society 
92 | P a g e  
 
in particular including access, livelihood, social inclusion and political voice. 
Nevertheless, water governance resources are most likely to be mediated by 
factors such as formal and informal relations, technology, natural environment, 
etc which interfere with the impact of these resources on poor people. 
Consequently, for water governance systems to work for the poor we need to 
make sure that the available resources as well as the mechanisms in place are 
all working towards achieving this end.      
According to Trémolet and Hunt (2006: 4), a pro-poor policy and regulatory 
framework should provide a framework for competition that allows the provision 
of a wide range of service solutions. Added to this, the dominant operators have 
to be incentivised in order to extend existing services while respecting basic 
quality requirements. A pro-poor policy and regulatory framework should also 
establish a tariff level and structure that encourage higher access to services 
without jeopardizing financial stability. All this must be done in a manner that 
benefits the poor in the society and guarantees the sustainability and the 
affordability of water services particularly for poor communities. To this end, the 
overall policy framework, as well as water regulations, should be flexible enough 
to accommodate the different forms of delivery methods, both formal and 
informal. Furthermore, quality standards should be tailored in line with local 
conditions and in a manner that reduces the cost of serving remote and scattered 
areas where most poor people live. Finally, the major criteria for the success or 
failure of pro-poor water policies is the extent to which these policies have 
contributed to improving the living conditions of poor people relative to those 
better off in the society.    
3.6 Conclusion  
 In this chapter, the water crisis has been presented as a governance issue that 
calls for the collaboration of state and non-state actors. The concept of water 
governance has been unpacked and the different components of this term have 
been explained and discussed. The conceptual discussion of water governance 
has indicated that this concept is still in the phase of formation. Different scholars, 
policymakers and water managers, in addition to other stakeholders have 
different meanings and understandings regarding water governance. 
Nevertheless, all these meanings and understandings share a common element, 
which is that the command-and-control and top-down approaches for water 
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management are no longer accepted and that water sectors are now open to the 
participation of state and non-state actors in making, enforcing, and evaluating  
water policies and regulations. The new model entails different roles and 
responsibilities for the participating actors. While state actors (e.g. water 
ministries and regulatory agencies) are responsible for developing the overall 
policy and regulatory framework for the entire sector and monitoring the 
behaviour of the rest of the stakeholders, private and other non-state actors are 
more involved in infrastructure development, service provision, and advocacy.  
Based on such a conceptualisation of water governance, the discussion moved 
on to look in detail into the overarching institutional framework governing state 
and non-state actors involved in making, implementing and evaluating water 
policies. The three main institutional components of water governance systems 
(policies, laws and management) have been identified and analysed. The 
interplay dynamics among these three components have been highlighted and 
the discussion showed that these three components are linked in practice. Water 
laws and policies are always in the background of any water decisions made by 
water managers and practitioners.      
The chapter has also concluded that managing water wisely comes at the heart 
of water governance perspectives. This means that developing water 
governance systems is not an end in itself but it is a means for addressing certain 
strategic issues in water sectors. The discussion in this chapter has focused on 
three of these issues: sustainability, gender and poverty. Effective water 
governance systems are required to deal with these ‘wicked’ water issues in the 
light of the existing complexity and uncertainty. Managing water wisely can be 
the way forward for achieving sustainability and sustainable development. Added 
to this, a gender-sensitive water governance system can help in reducing the 
gap of inequality between men and women and improving the living conditions 
of women in the society. It can also help women to capitalise on their experience 
and knowledge in managing water resources and to maximise their contributions 
to the entire society.  The discussion of the strategic issues in water governance 
has also indicated that pro-poor water policies are needed to address the issue 
of poverty and to improve the situation of poor people. Compared to the rich, 
poor people are more vulnerable and more affected by changes in the 
surrounding environment upon which many of their aspects of lives are 
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dependent. They are also more vulnerable to market failures and changes in 
water prices. Those water issues are particularly important for the developing 
countries including Egypt. Consequently any just, sustainable, and equitable 
water governance system should have built-in mechanisms to deal with those 
policy issues. The reliance on handling and managing those water issues from a 
governance perspective should not be the responsibility of state actors. Private 
and societal water stakeholders should be regarded as partners and designing 
and implementing water solutions and decisions (Rhodes, 2007; Bevir, 2013).   
With the meaning and main issues of water governance thus identified, the next 
chapter will focus on the ways in which policies, programmes, and governance 
systems are transferred from one context to another. The issue will be framed 
as a structure-agency dilemma to allow the investigation of the degree of 
freedom available to policymakers to adopt certain policies and models. 
Combining structure-agency insights with the notion of governance would help 
understanding the degree of freedom that water agents in general and water 
policy and decision-maker in Egypt in particular enjoy when they decide on water 
issues and reform initiatives.             
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CHAPTER 4: THE GOVERNANCE OF POLICY TRANSFER: A 
STRUCTURE-AGENCY PERSPECTIVE  
4.1 Introduction  
The theoretical and conceptual discussion of governance in chapters 2 and the 
conceptualisation of water governance in chapter 3 have indicated that all forms 
of governance include a process of interaction between state and non-state 
actors around a diverse array of policy issues. Such an interactive process is of 
political nature and determines policy outcomes and results, in many situations, 
in policy change. Nonetheless, the story is not as simple as it sounds; the 
question about policy change and what brings about such a change is a complex 
query that calls for a heuristic framework of analysis to help us understand how 
policy change takes place and what the role of ‘agency’ is in terms of the free 
actions taken by policy actors in motivating and initiating the change processes. 
To this end, and to continue the search for a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of water policy processes and governance arrangements, this chapter 
adopts a structure-agency approach in an attempt to unpack water policy 
governance. The aim is to examine the limits imposed by water structures on 
water policy agents when they try to bring about water policy change in water 
governance settings. Examining the structure-agency relationship is particularly 
important to explain the decisions and actions taken by Egyptian water policy-
makers and water stakeholders while dealing with the water challenges facing 
Egypt. A structure-agency perspective on water governance should also help 
underlining the limitations imposed on Egyptian water policy agents by existing 
national, regional, and international water structures (see chapters 7 and 8).   
In that sense, this chapter provides the link between governance as an overall 
environment within which policies and reform models are transferred across 
countries and role of the governance structures and agency in facilitating or 
hindering this process. The chapter is organised in three sections. In section one, 
the structure-agency dilemma in policy analysis will be discussed in order to 
highlight what structures are, what constitutes an agency and how the two 
elements interact. Section two will focus on discussing the notion and the models 
of policy transfer in an attempt to distinguish policy transfer from other similar 
concepts including policy learning, lesson drawing, and policy diffusion. In 
section three, the policy transfer approach will be examined from a structure and 
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agency perspective in order to explain the role of structures and agency in 
bringing in policy change. 
4.2 The Agency-Structure Dilemma and Policy Analysis 
The agency-structure dilemma is an ongoing challenge in political science and 
policy analysis. The debate around this issue raises many unanswered questions 
including: are policy actors free to make their own choices or is their freedom 
governed by whatever norms, values, and rules are imposed by social 
structures? Can policy agency change structures? If so, how and under what 
conditions does this happen? To answer these questions is to resolve one of the 
most problematic issues in social sciences in general and policy science in 
particular and that is the agency-structure dilemma. Different academics have 
different conceptualisations of what constitutes an agency and what can be 
regarded as structure. They also hold divergent perceptions concerning the 
relationship between these two social constructs. A structure-centred approach 
will tend to assume that individuals’ actions are determined by social structures 
while an agent-centred account is more likely to assume that those individuals 
are free agents and their actions are not so determined (Stets and Burke, 2003).  
My contention in this chapter is that a better understanding of policy phenomena 
requires a full consideration by policy analysts of the interplay between structure 
and agency. In other words, instead of conceiving agency and structure as being 
two opposing concepts or rather than reducing one feature of either domain to 
the other, a dialectical approach that focuses on agency-structure interactions is 
intuitively most compelling. The scope of this chapter is relatively limited in 
comparison to the challenges that the issue of agency-structure brings to policy 
analysis. Therefore, the aim of the chapter is two-fold: first, it seeks to highlight 
the major trends and academic contributions to the agency-structure debate by 
examining the different ontological, epistemological and methodological 
underpinnings of this debate, which in turn determine how different accounts 
conceptualise agency and structure and visualise the relationship between these 
two concepts. Second, and arguably more importantly, the chapter seeks to 
underline the significance and the implications of this debate for policy science 
and policy analysis.  
To this end, the chapter is divided into three main sections. Section one provides 
a conceptual and theoretical background for the agency-structure debate as 
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reflected in social and policy literature. In section two, the relationship between 
agency and structure will be brought into sharper focus to find out how social and 
policy scientists have attempted to solve the dilemma of the priority of either 
individual agency or social structure. The chapter concludes with section three, 
which discusses the significance of the agency-structure issue to policy sciences 
and policy analysis.  
4.2.1 Agency, Structure, and Policy Analysis: A Conceptual and Theoretical 
Background   
The axiom ‘structure-agency’ is regularly used by scholars to denote a meta-
theoretical debate about social science explanation (Weaver and Gioia, 1994). 
In this context, many policy analysts have emphasized the importance and 
centrality of structure and agency concepts for the notion of power and in turn, 
for the study of politics and policy analysis (Hay, 1995, 2002; McAnulla, 2002). 
In this respect, Hay (2002:3) has stated that a policy analysis is, then, one, which 
draws attention to the power relations implicated in social relations. The terrain 
of policy analysis should include all perspectives, whether consciously policy 
related or not, which might have something to say about the distribution and 
exercise of power. Consequently, the sphere of policy analysis is broad indeed, 
ranging from the narrow policy analysis of narrow policy variables to the 
sociology of structural inequality within contemporary societies. Hence, it is 
paramount from this perspective to conceptualise these two aspects of social 
reality in order to provide a deeper understanding of policy phenomena.  
Nonetheless, defining what is meant by ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ in the agency-
structure debate is problematic for several reasons: (1) both concepts are closely 
interrelated to the extent that focusing on one of them and trying to define it 
resembles focusing on one side of a coin and ignoring the other one or telling 
one part of a story and disregarding the other part; (2) different policy theorists 
take different standpoints which affect the way they describe each of these two 
concepts; (3) both concepts are quite abstract and mean different things to 
different policy analysts; (4) the debate about the conceptualisation of agency 
and structure concepts intersects with the discussion which has gone on for 
centuries in the form of a variety of dualisms (McAnulla, 2002). This discussion 
has varied according to the particular social science discipline or the 
philosophical stance of particular authors. In this sense, different variations of the 
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agency-structure debate can be identified under diverse names such as 
voluntarism vs. determinism, micro vs. macro, individualism vs. collectivism, 
subjectivism vs. objectivism, and holism vs. individualism (see Carlsnaes, 1992). 
Having said that, the purpose of this section is to provide a conceptual and 
theoretical background which paves the way for a more rigorous discussion of 
the agency-structure relationship and its implications for policy analysis.        
Giddens (1984: 16-17) has noted that from a functionalist point of view, structure 
can be regarded as the ‘patterning of social relations or social phenomena’. At 
the same time, a structuralist perspective on the same concept may present it as 
‘an intersection of presence and absence; underlying codes (that) have to be 
interred from surface manifestations’ (Giddens, 1984: 16). In other words, 
structure can be conceived in terms of the social, economic, and policy contexts 
wherein action occurs (compare with Hay, 1995). According to Giddens (1984), 
neither functionalist nor structuralist perspectives are sufficient to capture the 
whole notion of structure and agency. While these perspectives focus primarily 
on the structure, they leave no room for agency. Following on from this 
observation and based on a distinction between the concept of structure and the 
concept of system, Giddens (1984: 17) has defined structure as ‘an ensemble of 
formal and habitual rules and resources’. This definition of structure is useful in 
the sense that it is wide enough to provide a space for the analysis of agency 
and at the same time, it highlights the rules and the habits of the institutions and 
actors. Similarly, McAnulla (2002: 271) defines structure as ‘the context or 
material conditions which define the range of actions available to actors’. 
Based on such notions, structures are sometimes wrongly conceived as stable 
constructs just because they change at a slower pace than agents do. This 
misunderstanding has been underlined by scholars who have clearly indicated 
in their conceptualisations of structure the dynamic nature of these constructs 
and their tendency to change over time. A good example in this regard would the 
definition of Cerny (1990: 4), who describes structures as ‘the pattern of 
constraints and opportunities for action and choice’. In this sense, what 
constitutes a structural constraint for one agent can be seen as a conjectural 
opportunity liable to be transformed by another (Jessop, 1996: 8). As soon as 
structures develop, they tend to incorporate incremental changes and to 
reproduce themselves. Wearing the same analytical lenses, Sibeon (1999:142) 
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has defined structure as the ‘relatively enduring though not immutable 
circumstances within which actors operate’. By focusing on the duality or the 
dualism of the structure and agency, Bourdieu (1991) has described structures 
as ‘the durable set of dispositions which we carry around in our heads as social 
actors as a result of our experience in certain kinds of backgrounds and 
circumstances (class, language, ethnicity, gender and so on). This definition is 
very close in its nature and content to what Giddens says about structure. Both 
scholars conceive structure as the external social context of an agency’s 
behaviour. In the same vein comes the definition of Sztompka (1993: 213), who 
regards structures as ‘abstract social wholes of a super-individual sort, 
representing social reality sui generis (societies, cultures, civilizations, socio-
economic formations, social systems, etc)’. Added to this, Layder (1994: 5) 
describes structure as ‘the social relationships which provide the social context 
or conditions under which people act’.     
A common feature among the above-mentioned definitions is that they provide 
broad conceptualisations of structures as 'context', a 'set of dispositions', 'social 
relationships', 'circumstances' or 'patterns'. From this angle, social structures can 
be everything that is not an agent. In an attempt to shape the concept in a more 
precise way, social scientists have controlled the use of language and tried to 
distinguish structure from other related concepts such as systems and social 
chance (see Giddens, 1984 and Sibeon, 1999). Some other scholars have 
admitted to the difficulty of producing an agreed upon definition of structure and 
they have left this task completely to the agency as they see that agents are 
more capable of defining the structure wherein they exist (see for example Buller, 
1999). Although it makes a lot of sense to leave the task of defining structures to 
the agents, following this line of thought may disregard the fact that social reality 
can be observed independently of the agents’ perceptions which means that 
structure is real and should be defined (Lewis, 2000). Despite the fact that there 
is no universal definition of the concept of structure, the discussion thus far has 
shown that at least two main characteristics can be attributed to this concept: 
dynamisms and contextualisation. In other words, social structures should be 
regarded as dynamic constructs, which have the ability to change and to respond 
to agents’ actions. They also should be conceived as wider frameworks and 
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contexts wherein policy agents interact and try to pursue their own goals and 
achieve their own interests.  
As with structure, the term ‘agent’, has been used by different scholars to refer 
to different things.  Some scholars used the term in a strict fashion to refer to 
individual human beings (Foucault, 1980; Layder, 1994) and some others have 
widened the meaning of this concept to include individuals and groups 
(Sztompka, 1993; Sibeon, 1999). Giddens (1976: 75) has defined agency as ‘the 
stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the 
ongoing process of events-in-the-world’. According to Layder (1994: 5), agency 
is ‘the ability of human beings to make a difference in the world’. In this context, 
agency corresponds with action that individual agents take to achieve their goals. 
Scholars from the field of international relations have focused on the individual 
elite members who share the same international structure. From this angle, 
agency can be defined as ‘the individual international elite’ (Friedman and Starr, 
1997: 16). Policy agents reflect this concept in practice through their ‘willingness 
to act’ in relation to the environment which may provide them with opportunities 
or challenges. The same logic applies to water sectors as water decision-making 
elite can be identified and their role in changing water governance institutions 
can be investigated in order to underline the relationship between water agents 
and water structures that may interfere with agents’ willingness to act upon water 
policy issues and problems.   
From a wider perspective, scholars such as Sibeon (1999:141) describe agents 
as ‘an entity that, in principle has the means of formulating and acting upon 
decisions’. From this angle, it is not necessary for agents to be human beings; 
they can be any form of social actors including, for example, trade unions, 
governmental organisations, and syndicates. The main feature that distinguishes 
these social actors as agents from other social entities is their ability to make 
decisions. Without having the capability of making decisions and taking actions, 
no social entity can be classified as an agent (see Hindess, 1986: 116). In 
contrast with Sibeon (1999: 213) has broadened his definition of agents to 
include all forms of social actors, whether they have decision-making capabilities 
or not. According to him, an agent could be individuals or members of concrete 
collectives such as groups, associations, communities, or social movements. 
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None of these definitions are instinctively good or bad. The way in which agents 
are defined is determined to a great extent by the theoretical standpoints taken 
by the above-mentioned scholars. To put it bluntly, those who are driven by 
theory building are most likely to widen their definitions of agents to include 
different formal and informal social actors. This can be understood and justified 
on the grounds that their core objective is to highlight the theoretical links 
between agents and their wider social structures. A broad definition of agency 
can fulfil this task. On the other hand, scholars who are primarily motivated by 
empirical goals are expected to adopt a narrow and more concrete concept of 
agency that may help them to test certain hypotheses about the relationship 
between agency and structure.  
Following on from the above discussion it can be concluded that the concepts of 
structure and agency are quite fluid and deeply entwined. Agents are implicated 
in structure and structure is occupied by agents. In other words, what can be 
seen as a structure from one angle may be considered as an agency from 
another perspective and vice-versa. A policy institution for instance represents a 
structure for those who join it but for the parliament and other governmental 
bodies, it is an agency. Additionally, Hay (2002:23) notes that international 
institutions and organisations, although in some sense themselves the product 
of state action, may come to assume an independent identity and display agency 
in their own right. As Dowding (2008: 25) puts it, ‘some accounts of agents are 
themselves deeply structural; and some accounts of structure implicate agents’. 
Therefore, when we conceptualise an agency, this should be done in relation to 
structures and when structures are defined this also should be done in relation 
to an agency.  
With the concepts of structure and agency so discussed the focus will now be on 
what is meant by policy analysis. As noted by Hay (2002), a distinction can be 
made between policy analysts who provide a limited and impoverished 
conception of policy analysis by focusing on narrowly policy variables and those 
who introduce a wider conception of this type of analysis that includes extra-
policy variables and incorporates a full range of analytical strategies that might 
inform policy inquiry. The first group of analysts tend to narrow down the meaning 
of policy analysis and to use it interchangeably with analytical politics particularly 
those traditions which focus on rationalism and rational choice. This 
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conceptualisation of policy analysis is important but not sufficient to capture the 
whole range of policy activities. In the words of Hay (2002:3), ‘[T]he policy should  
be defined in such a way as to encompass the entire sphere of the social’. In this 
sense, all events, processes and practices which occur within the social sphere 
have the potential to be policy and, hence, to be amenable to policy analysis. 
This is not to say that policy is indistinguishable from other economic or cultural 
aspects of the social life. What makes a policy analysis policy is the emphasis it 
places on the policy aspect of social relations.  
Having identified and discussed the three main concepts used in this chapter, 
the following two sections seek to map out the major perspectives which have 
come to define mainstream debate about the relationships between agency and 
structure and the significance of such a debate for policy analysis. This 
discussion is necessary for the conceptualization of policy transfer governance 
from a structure-agency perspective later in the chapter. 
4.2.2 Bridging the Agency-Structure Divide: Uni-Dimensional and 
Dialectical Approaches in Policy Analysis   
The question of the agency-structure relationship has consistently plagued policy 
analysis and divided policy analysts. The crux of this issue is to define the 
relationship between policy actors and policy institutions, between policy conduct 
and policy context, between structure and agency (Hay, 2002). Many social and 
policy theorists have attempted to reconcile agency and structure and to bridge 
the agency-structure divide. The problem with identifying the relationship 
between structure and agency is that this issue is entangled with different 
theoretical and empirical predicaments.  According to Dessler (1989: 443), this 
problem emerges from two uncontentious truths about social life, ‘first that 
human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and 
outcomes of the social world; and second, that human agency can be realized 
only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the possibility for action 
and influence its course’. The agency-structure debate has been fuelled by the 
contributions of scholars from two main rival theoretical camps: the 
unidimensional and the dialectical (see Table 4.1).  
As the table indicates, the problem with the one-sided approaches in policy 
analysis such as structuralism, functionalism, and intentionalism is that they are 
unidirectional and tend to give prominence to either the structure or the agent. 
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Within the Marxist traditions, for instance, there is a tendency to focus on 
structure as a superior to agency. As stated by Marx, ‘men make their own 
history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves 
have chosen’ (see Hay, 2002: 117).  
 Theoretical Approaches Agency-Structure Relationship 
 
 
 
Unidimensional  
Approaches 
Behaviouralism Structural  regularities as exhibited in 
policy behaviour 
 Rationalism  Agency is reducible to the structural 
context in which it is exercised. 
Structuralism 
 
 Tends to reduce social and policy 
outcomes to the operation of 
institutional or structural beyond the 
control of actors 
Intentionalism Tends to account for observable 
effects in purely agential terms 
Marxism Structure as a superior to agency 
Functionalism Social wholes are more important than 
social participants 
 
 
Dialectical 
Approaches 
Structuration theory The structural characteristics of social 
systems as both medium and outcome 
of social practices. 
Archer’s morphogenetic  
approach 
Agency and structure cannot be 
analysed simultaneously because in 
reality they do not coexist through time 
Institutionalisms, 
constructivism, critical theorists 
and other  post-positivists 
Focuses on the dynamic relationship 
between conduct and context, agents 
and structure 
 
Table 4.1: Structure-Agency Relationship from Different Theoretical Perspectives 
 
This is not to say that these theoretical accounts are by nature static as some 
scholars within these traditions have admitted the interactive and dynamic nature 
of the relationship between structure and agency (see Jessop, 1990). However, 
even with this consideration of the dynamic agency-structure relationship, 
Marxists still give more weight to the static structure and less weight to the 
dynamic agents acting within these structures. To give an example, the state can 
be regarded according to Marxist traditions as a static social structure within 
which different types of dynamic but less important agents such as interest 
groups and policy networks interact and try to pursue their own interests. The 
structural elements in this example determine to a great extent the way in which 
agents interact and in turn what they can get out of this interaction (Jessop, 
1990). 
In this context, structuralist recognise that there are specific conditions which 
produce policy actions and shape policy behaviour. Because these conditions 
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change through time and space then policy agents do not enjoy absolute 
freedom in determining their own affairs. Structuralist have been criticised on the 
grounds that by focusing on the individual's position in a hierarchy, their accounts 
underestimate the reflexivity and autonomy of human actions and the role of 
ambiguity and ambivalence of human experience. Similar to the Marxists, the 
functionalists see the structure as a superior element in agency-structure 
relationships. According to them, social wholes are more important than social 
participants as they normally are related to particular functions. In this sense, 
functionalists tend to take policy structures as a starting point to understanding 
and explaining policy behaviour and the way in which policy systems work.  
Mouzelis (1995) gives a good example of a functionalist account that has 
attempted to re-establish a balanced framework of analysis to the relationship 
between agency and structure. This is not to say that these theoretical accounts 
are by nature static as some scholars within these traditions have acknowledged 
the interactive and dynamic nature of the relationship between structure and 
agency (see Jessop, 1990). However, even with this consideration of the 
dynamic agency-structure relationship, Marxists still give more weight to the 
static structure and less weight to the dynamic agents acting within these 
structures. One of the major insights of this work for social scientists in general 
and for policy scientists in particular is that different structures and different 
agents possess different levels of power and in turn have different impact on 
shaping social realities. Another strand of the unidimensional approaches can be 
found in the intentional accounts, which focus on individuals and try to present 
the social world as a series of complex interactions. The most important 
contributions in this regard come from symbolic interactionist and the 
phenomenological approaches in sociology. One of the merits of these accounts, 
as noted by Layder (1994), is that they tend to focus on the micro level in order 
to explain the way in which individual agents behave. By doing this, they have 
diverted the debate from focusing on the macro level and big narratives of the 
Marxists and the functionalists to focus on more practical and lively issues. 
The unidimensional approaches to policy analysis that consider agency-structure 
relationships have been criticised on different grounds. Chief among these 
critiques is that these accounts tend to overlook the dialectical and dynamic 
interactions between these two concepts when focusing on one of them and 
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giving it supremacy over the other. In this sense, these approaches ignore the 
totality and the inclusiveness of the issue by focusing only on one side of the coin 
and disregarding the other (see Hay, 1995; Bhaskar, 1997). In other words, the 
major flaw of the unidimensional approaches is that they do not explain how 
agency and structure work together to shape policy reality, to produce policy 
outcomes, or to create policy institutions. Added to this, these approaches tend 
to ignore the complex and dialectical nature of policy phenomena. Taking this 
criticism as a starting point, the dialectical accounts on agency-structure 
relationships have emphasised that, at the ontological and epistemological 
levels, social and in turn, policy reality exists and entails subjective interpretation. 
Many contributions come under the umbrella of the dialectal approaches 
including Giddens’s structuration theory (1984), critical realism as presented in 
the work of Bhaskar (1986) and Sztompka (1993), Archer’s analytical dualism 
(1996), plus the duality and dualism approach as presented by Mouzelis (1995).  
The theory of structuration as presented by Giddens represents a landmark 
compared to the previous efforts, which attempted to conceptualise and explain 
the nature of the relationship between structure and agency. In this theory, 
Giddens suggests that dualism, in which classical unidimensional approaches 
conceptualise the structure-agency relationship, should be replaced with the 
concept of duality of structure. In his words, ‘the constitution of agents and 
structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but 
represent a duality' (Giddens, 1984: 25). In this sense, the structural 
characteristics of social systems can be conceived as both medium and outcome 
of the practices they recursively organise. Consequently, policy systems are 
created through the ‘dynamic reproduction of social structures over time as a 
skilled accomplishment on the part of social actors’ (Hay, 2002: 119). In addition 
to presenting the concept of duality of structure, the theory of structuration has 
also made another contribution by emphasising the element of time. According 
to Giddens the dialectal relationship between structure and agency does not take 
place in a vacuum. On the contrary, this relationship is bounded by a particular 
space and time. Taylor (1993) has noted that by introducing the reader to the 
dialectical interrelationship of structure and agency and to the importance of time 
as an intervening factor, the theory of structuration has provided   as a way out 
of the problem of structure and agency (see also McAnulla 2002). According to 
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Hay (2002: 118) the theory of structuration provides a ‘third ontology’ beyond 
structuralism and intentionalism. Despite its popularity, Giddens’ theory of 
structuration has been criticised on different grounds. For instance, Blaikie 
(1993) has noted that the central concepts in the theory (structuration and duality 
of structure) are inadequately developed. Additionally, in contrast with Giddens’s 
notion about the duality of agency and structure, he has emphasized that the 
relationship between these two concepts is one of tension.  Jessop (1996) has 
also argued that Giddens has mistakenly mixed different concepts dualism and 
dialectism. According to their view, a truly dialectical approach should 
acknowledge the contradictions inherent within structure-agency relationships 
and consider their effects on the construction of policy reality. In the words of ‘the 
dualistic dichotomy of absolute external constraints and unconditional, free-
willed subjective action’ needs to be replaced with ‘the dualized conceptual 
couplet of an emergent, contingent social structure and the actions selected by 
agents’ (Jessop, 1996:6). 
Based on a distinction between analytical and philosophical dualism, Archer 
(1985, 1996) has made her contribution to the debate on structure-agency 
relationship. According to her view, there is a difference between these two forms 
of dualism as analytical dualism starts from the dialectal relationship between 
agency and structure but at the same time, it emphasises that these two 
concepts cannot be analysed simultaneously because in reality they do not 
coexist through time. Instead of the notion of structuration presented by Giddens, 
Archer proposes the concept of morphogenesi as an analytic tool of changes 
structures. Morphogenetic simply means ‘society has no pre-set form of 
preferred state…it takes its shape from and is formed by, agents, originating from 
the intended and unintended consequences of their actions’ (1996:5). For her, 
this concept does not only imply a process but leads to an end product as well in 
terms of structural elaboration. As she puts it, ‘the morphogenetic perspective is 
not only dualistic but sequential, dealing in endless cycles of structural 
conditioning/social interaction/structural elaboration – thus unravelling the 
dialectical interplay between structure and action' (1985: 61). 
Critical realists do not accept the notion of analytical and dualism as presented 
by Archer. They also have a conception of the relationship between structure 
and agency, which emphasises a closer relationship between these two 
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concepts than the one presented by Giddens. According to Sztompka (1993: 
217), ‘structure and agent are fused together in one human social world'. Instead 
of looking at structure and agency as two sides of the same coin, critical realists 
see them as ‘two metals in the alloy from which the coin is moulded' (see Hay, 
1995: 200). To put it another way, both structure and agency are self-contained 
concepts but working in different ways and governed by different dynamics. For 
structure, three principles govern their dynamics: inertia, momentum, and 
sequence. Inertia means that things are more likely to continue working as they 
already do. Momentum indicates that when a phase is reached it is likely to 
proceed to the next one. Finally, the principle of sequence claims that there are 
routines in social life which have to be followed (Sztompka, 1993: 215). For 
agents, the story is different as their behaviour does not follow certain patterns, 
which means they are free to do what they want within the existing structures.   
Rather than focusing on the duality and the dualism of structure and agency, 
Mouzelis (1995) has taken a more flexible and pragmatic approach to dealing 
with this issue. According to his view, both duality and dualism can exist in 
structure-agency relationships. In this sense, duality will exist when actors 
reproduce the social structures and dualism when actors distance themselves 
from social structures (Sibeon, 1999: 140). One of the main merits of this 
approach is that it does not presume a certain type of relationship between 
structure and agency and then take it a starting point for the analysis. Instead, 
the researcher should be open to the different possibilities that may be found in 
the relationship between agency and structure. Another merit is that in addition 
to this flexibility, the approach holds some helpful insights regarding the 
dialectical relationship between these two concepts, which can be empirically 
relevant. The major contribution presented by Mouzelis (1995) in his treatment 
of the agency-structure issue is his distinction between macro and micro levels 
in structure-agency relationships. According to him, both agency and structures 
can be found at the macro and micro levels. In his words, 'whether we are dealing 
with actors/interactions or institutional structures, macro refers to cases where 
the impact of institutionalised rules (when instantiated) or actors practices stretch 
widely in time and space; micro applies where this impact is very limited' 
(Mouzelis, 1995: 155). From this angle, agents are seen as products and 
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producers of social structures. However, agents at the macro level are more of 
producers than products and vice-versa.  
One merit of the dialectical approaches to the agency-structure debate 
compared to the unidimensional ones is that instead of regarding the relationship 
between these two constructs as being problematic, these theoretical accounts 
consider agency and structure as ‘a language by which ontological differences 
between contending accounts might be registered’ (Hay, 2002: 90-91). To put it 
another way, rather than problematizing the relationship between agency and 
structure, the dialectic approaches acknowledge the fact that this debate exists 
because policy analysts conceive policy phenomena in different ways and thus 
conceptualise the structure-agency relationship differently.   
4.2.3 The Significance of Structure-Agency Debate to Policy Analysis  
As the discussion hitherto illustrates, prominent policy and social scientists have 
suggested that the structure-agency question is among the most important 
theoretical issues within the social sciences. It is an inescapable issue when 
attempting to understand social reality and to explain policy phenomena. As Hay 
(1995:189) puts it, ‘every time we construct a notion of social, policy or economic 
causality we appeal to ideas about structure and agency’. In this sense, 
‘questions of structure and agency, however implicit, are implicated in all 
attempts to fashion notions of social and policy analysis’ (2000:55). Archer 
(1996) has also highlighted the importance of structure-agency debate to social 
sciences. According to her, ‘in facing up to the problem of structure and agency 
social theorists are not just addressing crucial technical problems in the study of 
society, they are also confronting the most pressing social problem of the human 
condition’ (1996: xii). From this angle, it can be safely argued that the agency-
structure debate can deepen our understanding about policy phenomena and 
help us conceive policy systems.  
At the normative level, the structure-agency debate indicates the importance of 
answering fundamental questions about the ability of policy agents to act freely 
within the existing policy structures. In the words of Hay (2002:28), the thorny 
perennial question of the structure and agency relationship is basically about ‘the 
relationship between policy conduct and the context within which it occurs and 
acquires significance’. This issue has been a concern for policy theorists for a 
long time but with no clear-cut answer. Between methodological individualism, 
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and its emphasis on individuals’ actions as the main source for understanding 
social and policy reality and the denial of the structuralists that individual human 
beings are the ultimate social reality, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. No 
one can safely argue that policy agents are totally free. At the same time, it would 
be unrealistic to assume that all policy actions are determined by the rules, 
norms, and structural features of our contexts. It is true that policy agents cannot 
act completely in isolation of the impact of policy structures but their actions and 
behaviour may result in changing these structures.        
Additionally, the debate around the relationship between structure and agency 
provides broader linkages into issues of policy theory and a more reflexive and 
conscious use of the policy phenomena under study. In this context, policy 
theorists attempt to answer significant questions about the relationship between 
policy agents and policy institutions or between the micro and macro levels of 
policy interaction. Identifying such relationships is crucial for understanding how 
policy systems function and explaining the way in which agents behave under 
certain structural conditions. Therefore, scholars such as Layder (1994) have 
highlighted the importance of the agency-structure debate and presented it as a 
fundamental precondition for conceiving different forms of social behaviour and 
informing social, economic and policy change.   
The agency-structure debate also has a direct implication for the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological positions adopted in any policy research 
endeavour. In this sense, this debate can enlighten scholars concerning the way 
in which theorists and policy scientists observe the world around them and 
perceive the different aspects of policy reality. Focusing on structure and agency 
can expose the main ontological assumptions held by policy analysts. At the 
epistemological level, the structure agency debate can inform us about the way 
in which scholars in the different fields of policy sciences build-up their 
knowledge with regard to policy phenomena. Methodologically speaking, the 
discussion of structure and agency can highlight the different tools and methods 
used by social scientists to collect data about social phenomena. Having said 
that, one should expect different ontological, methodical and epistemological 
assumptions to be held by policy analysts based on the way in which they 
perceive the relationship between agents and structures (see Audi, 1995). For 
instance, it is more likely for a researcher who follows the positivist research 
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traditions to have different ontological, epistemological and methodological 
concerns from another one who takes realism as a starting point for his analysis. 
Additionally, a methodological approach that departs from a positivist 
perspective on the phenomenon under investigation may lead the investigator to 
adopt quantitative analysis to examine the relationships between the variables 
rather than following qualitative traditions. 
With power relations coming at the heart of the agency-structure debate, the 
implications can be insightful for policy analysts. As noted by Harold Lasswell 
(1936), the investigation of who gets what, when and how is of a great 
significance to policy scientists. The question about the ability of policy actors to 
act freely in the context of the existing social and institutional structures has been 
of a great importance to politics students and scholars. The dynamic interaction 
between agents and structure can be policy intuitive with regard to showing the 
limits of agents to take specific decisions or to enforce certain rules. A look at the 
overall institutional environment of policymakers, for example, can tell us a lot 
about what they can and cannot do. It would also be very enlightening in this 
respect to observe how structures and institutions gradually change in response 
to the acts that agents take and the decisions they make. The debate around 
super and sub structures in Marxist traditions and how the former shape the later 
has too many implications regarding the way that we can understand policy 
systems and social order in any society at any given point. In a deterministic 
fashion, this debate has highlighted the limitations of individual agency and 
concluded that agents can make their own choices; however, under 
circumstances which are out of their choices. Following on from this it can be 
emphasised that a good understanding of the structure-agency debate can 
enable policy analysts to acknowledge the impact of agency-structures 
relationships on the way that policy events and actions explained. For instance, 
it can highlight the rules and role of different policy actors and in turn, their 
responsibilities about their actions. In international relations, for example, the 
decision to reform and privatise water sectors is made by water policy and 
decision-makers who can be held responsible for their decision in front of the 
public. However, we should also not forget that while working on this decision 
such water agents are faced with many structural elements that have either 
facilitated or obstructed the final decision. Hence, by regarding the both sides of 
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the coin (structure and agency) many policy decisions, actions, and changes can 
be explained.    
To recapitulate, at the conceptual level, the boundaries between agency and 
structure are blurred. In Takashi’s words (2005:15), ‘agents are implicated in 
structure and structure in agents’. Consequently, any attempt to separate these 
two concepts would only be for the sake of explanation of their relative influence 
on the outcomes, events or institutions under investigation As Loyal and Barnes 
(2001:31) state: 
‘[A]gency stands for the freedom of the contingently acting subject over and against 
the constraints that are thought to derive from enduring social structures. To the 
extent that human beings have agency, they may act independently of and in 
opposition to structural constraints, and/or may (re)constitute social structures 
through their freely chosen actions. To the extent that they lack agency, human 
beings are conceived of as automata, following the dictates of social structures and 
exercising no choice in what they do. That, at any rate, is the commonest way of 
contrasting agency and structure in the context of what has become known as the 
structure/agency debate’  
Hence, a dualism approach for dealing with these two aspects of social theory 
cannot overcome many problems related to framing the debate in a way that 
emphasises the pre-eminence of one aspect at the expense of the other. Instead, 
a duality perspective that highlights the dynamic interactive nature between 
these two social constructs can be more enlightening and more likely to result in 
bridging the gap between structures and agents. 
With the structure-agency dilemma in policy analysis explained and discussed, 
the next section will be devoted to unpacking the notion of policy transfer from 
a structure-agency perspective. 
4.3 Theories of Policy Transfer: Structures, Agency, and Change 
As noted by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 20), ‘an increasing amount of policy 
development, and particularly policy change, in contemporary polities is affected 
by policy transfer. As such, when we are analysing policy change we always 
need to ask the question: Is policy transfer involved?’  In this section, the 
discussion will focus on theorizing and conceptualizing the policy transfer 
governance notion using a structure-agency framework of analysis. It is my 
contention that the governance of policy transfer extends beyond the process of 
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importing models and practices from other jurisdictions and transplanting them 
the way they are in the receiving environments. Many previous studies, 
particularly those addressing the issue of lesson drawing have focused on this 
element as will be discussed later in this section. For the purpose of this study, 
and taking into account the pervious conceptualization of governance and the 
discussion of the agency-structure dilemma, it will not be enough to focus merely 
on the transfer process itself. For a better understanding of policy transfer 
governance systems, the dialectical relationships between existing structural 
components of policy transfer environments and the way they either limit or 
widen the scope of policy options available for policymakers should be brought 
into sharper focus and discussion.   
In any policy transfer process, there are different state and non-state actors 
interacting at different functional and territorial levels in an attempt to influence 
final decisions with regard to what model or practices are to be transferred.  In 
such a context, all policy actors involved are governed by existing structures in 
their interactions, which interfere with policymakers’ agency when selecting 
specific models, ideas, or practices. Such an understanding of policy transfer 
governance will allow the examination of how existing governance structures and 
agency come into play when deciding upon selected practices and models. To 
put it another way, the discussion in this section will contribute to the current 
debate on policy transfer by going beyond the typical questions about which 
actors are included in the transfer process or the lessons to be drawn from 
certain experiences, to examine the way in which actors are situated in relation 
to each other and how their positions within existing structures influence 
interactive processes of transferring models and practices. Additionally, instead 
of focusing on the relationship between policy transferee and policy change in 
importing jurisdictions, the locus of the discussion in this section will be on how 
policy transfer contributes to the creation of new institutional arrangements 
including independent regulators. 
4.3.1 Policy Transfer Governance: Clarifying the Concepts  
Policy scholars use different terminology to describe the process of transferring 
ideas, practices and institutions. Common among those conceptual constructs 
are: lesson drawing, policy learning, policy diffusion, policy governance and 
policy transfer. All these concepts share the idea that policymakers worldwide 
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can learn from each other’s experience and that policy ideas, practices and 
institutions can be transferred and moved across time and space. This is not to 
say that these concepts can be used interchangeably as scholars have 
underlined differences among them.      
At the outset, lesson drawing is defined by Rose (2002: 3) as ‘a process of 
applying knowledge about a program in one country to the design of a program 
in another’. Such a conceptualization implies a process of policy learning in which 
policymakers motivated by a high level of dissatisfaction in their countries about 
certain policy issues, or by dysfunctional policy programs, start looking for 
solutions and lessons to learn and draw from countries with similar conditions. In 
this context, the meaning of learning goes way beyond the mere descriptions of 
policy solutions worked elsewhere or the exact copying of models and practices 
from other jurisdictions. As Gilardi (2010: 651) puts it, learning is ‘a process 
whereby policymakers change their beliefs about the effects of policies’. From 
this angle, policy learning is a complex process that includes an active 
engagement of policymakers in studying, selecting, and evaluating policy options 
and lessons from other countries given the existing structures and contexts within 
which they work (see Figure 4.1).         
                 
Figure 4.1: Modelling the Process of Policy Learning  
Developed by the researcher based on the discussion provided by Rose (2002) 
As the figure indicates, when deciding upon what lessons to draw from the 
experience of other countries and what lessons are to be learnt, policymakers 
normally go through three main phases: the search for a lesson, lesson 
development, and adopting and justifying lessons. The first step in stage one is 
to identify the problem at stake or the policy issue(s) causing dissatisfaction in 
Modeling Policy Learning
(1) In search for a lesson
•What is the problem?
•Where to search for 
lessons?
•How functional is the 
selected model?
•What is needed to make 
the model work for 
importing country?
(2) Lesson development
•How to design the new 
program/idea?
•What are the enablers and 
constraints in the 
surrounding environment?
•What is needed for the 
success of the transferred 
model/practice?
(3) Adopting and 
justifying lessons
•Why the adopted 
model/pratcice?
•What would be the 
outcomes of adoption?
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the society. Once the issue is identified clearly, policymakers start looking for 
countries with a similar policy problem and attempt to learn from their experience. 
In this context, policymakers study the solutions provided by other countries and 
how successful those solutions were in addressing the issue at stake. Based on 
such an investigation, policymakers can decide upon the suitability of the studied 
solutions to be transferred into their own context. Once a lesson is agreed, the 
design process starts, in which adaptation to the existing policy environment is a 
paramount. The adopted lesson/practice has to be introduced to the society as 
the solution for the policy issue(s) under examination. In this sense, a convincing 
justification has to be presented and the expected outcomes of adopting the new 
lesson/solution have to be explained.            
As noted by Rose (2002: 3), the term lesson refers to ‘a proposed program for 
dealing with a problem that makes use of the experience of a program dealing 
with the same problem in another country or countries’. In this context, learning 
lessons from the experience of other countries entails a crucial and an active role 
for policymakers who act as agents for policy transfer. An effort is needed to 
understand the lesson(s) to be drawn in its own context and to decide upon what 
modifications are needed for the same lesson(s) to work in different contexts. As 
put by Rose (2002: 3), ‘[L]earners are not passive pupils but policymakers 
actively trying to formulate or decide about the program’. When selecting lessons 
to learn policymakers have to muddle through different trade-offs, chief of which 
is the balance between desirability and practicality.  From this perspective, 
lesson drawing is ‘a tool that can be used in many different contexts and to 
different ends. It can stimulate a government to adopt a novel program or lead to 
the conclusion that what is deemed best practice elsewhere cannot or should not 
be introduced here’ (Rose 2002: 2). 
One of the merits of lesson drawing is that it bridges that gap between two 
competing camps of scholars and practitioners: the universalists and those who 
support the contextual approach. On the one hand, the universalists believe in 
best practices and universal solutions to policy problems regardless of the 
context in which those practices or solutions are embedded. From this angle, all 
lessons and practices are transferable among countries and across time. This 
idea has been totally rejected by those who value contextual factors such as 
socio-economic conditions as well as legal and political frameworks and 
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acknowledge their impact of the success or failure of any adopted policy or 
practice. From this perspective, what has worked in the past or in another context 
does not necessarily work and succeed in other environments.  
These two opposing positions summarise the longstanding and unresolved 
debate over which is more important, agents or structures. The first group 
emphasises the role of agents and underplays the impact of structures and 
contexts while the other group emphasises the supremacy of structures in 
deciding the success of failure of agents’ efforts. In order to bridge the gap 
between the two mentioned groups, lesson drawing provides the notion of 
‘contingencies’, which acts as a link between agents and structures. Accordingly, 
what matters for drawing successful lessons from other jurisdictions is the extent 
to which the borrowed lessons fit nicely into the existing structures. This, in turn, 
requires identifying under what conditions the transfer of certain lessons, 
knowledge, or practices can be regarded as a success.  In the words of Rose 
(2002: 2), ‘[T]he critical challenge of lesson drawing is not whether we can learn 
anything from what is happening elsewhere but when, where, and how well we 
learn’. In the context of this research, policy transfer will be used in accordance 
with Evans and Davies (1999: 363-364) as a generic term that includes different 
transfer practices and holds divergent claims with regard to policy development.    
4.3.2 Policy Transfer Governance: Unpacking Transfer Processes   
The policy transfer approach and its explanatory powers have long been the 
subject of debate among policy scholars. For some, the policy transfer approach 
is nothing but a descriptive analytic tool that has limited or no explanatory 
powers. James and Lodge (2003), for instance, raise three fundamental 
concerns about policy transfer and lesson drawing approaches. The first 
observation is related to the novelty and the distinctiveness of these approaches 
compared to the other traditional policy tools. From this angle, policy transfer and 
lesson drawing do not provide distinctive forms of policymaking compared to 
other traditions of rational policymaking. The policy transfer accounts have also 
failed in explaining why policy transfer occurs and not any other form of 
policymaking. The third criticism of the policy transfer approach is related to the 
effect of policy transfer and lesson drawing on the success or failure of public 
policies.  Despite such criticisms, the trajectory of policy transfer shows that such 
a notion and associated approaches have the potential for moving from being 
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merely descriptive tools of policy processes to being a theoretical framework, 
which may help policy scholars advance their understanding of policy processes, 
choices, and change (see Grin and Loeber, 2007).  
A glance at the literature of policy transfer indicates that in the cradle of this body 
of research is the work of distinguished scholars including Richard Rose, 
Schnieder and Ingram, Bennett, Dolowitz and Marsh, Stone, and Evans and 
Davies, alongside many others who have contributed to developing our 
understanding of such a notion. The early work of Rose (1991) on lesson drawing 
has shaped the discussion of policy transfer and guided the debate and the 
contributions of others in this regard. According to his view, many policy issues 
are similar; that means when faced with an uncertain situation or a gap between 
reality and aspiration, policymakers do not have to reinvent the wheel as they 
can draw lessons by studying the experience of their counterparts in other 
contexts that might help them address the problems they face (Rose, 1991: 11-
12). In other words, what works in certain situations can be a good solution to 
similar policy issues and problems in different jurisdictions. In this context, 
policymakers act as social agents for change who instrumentally seek solutions 
to whatever policy issues they try to address by looking at workable solutions 
and lessons to be learnt from other policymakers nationally or internationally. As 
noted by Grin and Loeber (2007: 203), Rose has conceived policy agents as 
‘social engineers seeking to apply knowledge instrumentally to improve the 
feasibility of policy programs’. In that sense, lesson drawing has been conceived 
at such an early stage as a technical issue and Rose has emphasised the 
practical nature of this process.    
In an earlier account, Schnieder and Ingram (1993: 334) draw our attention to 
the fact that, the policy design process has more to do with selection than 
invention. In that sense, Rose (1991) shares the same idea when he talks about 
the engagement of policymakers in lesson drawing rather than looking for new 
innovations; an idea perceived by Page (2000) as being self-evident. This early 
account on policy design has provided some other thoughts upon which Rose 
(1991) has built his notion about lesson drawing. As noted by Grin and Loeber 
(2007), the work of Schnieder and Ingram (1993) has underlined the sources of 
bias in selection processes and ideas which appeared later in the work of Rose 
(1991) on lesson drawing.  Accordingly, during the selection processes of 
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lessons to learn from other experiences, policymakers are most likely to be 
influenced by some intervening factors such as their previous experiences. From 
this angle, policy institutional design can be regarded as a result of selection 
processes based on policymakers’ experiences and expertise. Having said that 
Schnieder and Ingram (1993) have highlighted the possible bias by policymakers 
when selecting what experience to look at and what lessons should be selected 
to draw and learn from. The selection processes will be influenced by the 
personal preferences of policymakers and the way they see the problem as well 
as the way forward.    
By looking at the motives and driving forces behind the selections of 
policymakers, Bennett (1991) has stated that during selection processes of 
models and practices to be transferred, policymakers can be motivated by 
several motives ranging from providing a quick remedy or fix to the issues in 
place by copying and pasting workable solutions from other jurisdictions to 
getting seriously involved in learning processes to develop long-term and 
sustainable solutions to policy problems. In quick fix situations, policymakers 
respond to social and political pressures by selecting and presenting what they 
think is the best practice and the best model elsewhere. The main shortcoming 
of this quick-fix approach is that not enough time is given to examine the 
suitability of the imported solutions to the new environments. Given that, the 
consequences of copy and pasting exercises are not always promising. 
Therefore, the active learning approach for policy transfer can guarantee more 
positives impacts with regard to the addressed policy issue(s).  
Building on the work of Rose and others, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) have 
developed the notion of policy transfer. According to their view, policy transfer 
can be regarded as ‘a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another 
time and/or place’ (p.343). In their work, they focus on the role of structures and 
agency in shaping decisions of policy transfer. From this angle, they make a 
distinction between two broad modes of transfer: voluntary and coercive. In 
voluntary modes of policy transfer, the element of agency in the terms of the 
freedom of policymakers in choosing models and practices is quite obvious. This 
is not to say structures have no effect, but when structures allow the freedom to 
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look around for good models and practices policy agents tend to adopt them in 
order to address policy issues in their respective environments. On the other 
hand, in coercive modes of policy transfer - either directly or indirectly - the level 
of agency seems to be limited as structures play a major role in determining what 
can be adopted and transferred. In these modes of transfer processes, 
policymakers can be forced to select certain models because of existing 
structures and frameworks.  
The outcomes of transfer processes could be a success, failure or showing 
mixing results. In an attempt to explain this, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) have 
underlined three main explanatory factors which can render transfer processes 
either a success of a failure. The first among those factors is the level of 
awareness and knowledge by policymakers of the main features of the 
transferred model and the level of completeness of the transfer process. From 
this perspective, the uninformed transfer in terms of the absence of fundamental 
knowledge of the transferred models and practices can result in policy failure. 
The second explanatory factor focuses on the level of contextualization and 
adaptation of the adopted models and practices in order to better fit in the 
receiving environment. Models and practices are products of their environments; 
therefore, we should not expect them to be fully functional in new environments 
especially if such environments are not similar to the ones wherein the 
transferred models and practices have originated. The third and final factor for 
explaining the success or failure of policy transfer is the level of consistency 
between adopted practices and models and existing policy programs. This 
element is particularly important when the transferred model or practice is part 
of existing programs. In this case, policymakers have to make sure that the 
transferred practices are not at odds with existing arrangements, otherwise the 
risk of failure will be higher.         
The work of Stone (1999) has taken the discussion of policy transfer one step 
forward by drawing our attention to the political nature of selection processes. 
According to her view, the selection of practices, models, ideas, institutions, etc. 
by policy agents will be affected and guided by the underlying assumptions of 
current policies and programs. To put it another way, the agency of policymakers 
when selecting lessons to draw or to learn from other contexts is restricted by a 
major structural element and that is the existing policies and practices. This 
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means that policymakers cannot select any policy model or practice which will 
be at odds with existing policies and procedures. From this angle, one can 
perceive of existing policy structures as a medium for interaction for policymakers 
as well as a product or an output for such an interaction.  
4.3.3 Agents, Structures and Policy Transfer  
Evans and Davies (1999) have provided a model to explain how structural factors 
may interfere with the ability of policymakers when making policy decisions and 
selections. Guided by the theory of ‘structuration’ as presented by Giddens, the 
authors have highlighted how existing institutions can act as a framework which 
can either facilitate or hinder policy transfer. According to their view, the research 
on policy transfer has disregarded the link between macro and micro levels of 
analysis. In other words, to fully understand how policy transfer takes place and 
its impact on policy development, this process has to be analysed in multi-level 
settings and from an inter-disciplinary point of view.  The authors were cautious 
not to make any claims that they provide a comprehensive explanatory model of 
policy change but an ‘analogical’ construct that underlines similarities between 
two entities.    
One major contribution of the model provided by Evans and Davies (1999) is that 
it has conceptualized policy transfer from a structure-agency perspective. The 
authors highlight the MLG structures within which policy transfer occurs by 
looking at the meta-governance frameworks (global, international, transnational, 
and regional), macro governance structures (national and state levels), and 
micro-level structures (inter-organizational relations). At all these levels, ongoing 
interactions between policy agents and governance structures take place, in a 
manner that influence major policy decisions regarding what to transfer, when 
and how. Additionally, decisions made regarding the adoption of certain 
practices or policies impact policy development in importing countries. The 
analytical role of policy transfer from this angle is to bridge the gap between 
macro and micro governance structures. Based on such a conceptualization, and 
acknowledging the dialectical relations between policy agents and MLG 
structures, Dolowitz (1998) has identified 25 possible pathways for transferring 
policies across different levels and structures (see Figure 4.2).  
As the figure indicates, a distinction has been made between international and 
transnational levels. At the international levels, nation states are the major 
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players in transfer processes while at the transnational level other non-state 
actors such as international NGOs and multi-national businesses are the leading 
players. At each of the five levels identified there are five possibilities or pathways 
through which policies and practices can be transferred across governance 
structures. In all transfer processes, the role of agency is paramount. This role 
can be taken by exporting countries, importing countries, or a third party. 
Additionally, the transfer of certain policies or practices can either be voluntary, 
as is the case with most lesson drawing exercises done by policymakers, or it 
can be coercive especially when there is a third party involved in the process of 
the transfer. Another feature which denotes the role of agency in policy transfer 
is the intentionality, in terms of the conscious selection of certain policies, 
lessons, or practices by policymakers to be imported into their own context. This 
intentional and conscious selection differentiates policy transfer from other forms 
of policy change and development such as policy convergence, which tends to 
occur on an unintentional basis.    
 
Figure 4.2: Policy Transfer Pathways 
Source: based on Dolowitz 1998: 23 
Following on from this conceptualization of policy transfer as a question of 
structure and agency, it can be noticed that the mentioned governance structures 
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act as independent variables, which in turn may have an impact on the transfer 
activities and the consequences for policy development. In other words, 
governance structures can enable or hinder the transfer processes and may also 
determine to a great extent their success or failure. For that reason, transfer 
processes that take place within certain governance structures at different levels 
and characterised by the intention and conscious selections made by 
policymakers as agents should be the focal analytic point to enable us to 
understand how practices, knowledge, models and policies travel from one place 
to another. As Evans and Davies (1999: 370) argue, ‘in order to comprehend that 
nature of policy transfer it is crucial that we put social and political action within 
the structured context in which it takes place’. In that sense, to fully comprehend 
policy transfer we should analyse how governance structures interfere with the 
ability of policy agents to make free choices and how the choices made by agents 
affect existing policy arrangements and structures.  
Page (2000) has provided a comprehensive review of policy transfer and lesson 
drawing literature in which he tries to demarcate the boundaries between such 
extensive bodies of research. According to his view, to unpack the process of 
policy transfer we need to answer some basic questions (see Table 4.2).  
Policy Transfer 
Variables 
Description 
Who?  Focusing on the policy transfer agents (individual/organizational) 
What? Focusing on the content of the transfer processes and transfer 
mechanisms (copying/inspiration)  
When? Focusing on the timing of the transfer processes (single act/over 
extended period of time) 
Why? Focusing on the rationale behind the policy transfer processes 
(coercion/voluntary) 
How? Focusing on the vehicle of policy transfer  
 
Table 4.2: Policy transfer variables 
 
As the table indicates, in order to fully comprehend the process of policy transfer 
and to capture the whole picture of how ideas, institutions, practices, systems 
and regimes travel from one jurisdiction to another, we need to analyse agents 
and structures in terms of processes and the content. When it comes to policy 
agents, the literature has identified individual as well as organizational agents. 
The policy transfer agents play an important role in identifying what to 
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import/export and also determine the way in which ideas, institutions, and 
programs are transferred and the level of rigor in transferring them. In this regard, 
policy agents can simply copy directly from other jurisdictions what they think will 
work on their own, or they might be engaged in a serious process or learning in 
which the experience of other countries inspires them to find real solutions to the 
policy issues under investigations. The timing of the transfer process is another 
important factor as the process itself may take place at different points in time. 
In addition to this, some policies may take longer transferred over an extended 
period of time. Regarding the rationale behind the adoption of certain policies 
and practices, the literature makes a broad distinction between coercive and 
voluntary reasons for policy transfer.              
4.3.4 The Limitations of Policy Transfer  
The previous discussion has indicated that the concept of policy transfer provides 
a powerful analytic tool that can help researchers analyse and understand 
different policy issues in relation to their governance structures. Nonetheless, 
this is not to say that policy transfer is the cure for all policy illnesses.  As is the 
case with all analytic tools, the policy transfer approach has its own limitations. 
According to Evans and Davies (1999: 364), ‘policy transfer analysis does not 
have full explanation and theory status’. In a more detailed critical account, 
James and Lodge (2003) have noted that the policy transfer approach has failed 
in addressing three major questions: can policy transfer be defined as distinctive 
forms of policy- making separate from other, more conventional, forms? Why 
does ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ occur rather than some other form of 
policymaking? What are the effects of ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ on 
policymaking and how do they compare to other processes? 
Responding to the first questions, James and Lodge (2003) have stated that 
policy transfer and its associated terminology such as lesson drawing do not 
differ as much from the conventional approach of policymaking. For example, the 
authors have mentioned that the notion of lesson drawing is very close in nature 
to the idea of rational policymaking. Additionally, the concept of policy transfer 
has not added much to the previous analytic approaches on policymaking. 
Consequently, the authors have concluded that it is difficult to present the policy 
transfer approach as a distinct tool for analysing policymaking. Another 
shortcoming of the policy transfer approach from this perspective is its inability 
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to explain why, in certain contexts, policy transfer takes place rather than any 
other forms of policymaking. The provided analytic framework as per James and 
Lodge (2003) combines different theoretical accounts in a way which makes it 
very difficult for scholars to distinguish between them. In addition to this, the 
proponents of the policy transfer approach have failed in linking it directly to 
certain policy results. In other words, the link between policy transfer and policy 
success or failure has not been fully addressed by policy transfer scholars. 
Flowing on from such an understanding of the limitations of the policy transfer 
approach, James and Lodge (2003) have decided that ‘researchers may be 
better off selecting from a range of alternative approaches than limiting 
themselves to these conceptual frameworks’. In an attempt to examine and 
classify the limitations of policy transfer, Benson (2009) has made a distinction 
between four types of constraints: demand-side constraints; programmatic 
constraints; contextual constraints; and, application constraints (see table 4.3).  
Factors 
constraining 
transferability 
Key questions Indicators 
Demand side constraints 
Policy demand  
 
Is there a demand for the policy or 
programme? 
Is there potential resistance to transfer? 
High demand, low 
demand. 
High resistance, low 
resistance 
Programmatic constraints 
Programmatic 
uniqueness 
How unique is the programme? Unique, generic 
programme. 
Programmatic 
complexity  
How complex is the programme? Complexity: low/high 
Contextual constraints 
Path dependency  Are past policies restrictive or enabling? Path dependency: 
high/low  
Existing structures  Are existing structures restrictive or 
enabling?  
Structural density: high/ 
low  
Political context  Is politicisation apparent?  Politicisation: High/ low 
Resources  Does the receiving context possess 
adequate resources for transfer?  
Resources: adequate/ 
inadequate. 
Ideological 
consensus  
Is there ideological consistency or 
divergence?  
Ideological consistency/ 
divergence 
Application constraints 
Institutional 
substitutability  
Would new institutional structures be 
needed?  
Institutional structures: 
enabling/disabling. 
Scales of change  Is the anticipated scale of change large 
or small?  
Change: large-
scale/small-scale  
Programmatic 
modification  
Are programmatic adjustments needed?  programmatic adjustment: 
High/low  
 
Table 4.3: Factors constraining transferability 
Source: Benson (2009: 11) 
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As the table shows, on practical grounds, the process of policy may face different 
types of constraints. On the policy demand side, a crucial question would be the 
level at which certain policies or programs are needed as well as the level of 
expected resistance. As indicated earlier in this chapter, policy transfer takes 
place in response to the need to address existing policy issues or problems. 
Therefore, if there is no need to transfer policies and programs, policy agents are 
not expected to embark on transfer practices. It is equally important from this 
angle to think about the expected level of resistance to the newly transferred 
practice. As the discussion in this chapter has indicated, the transfer process 
does not take place in a vacuum. Therefore, it is imperative that policy agents 
should consider how consistent the new practice is with existing institutions and 
structures. At a pragmatic level, the degree of uniqueness in addition to the level 
of complexity will either facilitate or constrain the transfer processes. Unique and 
highly complex policies and programs are less likely to succeed in completely 
dissimilar environments.  
 In his analysis, Benson (2009) has also highlighted the impact of structural and 
contextual factors on the policy transfer processes. According to his view, 
existing structures, in addition to the extent to which the newly transferred 
policies will be restricted with previous ones in terms of path dependency, will 
affect the process of transfer. Added to this, the political context and the level of 
politicisation and ideological consensus can act to facilitate or hinder policy 
transfer. The availability of the required resources to complete the process of 
transfer has also been underlined by Benson and Jordan (2011) as one of major 
contextual factors affecting the transfer policies. On the implantation side, other 
factors such as the scope of intended change, as well as the need for creating 
new institutions can act as constraints on the ability of policy agents to adopt and 
implement certain policies/programs.               
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the governance of policy transfer from a structure-
agency perspective. The chapter started with a discussion of the debate around 
the structure-agency dilemma and its relevance to policy sciences in general and 
the notion of policy transfer in particular. The discussion has indicated that, to 
fully understand policy decisions and choices made by policymakers, we need 
to focus on and explain the role of agency in terms of the ability of policymakers 
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to make free decisions and the structural contexts, which may hinder the making 
of such policy choices. Focusing on one side of such a dialectal relationship will 
give us a partial and incomplete explanation of why certain policies are adopted 
by policymakers. Therefore, the discussion has concluded that a dialectical 
rather than a unidimensional approach would be more helpful for understanding 
and explicating the reasons behind the adoption of certain policy choices.   
The discussion of agency-structure relationships has been of a great importance 
to conceptualize policy transfer. At the end of the day, policy transfer can be 
regarded as a result or an outcome of the dialectal relationship between policy 
agents and governance structures. It is true that ideas, programs, institutions and 
practices are transferred from a certain jurisdiction to another following a process 
of identification and selection by policymakers in which the role of agency is 
evident. Nevertheless, as explained in this chapter, many contextual and 
structural factors can either constrain or facilitate the transfer process.  
In sum, policy transfer and lesson drawing approaches may have the potential 
to contribute to the growing governance accounts and more precisely, to the 
efforts exerted in order to theorize the policy process. Theoretically and 
analytically speaking, combining policy transfer insights and theoretical and 
analytic structure-agency traditions help in addressing some aspects of the 
criticism directed at this approach. The growing and influential role of non-state 
actors has been accounted for in the recent work of policy transfer scholars (Grin 
and Loeber, 2007). Added to this, as discussed earlier in this chapter, perceiving 
policy transfer from a structure-agency perspective helps in focusing on the role 
of agency in policymaking processes. When combined more tightly, policy 
structures and policy agents can help unfold the dynamics of policy transfer 
governance. In that sense, some insights regarding the rationale behind the 
success or failure of policy transfer can be provided and expand the limitations 
of policy transfer approaches discussed above. At the empirical level, such an 
understanding of the ways in which policy practices and institutions are 
transferred from one context to another is particularly important for explaining the 
changes in the Egyptian water governance and the role played by water 
structures and water policy agents in bringing about that change (see chapters 
7 and 8).   
      
126 | P a g e  
 
With the notion of governance and water governance having been readily 
defined, and having conceptualised the notion of policy transfer from a structure-
agency perspective, the theoretical framework of the study is now complete. 
Such a framework will be utilized to investigate and analyse water governance 
in the context of Egypt. But, before discussing and examining water governance 
structures and water policy agents in Egypt, the methodological underpinnings 
of the research have to be explained in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AND METHODS  
5.1 Introduction  
The preceding four chapters have been devoted to discuss the overall research 
outline in addition to the theoretical and analytical framework of the study. Before 
moving to the empirical analysis, it is necessary to explained how the research 
questions are going to be addressed using the proposed multilevel structure-
agency analytic perspective. In this context, the research methodology is driven 
by the research questions about the possible explanations that a multilevel 
structure-agency perspective might offer on water governance arrangements in 
Egypt (see chapter 1). My contention is that, an understanding of the changes of 
water governance institutions in Egypt calls for an examination the driving forces 
behind water governance reforms and the role of water agents and structures in 
selecting specific reform models. To systematically follow-up this line of 
argumentation, it is important to highlight the methodological drivers as well as 
data collection and analysis techniques. To this end, this chapter explains the 
research methodology in terms of describing the research design, approach, and 
strategies. The discussion focuses primarily on the way in which the research 
questions will be addressed as well as data collection and analysis. The chapter 
starts with a discussion of the overall research design in an attempt to justify the 
analytic approach and the selection of qualitative analysis for investigating water 
governance in Egypt. Differences between quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
approaches for analysis will be examined and the reasons behind choosing 
qualitative research will be fully explained (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). In section 
two, another element of the research design and strategy will be discussed by 
focusing on a single case study methodology. The rationale behind case 
selection as well as the relevance of single case analysis to the subject matter 
of the study will be elaborated on. Section three focuses on data collection and 
analysis in order to explain data sources in addition to the process of data 
gathering and the tools used for collecting, organising and analysing primary and 
secondary data.             
5.2 Research Design and Strategy 
Research design represents an important step in any robust research process in 
social sciences generally and in policy sciences in particular. The design process 
itself is an integrated part of different research activities such as designing data 
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collection tools. Nonetheless, what is meant by research design is broader than 
design exercises which might be linked to research activities. The research 
design process deals primarily with ‘aims, uses, purposes intentions, and plans 
within the practical constraints of location, time, money, and availability of staff’ 
(Hakim, 1997: 1). It focuses principally on the application of scientific procedures 
and methods to acquire answers to the posed research questions (Adams and 
Schvaneveldt, 1991:16). Accordingly, Creswell (2008:3) describes research 
design as ‘plans and procedures for research that span the decisions from broad 
assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis’. In a broader 
sense, Gorard (2013:8) defines research design as ‘a way of organising a 
research project or programme from its inception’. Research design can also be 
perceived from a minimalist perspective as ‘a set of decisions we take in order 
to reduce or control bias.’ (Maggetti et al., 2013: 10). The provided definitions of 
research design denote that identifying the design of any research project is 
basically about answering a number of straightforward questions about the main 
objectives of the study and the means for reaching these objectives. That means 
the methods to be utilised to approach and analyse the research questions 
should be clearly identified and the researcher should provide a justification for 
the utilisation of those methods.  
Following on from this, it is evident that this concept might be expanded to cover 
different elements. For instance, according to Maggetti et al. (2013), when 
looking at research design it is essential to consider: theoretical frameworks, 
concept formation, types of propositions, research questions, causality, selection 
of cases, variables, explanations, mechanisms and methods. Gorard (2013) has 
narrowed these elements down to two main elements: case studies and data 
collection.  Regardless of how broad or narrow the definition of research design 
is, the ultimate goal is to generate convincing evidence and to provide a 
persuasive answer to the addressed research questions. In other words, 
research design provides the logical link between the different elements, parts 
and sections of the research. It links research puzzles and questions, which 
represent the first step for any project to the final findings and conclusions.              
From this angle, research design is quite a significant step for any robust 
research project for many reasons. On the one hand, it is essential to 
demonstrate to the readers and the examiners the ways that data for the 
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research was collected from its sources, categorised and analysed. Different 
researchers follow different methods and use different tools for data collection. 
Considering that some of those tools and methods are more robust than others, 
it is important to spell out the methodological underpinning of the study to enable 
readers to judge the quality of the findings and conclusions. Added to this, a good 
research design should also inform the readers about the rationale behind 
choosing certain tools and methodologies and how appropriate the selected tools 
are for addressing the issues under investigation. Research design also allows 
the researcher to set the boundaries for his/her research by talking about the 
technical, financial and time limitations of the study. By acknowledging such 
limitations, readers will be able to soundly judge the research results and findings 
without overestimating or underestimating the research procedures. In short, 
research design should inform the readers about how scientific the research is, 
how rigorous the analysis is, and how valid the credible the results are given the 
indicated limitations.            
In spite of the importance of research design, this element of the research 
process is more often than not overlooked by social scientists. As Gorard 
(2013:3) notes, ‘many areas of social science do not pay enough attention to 
design’. Social science scholars, including policy analysts, tend to focus more on 
research methods and data collection tools without providing the link between 
the addressed research puzzle and the final conclusion(s) of their studies. In 
such a situation, paying little attention to the design of the research project may 
result in imprecise findings and misleading conclusions. Consequently, social 
researchers need to think ahead  to consider what their findings and results may 
look like in order to be able to come up with suitable research designs. In the 
words of Maggetti et al. (2013), social scientists need to consider research 
design as an overall term that links claims, arguments and evidence. They should 
not ‘jump into the methods’ before fully considering research design options.     
Having discussed the importance of research design, the following sections will 
focus on different research design elements of the study, including the debate 
over qualitative and quantitative approaches and the case study analysis. Data 
collection tools and data analysis will also be discussed in addition to sampling 
and the validity of the results (Johnson et al., 2009).      
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5.3 Selecting the Analytical Approach: Why Qualitative Research?  
Stoker (1995) has noted that the research methodology is mainly determined by 
ontological and epistemological decisions based on the researcher’s view of how 
social phenomena can be analysed and explained. In this regard, ontology refers 
to a view about the nature of social entities while epistemology reflects a 
researcher’s approach regarding the most appropriate way to understand social 
phenomena. Different ontological and epistemological decisions lead to different 
methodologies. One of the first decisions that should be made at a very early 
stage of the research is about choosing the analytical paradigm. Here, a choice 
should be made between qualitative, quantitative, or mixed analytical paradigms 
(Neuman, 1997). Each one of those approaches has its merits and shortcomings 
and the selection between them is a matter of practicality. In other words, 
choosing the analytical approach depends greatly on the addressed research 
question, as well as the objectives of the study and the degree of analytical rigour 
(Saunders et al., 2009). The serious treatment of a specific topic may call for the 
application of qualitative, quantitative or mixed approaches. 
At the outset, it must be noted that quantitative and qualitative research differs 
with regard to many aspects including: the role of the qualitative research, the 
relationship between the researcher and the subject, the researcher's stance on 
the subject, the relationship between theory, concepts and research, data 
collection, the scope of the findings, the image of social reality, and the nature of 
the data (see Bryman, 1988; Neuman, 1991; Devine, 1995). Such differences 
have pushed some scholars to value some approaches over others and a 
polarisation process has taken place between those who value quantitative 
methods and those who support qualitative research.  Such a polarisation has 
resulted in a paradigm war in which each group of researchers sticks to their 
understanding of the world and social reality.  
While quantitative researchers normally accuse qualitative analysis of being 
journalistic, descriptive, and having less rigor than quantitative inquiries, the 
adherents of qualitative approaches stress that it is imaginative, artful, flexible 
and reflexive (see Sarantakos, 2013). Qualitative researchers start by rejecting 
the very basic notion of ‘logical positivism’ as a foundation for social inquiry in 
quantitative traditions (Locke et al., 2014). According to their views, social reality 
and social order is far more complex than the way that the supporters of 
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quantitative approaches present it. In real life, there are some aspects which 
researchers cannot quantify and present in the language of numbers and 
equations. Therefore, it is possible and important to ask people about what they 
make out of social events and try to construct social reality based on their 
subjective experiences. In other words, qualitative researchers believe that 
different people see the world and interpret social events and experiences in 
different ways (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Consequently, what we see as 
a social reality may not be the same for other people. In the words of Locke et 
al., (2014: 98) ‘what is real is regarded as invariably multiple and immutably 
relative to person and context’. From this perspective, qualitative analysis is 
‘deeper, more focused, and more detailed than the analysis in quantitative 
research (Sarantakos, 2013: 366).  
In this respect, interpretive approaches provide a good example of in-depth 
qualitative analysis by focusing on the role of meanings in shaping actions, 
institutions and the ways in which these two parties function and interact with 
each other (Bevir and Rhodes, 2000). From this angle, interpretive accounts 
underscore the importance of understanding meanings in informing the 
epistemological underpinnings of research in political science and in turn public 
policy. In other words, qualitative research is able to place into context and 
understand quantitative data. Between the two conflicting quantitative and 
qualitative views of the social reality, a group of scholars has tried to bridge the 
gap between quantitative and qualitative research and to build up a middle 
ground by using a mixed methodology that focuses on the strengths of each 
approach and avoid its shortcomings (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010).             
The debate about the selection of analytic paradigms in research methods 
literature indicates that the choice between quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
approaches is quite important for determining the roadmap of the research 
process. Based on the selected approaches the researcher can then define the 
research strategy and the available methodological tools. For the purposes of 
this study, and without undermining the value of quantitative research traditions, 
the qualitative approach will be selected for analysing water governance in Egypt 
for the following reasons: 
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 Qualitative research suits the ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings of the study as it looks at water governance as continuous 
interactions between water structures and water agency. No general static 
laws can be applied independently of time and place to govern such an 
interaction and the researcher has to use theoretical insights to develop 
an understanding of how water governance systems work.   
 Qualitative research allows the production of rich, detailed and first-hand 
description of the investigated topic and takes account of the contextual 
factors and their impacts on the phenomena under examination (see Stein 
and Mankowski, 2004). From this perspective, using a qualitative 
approach will help provide an accurate and vivid picture of water 
governance systems and processes in Egypt. Such a narrative is 
essential for more rigorous analysis of the Egyptian water sector.      
 Qualitative research is more process oriented as it allows the researcher 
to focus primarily on policy processes and mechanisms rather than policy 
outcomes. As Locke et al. (2014: 99) state, ‘’it is common for qualitative 
researchers to have a primary interest in identifying and understanding 
social processes by which particular end results are created rather than 
simply describing the results themselves’‘.  From this angle, qualitative 
analysis is well suited to understanding governance processes and 
mechanisms in the Egyptian water sector, which may result in certain 
water policies and decisions. 
 Qualitative methods also help to highlight and explain the driving forces 
and the rationale behind adopting specific policy options. This issue is 
quite important to explain how policies and policy practices and models 
are transferred into the context of developing countries such as Egypt.    
 Qualitative research better suits the analysis of complex systems such as 
water governance, wherein different governmental and private actors 
work together to deliver policy goals. Quantitative methods are not 
sufficient to fully capture the dynamic nature of governance processes.     
 Quantification is not a major concern of this study. The main aim is to 
unpack, analyse and interpret water governance processes in the 
selected case study in accordance with empirical observations collected 
from field work and based on the subjective interpretation of the 
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researcher rather than a purely objective endeavour. For that purpose, the 
quantitative approach does not suit this type of analysis.                  
To sum up, the qualitative approach has been selected because it suits the 
nature of investigated phenomena and matches the addressed research puzzle. 
As Locke et al. (2014: 103) note, ‘it is the match between the paradigm and the 
problem that must carry the day’.  With the analytic approach so identified and 
justified, the next section will focus on the research methodology in terms of the 
way in which water governance in Egypt will be analysed.   
5.4 Selecting Research Methodology: Why Case Study Analysis?  
There is a wide range of methods available for conducting qualitative research 
including case studies, archival analysis, surveys, and experimental designs. 
The chosen methods should be governed by the type of the addressed research 
question as well as the nature of the investigated phenomena and level of control 
exercised by the researcher over the examined events (Yin, 1994). From this 
angle, case studies are preferred when the researcher tries to answer 'how' and 
'why' questions in a contemporary context and without having control over the 
events under study. Experimental research designs are more useful when the 
researcher can control the events while analysis of archival information is more 
appropriate for historical research. Surveys have a more quantitative character 
although they can be combined with case study analysis.     
Thus, in order to understand water governance in general and the ways in which 
water governance systems works in Egypt different research methodologies 
could be followed. Given the qualitative nature of this research and taking into 
account the nature of the studied topic as a contemporary phenomenon, wherein 
the researcher has no control over the events under examination, water 
governance in Egypt will be examined as a single case study (Yin 1994, 2003). 
In comparison to other research methods, the case study approach is claimed to 
have the following advantages: it is suitable for studying contemporary 
phenomena and it has descriptive and explanatory powers; it is mainly qualitative 
therefore it can serve several objectives including description, explanation, and 
or exploration; it allows the application of numerous data sources and the 
production of rich and contextual interpretations; it  takes several types according 
to the research purpose such as exploration, theory building, and theory testing 
and theory extension/refinement;  finally, case studies are multi-perspective 
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analyses; a case study is a triangulated research strategy (Denscombe, 2003; 
Grunbaum, 2007). 
In the context of this research, case study analysis provides detailed accounts of 
the investigated phenomena and looks at the governance issues under 
examination in its wider context using different tools and data sources. As stated 
by Gorard (2013:6), ‘case studies involve immersion in one real-life scenario, 
collecting data of any kind ranging from existing records to ad hoc observations’.   
Furthermore, case study analysis also better suits the nature of posed research 
questions which focus basically on understanding the ways in which water 
governance works in Egypt as well as the ways that private and governmental 
actors collaborate to reach intended policy goals. Added to this, the lack of in-
depth analysis of the water sector in Egypt justifies the focus on Egypt as a single 
case in order to produce a thick description of water governance in this sector. 
The availability of such a description represents an initial starting point for any 
serious and rigorous treatment of water governance issues in Egypt.  
This is not to say that single case analysis is problem free. One of the major 
shortcomings of focusing on one case or even a small number of cases is the 
limited ability to generalise the findings. Nonetheless, generalisation of the 
results is not a major concern for the researcher at this stage as the primary goal 
is to first understand how water governance works in the selected case. In other 
words, rather than focusing on causal relations from a positivist perspective this 
research examines the mechanisms through which water governance systems 
work in Egypt. Additionally, in spite of the limited ability to generalise results from 
a single case analysis across cases and across countries, generalisations can 
still be made for similar sectors within the same case.      
Among the different traditions available for case study analysis, water 
governance in Egypt will be analysed employing the congruence method (Blatter 
and Blume, 2008). As noted by Alexander (1997), the congruence method can 
be used to analyse single case studies when comparison does not represent a 
major concern for the research project. The method itself is quite adaptable and 
can be used with different research designs to fulfil different objectives. The 
congruence procedure can be employed ‘in a disciplined-configurative study, a 
heuristic or hypothesis-generative study, a plausibility probe, or a crucial case or 
tough test’ (ibid: 11). The flexibility of the congruence method also allows the 
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analysis of case studies to examine predictive and/or explanatory issues derived 
from deductive or an empirical theory.  Added to this, the congruence method is 
quite helpful when the theoretical framework used to conceptualise and define 
the problem under examination is not clear-cut. Given that the governance 
analytic framework as discussed in chapter two and three is still problematic it 
will not be helpful, for example, to use more rigorous methods such as process-
tracing, which best suits testing a hypothesis driven from well-elaborated 
theories. For these reasons, the congruence procedure will be employed in order 
to test the explanatory power of the governance analytic framework as well as 
exploring the role of structure-agency interrelationships in water governance and 
management in Egypt.                     
5.5 Data Collection  
As noted by Yin (2003), one of the major characteristics of case study research 
is the use of multiple data sources. In this context, potential data sources of this 
study may include: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant-observation, and physical artefacts (see also Stake, 1995). The data 
for this research was collected from primary and secondary sources. A 
combination of data collection tools were used to gather information from these 
sources including documentary analysis, qualitative interviews and participants’ 
observation. Such a combination of tools was necessary for the purpose of data 
triangulation and to avoid any subjective judgments regarding the issues under 
investigation. In other words, diversifying data collection tools was done to arrive 
at a relatively objective and precise picture of water governance in Egypt.        
5.5.1 Collecting Secondary Data 
Denscombe (1998), has noted that there is a wide range of secondary material 
available for qualitative research ranging from books and journals to official 
governmental reports and statistics. The data collection process started with a 
desktop exercise wherein the researcher started to search for and collect 
relevant literature on water governance in general and water governance 
systems in Egypt in particular. A considerable amount of previous studies, 
reports, official and policy documents as well as documents published by private 
actors including NGOs and private companies working in the water sector in 
Egypt were collected from the university library and using online sources. The 
researcher also visited the websites of governmental and non-governmental 
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actors involved in water governance and management in Egypt in order to get a 
better understanding of the nature of those actors and the roles they play in 
managing water resources. Valuable materials were collected from the online 
sources as they were publicly available.  
 A critical documentary analysis was conducted by reviewing the collected 
material. The data collected from these secondary sources was used to map-out 
the major actors in the sector and to acquire the required information about the 
structure and the functions of the water governance system via interviews. 
Mapping out the main player was a crucial step before conducting the fieldwork 
as it enabled the investigator to identify key actors and to approach them for 
acquiring their consent to participate in the study via interviews. By doing so, the 
researcher followed a well-established tradition of mapping in policy science that 
has been implemented by policy scholars in different areas. For example, in a 
comparative study of regulatory developments in the UK, USA and Canada, 
Doern (1998) utilised the mapping technique in order to identify and highlight the 
interconnection and the interplay among regulatory institutions in these three 
cases. As was the case with this research, mapping has also been used by 
Turnpenny et al. (2005) to identify the key players in the climate change policy 
networks within the U.K. The mapping technique was also helpful in mapping-
out power relations, concepts, and ideas in different policy fields (see Mayers 
and Vermeulen, 2005).         
5.5.2 Collecting Primary Data  
Primary data for this research was collected via elite semi-structured interviews 
and participant observations. Unlike quantitative research, wherein the data 
collection process is external to the researcher, the principal instrument for data 
collection in this study will be the investigator herself, especially while collecting 
primary data using interviews and participant observations (Brannen, 1992). As 
noted by Locke et al. (2014: 100), ‘with rare exceptions, qualitative researchers 
must interact directly with study participants determining from moment to 
moment how to behave, what to notice and record, and how a particular line of 
inquiry does or does not offer promise for answering the research question at 
hand’. That means the researcher will be a part of the examined context while 
interacting, observing and asking questions to respondents. As such, the 
researcher’s own values, perspective and understanding will inevitably become 
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an integrated part of the research process and will ultimately influence the 
findings and the final conclusions of this research. This is not to say that the 
researcher has been biased in favour of some views at the expense of others as 
every effort was made and every tactic was used to minimise such a bias, to limit 
data distortion, and to provide an accurate and objective picture of water 
governance in Egypt. The main two tools for collecting primary data will be 
elaborated on in the following section.              
(A) Interviews  
Interviews are among the most commonly used tools for collecting data in the 
social sciences. Liedtka (1992) states that together with participant observation, 
interviews are considered as the keystone of qualitative research. Different 
researchers define interviews in different ways depending on the manner in 
which these tools are used in their research projects. Baker (1998: 232) has 
described interviews as an ‘interactional event in which respondents draw on 
their knowledge’. Liedtka (1992: 162) has defined interviews as ‘processes of 
interaction in which questions are asked by one party and answered by another’. 
Church and Rogers (2006) have described interviews as one-on-one contact 
with stakeholders, either in person or by telephone. Bachman and Schutt 
(2008:178) regard interviews as ‘a qualitative method that involves open-ended, 
relatively unstructured questioning in which the interviewer seeks in-depth 
information on the interviewee’s feelings, experiences, and perceptions’. The 
primary objective of interviews, in this sense, is to generate data, which give 
genuine insights into people’s experiences. The common factor among all these 
definitions and others is that they all treat interviews as a form of conversation in 
which the purpose is for the interviewer to gather data that address specific 
phenomena and achieve certain goals. In such conversations, the logic of 
interaction and collaborative meaning-making is paramount. 
The literature on qualitative research methods is full of classifications and 
typologies of interviews. Flick (2006), for instance, has made a distinction 
between five types of interviews: focused, semi-standardised, problem-centred, 
expert and ethnographic interviews. Based on the level of the structure of the 
interview, Bernard (1988) has distinguished between informal, unstructured, 
semi-structured and structured interviews. Considering the way in which 
interviews may be conducted, Fontana and Frey (1994) differentiate between 
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individual and group interviews. Scheduled versus non-scheduled or 
standardized versus non-standardized interviews are other classifications 
presented by Goetz and LeCompte (1984). Taking the number of involved parties 
as a criterion for classification, Bachman and Schutt (2008) make a distinction 
between dyad interviews (one interviewer and one respondent), triadic interviews 
(one researcher and two respondents) and focus group interviews (one or two 
researchers and a group of respondents). 
Compared to other data collection methods, interviews enable researchers to get 
the in-depth information around a topic and to discover the story behind 
interviewees’ experiences. By allowing direct communication with respondents, 
interviews make it easier for investigators to follow up specific issues and to 
encourage respondents to reflect on their responses. From these perspectives, 
interviews are exclusive interactions between interviewers and interviewees 
where both parties create narrative versions of the social world and present 
reality as they see it.  
This is not to say that interviews are problem-free techniques. Like any other 
data collection tool, interviews have their own problems. For example, they are 
time consuming, more expensive, and require high communication skills, which 
may not be available to all researchers. Additionally, scholars such as Holstein 
and Gubrium (1998) have doubted the added value of interviews by noting that 
from post-modernist and constructionist viewpoints interview materials cannot be 
seen as representing the truth about social phenomena as they normally are 
invented and context specific. In this context, interviews are framed as a potential 
source of bias, error, misunderstanding, or misdirection. To put it another way, 
post-modernists and constructionists reject the idea that interviews can provide 
a mirror reflection of the reality that exists in the social world.  
These concerns are understood; however, they do not undermine the potential 
of interviews for collecting primary data by getting directly in touch with 
experienced respondents. There is no such thing as a perfect data collection tool 
and the merits of interviews outweigh their shortcomings. In other words, the 
assumption that interviews are meaningless beyond the context in which they 
occur is an intimidating one. The possibility of learning about social realities 
outside the context of the interview situation should not be totally discounted. 
Taking into account the interactive nature of interviewing processes where 
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different roles are played by interviewers and interviewees in constructing 
meanings and describing social realities, following the appropriate interview 
logistics, it can be safely claimed that interviews, as data collection tools, can 
potentially help researchers to learn about the social world.   
Consequently, elite semi-structured interviews were used to collect data from the 
main stakeholders participating in water governance in Egypt. Major players 
were approached by the researcher to arrange interviews with them in order to 
complete the missing data collected from the documentary analysis process and 
to countercheck some of this data.  Among the different types of interviews the 
semi-structured type was used a primary tool for collecting data (Weiss 1992). 
The reason for this is that compared to the other forms interviews the semi-
structured type allows for probing questions, which allow the researcher to follow 
up on the issues under examination. Added to this, semi-structured interviews 
better suit elite interviews, wherein policymakers and other stakeholders can 
freely evaluate and reflect on policy measures and tools.  
1. Interviewing Logistics 
The logistics of interviewing include the need to decide upon the type of interview 
to be employed, who to interview, how to prepare for the interview, how to start 
and conclude the interview, how to ask questions, and how to pace the interview 
and keep it productive. For the purpose of this study, semi-structured elite 
interviews were chosen as the main tool for gathering primary data. An interview 
questions guide was developed that included open-ended questions related to 
the different examined areas in the Egyptian water sector. Shorthand notes were 
taken during the interviews and a full version of each interview was fully 
developed straight after each meeting. These logistics are fully explained in the 
sections to follow.  
2. Selecting the Type of Interview   
Different types of interviews are available for qualitative researchers to choose 
from. Based on the level of formality, a distinction can be made between informal 
or unstructured, structured or formal, and semi-structured interviews 
(Sarantakos, 2013). In structured interviews, the researcher uses a structured 
interview questions guide to collect information from informants. Questions are 
verbally asked to interviewees in the same order and exactly in the same way. 
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Responses are recorded by the interviewer immediately during interviews. 
Unstructured interviews allow more freedom and flexibility for the researcher as 
she can change the order of the questions or the way she asks respondents in 
order to collect the information she needs. Semi-structured interviews are 
located somewhere between formal and informal interviews. They normally 
combine elements of both types.  Different research designs, topics, objectives, 
preferences and methodological standards may call for employing formal or 
informal interviews. If a researcher, for instance, is seeking to collect general 
information about the issues under examination from different respondents, in 
this case informal interviews would better suit his task. Nevertheless, when 
researchers seek to collect information from a selected group of interviews 
regarding specific issues and theme, a more structured form of interviews, either 
formal or semi-structured interviews, is required.   
For the purpose of this study, semi-structured interviews were employed to 
collect information from policymakers, regulators, water managers, private sector 
companies and civil society organisations such as consumer groups who are 
involved in water governance systems in Egypt. The selection of semi-structured 
interviews can be justified on different grounds. Compared to structured or formal 
interviews, semi-structured interviews allow more control for the investigator over 
the interview situation. She can change the wording and the order of the 
questions in order to direct the conversation during the interview in the way she 
sees suitable for collecting relevant information about the discussed topics. Such 
flexibility in the interview situation enables the researcher to focus on the most 
important issues for her research and to jump from one issue to another 
depending on the flow of conversation and the knowledge and expertise of 
respondents. Added to this, unlike structured interviews, which look more or less 
like formal investigations, semi-structured interviews give respondents enough 
room to freely think and reflect on the questions and to express their opinions 
without feeling threatened.                    
3. Selecting Interviewees 
Yin (1994) has noted that case study research is not primarily concerned with 
sampling from a statistical point of view. Nonetheless, he has also mentioned 
that the cases should be selected in a manner which contributes to the realisation 
of the stated objectives, and the boundaries of the analysis should be clearly 
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demarcated. In other words, researchers using interviews to collect data from 
primary sources in order to conduct a case study analysis should be selective 
when they define the boundaries of their sample and decide who to include in 
their interviewees list. In this regard, Mack et al. (2005: 56) state that selecting 
respondents for interviews can be problematic for the following reasons: the 
delicate nature of working with vulnerable populations; possible stigmatization of 
participants resulting from affiliation with the study; the high mobility of some 
populations; participants’ concerns about confidentiality; and misinformation, 
lack of information, fear, or rumours about the study. 
In the light of these restrictions, the process of selecting interviewees should be 
done very carefully (Bachman and Schutt, 2008). Random selection and 
sampling of respondents is not necessarily the best means to this end as 
representation and generalisation are of secondary concern.  In this regard, 
Locke et al. (2014: 100) have stated that ‘only rarely are samples of participants 
created by random procedures. Selection is more likely to be purposeful with the 
intention of maximising the utility of data for the research goals intended’. Thus, 
case study researchers should take into account what kind of information they 
need to answer their research questions and to achieve the objectives of their 
studies then they should select the respondents who are knowledgeable about 
the subject of the interview, open to talking, and who represent the range of 
perspectives. It is important for researchers in this regard as well to know when 
to stop selecting new interviewees. In this respect, reaching a saturation point, 
which means new interviewees seem to yield little additional information, can be 
a good indicator for researchers to stop the selection process. 
Following on from the above, the respondents for this study have been 
purposively selected from among the stakeholders participating in water 
governance in Egypt. As Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007) note, purposive 
sampling is a familiar technique in qualitative research. This technique allows the 
investigator to intentionally select the respondents based on their expertise and 
knowledge about the studied subject, which in turn enables him/her to get a deep 
understanding of the issues under examination. In that sense, purposive 
sampling is conceptually driven and does not aim at achieving statistical 
representation (Huberman and Miles, 1994: Leech, and Onwuegbuzie, 2009). 
Nonetheless, the researcher was keen on representing different points of views 
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by selecting different types of stakeholders, including policymakers, public 
employees, private sector actors, and civil society organisations. Such diversity 
in stakeholders’ selection was necessary to meet the objectives of the research 
and to be able to collect data relevant to the investigated research question. 
Another important feature of purposive sampling is that the process of 
respondents’ selection is a sequential process, which means the sample keeps 
evolving as the fieldwork proceeds. In this regard, the mapping activity conducted 
during the documentary analysis helped to identify key players in water 
governance in Egypt. Those key players formed the core of the research sample.  
The initial sample of interviewees was extended by using the snowballing 
technique during the interviews. Respondents were asked if there was anyone 
else they thought the researcher should talk to in their organisation or elsewhere. 
This was a quite helpful exercise as it helped in including other stakeholders and 
directed the researcher towards new sources of information that did not appear 
in the initial mapping of stockholders.  
The sample for this study consisted of 32 interviews. Key informants were 
approached and contacted by the researcher prior to the interviews in order to 
explain the purpose of the study and to get their consent to participate in the 
research. Those who positively responded and agreed to take part were asked 
to fix a date and a time for the interview and a list was generated including their 
names, positions and agreed dates for interviews.     
4. The Process of Interviewing  
The process of interviewing included four main stages: planning the interviews; 
designing the interview protocol; conducting the interviews; ending and reporting 
the interviews.  
Stage One: Planning Interviews 
At the planning stage, the researcher should start thinking about the different 
aspects of the interviewing. An important issue to consider at this stage is to 
finalise the list of interviewees and to confirm the dates and times of interviews. 
Following on from that, the researcher should start thinking about the issues to 
include in the interview questionnaire based on the theoretical and conceptual 
underpinning of the study. Such an initial thinking should be further developed 
when designing the actual interview questions guide. It is recommended at this 
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stage also to think about the practicalities of interviewing in terms of the way that 
the researcher is going to introduce herself to respondents and the way that 
questions will be posed and probed in addition to the way that interviews will be 
concluded. In short, the planning stage acts as a brainstorming exercise wherein 
the researcher takes a panoramic view of the overall interviewing process (Mack 
et al., 2005).  Those pointers were of great help for the researcher when she was 
planning the interviews with the water stakeholders in Egypt.        
Stage Two: Designing the Interview Protocol 
The main issue while designing and planning interviews is what the interview 
protocol should look like and what types of questions are needed to acquire 
information. As noted by Baker (1998: 131), questions are a central part of the 
data and cannot be viewed as a neutral invitation to speak. In other words, the 
ways in which questions are structured and posed during the interview influences 
the final output of the interviewing process. It is generally recommended in this 
respect that interviewers should start with broad and general questions that do 
not represent any kind of threat to respondents and delay the critical questions 
until a good rapport with informants is built (see Mayoux, 2001; Mack et al., 2005; 
Bachman and Schutt, 2008). Depending on the focus of investigation, questions 
can range from micro-level details of people's experiences to detailed questions 
about ways in which organisations and institutions work, or macro level policies 
(Mayoux, 2001). In this context, Goetz and LeCompte (1984:141) have noted 
that interview questions can be categorized in a multitude of ways to gather 
information about different things including experiences, opinions, and feelings, 
in addition to hypothetical and propositional questions. 
Guided by the theoretical and conceptual framework developed in this study, the 
researcher designed the interview questions guide, which was used to 
systematically collect information from respondents and to maximise the flow of 
valid and consistent information while minimising misrepresentation of what 
respondents said during interviews (see appendix 1). The guide included 
different questions about the main players in water governance in Egypt and their 
roles and functions. Some questions also aimed at collecting information 
regarding actors’ perceptions of how efficient and effective the existing 
governance mechanisms and arrangements are, and their opinions on how to 
improve existing practices in order to face the increasing water challenges.  
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The interview questions were open-ended questions in order to give the 
respondents a chance to reflect on the issues under consideration and to freely 
express their opinions.  The way in which questions are directed determines to 
a great extent the type and the quality of information to be generated afterwards. 
In the words of Holstein, and Gubrium (1998: 111) ‘[I]f the interviewer asks 
questions properly the respondent will give out the desired information’. To put it 
another way, asking effectively and the proficiency of asking techniques are very 
important to control the interview situation and to direct respondents to the focal 
point of the question. Therefore, interviewers should strategize throughout an 
interview about how best to achieve their objectives while taking into account 
interviewees’ answers. As  Bachman and Schutt (2008) mention, this requires,: 
keeping track of which questions have and have not been asked and answered; 
knowing how to phrase questions that encourage participants to provide detailed 
responses; and asking questions that elicit the participant’s own views and 
experiences as opposed to reflecting the convictions of the interviewer.  
Encouraging respondents to reflect on their answers by using probing questions 
is an important interviewing technique. As noted by Mayoux (2001), one of the 
distinctive features of qualitative interviews is their continual probing and cross 
checking of information. Questions that lead participants along a particular line 
of thinking or what Mack et al. (2005) call ‘leading questions’ must be avoided as 
informants are most  likely to provide answers that agree with interviewers’ 
preconceptions. In the words of Platt (2002: 37), ‘leading questions are likely to 
have the effect that the adventure into the unknown, into uncharted and hitherto 
undisclosed spheres, has been destroyed’. Questions were posed to 
respondents in a neutral fashion and the researcher made every effort not to 
interfere with the way that respondents answered the questions. Macro level 
questions about the structure of water governance systems in Egypt and the 
main players participating in managing water resources were posed first, 
followed by micro level questions about respondents’ respective roles and 
responsibilities plus their relations with the rest of the stakeholders. Probing 
questions were used during interviews to encourage respondents to reflect on 
their thoughts and to double check information.              
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Stage Three: Conducting Interviews  
Qualitative research accounts provide practical tips help interviewers to avoid the 
pitfalls of the interviewing process. Sarantakos (2013: 283) has identified certain 
tasks that have to be performed by the interviewer during interviews. These tasks 
include: controlling and guiding the interview; complying with the underlying 
paradigm; ensuring they do not influence the way the respondents answer the 
questions; recording the answers accurately; establishing and maintaining 
positive relations with the public and observing ethical standards. The researcher 
performed all the listed tasks during the interviews and made sure that she did 
not interfere with the way that informants were answering the questions. She 
also gave them enough time and room to elaborate on their ideas and to further 
their arguments and points of view.  
Answers were briefly recorded during interviews. Shorthand notes were taken 
and then extended into full scripts straight after each interview. The researcher 
preferred to take shorthand notes and not to record interviews for practical 
reasons. Compared to recording interviews, shorthand notes allow respondents 
to freely elaborate on the issues under examination without feeling that they are 
threatened or being interrogated by the interviewer. Added to this, in elite 
interviews where policymakers and senior members of staff in government and 
private companies are involved, recording may make them feel uncomfortable to 
freely express their opinions.       
Ethical considerations were fully considered through the interviewing process as 
informants were asked for their consent to take part in the study prior to 
interviews. During interviews, informants were assured that the collected 
information would only be used for scientific research purposes and would not 
be employed in any manner that might reveal the source of information. It is worth 
mentioning in this regard that the researcher also received ethical approval from 
the ethical committee at the College of Social Sciences and International Studies, 
University of Exeter, to conduct the interviews and to collect data from the 
selected informants (see appendix 2) 
Stage Four: Ending and Reporting the Interviews 
It important to conclude the interview in the same positive way that it has been 
started (Sarantakos, 2013). The contributions of respondents should be 
146 | P a g e  
 
acknowledged and appreciated and the interviewer should smoothly end the 
conversation and interaction with the respondents. Concluding interviews in such 
a positive manner enhanced the trust between the interviewer and the 
interviewee and increased the possibility for future cooperation. At the end of 
each interview, the researcher showed her appreciation to respondents and 
thanked them for their cooperation and contribution to the study.     
(B) Participant observation 
In addition to documentary analysis and interviews, the researcher also used 
participant observation. Observation is one of the oldest social research methods 
in which investigators collect data via vision as a main source (Sarantakso, 
2013). As Denscombe (1998) notes, participant observation is a more direct way 
for collecting data in qualitative research because it depends on the actual 
participation of the investigator in certain events rather than listening to 
respondents talking about them. For the purpose and the nature of this study the 
researcher decided to use participant observation and not to use systematic 
observation. Unlike systematic observation followed in quantitative research, in 
order to collect information about the frequency and repetition of certain events, 
participant observation is more concerned with understanding and getting 
insights into the examined events. Qualitative research methods literature makes 
a distinction between different types of participant observation based on the level 
of participation including total participation, participation in the normal setting and 
participation as observer (Denscombe, 1998). Without going into the details of 
each type, the way in which participant observation was used in this research 
can be described as participation in the normal setting. In that sense, participant 
observation was flexibly utilised during the site visits conducted by the 
researcher, wherein the investigator was observing the way in which people 
interact within those organisations to deal with water governance issues and to 
come to a decision on the course of action to be followed to solve those issues.      
5.6 Data Analysis  
The data for this research was qualitatively analysed in order to unpack water 
governance actors, mechanisms, and processes in Egypt (Johnson et al., 2009). 
The reason for this was that qualitative analysis is more suitable for the type of 
data collected during the fieldwork. As noted by Sarantakos (2013: 365), 
‘qualitative analysis is a research procedure that (a) deals with data presented in 
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textual, verbal and multi-focus formats; (b) contains a minimum of quantitative 
measurement, standardisation and statistical techniques; (c) aims to transform 
and interpret qualitative data in a rigorous and scholarly manner’. All 
representations of human acts during the interviews, as well as all collected 
documents and material during the desktop search or throughout the fieldwork, 
were considered as data for the analysis.       
The collected data was organised and analysed thematically using NVivo 
software (Di Gregorio, 2000; NVIVO 10 Getting started Guide, 2013). Following 
the full transcription of all interviews, the major themes covered were coded and 
entered into NVIVO software.  Using the NVIVO software was very helpful in 
comparing respondents’ viewpoints and answers to the posed questions.  In the 
light of empirical findings and the fieldwork, such a thematic analysis enabled in-
depth reflections on the theoretical and conceptual issues discussed in the 
theoretical framework. For triangulation purposes and to enhance the credibility 
of the results the researcher compared the data collected from the secondary 
sources and the primary data collected via interviews with empirical observations 
during the visits to the interviewed organisations (Stake, 1995). 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the methodological decisions made in this thesis have been 
outlined and justified in comparison to other alternative options. The qualitative 
approach was selected to analyse water governance in Egypt and to address the 
core research question on how could we understand and explain water 
arrangements and mechanisms in the Egyptian context. The qualitative analysis 
was chosen for its suitability to answer the research questions and to achieve 
the objectives of the study. The water sector in Egypt is analysed as a single 
case study in order to produce a rich description of water actors, arrangements, 
and mechanisms. Due to the lack of rigorous academic research in Egypt on 
water governance, producing such a description and in-depth analysis is a crucial 
step in mapping out this vital sector. The thick description of the water 
governance system in Egypt is also required in order to provide the data needed 
for any future comparative studies.  
The data for this research was collected from secondary and primary sources 
using different data collection tools and techniques. A desktop search of libraries 
and online databases, qualitative semi-structured interviews and participant 
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observation were all used for collecting the required data. Data from these 
sources was triangulated in order to double-check its accuracy and to ensure the 
credibility and validity of the results (Onwuegbuzie, 2003: Onwuegbuzie and 
Johnson, 2006). The collected data was qualitatively analysed using thematic 
analysis and with the help of the NVIVO software.      
One of the major challenges during the fieldwork was data collection through 
interviews and convincing my interviewees to speak out their minds and express 
their opinions freely. Many of my interviewees are senior civil servants in different 
water organizations who fear to be quoted in research articles or to be named in 
written publications. In order to overcome this problem I assured all my 
interviewees at the beginning of each interview that their identity and names 
would not be exposed and that all the data and information will only be used for 
scientific purposes. I have also avoided using tape recording as many of the 
public officials refused to be taped. Instead, I used shorthand notes during the 
interviews and fully expanded my notes directly after each interview. This 
technique was very useful and helped the smooth flow of conversation during 
the interview as my informants did not feel that they were interrogated. Added to 
this, fixing the interview date and time with some of my informants was also 
problematic. Some of them were quite busy and their time was limited. Therefore, 
I had to show a great deal of flexibility in order to fit into their tight schedule. 
Given the short span of time some of my interviewees had offered me, I had also 
to focus during the interview on the most relevant questions and the data that no 
one else but the interviewee can provide me with. In spite of those challenges, 
working on my interviews logistics at an early stage of my research and 
contacting my interviewees’ offices way in advance have helped me overcoming 
many of difficulties and made my fieldwork a success. 
With the theoretical and methodological drivers of my work so explained in the 
previous five chapter, the next part of the thesis will focus on the analysis of the 
case study by examining water governance in Egypt. The multilevel structure-
agency framework developed in the theoretical section of the thesis will be used 
to explain water governance arrangements in the Egyptian case. For 
contextualisation purposes, the empirical section will start by giving a 
background on water resources in Egypt in chapter 6. The transboundary nature 
of the Nile governance will be highlighted and the challenges facing Egypt 
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because of such governance arrangements will be explained. In chapter 7, the 
main elements of the national water governance will be examined by focusing on 
the existing water agents and structures. Chapter 8, unpack the interplay 
dynamics between water agents and structures in order to demonstrate the level 
of agency in making water policy decisions and the ways in which the freedom 
of water agents is determined by existing water structure at national, regional 
and international levels.    
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CHAPTER 6:  WATER GOVERNANCE IN EGYPT: THE HYDRO-POLITICS 
OF TRANSBOUNDARY GOVERNANCE IN THE NILE BASIN 
There is no country in the world where the government controls more closely, by 
means of the Nile, the life of the people. Under a good administration the Nile 
gains on the desert, under a bad one the desert gains on the Nile (Napoleon, 
1798). 
6.1 Introduction 
In theoretical section of the study, water governance has been conceptualized 
as a multilevel construct wherein water policies and decisions are framed via the 
interaction of policy actors at different local, regional and international levels (see 
chapters 2 and 3). Water governance arrangements were also perceived as a 
result of the interaction between water structures and water agents (see chapter 
4). This understanding of water governance is essential in order to unpack and 
analyse governance arrangements in the Nile basin and the ways these 
arrangements impact on water policies and decisions in Egypt. The Egyptian 
water sector and the associated water governance arrangements do not work in 
a vacuum. Water policies and institutions at the national level in Egypt are 
impeded in the overall structures of a governance system in the Nile basin, which 
is characterized by its transboundary nature. Such transboundary governance is 
a product of different cooperative initiatives that combine different types of actors 
and institutions involved in managing and allocating water in the Nile Valley.             
 The aim of this chapter is to characterize the transboundary water governance 
regime in the Nile basin in order to underline its main components and to highlight 
the way in which water issues are managed at the regional level. Water 
governance arrangements at the basin level influence water policies and 
governance arrangements within each country of the Nile Valley. As such, 
understanding the hydro-political dynamics in the Nile basin is necessary in order 
to allow an in-depth analysis of structure-agency dialectics and the policy transfer 
mechanisms in the chapters to follow.    
6.2 Water Resources and Governance in Egypt: Contextualizing the Debate  
The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the geo-political, economic, 
social and demographic contexts within which water resources in Egypt are 
utilized. This overview is necessary to identify water availability as well as the 
main water users in the country. 
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6.2.1 The Political Regime 
The Arab Republic of Egypt has a republican governmental system that is based 
on citizenship and the rule of law. The Egyptian Constitution pledges equality, 
justice and equal opportunities among all citizens and defines the people as the 
main source of power and the safeguard of national unity. The political role of 
Egypt is defined based on its affiliations to the Arabic and Islamic world as well 
as being an Afro-Asian country (Arafat, 2009). The strong ties with the Arabic 
and Islamic states and the African and Asian dimensions have enabled Egypt to 
play a fundamental role in shaping history and building human civilization by 
taking the lead on many transformations in the region. The Egyptian political 
system is a hybrid model located somewhere in-between the parliamentary and 
the presidential systems (Rennick, 2015). In other words, the political regime 
carries some features from the parliamentary regimes such as having a 
majoritarian government headed by a prime minister. Nonetheless, unlike 
parliamentary systems, the powers of the prime minister are limited as the 
constitution identifies the President of the Republic as the head of state and the 
head of executive power. From this perspective, the prime minister acts more 
like a coordinator between the different ministries rather than an actual decision-
maker and head of government (Islami, 2016). The powers and authorities 
invested in the presidency by the provisions of the constitution make the overall 
regime look more like a presidential system with many responsibilities assigned 
to the president including: protecting the interests of the people and safeguarding 
the independence of the state and the integrity of its territories.  Political and 
partisan pluralism provides the basis for the political party system in Egypt. The 
Egyptian constitution emphasizes the separation and balance of powers 
between legislature, executive, and judicial branches. The provisions of the 
constitution have also underlined the inevitable correlation between powers and 
responsibilities and the peaceful rotation of power among all players (State 
Information Service, www.sis.gov.eg, 2015, 23/5/2017). 
6.2.2 The Egyptian Economy  
The basic configuration of the Egyptian economy reflects comparable 
proportions of different economic sectors including agriculture, industry, tourism 
and services. Compared to the other economies in the region, the Egyptian 
economy is characterized by more diversification with a vibrant labour market. 
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According to 2010 statistics, the 26-million labour force is distributed among the 
main economic sectors with the majority of labour concentrated in the service 
sector (51%). The agriculture sector comes in second place with (32%) of the 
workforce followed by the industrial sector (17%) (State Information Service: 
www.sis.gov.eg, 2015, 23/5/2017). The main sources of revenue are Suez Canal 
revenues and tourism in addition to revenues generated from petroleum exports 
and remittances of more than three million Egyptians abroad, mostly in the Gulf 
States, the United States, Europe and Australia. After two revolutions in almost 
two years, the Egyptian economy has badly deteriorated.   
The contribution of the private sector in economic development varies due to 
changes in political regimes and the ideological shifts between social and liberal 
ideologies. The leading role of the private sector before the 1952 revolution was 
dramatically constrained in favour of a growing role of the public sector as a result 
of a nationwide nationalization program and a state-led economic strategy 
focusing on import substitutions. The Nasser regime embarked on an ambitious 
industrialization policy, which was launched in 1957 and focused on heavy 
industries such as iron, steel and chemical industries. The poor performance 
record of the public sector at the beginning of the 1970s and the ramifications of 
the 1973 war paved the way for a new shift in the state’s economic strategies 
away from state-led strategies and public sector organizations towards a growing 
focus on private investors under Sadat’s open door policy. As noted by Badran 
(2015), this shift was gradual because of the heavy legacy of Nasser’s regime 
and its socialist orientation.  
The open-door policy has opened the door to the participation of the private 
sector but with a fundamental and in some cases, a leading role of public 
organizations.  The role of the private sector as a driving force behind the 
economic development has been substantially vitalized following the 
privatization program, which was devised by the international financial 
institutions led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 
mid-1980s. The state owned enterprises were sold to private investors and the 
participation of the private sector has steadily increased in different economic 
sectors until the present day. Greater incentives have been given to the private 
sector in order to increase its contribution in all economic activities since 2007. 
Between 2008 and 2011, the national economy of Egypt was struggling to 
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overcome the negative impacts of the global financial crisis. The dramatic 
increase in food prices during the same period worsened the economic situation 
for millions of Egyptians who suffered from poverty, unemployment, and poor 
state service. The rich became richer and the poor became poorer while social 
and economic injustice soared in the society and paved the way for the revolution 
of January the 25th, 2011. Revitalizing the Egyptian economy is now the main 
target for all governments that came to power after the revolution. This task is 
not easy, particularly if one considers the high demands and even the higher 
expectations of the citizens, the level of corruption at all levels within the 
government and public sector organizations, and the state of conflict among 
political powers.  
6.2.3 Geography and Demographics  
Egypt’s geographic location in the northeast corner of Africa is distinctive. With 
long shores on the Mediterranean Sea to the north and the red sea to the east, 
the country acts as a link between three continents: Europe, Africa and Asia. 
From the West, Egypt is bordered by Libya and from the south by Sudan. The 
eastern and western deserts establish the majority of the country’s one million 
square kilometres geographical area. With a large population reaching 82.06 
million in 2013 and an annual growth rate of over 2% (World Bank Group, 2015), 
Egypt represents a cornerstone in the Arab world and in the MENA region. Most 
of the Egyptian population is concentrated in the fertile Nile Valley, which 
represents a narrow strip alongside the two banks of the Nile. This creates 
densely packed population centres with increasing demand for access to clean 
water. The rapidly growing population, the climate change, as well as being the 
last riparian on the Nile are all challenges facing the water resources 
management and governance systems in Egypt. In addition to this, and as rightly 
noticed by Brunnée, and Toope (2002), agriculture in Egypt, which represents a 
major economic sector, is heavily reliant on crops that require extensive 
irrigation, such as rice. In this regard, Conniff et al. (2012:5) have emphasized 
that ‘[M]ore than ever, the Nile basin countries feel the pressure of expanding 
population requirements for food production and energy to develop their 
economies’. From this perspective, and given the heavy reliance in agricultural 
on water, sustainable agricultural practices have been emphasised by many 
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researcher as the way forward for dealing with water shortage (Walsh, 1991; El-
Ramady et al. 2013).       
Because of being the last recipient of the Nile’s waters, Egypt’s water share is 
vulnerable to any actions or developmental projects established by the upstream 
countries. This point has been emphasized by Johnston (2012: 61), who states 
that ‘[E]gypt is already using 120 per cent of its nominal allocation and is 
dependent on ‘excess’ flows to Aswan which may not be guaranteed in the longer 
term; and thus it is vulnerable to any increase in upstream withdrawals’. In the 
same vein, Whittington et al. (2014:1-2) note that ‘it is a simple but stark fact that 
Egypt receives virtually all of its surface water from the Nile and that these Nile 
flows come entirely from outside its borders. No other Nile riparian exhibits 
anything close to that level of dependency on the river’.  
The current project of the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia is a clear example 
of how vulnerable Egypt is in the face of the upstream countries (Yahia, 2013). 
Considering the huge hydropower potential in the volume of water with a steeply 
sloping landscape, Ethiopia has the capacity to become the main power broker 
in the Nile basin (Baldassarre and Elshamy, 2011). As mentioned by Conniff et 
al. (2012:20), ‘Ethiopia has at least six new dams proposed and four under 
construction’. The renaissance dam project - known also as the Grand 
Millennium Dam - was announced in April 2011 and was planned to be 
completed by 2017. As pointed out by the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, 
the full execution of the project to be delayed by 5 years due to technical issues 
and lack of commitment from the contractors’ side (Getachew, 2018).The project, 
as described by Whittington et al. (2014:4), represents a quantum leap in 
Ethiopia’s ambitions. As pointed out by Verhoeven (2011a), the dam is located 
about 40 km from the Sudan border and it is estimated to generate 5250 MW. 
This large dam in Ethiopia will have a major impact on Egypt as it is expected to 
result in significant reduction of the Nile flows into the country (Johnston, 2012).  
This fact adds more pressures on the limited amount of water that Egypt receives 
and makes the effective and efficient management of such a scarce resource a 
necessity. 
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6.2.4 Water Availability 
The River Nile – one of the world’s longest rivers- is the main source of water in 
Egypt2. As reported by the Global Water Partnership (GWP) (2014: 14), 90% of 
the country’s direct water needs and 97% of its agricultural irrigation 
requirements is provided by the Nile. As noted by Conniff et al. (2012:5), 
‘[I]rrigated agricultural expansion over the last hundred years, often driven by 
foreign powers, has caused significant change in the use of the Nile water, and 
continues to be a major influence on the decisions around the Nile River use 
today’. In spite of this importance of the Nile to Egypt, Egyptian authorities have 
no control over the flow of the water into the country. As noted by Eckstein (2009: 
411), 95% of the freshwater reaching Egypt originates outside the country with 
the majority coming from the Ethiopian Highlands. 
Egypt’s water resources are severely strained and a gap between what is 
required for socio-economic development (76 billion cubic meters) and the 
annual quota of the surface Nile water received by Egypt as per the 1959 (55.5 
billion cubic meters) keeps getting wider  (MacAlister et al., 2012: 201) . The 
overall flow of the river is by nature seasonal as 80% of the flow occurs between 
August and October, which adds to the complications of water scarcity in Egypt. 
Furthermore, the recent measurements of the Nile have indicated that the flow 
is already diminishing (Paisley and Henshaw, 2013). According to Plan Bleu's 
analysis of future trends, measured by the renewable natural resources 
exploitation index, water withdrawals will exceed water availability from 2005 to 
2025 across the region including Egypt (GWP, 2012:15). According to the Food 
and Agriculture Organization Aquastat (2009), renewable freshwater per capita 
in Egypt is 923 cubic meters. This figure puts Egypt in the category of chronic 
water scarcity measured by international standards.  
The situation of water resources scarcity in Egypt is expected to get even worse 
with the population of Egypt projected to double by 20253  and most likely to 
reach 114.8 million before it stabilizes in the year 2065 (Gad, 2017:40). As noted 
by Hefny and Amer (2005: 43), the steady growth of the Egyptian population at 
                                                          
2 It is on record that the River Nile is one of the world’s longest transboundary rivers flowing a 
distance of more than 6,700 km from its farthest source at the headwaters of the Kagera Basin 
in Rwanda and Burundi to the Mediterranean Sea in Egypt (Cascão, 2012).  
3  Kinyangi et al. (2012: 30) have reported that ‘‘[P]opulation growth is the primary driver of 
agricultural intensification, which appears to enhance vulnerability to biophysical shocks in 
pastoral, agro-pastoral and cultivated production systems’’. 
156 | P a g e  
 
such a high pace will result in an increasing demand for clean water, in turn 
reducing the share of the population’s fresh and clean water to around 500 cubic 
meters by 2025. In addition to population growth, the gap between water demand 
and supply in Egypt is also expected to increase because of the expanding 
agriculture plans as well as urbanization processes and efforts of the Egyptian 
governments to provide higher living standards for the people (Swain, 2008; 
MacAlister et al., 2012). The gap between supply and demand can be even 
further complicated if one considers the high levels of uncertainty around these 
two elements. In this context, Johnston (2012: 61) has stated that ‘uncertainties 
in estimates of both irrigation demand and available flows within the basin are so 
high that it is not possible to determine from existing information the stage at 
which demand will outstrip supply in Egypt’. 
The Egyptian agricultural sector has the highest impact on water consumption 
with the agricultural irrigation consuming approximately 87% of all water 
resources (GWP, 2014). As noted by MacAlister et al. (2012: 202), almost 70% 
of the water consumed for agriculture is satisfied by surface water diverted in the 
Nile Valley. Nevertheless, Egypt’s situation is not unique among the rest of the 
Nile basin countries wherein agriculture sectors represent major economic 
players in the national economy. As noted by Awulachew et al. (2012:1), 
‘[A]griculture plays an important role in the economies of all Nile Basin countries. 
Yet the role and potential of water for agriculture are not well understood 
throughout the basin, and in some parts of it massive investments in agricultural 
water development have not achieved the desired levels of food security and 
poverty reduction’. Another important issue that impacts on water scarcity and 
water consumption in Egypt is the ambitious economic and developmental plans 
undertaken by the Egyptian government. The new valley project is a case in a 
point. This project, which is also known as the Toshka Project, requires the 
redirection of almost 10% of Egypt’s allotment from the Nile in an attempt to 
establish a new Nile Valley and new inhabitable communities in the west desert 
(Paisley and Henshaw, 2013).  
The issue of water scarcity has been clearly recognized by the consequent 
Egyptian governments. This has been noted by MacAlister et al. (2012: 207), 
who state that ‘The challenge of managing scarce water resources, including 
groundwater, for sustainable development incorporating medium and long-term 
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use for a range of stakeholders is recognized as priority by the Egyptian 
government’. Major actors, such as the Ministry of Water Resources and 
Irrigation (MWRI), play an important role in developing plans and strategies to 
manage water resources in Egypt on a sustainable basis. As noted by a senior 
policy advisor in MWRI: 
‘the efforts of the Ministry in this regard do not only include water management 
plans for the surface water but also strategies to utilize the ground water in a 
sustainable manner. The MWRI uses the lasts technologies to utilize and model 
groundwater and surface water. Additionally, the ministry tries to reach the wider 
population via the mass media and attempts to raise their awareness with regard 
to the sustainable use of water both in households and in irrigation. An equally 
important role of the MWRI is to coordinate and link water activities and decision 
among all stakeholders at the national and international levels’ (Interview 11).       
In addition to water scarcity, water quality is a major concern when we consider 
the case of the River Nile basin. The quality of water in the River Nile is 
deteriorating due to the resulting household and industrial waste disposed 
directly into the river without proper treatment. Another contributing factor to the 
degradation of the Nile water quality is the runoffs from agriculture, which 
contaminate the water with pesticides and fertilizers (Golia, 2008). These 
sources of pollution can cause health hazards to the population, which is rapidly 
increasing and adding more demands for clean water (Swain, 2008).         
6.3 The River Nile’s Transboundary Governance: The Institutional Context  
The use of Nile River water is a cause for transboundary cooperation and conflict 
(Conniff et al., 2012:5). The aim of this section is to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the water governance regime in the Nile basin, and to provide an 
informed investigation of the current institutional set-up. Such an in-depth 
analysis is required to contextualize the debate of water governance in Egypt 
and to provide an overall picture of the broader water governance framework 
within which the water sector in Egypt is working. The analysis of the Nile’s 
transboundary governance is equally important to evaluate the cooperative 
efforts exerted by stakeholders to develop a comprehensive water governance 
system that benefits all the countries in the Nile basin. A critical analysis of water 
governance arrangements is also needed to underline the success, failure and 
pitfalls of almost a decade of cooperation in the Nile basin. Such an evaluation 
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would be helpful in looking into some future scenarios of governance 
arrangements in the Nile valley.          
6.3.1 The Hydro-Politics of the Nile Basin 
The River Nile’s catchment basin covers approximately 10% of the African 
continent and the river is shared by eleven riparian states: Ethiopia, Sudan, 
South Sudan, Egypt, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, and 
Kenya (GWP, 2011:1). This very fact makes water governance arrangements, 
let alone, the effectiveness of transboundary governance of the Nile River basin 
a challenging and complex issue. The reason behind this is that governance 
arrangements and the associated institutional architecture are normally products 
of the political, economic, social, and legal contexts. In other words, one-size-
fits-all governance systems and arrangements will not simply work for all eleven  
sovereign states (Schreiner et al., 2011). Different approaches are needed to 
design water governance arrangements in each country, taking account of the 
contextual factors which provide the overall structures within which all 
governance arrangements and policy actors operate. The fundamental question 
that needs to be addressed in this regard is how to develop governance 
arrangements which guarantee the equitable sharing and protection of River Nile 
water (See Stinnett and Tir, 2009).    
Another important feature of the transboundary water governance in the River 
Nile basin is the hydrological and economic interdependence created among 
involved countries (Baldassarre and Elshamy, 2011). Such interdependence 
establishes power relations and structures which may benefit one party at the 
expense of the others. The concept of power in this regard is relative as there is 
no one actor who possesses all the powers. In other words, power in the context 
of the interdependent relations in the Nile basin is a two-way relationship and 
very contextual. For instance, an actor could be more powerful than others 
because of its geographic location; however, when it comes to its ability to 
negotiate legal agreements, its power could be limited compared to the other 
parties involved (Mayers and Vermeulen, 2005). This conceptualization of power 
is quite relevant to describe power relations and structures in the Nile basin. The 
geographic nature of the basin has given upstream countries the power to 
influence water policies because they are the main contributors to the volume of 
water running through the river. From this angle, power relations are leaning 
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more towards the upstream countries wherein water decisions can dramatically 
affect water sources in downstream countries (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006).  
As stated by Cascão (2012: 230), ‘[I]n hydro-political terms, the basin has been 
characterized, historically, by the existence of low-level conflict (mainly 
diplomatic), opposing the two downstream riparians and main users of Nile water 
(Egypt and Sudan) and the upstream riparians, the main contributors to the Nile 
flows’. Hence, the overall situation is characterized by long-standing historical 
power asymmetrical relations. In this context, power asymmetry can be noticed 
between upriver and downriver countries, particularly Egypt, at different material, 
bargaining and ideational levels. At the material level, in comparison to Egypt, 
upstream countries are lagging behind in terms of GDP, economic diversification, 
external political support and access to international funding. Added to this, the 
bargaining power of upstream countries in terms of their ability to influence 
regional and global political and water agendas and also the basin’s legal 
negotiations appear to be limited. From an ideational perspective, a gap exists 
between upstream and downstream riparians with limited capacities of upriver 
countries to produce and disseminate knowledge and to influence policy 
discourse. These forms of power asymmetry between Egypt and the upstream 
countries, especially Ethiopia, have created an ongoing tension between these 
two countries as the latter tries to fight against what it thinks is the hegemonic 
role of Egypt in the existing water governance system.           
Following on from the above discussion, it can be noted that the asymmetric 
upstream/downstream power relationships pose many challenges for Egypt and 
Egyptian policymakers, who have to take account of what actions are taken by 
upstream countries and calculate the potential impact on water governance in 
the country. Managing water resources in transboundary governance systems 
requires considerable attention from water decision-makers as it poses many 
diplomatic challenges (Conca and Mei, 2006).  
With the pressures on water increasing substantially in the River Nile basin, 
tensions among involved countries are increasing, which calls for diplomatic 
efforts to mitigate potential conflicts.   As noted by a senior civil servant in the 
Egypt Water Regulatory Agency (EWRA): 
‘We try to do our best to respond to water decisions taken in other River Nile 
basin countries in a way that protects our national interest. This is not to say that 
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we react all the time to their actions as in some cases we take a proactive 
approach and get involved in negotiations and diplomacy to stop some decisions 
or at least reduce their potential negative impact on Egypt’ (interview 9).  
In spite of the diplomatic efforts exerted by the Egyptian negotiators in order to 
minimize the negative impact of the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia, no real 
progress has been achieved as noted by Dr Mohammed Nassr Al-deen Allam 
the ex-water minister in Egypt. According to his view, this issue requires political 
intervention because diplomatic efforts have not been fruitful so far. He has also 
mentioned that there is no point in negotiating the potential negative impacts of 
the dam on Egypt as almost 50% of the project has already been completed. 
This progress, as well as the support of the project from the Sudanese side, is 
weakening the bargaining  powers of the Egyptian negotiators (interview at 
Almasry Alyoum newspaper, 25/7/2015).        
6.3.2 The River Nile’s Transboundary Governance:  Regional Dimensions  
The water governance arrangements in the Nile basin have been altered 
significantly in the past decade. Based on the principle of multilateral 
cooperation, new transboundary MLG settings have been originated, (Cascão, 
2009; 2012). At the institutional level, the allocation of water resources in the 
River Nile basin is governed by several agreements and institutions, which dates 
back to the colonial era. Such historical treaties and practices ‘continue to 
significantly shape directions of future Nile water use’ (Conniff et al., 2012:5). In 
order to protect its interests in Egypt and other British colonies in Africa, the 
United Kingdom has entered into agreements and signed off treaties with the 
upstream countries (Tvedt, 2006). The aim was to guarantee the flow of the River 
Nile into Egypt and to prevent upstream countries from taking any action or 
developing any projects which may affect this goal and harm the interests of 
Egypt.  As Brunnée, and Toope (2002) state, the first agreement was in 1902 
between Britain and Ethiopia. According to this treaty, Ethiopia was not allowed 
to take any action or work on any project that could divert the flow of the River 
Nile and prevent it from reaching Egypt. In return, Britain recognized the 
independence of Ethiopia. In 1941, Ethiopia disavowed this agreement and 
entered into a new series of conflicts with Egypt and Sudan (Swain, 1997).  
Among all water agreements in the Nile basin, the 1929 and the 1959 
agreements were the most controversial ones. The major point of contention 
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revolves around these two water agreements allocating Egypt and Sudan 
specific volumetric water but not the other riparians. In 1929, an agreement was 
reached between Egypt and Sudan, which emphasized the high priority of the 
Egyptian water needs from the River Nile (Waterbury, 2002). This treaty has 
given Egypt the right to reject any future projects or constructions in other former 
British colonies that affect the flow of the Nile into the country and reduce the 
share of Egypt from the Nile water (Tvedt, 2006). This treaty was challenged and 
rejected by other Nile basin countries, which claim that the agreement is no 
longer valid given the changes in the economic and demographic situations in 
Nile basin countries at the time being. On the other hand, Egypt is referring to 
the principle of state succession as one of the international law principles that 
validates the 1929 agreement and obliges the Nile basin countries to respect it 
and honour their stated obligations (Waterbury, 1979).  In addition to this, Egypt 
also insists on keeping its historic bestowed powerful rights based on the 
demonstrated use of the Nile waters over time. According to most water law 
regimes the rule of ‘first in time, first in right’ is widely recognized and accepted 
(Whittington et al., 2014:2).  
The controversial 1929 agreement was replaced by the Agreement for the Full 
Utilization of the Nile Waters between Egypt and Sudan in 1959 aiming at ‘the 
full utilization of the Nile’. According to this agreement, Egypt and Sudan were 
named as the only beneficiaries from the entire flow of the Nile at the Aswan High 
Dam4 (Abdel-Gawad, 2004). The entire flow of the Nile was allocated between 
the two countries, with 55.5 billion cubic meters going to Egypt and 18.5 billion 
cubic meters going to Sudan (Whittington et al., 2014:2). This share constitutes 
almost 90% of the Egypt’s water budget (ICARDA, 2011: 15). This means that 
no water was left for the other Nile riparian countries including Ethiopia, which 
contributes over 80% of the Nile flow. Despite the fact that the 1959 agreement 
has somehow protected the Ethiopian developmental plans by limiting Sudan’s 
share of water to 18.5 billion cubic meters, a volume which is way less than 
Sudan’s needs for irrigation, the agreement was not welcomed  by Ethiopia or 
by the other upstream countries (Allan et al., 2013).  As pointed out by Salman 
(2011) the 1959 agreement triggered a new series of regional conflicts, as the 
                                                          
4 Aswan High Dam (AHD), completed in 1970, is the largest man-made reservoir and produces 2100 megawatts (MW) of electricity – about half of 
Egypt’s total power supply (Conniff et al. 2012:18). 
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other riparian countries were not happy with the provisions of the treaty. As put 
by Whittington et al. (2014:2), ‘[T]he 1959 Nile Waters Agreement became the 
bedrock for the development of irrigated agriculture and hydropower generation 
in Egypt and Sudan, but it induced longstanding bitterness and a climate of 
mistrust among the other eight Nile riparians existing at the time’. In this context, 
the other Nile basin countries invoked the Nyerere Doctrine which states that all 
treaties concluded during the colonial era shall be subject to a two-year 
negotiation process among interested parties. If the negotiated parties fail to 
come to an agreement, the disputed agreement will lapse.  
Conflicts between upstream and downstream countries pose challenges for 
water governance arrangements in the Nile basin as a whole and within 
individual states. On the one hand, the downstream states, namely Egypt, defend 
what they consider as their historical and natural rights to the full volume of the 
Nile. Accordingly, the upstream countries have no rights to take any 
arrangements that may disrupt the volume or the quality of water coming to 
Egypt. Ethiopia and the rest of the upstream countries hold an opposing view 
that all the treaties concluded during the colonial era favour the downstream 
countries at the expense of the upstream one and therefore, they are not 
obligatory (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). From 
their perspective, upstream countries have the right to utilize the Nile in a way 
that serves their developmental plans and projects regardless of the 
consequences on the volume or the quality of water (Bulto, 2009). 
In an attempt to overcome such dichotomous views on historic and natural rights 
versus the rights of utilization and development and after long and strenuous 
negotiation processes, the first step towards regional cooperation in the Nile 
basin was taken by establishing an institutional framework under the name of the 
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999. As per the Nile Basin Act, the main aim for 
establishing NBI was to ‘foster cooperation and sustainable development of the 
Nile River for the benefit of the inhabitants of those countries’ (NBI, 2002). The 
establishment of the NBI and the negotiations for the Cooperative Framework 
Agreement are the major steps supporting the cooperation process in the Nile 
basin (Cascão, 2012). The intention was to create an overall legal and 
institutional framework to organize water allocation and water management in 
the River Nile basin. As noted by NBI (1999: 65), the goal was ‘to achieve 
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sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and 
benefit from, the common Nile basin water resources’. To this end, the NBI has 
devised two complementary mechanisms: the Shared Vision Programs (SVPs), 
and the Subsidiary Action Programs (SAPs).  
The SVPs aim at enhancing trust and cooperation among the Nile basin 
countries as well as helping the Nile riparians in developing an investment 
friendly environment. On the other hand, SAPs focus primarily on identifying 
cooperative opportunities in the Eastern Nile and the Nile Equatorial Lakes 
regions. Institutionally speaking, the NBI was run by three main bodies: the 
Council of Ministers [NIL-COM], the Technical Advisory Committee [NIL-TAC], 
and the Nile Secretariat [NIL-SEC]. The overall role of NIL-COM was to provide 
guidance on policy issues while NIL-TAC’s role was to provide a technical 
opinion on the proposed projects. The NIL-SEC was responsible for monitoring 
the delivery of the projects in addition to integrating and coordinating cooperative 
efforts and information sharing (see Cascão, 2009). The efforts to establish a 
holistic cooperative framework via the aforementioned mechanisms have not 
been a complete success. However, the NBI has resulted in the establishment 
of a debatable Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) among a number of 
the Nile basin countries. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the established 
CFA excludes downstream countries (i.e. Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan). 
The international aspect of water governance in the River Nile basin started to 
become obvious with many overlapping technical initiatives established under 
the umbrella of the NBI to investigate and provide solutions for technical and 
hydro-meteorological issues. These efforts were led by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), which played an active role in facilitating 
discussion in framing the issues under examination. Nonetheless, the 
international efforts on the technical side did not ease the tensions and the major 
disagreement between upstream and downstream countries. This disagreement 
has resulted in the rejection of the formation of a new organizational body under 
the name of UNDUGU. The aim of this organization was to forge and enhance 
economic, social, cultural, and technical ties among the riparian countries in the 
Nile basin as a step towards creating a basin-wide management system.  The 
upstream countries, namely Kenya and Ethiopia, have opposed the idea just 
164 | P a g e  
 
because they thought that the UNDUGU is a new tool to enhance the Egyptian 
hegemony in the River Nile basin.  
The Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development 
and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin, known by its acronym 
TECCONILE, represents another institutional development towards the 
establishment of a legal and regulatory framework in the Nile basin. The broad 
goal of TECCONILE was to develop the Nile basin via enhancing cooperation 
among the Nile basin countries. To this end, TECCONILE has several objectives 
at the level of improving infrastructure projects and building the capacity of 
national institutions in order to be able to develop master plans at national levels 
to be integrated later in a comprehensive Nile Basin Action Plan. As Brunnée, 
and Toope (2002) note, the Nile basin countries initiated the D3 Project, which 
aimed to address legal and institutional issues and it was also under 
TECCONILE sponsorship. As was the case with UNDUGU, and for the exact 
same reasons, Ethiopia and Kenya refused to join TECCONILE in full 
membership. In addition to their rejection of the Egyptian dominance as they see 
it, the two countries have criticized the framework of TECCONILE as being a 
failure with regard to addressing the main issue of issue of equitable water 
allotment among the basin countries (Paisley and Henshaw, 2013).   
In spite of the opposition of Ethiopia and Kenya for the TECCONILE, the rest of 
the Nile basin countries have succeeded in developing the Nile River Basin 
Action Plan (NRBAP). The questions of economic development and the 
equitable utilization of water resources have been addressed for the first time in 
the NRBAP (Zedan, 2013: 66). The plan was formally adopted in 1995 by all Nile 
basin countries and focused primarily on developing a number of development 
projects to benefit all countries. However, because of the competition among the 
basin countries as well as the limitation in resources, many of the provisions of 
the action plan have not been put in place. This is not to say that the efforts of 
TECCONILE have gone in vain, as it acted as a hub for information exchange 
among the riparian countries as well as a catalyst for cooperation (Paisley and 
Henshaw, 2013). The NRBAP was also instrumental in the founding of the NBI 
in 1999 (Dombrowski, 2003)     
At the informal level, and in an attempt to facilitate discussions and negotiations 
among the Nile basin countries, a series of conferences known as the Nile 
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Conferences started in 1993 and continued on a yearly basis until 2002. 
Delegates to these conferences did not hold any formal status and they were 
involved in discussions and drafting any joint statements. Discussion topics were 
arranged in these meetings based on the level of urgency with some sessions 
allocated to open discussion. The conferences covered many technical as well 
as policy issues. As noted by Hefny and Amer (2005), those conferences 
substantially increased the basis for dialogue and publicly debated several 
crucial and innovative issues. In that sense, the Nile conferences have paved 
the way for the establishment of a multilateral, basin-wide cooperation. 
Discussions in these meetings were sponsored by different international 
organizations including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
the UNDP, and the World Meteorological Organization. The involvement of those 
international agents represents another manifestation of the MLG nature of the 
water governance system in the Nile basin, wherein institutions are created as 
result of interactive processes between global, regional, and national levels. 
6.3.3 The River Nile’s Transboundary Governance: International 
Dimensions 
The role of international agents, especially the World Bank (WB) and the UNDP, 
was paramount since the very early stages of creating the NBI. In that sense, 
regional actors of the Nile Basin were involved in bilateral and multilateral 
agreements with international donors including the World Bank, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). This aspect reflects the international dimension of water 
governance arrangements in the Nile basin and indicates the ways in which 
global level water governance influence regional and in turn national levels (Hira 
and Parfitt, 2004; Cascão 2012).  
In addition to being the main financiers to the NBI, the Nile basin countries called 
upon international agencies to support them in their pursuit of developing an 
overall governing framework for water allocation and management in the basin 
(Hira and Parfitt 2004). The lack of funding and absence of expertise have made 
the basin countries heavily reliant on international organizations and donors’ 
support to implement the Nile River Basin Action Plan and the other 
arrangements. In this regard, the WB for instance, has played a major role as a 
coordinator for donors’ investments. At the same time, the UNDP and CIDA have 
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also assisted in encouraging and organizing cooperative projects in the Nile 
basin. In fact, the role of those international agents has gone way beyond 
cooperation and coordination to become directly involved in the revision of the 
established frameworks, policies and plans. They were also key players in 
prioritizing the issues and framing policy debates (Hira and Parfitt, 2004). As 
noted by Paisley and Henshaw (2013: 63), ‘The World Bank, UNDP, and CIDA 
reviewed the Action Plan and recommended consultations with Nile countries’. 
Accordingly, further review of the Action Plan to be done by an International 
Advisory Group (IAG).  
As such, those international agents were involved in crucial activities shaping the 
main features of the water governance system in the Nile basin. This includes: 
definition of collaboration projects; refinement of a proposed priority portfolio; 
presentation of findings to the water ministers; the establishment of a donors’ 
consortium called the International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile 
(Sadoff and Grey 2005: 423). In this context, the review process by IAG has 
underlined the following areas as potential drivers for cooperation in the Nile 
basin: creating a shared vision among the River Nile basin countries; moving 
from the planning stage to taking concrete action on the ground; pre-emptive 
facilitation of negotiations and tensions; simultaneous promotion of country and 
inter-country dimensions; building trust and confidence among the basin 
countries (Paisley and Henshaw, 2013).  
A quick look at the list produced by the IAG reveals that working on the identified 
dimensions is problematic especially if one takes account of the long history of 
competition and distrust between the countries in the Nile basin. From this 
perspective, creating a shared vision and trust building processes is not be an 
easy task. In an attempt to build-up a shared vision, the WB has taken the lead 
via its Senior Water Advisor for the Africa Region who played a fundamental role 
in reforming national water policy agendas to incorporate and focus on 
cooperative projects instead of unilateral actions. To this end, the parties 
involved in negotiations were encouraged to move away from divisive issues 
such as the allocation of water rights to focus more on potential collective 
benefits that can be reaped from cooperation (see Sadoff and Grey, 2005; 
Gersfelt 2007). In other words, instead of focusing on the actual allocation 
percentages and negotiating who gets what from the Nile, the basin countries 
167 | P a g e  
 
should look at how to benefit each other through the established development 
projects along the river. The efforts in this regard have culminated in developing 
a regional framework for cooperation.    
6.4 Implementation Challenges and the Effectiveness of Water Governance 
Institutional Arrangements  
The aforementioned discussion of the transboundary governance in the Nile 
basin has indicated that the attempts to develop an overall governing framework 
for cooperation and water management and allocation in the basin have not been 
a complete success. The hydro-political cooperation process was bumpy and 
was full of difficulties. According to Cascão (2008), the Nile is a politicized and 
securitized basin and the results achieved with regard to developing 
transboundary governance arrangements underline a mix of cooperative 
mutually beneficial projects and continuing diplomatic and legal deadlocks 
between upriver and downriver countries.  
Despite the generous funding from international donors directed towards the 
establishment of a cooperative water governance system in the Nile basin, none 
of the institutors established in the 1980s and 1990s were holistic enough to 
include all the Nile basin countries. Major up-streamers including Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Tanzania have always been sceptical of those institutions and were hesitant 
to join cooperative governance arrangements in full capacity. According to their 
view, established cooperative initiatives were enhancing the existing power 
asymmetric relations in the Nile basin. Most of those projects and mechanisms 
such as the Undugu and TeccoNile were controlled by downstream countries 
and worked in their favour. Additionally, those governance arrangements have 
not directly addressed the fundamental issue of unfair water allocation of the Nile 
waters because of the colonial era water agreements (Arsano, 2004).  
Consequently, early cooperative efforts and initiatives have failed to establish a 
basin-wide water governance system to manage and allocate waters in the Nile 
basin. The main focus was on technical issues and major water governance 
issues such as economic development and water infrastructure projects and 
water investment have received little attention.  Realizing the shortcomings of 
previous collaborative projects, the recent initiatives including the NBI tried to 
move forward and to address some of issues that have been neglected by old 
governance arrangements.  The penultimate goal of the NBI was to create a 
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Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) to govern water allocation and water 
management in the Nile basin. That means, the NBI was a means to an end but 
it was not meant to be a permanent water governance mechanism. In other 
words, the NBI was regarded as a transitional cooperative mechanism to be 
replaced at a later stage by the Framework Agreement, CFA as permanent 
organization. Nonetheless, because of the disagreement between the Nile basin 
countries on fundamental water issues, the NBI stayed in place for almost a 
decade, which was much longer than expected. During this time, the NBI has 
succeeded in developing and implementing several projects but never reached 
the overall goal of creating the CFA (Zedan, 2013).         
The implementation of the NBI and the associated framework was faced with 
many obstacles, chief among which was the rejection of Ethiopia to abide by a 
well-established, fundamental principle of international law which is the principle 
of prior notification. This principle regulates the conduct of countries with regard 
to international water resources and dictates that all riparian countries have to 
be notified in advance with any projects, construction, or actions to be taken by 
any other country that may cause harm to the interests of others. That means 
any water decision that may affect the current utilization of the Nile has to be 
declared beforehand and the Nile basin countries have to be notified and 
provided with all technical information needed to evaluate the potential impact of 
this decision. From the Ethiopian point of view, this rule restricts its sovereign 
rights to use the water of the Nile flowing via its territories (Waterbury and 
Whittington, 1998).  
In addition to the Ethiopian sceptical position with regard to the benefits of 
cooperation, water security, especially for the downstream countries, has been 
a matter of concern. The downstream countries, namely Egypt and Sudan, insist 
on keeping the current flow of the Nile as per the 1959 agreement untouched. 
From their perspective, the flow of the Nile at the current pace is a matter of 
national security and any change in the use, which may result in a reduction in 
water allotments, will threaten the water security. As mentioned previously, the 
idea of sticking to old international agreements to determine water rights and the 
allocation of water in the Nile basin is highly challenged by other riparians, 
particularly Ethiopia, which obviously holds an opposing position focusing on its 
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absolute right to use the Nile crossing its land the way that serves its 
developmental plans (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006).  
Finally, the issue of funding the NBI has also been a major challenge for the 
initiative.  The majority of funds used to come from international donors 
particularly the WB the UNDP and CIDA. In this respect, it can be noted that the 
donor community has contributed generously to hydraulic infrastructure projects 
in the Nile basin (Geletu, 2008). A trust fund was created in 2003 under the name 
of the Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) to work as a funding mechanism to the NBI 
projects. The NBTF was the main source of funding projects in the Nile basin; 
however, other bilateral and multi-lateral donors have funded projects outside 
the trust fund.  Despite the multiple sources of funding for the NBI, the 
contributions from the basin countries used to be delayed which had affected the 
implementation process negatively (Paisley and Henshaw, 2013). 
In 2010, the five Nile basin countries including Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Rwanda, and Kenya   decided to move forward and to draft the long awaited 
CFA.  Egypt and Sudan plus the other countries, which did not sign the 
agreement in 2010, were given one year to join. In this context, the universal 
adoption of the CFA was challenged on the ground of water security. According 
to article 14 of the agreement, the Nile basin countries agreed ‘to work together 
to ensure that all States achieve and sustain water security and not to 
significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State’ (CFA, article 
14:24). This provision was rejected by Egypt and Sudan, who insisted on 
rephrasing this article to become the signatory states agreed to work together to 
ensure that all states achieve and sustain water security and not to adversely 
affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin state.  
The change in the way in which this article is formulated only reflects a 
disagreement on the terminology used but it also highlights a fundamental 
difference in opinion between the upstream and downstream countries in relation 
to the way the water should be allocated. The reformulation has been rejected 
by the up-streamers, who insisted that accepting the proposed article by Egypt 
and Sudan would preserve the old water agreements. Such a disagreement has 
brought the negotiators between those countries to a deadlock and the issue of 
water allocation mechanisms and methods is still hanging (Tawfik, 2016). 
Nonetheless, this was the first time in the history of the Nile basin in which all 
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upstream countries formed a unified front facing Egypt and Sudan. As such, the 
hydro-political dimension of the water governance in the Nile basin has changed. 
The political pressures have been intensified by the upstream riparians on Egypt 
and Sudan and old grievances among the Nile riparians were resurrected 
(Cascão, 2009).  
Because of the high stakes of Egypt not to allow such an agreement to be put in 
place when reaching the two-thirds majority required, pressures were put on 
Burundi and Congo by Egyptian officials to prevent them from signing the CFA. 
As reported by Al-Masry Al-Youm, an Egyptian newspaper in 2010, the 
diplomatic efforts of the Egyptian government have resulted in an 
acknowledgement by Burundi that any water agreement that works against the 
Egyptian intersects should not be signed by the other Nile basin countries. 
Nevertheless, the position of Burundi changed after the fall of Mubarak’s regime 
in Egypt, which created a political vacuum that encouraged Burundi to retreat 
from its support of the Egyptian position and to sign the agreement in 2011 
(Tawfik, 2015).  
The CFA is now ready for ratification thanks to the change in the position of 
Burundi, which opens a new page in the hydro-political history of the Nile basin.  
According to the draft of the CFA and following the ratification of the proposed 
agreement, a new mechanism by the name the Nile River Basin Commission 
has been proposed in order to replace the NBI (Eckstein, 2010). The draft of the 
CFA agreement has done much with regard to the allocation mechanism of the 
water in the Nile basin. Instead of focusing on specific allotments for each 
country, the CFA talked in general about the equitable use of water. Such a 
generalization has not been welcomed by downstream countries namely Egypt 
and Sudan, which insisted on receiving the exact amounts stated in the colonial 
era agreements (Zedan, 2013: 39).  
Putting the cooperative efforts in the Nile basin in the balance, Paisley and 
Henshaw (2013) have posed a major question that given the cooperative spirit 
that initially gave rise to the NBI, why has the negotiation of the CFA been so 
excruciatingly slow and seemingly unsuccessful? In an attempt to answer this 
question, the authors have underlined several of the following explanatory 
factors the first among them is the weakness of the NBI in addressing and solving 
fundamental differences in opinion between upstream and downstream 
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countries. Another factor that explains the slow pace of the CFA negotiations is 
the unsustainable water practices by some countries which have not been fully 
and effectively handled by existing governance institutions and mechanisms 
(Hefny and Amer, 2005).  
From a good governance perspective, the process of negotiating water 
governance institutions including the NBI and the CFA has left non-state actors 
and other stakeholders unrepresented. Added to this, the tensions between 
Ethiopia and Egypt have been fuelled by the new construction projects in the Nile 
basin, particularly the Grand Renaissance Dam by Ethiopia. Another important 
issue of contention related to the new construction development projects in the 
Nile basin is the appearance of new international actors such as China as the 
main player in the construction and funding process to replace the old players 
including the WB and the UNDP. Finally, the political unrest in downriver 
countries has shifted the focus of their governments away from addressing water 
governance in the Nile basin (Paisley and Henshaw, 2013: 11-12). 
With the main features of the hydro-political relations and dynamics in the Nile 
basin identified and having analysed and evaluated the cooperative initiatives 
and institutional set-up, the discussion now moves into potential future scenarios 
with regard to the transboundary governance of water in the Nile valley.      
6.5 Future Scenarios for Transboundary Water Governance in the Nile 
Basin 
In the absence of a ratified CFA, the water governance in the Nile basin faces 
several potential risks, which may hamper the cooperative initiatives and 
collaborative water management efforts. Chief among these risks is the 
possibility of not creating a Nile Basin Commission which will affect the potential 
of future sustainable cooperation in the basin. Added to this, the frustration of the 
upstream riparians is more likely to increase due to the lack of potential 
investment. In the absence of the NBI’s shared vision the Nile riparians would be 
more inclined to continue with, unilateral water development projects in an 
uncoordinated fashion. This in turn will interfere with the willingness of 
international donors to support and finance the cooperative process and the 
investment projects. In the worst-case scenario, the NBI may collapse as have 
other cooperative efforts in the Nile basin (Zedan, 2013; Tawfik, 2016).    
172 | P a g e  
 
Given such circumstances and based on a reading of the current geopolitical 
situation in the Nile basin, four alternative emerging scenarios could be identified 
(see Cascão, 2009; 2012):    
Scenario 1: ‘One Nile’: this scenario is based on the assumption that the CFA 
will be signed and ratified by all Nile basin countries in the short or medium term. 
If that happens, a new all-inclusive cooperation mechanism by the name Nile 
Basin Cooperation will be established and replace the existing transitional NBI. 
All the Nile riparian states will be members of the newly instituted river basin 
organization.      
Scenario 2: ‘Two-speed Nile’: the underlying assumption in this scenario is that 
the CFA will not be fully adopted by all the Nile riparian states and only some of 
them will sign and ratify the agreement while the others will either stay out 
completely or join just as observers. In such a case, an all-inclusive mechanism 
for cooperation will be difficult if not impossible. However, there are still some 
cooperation venues among the signatories of the treaty. 
Scenario 3: Cooperation-as-usual: this scenario assumes that the two-thirds 
majority required for putting the CFA in place will not be reached and that the 
CFA will be totally abandoned. In this case, the opportunity of an overall 
cooperation mechanism in the Nile basin will be completely lost and the Nile 
riparian states are most likely to continue cooperating based on a multi-lateral 
agreement framework.  
Scenario 4: End of multilateral approach: this extreme scenario suggests that 
in the absence of a CFA in the Nile basin there is a possibility for undermining 
the cooperation efforts among the Nile basin countries. That means the 
possibility for all the Nile riparian states to work collaboratively is minimal and 
there is a big chance for each one of them to act individually on whatever water 
issues and projects they see benefiting their national interests. 
As can be seen from the aforementioned scenarios, the future for establishing 
collaborative water governance arrangements in the Nile basin is really fuzzy. 
No one can predict with a high level of confidence what this future will look like 
or what will be the governing mechanisms. The existing fundamental differences 
between upstream and downstream countries further complicate the scenery. 
The previous water governance arrangements, as mentioned before, did not 
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succeed in addressing crucial water disputes and disagreements among those 
countries with regard to how to allocate and manage the River Nile waters. Given 
that, it is highly unlikely for the one Nile scenario to take place since the 
disagreement between upstream and downstream states will definitely prevent 
the development of an overarching water governance organization in the Nile 
basin. It is also highly unlikely for the cooperation in the Nile basin to stop 
completely as suggested by the end of the multi-lateral approach scenario given 
the ambitious developmental plans held by the Nile basin countries. Dropping 
these two scenarios from the calculations will leave us with the partial 
cooperation possibilities as suggested by the second and the third scenarios. 
Nonetheless, the historical as well as the current water disputes between Egypt 
and Ethiopia in addition to the present political context suggest that more projects 
will take place on business as usual basis.                                
6.6 Conclusion  
To conclude, the water governance of the Nile basin is characterized by regional 
tensions between the Nile riparian countries, which make cooperation among 
them difficult if not impossible. Adding to this, many of those countries such as 
Egypt and Ethiopia have a long history of conflicts and distrust. The internal 
conflicts and civil wars in other countries, including Sudan, add to the 
complications of the transboundary water governance in the Nile basin. All these 
challenges necessitate more efforts from the international community to put an 
end to a long-standing history of tensions and conflicts on waters in the Nile 
basin. A new basin-wide collaborative governance mechanism needs to be 
established to govern the allocation and management of waters in the basin and 
bridge the gap in opinions between upriver and downriver countries. In other 
words, the adoption of the Cooperative Framework Agreement by the Nile 
riparians will determine the future of cooperation in the Nile basin.  As the 
discussion in this chapter has indicated, coming to an agreement with regard to 
the adoption and the ratification of the CFA is not an easy ride given the 
fundamental resistance of downstream countries namely Egypt . 
One of the major shortcomings associated with the previous water governance 
mechanisms in the Nile basin was the inability of governance arrangements and 
institutions to address and resolve crucial and sensitive water issues. Chief 
among those issues was the longstanding historic tensions between downstream 
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and upstream countries in relation to the allocations of water rights in the Nile 
basin (Zedan, 2013). As the discussion in this chapter indicated, two main 
agreements form the subject of this conflict: the 1929 agreement signed between 
Egypt and Great Britain as well as the 1959 agreement between Egypt and 
Sudan. Any future water governance arrangements in the Nile basin have to 
revisit and reconsider these two agreements for several reasons. Firstly, these 
two agreements still have a major negative impact on water governance 
arrangements among the basin countries. The upriver states consider these two 
agreements as the main obstacles for regional cooperation in the Nile basin for 
the reason that they are partial in scope and do not include all of the Nile 
riparians. Secondly, the mentioned agreements allocate specific volumetric 
shares of the Nile waters to Egypt and Sudan without doing the same for the rest 
of the Nile riparians. Thirdly, and from a legal perspective, these agreements are 
only binding to the signatories, which gives the other countries the right to 
question them and to ask for fairer new institutions to replace them.  Dealing with 
this crucial water issue and coming up with new water governance arrangements 
which guarantee a fair distribution of waters among downstream riparians and 
the upstream neighbouring states will help overcome major stumbling blocks in 
hydro-political relations   in the Nile basin. 
Equally important to revisiting and revising the archaic water institutions in the 
Nile basin is the continuity of collaboration among the Nile riparians with respect 
to the new water projects and constructions on the Nile. As pointed out earlier,  
‘pressure on water resources remains the key factor in the political and economic 
development of the Nile Basin countries’ (Conniff et al., 2012:20). With many 
upstream countries trying to pursue their rightful plans to development and with 
the population of some other countries continually growing at a high pace, the 
pressures on water resources are expected to intensify. The absence of a 
collaborative water governance mechanism may result in an aggravation of the 
conflicts and tensions among the Nile riparians especially when countries start 
to take individual water decisions that can impact negatively on water availability 
in other countries. A glance at the Nile basin reveals that many water projects 
are planned and several are under construction in different countries. The 
establishment of those projects will have a direct impact on the flow of the Nile 
and will definitely reduce the amount of the Nile waters reaching downstream 
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countries, particularly Egypt, the last recipient of the Nile waters. Building new 
dams and water projects is not all bad as long as the new establishments carry 
benefits to all stakeholders. This cannot be achieved in the absence of a water 
governance collaborative mechanism that facilitates cooperation and 
negotiations with the aim of achieving mutual benefits and minimizing negative 
implications. Whether this collaborative mechanism will be developed and put in 
place is still a matter of speculation. In this context, it can be concluded that, the 
jury is still out on whether the Nile basin is gradually moving towards a new water 
governance regime marked by multilateral cooperation and joint management of 
the transboundary resources, or whether partial cooperation and unilateralism 
will dominate the decades to come.  
Unpacking the water governance arrangements at the regional level was a 
fundamental step to nationally analyse the water governance in Egypt. At the 
end of the day, water policies, decisions, institutions and players in Egypt do not 
exist in a vacuum. Hence, with the water governance system in the Nile basin 
explained, the discussion in the next chapter will focus on water governance 
arrangements in Egypt.   
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CHAPTER 7:  WATER REFORMS IN EGYPT: THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
GOVERNANCE  
7.1 Introduction 
Following on from the previous discussion of water issues and institutions at the 
regional level in Chapter 6, and guided by the theoretical discussions of water 
governance and structure-agency dialectic relations in chapters 2, 3, and 4, this 
chapter focuses on the national level water governance in Egypt. One of the 
major challenges in examining water governance arrangements in Egypt is the 
highly fragmented nature of the legislative environment of the water sector as 
the sector is still lacking a unified water law that governs all stakeholders and 
clearly identifies roles and responsibilities. Such a unified water law is an integral 
part of what Saleth and Dinar (2004) called the ‘software’ component of water 
governance systems (see chapter 3). Another difficulty associated with the 
investigation of the Egyptian water governance is the number of policy actors 
involved in making and enforcing water policies and regulations in the country. A 
glance at the institutional framework of the water sector reveals that the overall 
structure of the water industry is highly complex with too many state actors and 
agencies involved in different capacities in the water decision-making processes. 
Such institutional complexity in addition to the weakness and fragmentation of 
the legal environment hinder the proper administration of water governance 
systems or what can be called the ‘hardware’ component of the water 
governance system (see chapter 3).  Finally, knowledge about water governance 
in Egypt is dispersed in a range of documents and lacks a comprehensive 
analytic framework that combines previous work in this area in a well-
documented manner. This final observation indicates the importance of 
conducting such an in-depth systematic examination of water governance 
arrangements in Egypt done in this study.   
Having said that, the main aim of this chapter is to move from the regional level 
governance of the water sector in Egypt explained in Chapter 6 to the national 
level governance in an attempt to produce a vivid picture of this vital sector. 
Based on the documentary analysis of collected water policy documents and 
official reports, in addition to the analysis of the interview material, the water 
sector in Egypt will be mapped out. The main features of its legal and regulatory 
environments will be identified in addition to the analysis of the complex 
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institutional framework and the roles and responsibilities of the key policy actors. 
In order to contextualize the regulatory and institutional analysis, an overview of 
the development of the water sector in Egypt and the main drivers and stages of 
reform will be provided first.                    
7.2 Water Sector Reforms in Egypt: An Overview 
This section provides an overview of the development of the water sector in 
Egypt and the reform process. The aim is to pave the way for a detailed 
discussion of the legal and regulatory environment as well as the overall 
institutional framework. The early development of the Egyptian water sector 
dates back to the nineteenth century, particularly in 1860 when the first group of 
water companies was founded in Alexandria and the Suez Canal cities by a 
group of private foreign investors. Following the 1952 revolution, Nasser’s 
regime adopted a socialist ideology under which a nation-wide nationalisation 
program was devised. Many private industries, including the privately owned 
water companies were brought back under the direct control and management 
of the state in 1956. New strategies and policies were formulated to encourage 
investments in the water industry, particularly in rural and provincial areas. To 
this end, two governmental agencies were instituted to manage and develop the 
water supply and sanitation (Sharabas, 2000).          
The Open Door Policy, known locally as Infitah, was introduced under the regime 
of Anwar Sadat, the successor of Nasser, in an attempt to attract foreign 
investment from the Gulf and from international donors. As a result of this policy, 
international development agencies, including the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), started operating in Egypt and initiated 
several water projects during the 1970s and the 1980s.  These projects aimed at 
providing technical assistance to water and sanitation organizations in big cities 
including Greater Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal cities. Rural and 
provincial cities wherein almost three quarters of the population live did not 
receive as much attention from international agencies. The lion’s share of the 
projects went to the big urban cities and communities with almost half of the aid 
directed to assist water and sanitation organizations in these areas (World Bank, 
1995:3).  
The impact of the water projects and investments funded by international 
agencies and donors was a mixed bag. On the one hand, improvements in 
178 | P a g e  
 
service delivery were evident with more people having access to water and 
sanitation services. As reported by the Holding Company of Water and 
Wastewater (2006), since the 1980s the production capacity and the levels of 
consumption have substantially increased. The production capacity increased 
from about five million cubic meters daily in 1982 to twenty one million cubic 
meters in 2004. Additionally, the water consumption per capita increased from 
130 litres per day in 1982 to 275 litres per day in 2004. Such an improvement at 
the level of production capacity and service accessibility, however, was not 
accompanied by similar progress regarding the financial and human capabilities 
of water organizations. At the institutional level, water organizations, particularly 
in rural areas, are suffering from the lack of human and financial resources an 
issue that necessitates capacity building programs and more investments to be 
directed to address such a shortage.      
In an attempt to analyse and diagnose the most pressing water issues in Egypt, 
the World Bank devised and funded a detailed feasibility study of the water and 
wastewater sector in the country in 1977. The study highlighted the fragmented 
and dismal nature of the sector and underlined major issues that resulted in such 
fragmentation. Chief among those issues were: (a) disintegration of operational 
responsibility; (b) insufficient operation and maintenance; (c) excessive water 
losses; (d) inadequate investment level; (e) lack of skilled staff; and (f) low tariffs 
and inadequate cost recovery (The World Bank, 1995:2).  
The identified problems have been perceived as targets for improvement by the 
consequent Egyptian governments, which in collaboration with international 
development agencies and donors succeeded in addressing some of them. 
Actions were taken to enhance cost recovery mechanisms and tools. 
Nonetheless, the efforts exerted in this regard did not materialize on the ground 
or result in improving the capacities of water organizations to recover their costs 
and in turn minimize the subsidies received from the central government. Water 
organizations, especially in rural and provincial areas, were only able to recover 
one-third of their operating cost. These limited revenues had to be transferred to 
the Egyptian treasury, which restrained the capacity of those organizations to 
further operate and maintain their facilities and infrastructure.    
Despite the ongoing efforts of the consequent Egyptian Government to address 
the water sector problems identified in the mid-1990s, all the identified issues, 
179 | P a g e  
 
apart from the low level of investment, are still noticeable to a different extent 
today. For instance, after more than four decades of reforms, the water sector in 
Egypt is still highly fragmented and the overall structure of the water industry is 
still very complex. Such a fragmentation has always been a defining feature of 
the water sector since the 1970s. The responsibilities of delivering drinking water 
in addition to collecting and disposing of wastewater were divided between 
different agencies and local authorities (see Table 7.1). The fragmented nature 
of the water sector triggered another wave of reforms during the 1980s aimed at 
achieving more integration in the water operations and institutional framework. It 
is worth mentioning in this regard that the reform initiatives were driven by the 
World Bank and external donors.  
Drinking Water 
Key actors Responsibilities 
The General Organization for 
Greater Cairo Water Supply 
(GOGCWS) 
Own and operate local water infrastructure in Cairo. 
The Alexandria Water 
General Authority (AWGA)  
Own and operate local water infrastructure in Alexandria. 
The Suez Canal 
Authority (SCA) 
Own and operate water and sewer infrastructure in the 
Suez Canal cities. 
The General Organization for 
Potable Water (GOPW) 
Built and operated seven regional water systems, mainly in 
the Nile delta provinces. 
Municipalities in the larger 
provincial towns 
Own and operate 115 water systems in respective towns. 
Governorate housing 
directorates 
Operate approximately 1250 rural water supply systems 
relying on boreholes or wells serving those areas not 
covered by municipalities or GOPW. 
Wastewater Collection and Disposal 
The General Organization for 
Greater Cairo Sanitary 
Drainage (GOGCSD)  
Own and operate wastewater collection and disposal 
systems in Cairo.  
The Alexandria General 
Organization for Sanitary 
Drainage (AGOSD), 
Own and operate wastewater collection and Disposal 
systems in Alexandria.  
The General Organization for 
Sewerage and Sanitary 
Drainage (GOSSD) 
Decide on investment in sewerage systems in provincial 
Egypt. 
Municipalities Operate sewerage systems in provincial Egypt. 
 
Table 7.1: Key actors responsible for water and wastewater management 
Source: based on The World Bank (1995) 
The reform programme initiated at the beginning of the 1980s had two main 
pillars. Firstly, there was the merging of the water and sanitation investment 
agencies, the General Organization for Potable Water (GOPW) and the General 
Organization for Sewerage and Sanitary Drainage (GOSSD) in a single new 
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entity called the National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage 
(NOPWASD). Secondly, the model of water companies created in Cairo and 
Alexandria were replicated in every other governorate. When it came to the 
implementation stage, it was realized that creating independent water companies 
in each governorate was a far too ambitious goal. After more than twenty years, 
only three companies were instituted in the Nile Delta: the Beheira Water 
Company, the Damietta Water Company, and the Kafr el-Sheikh Water and 
Wastewater Company. The process of instituting and operating these companies 
was not problem-free. For example, the establishment of the Beheira Water 
Company has taken longer than expected and the cost was much higher than 
the predictable cost of the project. On a positive note however, the establishment 
of the Beheira Water Company resulted in better water services in the 
governorate and the company was able to recover the operation cost (World 
Bank, 1995). 
The overall idea of creating independent water companies in the Egyptian 
governorates was not a success story. On the one hand, many governors 
resisted the creation of such companies in their governorates and preferred other 
models of water utilities such as economic authorities. At the same time, the 
whole rationale behind creating such companies in terms of acting autonomously 
and generating revues was defied in practice as the three newly established 
companies in Beheira, Damietta and Kafr el-Sheikh were not acting in an 
independent fashion and neither were they profitable or covering their costs. In 
this regard, USAID (1991:21) reported that those water companies ‘are not as 
independent or as decentralized as was intended, are not financially viable but 
that the concept is workable’. The dysfunctionality of the independent water 
companies’ model pushed other governorates, including Aswan, Minya, Beni 
Suef, Faiyum, Dakahlia, Gharbia and Sharqia, to adopt a different model in which 
public economic authorities were created to provide water services for each 
governorate. Compared to independent water companies, the established water 
economic authorities looked less independent and the scope of their financial 
operations and responsibility was relatively limited.    
The efforts to restructure the Egyptian water sector towards a more integrated 
design were supported in 1985 by introducing a national policy for pricing the 
water service. The policy aimed at putting in place cost recovery mechanisms for 
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water utilities to allow them to reach a full coverage of their operation and 
maintenance costs in five years. To this end, the policy has introduced new 
charges such as the sewer surcharge of 10%, to be added to the water bill paid 
by the end-user. The national policy for water prices has also tried to readjust 
water tariffs in a way that allows water companies to charge higher prices. 
However, the policy goal has not been fully realized (World Bank, 1995). In that 
sense, the pricing policy has not achieved its major aim with regard to helping 
water utilities covering their cost at the operational and maintenance levels. In 
fact, after ten years of implementing the national water pricing policy Sharabas 
(2000) has reported that the overall situation has not changed much. The ability 
of water utilities to cover their operational and maintenance cost is considerably 
limited. With only one exception, the Alexandria Water Company, all other water 
utilities have failed to cover the cost of their operations. The financial position of 
water utilities has become even worse with the accumulated budget deficits, 
which made those utilities heavily reliant on government, subsides.  
The fact that water utilities have failed in recovering their costs draws our 
attention to the deeply rooted problems that those institutions are suffering from 
at the institutional and technical levels. The analysis of the interview material can 
shed some light on the deep causes of the failure of water utilities.  On the one 
hand, most, if not all of these utilities lack managerial qualifications and expertise 
in addition to modern management systems required to successfully run them 
on commercial basis. Additionally, these organizations are overstaffed and 
suffer, among other things, from the duplication of administrative functions and 
the lack of capacities and skills of their poorly paid employees. Many of the 
methods used for billing and collection processes are archaic and result in 
financial loss of the water utilities. Customer satisfaction is never a big concern 
for water utilities and they do not normally have designated units to handle and 
respond to customer complaints. Finally, maintenance is not a high priority for 
water utilities, a matter that results in the depreciation of the water assets and 
infrastructure.  
The deeply rooted structural issues in the water sector in general and the poor 
performance of water utilities in particular resulted in a new wave of water 
reforms in the 2000s in an attempt to address the previously highlighted 
problems (Sharabas, 2000). A diagnostic study was conducted to find out how 
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to modernize the Egyptian water sector in a way that builds the capacity of water 
utilities and enables them to function on a commercial basis. The study 
recommended the establishment of commercially based water companies at the 
governorate level, an old standing recommendation that was provided almost 
twenty years earlier. However, the diagnostic study has also provided two new 
components to the old proposal: an independent regulatory agency and private 
sector participation.  
To build the capacity of water companies and to modernize their management 
and operations, a holding company was created in 2004 under which all water 
companies and water public economic authorities have been transformed to 
affiliated companies (Bloomberg, www.bloomberg.com). Since its creation, the 
holding company has taken several positive steps to help affiliated companies to 
run their operations on a commercial basis and recover their costs (HCWW, 
www.hcww.com.eg). To this end, the holding company has focused attention of 
the affiliated water companies on performance and established performance 
benchmarks. Added to this, an incentive mechanism has been introduced, under 
which outperforming companies are given bonus payments to encourage them 
to further improve their performance. Customer satisfaction has become a 
priority for water companies and hotlines were created to receive customer 
complaints about water services. These reforms were complemented by a major 
decision to raise water tariffs in Cairo and Alexandria by 100% in order to help 
water companies achieving financial equilibrium (EWRA, www.ewra.gov.eg).          
In 2006, another important step was taken to reform the water sector by creating 
an independent regulatory agency to be responsible for controlling and 
regulating the activities of water companies and other stakeholders active in the 
water governance system. The regulatory authority has been assigned several 
tasks at the economic and social levels. At a general level, the sector regulator 
has taken charge of setting performance standards for water services in addition 
to monitoring and enforcing compliance with standards and regulations. The 
regulatory agency also has responsibilities towards price setting and regulation 
besides promoting the corporatization of water utilities and the introduction of 
competition in the water industry (EWRA, www.ewra.gov.eg). These regulatory 
reforms were enhanced by the creation of the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 
Central Unit in the Ministry of Finance in order to encourage the participation of 
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the private sector in all utility sectors including the water industry. In this regard, 
the PPP unit has facilitated the participation of the private sector in establishing 
new wastewater treatment plants in Cairo and Alexandria using the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) model (Ministry of Finance, www.mof.gov.eg). The 
revolution of January 2011 diverted the attention of policy makers away from the 
water sector and slowed down the reform process. Additionally, because of the 
increase in the salaries of water utilities’ employees, which has not been 
compensated by the government, the overall situation of water companies has 
further deteriorated in comparison to previous performance indicators and 
measures.  
7.3 Drivers of Water Governance Reforms in Egypt 
In addition to the sector specific problems highlighted in the brief historical 
background on the Egyptian water sector developments, the documentary 
analysis, in addition to the analysis of the interview material, has indicated that 
the current drivers for water governance reforms in Egypt are diverse. Chief 
among the Egyptian water reform drivers are: water scarcity and sustainability, 
lack of institutional and regulatory frameworks, water reforms for poverty 
alleviation, lack of public awareness, competition among Nile riparian countries, 
and internal pressures exerted by international organizations including the WB, 
the OECD, and the UN to develop and implement good water governance 
systems. As can be noticed, some of these drivers have motivated and guided 
the reform process in the Egyptian water sector over the last few decades. 
Nevertheless, the results achieved from the consequent reforms were quite 
humble. Consequently, the following discussion will reflect on the identified 
drivers of reform in order to explain how stakeholders in the water sector perceive 
them and how they see the way forward.        
The aforementioned discussion of water scarcity in Egypt has indicated that the 
water situation in the country is risky (see Chapter 6). The demand for water is 
steadily increasing with the ongoing and rapid increase of the Egyptian 
population. This unstoppable and nonlinear increase in water resource demand 
in Egypt for agricultural, industrial, and household reasons raises a fundamental 
question regarding the sustainability of water resource management and 
utilization. Many wasteful practices, especially in the agricultural sector - the 
major consumer of water resources in Egypt - exist and require better 
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management. From this angle, the quest for sustainable utilization of water 
resources represents one of the major drivers of water governance reforms in 
Egypt. As put by a senior member of staff at the Ministry of Water Resources 
and Irrigation, ‘[…] our demand for water exceeds what is available. The issue of 
water scarcity is becoming more significant if one considers the alarming pace 
at which the Egyptian population is growing. This rapid growth of population is 
putting more and more pressures on the scarce water resources and calling for 
more measures to be taken to better manage the demand side’ (Interview 12).  
From this angle, better governance arrangements with regard to managing the 
demand for the available water resources are needed in order to reduce existing 
water pressures in all areas where water scarcity threatens development. In 
other words, water demand management is seen as a solution for various 
economic, social problems (Varis, 2010). Nonetheless, managing water demand 
is not as easy as it sounds; managing the demand rather than the supply side 
requires interventions to change people’s behaviour and attitudes related to 
water utilization. These sorts of interventions do not yield an immediate impact 
as it takes a long time for people to change their behaviour.  Additionally, water 
demand management requires a modern institutional and technological 
infrastructure, which the Egyptian water sector lacks in different areas, as well 
as economically efficient water tariffs and a metering system.            
While suitability, in terms of finding the most efficient ways of water utilization in 
order to reserve the right of future generations in whatever water resources we 
have today, provides a major driver for water governance reforms in Egypt, a 
current and urgent need provides an equally important driver that is poverty 
alleviation. From a socio-economic perspective, the ways in which water 
resources are utilized have a direct impact on water availability, which in turn 
impacts on the economic welfare and levels of poverty in the population (see 
Chapter 3). Additionally, the failure of government to provide sufficient water for 
poor and marginalized areas is another major deficiency in a water governance 
system that adds to the intensification of the poverty issue.  
Lack of public awareness has also been underlined by some of the interviewees 
as one of the main reasons for reforming the water governance system. From 
this perspective, and taking a broad interpretation of the notion of water 
governance, many respondents have regarded water utilization by stakeholders 
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such as households and industrial organizations as a key driver for reforming the 
current governance arrangements. As rightly indicated by a water specialist in a 
leading NGO concerned with water utilization in Egypt, ‘we used to deal with 
water as an infinite source; we have the River Nile, which according to some 
people has more than we need’ (Interview 22). Consequently, many people at 
the household level, or even from other economic sectors, deal with water in a 
wasteful manner, primarily because they do not pay the actual price of their 
consumption. Such a misunderstanding about water and its availability is 
something that requires immediate action to raise the public awareness of the 
importance of water as a finite resource.             
From an MLG perspective, the increasing competition among the Nile Valley 
countries over the Nile waters provides another major driving force behind the 
water governance reform processes in Egypt. As Chapter 6 has indicated, over 
the years the Nile Basin countries have increased their demand for water as a 
major source for achieving economic development and responding to population 
growth and demographic changes due to urbanization, rising educational levels, 
and social, economic and political transformations. The increasing demand for 
Nile water, particularly from the upstream countries, has added to the pressures 
faced by the Egyptian water sector and has urged the Egyptian Government to 
look for new governance arrangements that guarantee the efficient management 
of water resources.        
There has been a growing role of non-state actors in developing and managing 
water resources, in addition to participating in water service delivery. The top-
down state-led approach for making water policies and decisions is long gone. 
National governments are no longer the sole actor in policies and decision-
making arenas. New players, such as private sector organizations and civil 
society institutions, are now sharing the policy and decision-making space with 
governments. The new water governance arrangements and the involvement of 
non-state actors in water policies and decision-making processes highlight the 
issue of the expected roles and responsibilities of involved parties. For the time 
being, the major contribution of non-state actors in Egypt appears in the policy 
implementation phase with governmental actors playing the main role in making 
water policies and decisions. Different voices for the Ministry and the regulatory 
body have verified this observation. A senior member of staff in the sector 
186 | P a g e  
 
regulatory agency has stated that ‘we rely on civil society organizations in certain 
areas including raising public awareness and delivering water to some deprived 
and scattered areas’ (Interview 29). However, when it comes to water policy 
formulation and decision-making, it is still reflecting largely a top-down approach. 
Accordingly, the role of non-state actors, namely the civil society organizations, 
in the process of formulating water policies and decisions is quite limited and 
depends to a large extent on information sharing.                  
International pressures to develop transparent, accountable, participatory, and 
gender equitable water governance practices are evident in the Egyptian case. 
The notions of good governance, as presented in Chapter 2, provide an 
important checkpoint against which international organizations, such as the WB, 
the OECD and the UN, measure and evaluate water governance arrangements 
worldwide. Such global comparisons put pressure on national governments to 
reform and modernize their water governance systems in order to reflect the 
qualities of good governance in terms of transparency, accountability, and 
participation. Despite the growing evidence related to the convergence in many 
government practices to meet the good governance criteria, formal officials in 
Egypt are most likely to implicitly admit that they are subject to pressures from 
international organizations to reform the water sector. They broadly frame the 
issue as they need to respond to changes in the global environment and the way 
in which the water sectors are reformed, forgetting that these reforms are 
normally motivated by donors’ agendas.                 
7.4 The Water Sector in Egypt: The Legal and Regulatory Environment   
As indicated in chapter 3, water laws and regulations provided the overall 
framework within which water policy decisions are made and enforced. This 
aspect of water governance was described by Saleth and Dinar (2004) as the 
‘software’ component while the administration of this aspect is referred to as the 
‘hardware’ component (see chapter 3). The performance of water governance 
systems is determined by the interactions between the software and the 
hardware components. In other words, water laws and regulations provide the 
structures within which water policy agents interact and make decisions 
regarding water policy issues (see chapter 4).  
The analysis of policy documents and the results of the interviews conducted 
during the fieldwork have indicated that the legal and regulatory framework of 
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the Egyptian water sector is of a very fragmented and complex nature. In the 
absence of a sector specific water law, several laws, decrees and decisions 
organize the development and management of water resources as well as 
identify and assign the role and responsibilities for the involved actors. Table 7.2 
summarizes the main legal documents including provisions on water governance 
and institutions.    
Laws and Legislation 
Law 3081/1955 concerning administrative sequestration 
Law 931/1962 concerning discharge of liquid wastes 
Law 441/1965 concerning organization of accounts control departments in authorities, 
public sector establishments and affiliated companies, units and 
associations, 
Law 531/1973 concerning the public budget 
Law 471/1978 promulgating law on the civil service 
Law 481/1978 promulgating law on public sector personnel 
Law 431/1979 promulgating law on the local administration system and its executive 
regulations 
Law 591/1979 concerning establishment of urban communities 
Law 481/1982 concerning protection of the Nile and other waterways from pollution 
Law 971/1983 promulgating law concerning public sector authorities and companies 
Law 971/1983 promulgating law concerning public sector authorities and companies 
Law 51/1991 concerning senior civil service positions in government administration 
and the public sector 
Law 41/1994 concerning environmental protection 
Law 81/1997 promulgating law on investment guarantees and incentives 
Presidential Decrees 
PD 47231/1966 on adoption of the Uniform Accounting System 
PD 16381/1968 concerning the establishment of the Greater Cairo Water Authority 
PD 16391/1968 concerning the establishment of the Alexandria Water Authority 
PD 2621/1979 concerning the establishment of the Alexandria Wastewater Authority 
PD 961/1994 concerning amendments to some provisions of PD 26211979 on the 
establishment of the Alexandria Wastewater Authority 
PD 1331/1981 concerning the establishment of the Greater Cairo Wastewater 
Authority, 
PD 951/1994 concerning amendments to some provisions in PD 13311981on the 
establishment of the Cairo Wastewater Authority 
PD 1971/1981 concerning the establishment of the National Organization for Potable 
Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD) 
PD 301/1986 concerning amendment of PD-19711981 
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PD 2811/1995 concerning the establishment of public economic authorities for 
water/wastewater in some governorates 
PD 1641/1996 concerning the organization of the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and 
Urban Communities 
Governor's Decisions 
Decree No. 
49711981 
on the establishment of the Executive Agency for the Greater Cairo 
Wastewater Project, with the consent of the Cabinet, and on the basis 
of the view of the State Council 
Decision No. 
3571/ 1984 
Damietta Governor: concerning the establishment of the Damietta 
Water Company 
Decision No. 
2011/1983 
Kafr El-Sheikh Governor: concerning the establishment of the Kafr el-
Sheikh Water and Wastewater Company, 
Decision No. 
19811981 
Beheira Governor: concerning the establishment of the Beheira Water 
Company, 
 
Table7.2: The Legal Framework of the Egyptian Water Sector 
As the table indicates, there are several laws, presidential decrees, and 
governors’ decisions govern the administration of water resources in Egypt. 
Among the identified legal documents in Table 7.2, the Irrigation and Drainage 
Law No. 12 (1984) is of particular importance because it regulates the usage of 
water, water management, and distribution in Egypt.  The law provides guidelines 
on how water resources should be utilized and the overall regulatory framework 
for the actors involved. Water issues are covered and discussed in eight 
chapters, which include 104 provisions dealing mainly with several issues 
including the identification and definition of public water streams as well as the 
requirements to use a water stream for irrigation and agriculture (Law 12/1984, 
Chapters 1 and 2). Chapters 3 and 4 of the Egyptian water legislation cover water 
utilization issues such as water banks and the methods of water distribution. 
Chapter 5 regulates the usage of waste and ground water by explaining the 
restrictions and prohibitions related to the utilization of these water resources. 
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the methods of protecting public water streams 
against misconduct and sanctions for violations by noncompliant parties. The 
Egyptian water legislation law provides a conflict resolution mechanism to solve 
water disputes between involved actors. This conflict resolution mechanism is 
fully explained in Chapter 8 (MWRI, www.mwri.gov.eg). 
At the regulatory level, the sector economic and social regulation has been 
perceived as an instrumental tool for controlling the behaviour of water utilities 
and stakeholders in addition to developing the sector by attracting and 
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encouraging private investments. Given the monopolistic nature of the sector, 
developing a regulatory framework was also necessary for protecting consumers 
by controlling water prices and enforcing quality and environmental standards at 
national, governorate, and municipal levels. In that sense, a broad distinction can 
be made between the economic regulation of the water sector in terms of setting 
and adjusting tariffs and prices for water services and other forms of regulation 
related to social and technical aspects such as health and safety, environmental 
protection, and water quality.  
From an economic viewpoint, the water sector regulator in Egypt plays a 
significant role in the following areas: promoting cost recovery and commercial 
tariffs; compelling  performance ‘benchmarking’; improving operations and 
maintenance; rewarding competitive utility management; fostering  financial 
management and customer relations; reducing  financial drain and leveraging 
resources and encouraging private investment in the sector.  
The literature on utility regulation provides several rationales to justify 
government intervention in water industries (Mitnick, 1980; Ernst, 1994; Baldwin 
and Cave, 1999; Nestor and Mahboobi, 1999). In the absence of competition, 
monopolistic water utilities can exploit water users and fix prices at higher levels. 
In this case, regulating water prices is required in order to make sure that water 
prices reflect the actual cost of services. Consequently, the role of the sector 
regulator is paramount in assessing the cost of production as well as setting the 
fare rate that water utilities can charge end-users. In the same vein, water sector 
regulation is also required in order to gradually introduce competition in sectors 
which used to be dominated by gigantic government institutions and run as 
natural monopolies. Opening up water sectors for competition is not an easy task 
and requires government intervention via the sector regulator to carefully design 
and put in place a competition framework that protects new entrants against 
water incumbents and manages the transition period towards the privatization of 
state-owned utilities. Expertise has also been put forward by some scholars in 
order to justify the creation of water sector regulators. As is the case with other 
utility sectors, water is a highly technical domain that can be better managed and 
organized by experts in this field. From this angle, creating a specialised 
technical body to regulate the Egyptian water sector can be seen as a strong 
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rationale for the establishment of the sector’s independent regulatory agency 
(Majone, 1994, 1997, 2001; Gilardi, 2003, 2005; McNamara, 2002).        
The overall rationale for regulating water sectors, as reflected in the literature on 
utility regulation, has been widely acknowledged by the interviewees from 
government as well as non-governmental institutions. Nonetheless, the majority 
of the respondents have placed much more weight on the badly needed private 
investment for modernizing the sector’s infrastructure and to build up new water 
facilities. In this regard, regulation has been devised by the Egyptian Government 
as an instrumental tool that will allow more efficiency at the operational level 
because of the sector liberalization and competition besides encouraging private 
investors to enter the market by reducing the risk of political interference. As 
noted by a senior member of staff in the regulatory agency, ‘[…] as the sector 
regulator we need to assure private investors that their capital will be well-
protected and their investments in the water sector will pay-off’ (Interview 30).   
This instrumental rationale, provided by policy-makers and senior members of 
staff in the Egyptian water organizations, is very much entwined with the notion 
of policy credibility as presented in the delegation literature of regulatory 
governance (Spiller, 1993; Majone 2001). From this angle, governments 
delegate to independent regulatory agencies in order to send positive and 
credible signals to private investors that the water sector will be run in isolation 
from any form or shape of political intervention. In other words, the policy 
credibility notion assures private investors that water decisions will be made on 
a professional, technical and commercial basis and that the overall water 
governance arrangements will be transparent, fair, and accountable. As 
mentioned by the head of an NGO concerned with water issues, ‘such an 
assurance is quite vital in the water industry because of the long legacy of 
government intervention in water decisions, which has distorted many issues, 
chief among which are water prices and tariffs.’ (Interview 32).  The heavy-
handed interventionist approach by the Egyptian Government in the water sector 
has also been echoed by an expert in the field who stated that ‘tariff setting and 
adjustments is a highly political process wherein the government is used to 
interfering with water prices to keep them below the cost of production. This can 
work for a short period of time but in the long run this approach cannot be 
sustained’ (Interview 30). Taking account of the history of state dominance and 
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intervention in the Egyptian water sector and considering the long term immobile 
and sunk cost nature of investments in the water industry, many interviewees 
have agreed that it has become a must to create an independent sector regulator 
in order to send private investors credible policy commitments about tariffs and 
other rules of the game.   
Other concerns were raised by informants during the interviews which, according 
to their point of view, justify the regulation of the sector. The industry structure 
and the level of market maturity were among the most important issues. The 
interviewees have linked this with the risk of investments in the sector. As a 
senior member of staff in the Holding Company for Water and Wastewater has 
stated, ‘the risk of investing in newly liberalized and emergent markets are higher 
and uncertainty is greater compared to mature and stable markets’ (Interview 
28). Accordingly, such high risks and high levels of uncertainty in the Egyptian 
water sector have called for the creation of a technical body to be able to 
accurately assess risks and provide a shield for private capital from all forms of 
politics and political intervention. From this perspective, designing the regulatory 
intervention is key in helping private investors to make sound decisions. A 
detailed and specific regulatory approach may lack flexibility and an ability to 
adapt to changing circumstances but at the same time, it reduces the cost 
associated with capital investment. On the other hand, a more flexible regulatory 
framework will provide service providers with more incentives for economic 
efficiency but it will also increase the level of uncertainty and the potential misuse 
of the system, which in turn will reflect negatively in the cost of capital.               
7.5 The Water Sector in Egypt: The Institutional Framework 
The relationship between the institutional components of water governance 
systems has been theoretically discussed in chapter 3 (Saleth and Dinar, 2000; 
2004; 2005). In the light of the aforementioned discussion, this section focuses 
on the institutional framework of the water governance in Egypt. The water sector 
in Egypt is a highly-centralised domain wherein in many state actors, including 
several ministries and affiliated agencies, play diverse roles and bear different 
responsibilities in relation to water management. The aim of this section is to 
analyse the institutional framework of the Egyptian water sector by briefly 
highlighting and discussing the key players influencing water governance 
arrangements, policies and decisions. The roles and responsibilities assigned to 
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each player will be underscored in order to highlight the way and the capacity in 
which those dominant players can influence water decisions and policies.         
At a general level, the contribution of water users in the actual decision and 
policymaking process is considerably limited apart from the role played by the 
Water User Association for Irrigation, which plays a relatively active role in the 
area of irrigation (El-Hanbali, 2003). Following the revolution of January 2011, 
the 1971 constitution was suspended and another one was formed in which there 
is a tendency towards decentralization of decision-making processes and more 
citizen participation in all policy domains including water policies.           
The documentary analysis of the official records has revealed that a number of 
ministries alongside several affiliated agencies play different roles with respect 
to developing and manging water resources in Egypt. At the ministerial level, the 
mapping out exercise of the state actors involved in water governance in Egypt 
has resulted in identifying the following ministries: Ministry of Water Resources 
and Irrigation; Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs; Ministry of Water and 
Wastewater Utilities; Ministry of Health and Population; Ministry of Finance; 
Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Agriculture and Lands Cultivation; Ministry of Local 
Development; and Ministry of Industry. Not all ministries play equal roles in 
shaping and managing water governance arrangements in Egypt. Some 
ministries have been identified by the interviewees as key actors in terms of their 
ability to influence water governance arrangements and decisions (e.g. The 
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation) while others have been perceived as 
being less influential because they are partially involved in managing or operating 
specific segments of the governance structure.             
7.5.1 The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) 
The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) has a long history as it 
is considered one of the oldest ministries in Egypt being about 150 years old 
(Viala, 2008:3). The initial stages of the Ministry go back to Mohamed Ali Pasha's 
reign, when it was known as the Public Works Department in 1934 and later in 
1957 as the Administration of Public Works. The responsibility for water 
resources and irrigation was not the sole function of the Administration of Public 
Works. Since the 1952 revolution, the name of the ministry as well as the duties 
assigned to the minister in charge has changed several times. In 1964, for 
example, the Ministry was called the Ministry of Irrigation and it has been 
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assigned duties in the areas of irrigation and drainage works. The name and 
responsibilities changed again twice under Sadat’s regime. The first change was 
in 1977 with the Republican Decree No. 587/1977, which delegated additional 
tasks of land reclamation to the Ministry’s former duties. Accordingly, the name 
of the Ministry was changed to the Ministry of Irrigation and Land Reclamation. 
Not long after, particularly in 1978, another Republican Decree No. 365/1978 
was issued and restored the old name and responsibilities of the Ministry to those 
of 1977. Under Mubarak’s regime, the name of the ministry changed twice in 
1987 and 1999. The Republican Decree No. 449/1987 modified the Ministry’s 
name to the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources until the issuance of 
the Republican Decree No. 409/1999, which has granted the Ministry its current 
name of the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (European Environment 
Agency 2010:16-17 ).        
According to Law 12/1984, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation 
(MWRI) is the main governmental body governing the issue of water 
management and usage in Egypt. In this regard, Varis (2010: 87) notes that 
‘Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation is the only one among the 
dozen ministries that are mandated to govern water issues in the country’. 
MWRI’s role, as noted by Viala (2008:3), has chiefly been to ensure the delivery 
of enough and timely water resources to all stakeholders for the purposes of 
irrigation, domestic and industrial needs, navigation, energy and production. 
Accordingly, the water legislation has given MWRI several rights and 
prerogatives including the right to identify specific streams as public water 
sources as well as the authority to set forth conditions and limitations on water 
utilization from public water resources, particularly for agricultural purposes 
(Article 5 of Law 12/1984).  
The water legislation has also granted MWRI the right to approve any 
modifications to main water resources and public streams or any creation of new 
streams in addition to the ability to abolish any previously issued licenses for the 
private usage of water streams and to destroy a certain stream if such a stream 
will damage neighbouring farmlands and surrounding bridges (Articles 9, 14, 39, 
and 41 of Law 12/1984). MWRI is also authorized by law to divide farmlands into 
zones and units in addition to identifying the irrigation network for each zone and 
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setting a specific schedule for distributing water for irrigation purposes (Article 18 
and Article 30 of Law 12/1984).  
According to Article 38, the Ministry also has the right to prohibit the planting of 
certain crops such as rice in specific areas because of the water-consuming 
nature of those crops. Any utilization for water for purposes other than irrigation 
has to be permitted by MWRI. To face the cases of non-compliance, the Law has 
given MWRI the right to impose a wide range of fines against non-complaints 
and violators. The issuance and the amount of penalties depend on the level and 
the gravity of violations. In this respect, the fines may vary from thirty Egyptian 
pounds for minor violations to ten thousand pounds for major infringements 
(Article 18 of Law 12/1984). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the Ministry 
follows an escalation strategy based on the way violators respond to its 
directions. As stated by the director of awareness and water advisory in MWRI, 
‘The Ministry’s inspectors start normally with giving warnings and administrative 
orders to non-complaints. If non-complaints continue in their violations the 
inspectors have right to report those to the law enforcing bodies authorized to 
take legal actions against them’ (Interview 9). Such an approach is very close in 
nature to the notion of Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite about the enforcement 
pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 35-36).        
The Law has also provided a mechanism to settle disputes among water 
stakeholders. According to Article 23 of Law 12/1984, in the case of disputes 
between farmers and MWRI the law has given farmers and landowners the right 
to appeal MWRI’s decisions before the General Department of Irrigation. The 
has also guaranteed the fair distribution of water among farmers for irrigation by 
authorizing the General Director of Irrigation’s authority to interfere and to 
enforce the law in order to deal with any violations (Article 37 of Law 12/1984).   
One of the main issues facing MWRI and restricting greatly its agility and ability 
to achieve its goals is the size of the organization. With over 70,000 employees, 
MWRI suffers from overstaffing and bureaucracy. In this respect, overstaffing in 
MWRI has been underlined by the World Bank (2005:2) as being one of the main 
issues resulting in a higher cost of transactions and in turn, reducing cost 
effectiveness and quality in the Egyptian water sector (see Figure 7.1).  
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As the figure illustrates, the organogram on the Ministry reflects a highly-
centralised structure. The daily operation of MWRI is the responsibility of two 
main departments and four public authorities. The Irrigation Department (ID) and 
the Mechanical and Electrical Department (MED) have extended functions 
related to the water resources system, irrigation water delivery, and drainage 
water disposal. The role of these two major departments is complemented by the 
functions undertaken by the affiliated public authorities including the Egyptian 
Survey Authority, the Coastal Protection Authority, and the High Aswan Dam 
Authority. The Egyptian Public Authority for Drainage Projects (EPADP), for 
instance, is in charge of all drainage activities within MWRI, and has representing 
directorates within the network. In addition to these operational units, the function 
of conducting applied research on irrigation and water management in MWRI is 
primarily done through the National Water Research Center (NWRC). NWRC 
encompasses 12 specialized research institutes in addition to a strategic 
research unit and a central laboratory for environment quality monitoring (MWRI, 
2005:12-13).  
 
Figure 7.1:  MWRI Organizational Structure 
Source: European Environment Agency (2010: 18) 
The large size of the Ministry has also impacted negatively on the economic 
efficiency of its operations (Varis, 2010: 87). Added to this, the centralized 
organization structure of MWRI has, on the one hand, facilitated and 
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consolidated the decision-making process but at the same time, the overall 
organization lacks coordination among the different departments.  As put by Viala 
(2008:6): 
Although Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been a 
common buzzword in water communities around the world for some time now, it 
is often a challenge for many water managers to propose a practical translation 
of the concept. The same applies to Egypt, where IWRM is an official MWRI 
policy and is frequently quoted by MWRI managers. But while the concept has 
been accepted, few are able to outline a concrete process to implement IWRM. 
The main issue is how to define integration as it relates to management.   
A collaborative effort between MWRI and a number of ministries, including the 
ministries of Agriculture; Environmental Affairs; Trade and Industry; Housing, 
Utilities and Urban Development; Health; Finance; Local Development; Media; 
Economic Development; and Tourism resulted in the development of a National 
Water Resources Plan for Egypt (NWRP) published in 2003. As reported by 
MWRI (2005:5), the main aim of the NWRP was to indicate the collaborative 
ways in which water resources in Egypt could be efficiently managed with respect 
to quantity and quality in order to achieve socio-economic and environmental 
goals. In other words, the main policy objective of developing the NWRP was to 
‘develop general and effective policies for all concerned ministries and agencies 
in Egypt to cooperate in order to achieve the principle of integrated management 
of water resources’ (the European Environment Agency, 2010: 18).  
The objectives of the NWRP have been materialized on the ground in the form 
of an Integrated Water Resources Management Plan (IWRM) that provides a 
complementary, action-oriented, implementation framework to the NWRP. The 
formulation of the IWRM followed an integrated management approach for water 
resources management within the water sector. That means, based on an 
accurate assessment of current and future water resources, all the gaps in the 
NWRP have been identified and accounted for in the new document in addition 
to any shortcomings in the existing reform efforts led by MWRI. The IWRM 
provides a long-term framework for strategically managing water resources over 
a period of 15 years and identifies the areas of interventions and the required 
actions in order to streamline the current trends and practices into an Integrated 
Water Resources Management System for Egypt. In this regard, IWRM has 
identified 39 required actions falling under the following categories:  institutional 
reform and strengthening; policies and legislations; physical interventions; 
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capacity building; technological and information systems; water quality; 
economic and financial framework; research; raising awareness of IWRM; 
monitoring and evaluation and trans-boundary cooperation (MWRI, 2005:5). 
Some of those areas have been given a high priority and required actions have 
been identified in the short term while others have been given lesser importance 
and their interventions have been planned in the medium or long term. Despite 
the adoption of the Integrated Water Resources Management approach in 
MWRI, Viala (2008:7) has noted that different departments within the Ministry 
are still working in isolated silos. This silo mentality in the workplace makes it 
difficult to integrate functions, processes, activities, research and knowledge at 
the organizational level.    
7.5.2 Ministry of Water and Wastewater Utilities (MWWU)  
While MWRI is responsible for the main water resources management and 
administration in the Egyptian water sector, the Ministry of Water and 
Wastewater Utilities (MWWU) was instituted in 2012 to act as the sector’s main 
actor in the area of drinking water supply and wastewater treatment and 
management. Upon its institution, MWWU replaced the Ministry of Housing, 
Utilities, and Urban Development (MHUUD) as the key player in the sector 
responsible for drinking as well as wastewater. As noted by Svendsen (2010: 
10), before the creation of the MWWU, the MHUUD was responsible among 
other things for the planning and construction of infrastructure including 
distribution systems and water purification plants, as well as sewage systems 
and wastewater treatment facilities. These responsibilities have been moved to 
the newly established MWWU. In this regard, MWWU has a general mandate to 
take necessary actions in order to develop the whole sector of drinking and 
wastewater. That means, the Ministry has responsibilities with regard to 
establishing new water and wastewater facilities in addition to increasing the 
capacity of the existing infrastructure. To this end, MWWU work very closely with 
several influential actors in the water sector including: the Egyptian Water and 
Wastewater Regulatory Agency as the sector regulator; the Holding Company 
for Water and Wastewater (HCWW) with its 23 affiliated companies; the National 
Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD); and the 
Construction Authority for Potable Water and Wastewater (CAPW).  
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Roles and responsibilities are divided among the aforementioned players with 
the regulatory agency taking the lead as a central organization in forming and 
enforcing economic and technical regulations of the overall sector (the roles and 
responsibilities of the sector regulator are discussed later in more detail). At the 
operational level, the HCWW with its 23 arms and affiliated facilities covering the 
majority of the Egyptian land is responsible for supplying drinking water in 
addition to the treatment of wastewater. It is worth mentioning in this regard that 
the creation of the HCWW has come as a reaction to the high rate of diarrheal 
diseases, about 20% among children under 5 in Egypt, reported by UNICEF in 
2010. The report has underlined the unsanitary water conditions as the main 
reason behind the spread of such diseases among children (UNICEF, 2010). As 
a result, the HCWW was established in 2004 with a broad mission of 
guaranteeing the delivery of clean and safe water and sanitation services for all 
consumers particularly in to rural communities (Abdel-Gawad, 2007).  
In this context, the gigantic holding companies and their affiliates play a major 
role in the area of providing drinking water via water purification, transport and 
distribution to households and industrial organizations. They also play an equally 
important role in collecting, treating and disposing of wastewater in a safe 
manner. As such, the HCWW has responsibilities with regard to monitoring the 
quality of drinking and wastewater. This job is done via the HCWW’s labs in each 
of the affiliated companies. Added to this, the HCWW monitors the performance 
of the affiliated companies against the five-year plans submitted from each one 
of them. The HCWW also provides affiliated companies with technical assistance 
and is in charge of their maintenance operations. At the level of managing and 
developing water and wastewater infrastructure, NOPWASD and CAPW are key 
players. Infrastructure investment and decisions in Greater Cairo and Alexandria 
are the responsibility of CAPW while the other infrastructure decisions in the rest 
of the country are taken by NOPWASD.   
7.5.3 Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) 
In June 1997, the responsibility of Egypt's first full time Minister of State for 
Environmental Affairs was assigned as stated in the Presidential Decree No. 
275/1997 (European Environment Agency 2010:11). Within its overall mission to 
protect the environment and natural resources, the Ministry of State for 
Environmental Affairs (MSEA) has been assigned some responsibilities in 
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relation to protecting the water sector (Presidential Decree No. 275/1997). 
According to its legal mandate, in addition to MSEA’s overall role in making and 
enforcing policies and regulation for the protection of the environment, it also has 
some responsibilities towards managing all natural resources in Egypt, including 
water resources, in a way that guarantees sustainable development (Ministry of 
State for Environmental Affairs, 2006). Accordingly, MSEA plays the role of the 
water quality inspector by monitoring the quality of water resources. MSEA plays 
its role as an inspector for water quality in collaboration with its functional, 
executive and administrative arm, the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency 
(EEAA). The Ministry, in collaboration with EEAA, monitors the quality of water 
through regional branches and 52 monitoring points in different governorates. In 
this regard, MSEA has the right to impose water standards and to take the 
required legal actions in case of non-compliance (Soulie, 2013: 17).  
MSEA’s commitment towards monitoring and protecting water resources has 
been documented in the National Environment Action Plan (NEAP), which 
reflects Egypt’s environmental agenda (2002-2017). The national programme for 
improving water quality, one of the eight programs included in NEAP, focuses on 
water issues such as wastewater reuse, protecting the fresh water environment 
and bodies from pollution, protecting the marine environment; and developing 
and managing the Egyptian lakes.  The realm of the MSEA does not extend to 
cover the underground water, an area covered by MWRI’s jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, Svendsen (2010:9) has noted that the MSEA is currently 
cooperating with MWRI on a project to reduce industrial pollution in the Nile 
River. In addition to its role in monitoring the quality of water, MSEA plays an 
equally important role in assessing the potential impacts of new projects on water 
streams as well as educating the public on the importance of protecting water 
resources from pollution. For this purpose, the MSEA ‘coordinates with 
international organizations on general environmental protection goals; monitors 
environmental data, works to preserves Egyptian natural resources, and 
conducts public environmental education programs’ (ibid).   
7.5.4 Ministry of Health and Population  
The Ministry of Health and Population is the governmental body responsible for 
public health and the management of the healthcare system in Egypt. From this 
perspective, and taking into account its responsibilities towards the general 
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public health, the Ministry has been assigned some duties related to monitoring 
the quality of drinking and wastewater in an attempt to reduce any potential 
health hazards. In this respect, Svendsen (2010:10) has noted that the Ministry 
of Health and Population ‘samples and analyses outflows from water purification 
facilities, and monitors the potability of water resources, including the Nile and 
canals’. The Ministry of Health and Population is also testing the quality of 
drinking water from wells and notifies MWRI of pollution sites in order to take 
actions to clean them up. 
To fulfil its mandate, the Ministry of Health and Population has established the 
Environmental Monitoring Centre to be responsible, among other things, for 
monitoring water and wastewater quality. The drinking water quality is monitored 
through the National Nile Water Pollution Monitoring Network, wherein the 
Ministry of Health Environmental Monitoring Network periodically tests the quality 
of the Nile waters at different points. As reported by the European Environment 
Agency (2010:20), ‘Levels of water pollution are measured through 174 sites 
along the Nile and its two branches as well as the main canals such as 
Mahmudiya, Ismailia, and Ibrahimeya, in addition to a number of sites located 
along Bahr Yusuf’. The Ministry monitors the water quality at three different 
points: at the intake point, after the treatment processes, and at the point of 
distribution. As for wastewater, the Ministry measures the quality of water 
entering the treatment plant and the quality after the treatment process and 
before discharging the treated water. In addition to its responsibilities with regard 
to monitoring the quality of water and wastewater, the Ministry of Health and 
Population also encompasses the Higher Committee for Water (HCW). The 
HCW acts as a coordinating platform on strategic water and wastewater issues 
as it includes in its membership representatives from different ministries and 
important agencies including MSEA, MWWU, MWRI, and the Ministry of 
Defence, representatives of the Water Companies, EWRA, and the National 
Center for Researches (Soulie, 2013: 17). The aim of having all those important 
agencies on board is to make sure that all water-borne diseases and water 
quality issues are adequately addressed in a coordinated fashion that helps 
improve public health.  
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7.5.5 Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) 
As has been previously mentioned, the agricultural sector in Egypt is the major 
consumer of water among all other economic sectors. More than 80% of water 
is used for agricultural purposes and for irrigation. With such a huge amount of 
water, the primary aim of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation 
(MALR) has been set as ‘to rationalize the utilization of water for agricultural 
purposes and to maintain adequate water quantities via good management 
practices of the available resources’ (Interview 14). In this respect, MALR is 
working in collaboration with MWRI and other concerned parties such as MSEA 
to ensure the availability of water for agricultural purposes and monitor the quality 
of irrigation water in an attempt to control and minimize the impact of farmers’ 
utilization of fertilizers and pesticides on water pollution. As noted by Soulie 
(2013: 19), the Ministry of Agriculture and MWRI also work together to plan and 
organize the yearly crops via the Common Committee for Planning.  In addition 
to its comprehensive responsibilities for water used in agriculture, the MALR also 
oversees fisheries and aquaculture industries in Egypt and monitors their effects 
on water quality (Svendsen, 2010:9). One of the major challenges to face the 
MALR in the coming years is related to its ability to formulate and implement 
policies in order to increase farming activities, agricultural production and the 
development of new agricultural land at a pace that meets the growing demands 
from the rapidly increasing Egyptian population. To meet such a challenge, new 
water governance and management arrangements are necessary.    
In addition to the previously mentioned big players in the water sector in Egypt, 
a number of ministries are involved to a lesser degree and in different capacities 
in the sector’s governance system via auxiliary management and operation of 
part of the irrigation and drainage systems. For instance, in addition to the role 
played by the Ministry of Industry in running and privatizing the previously state-
owned industrial projects, the Ministry is also responsible for controlling and 
managing water supply for these industries. With respect to water investments 
and subsidies, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry 
of Local Development are key players in determining finance methods for new 
projects and water utilities as well as the overall local development water plans 
(Svendsen, 2010:12).  
202 | P a g e  
 
7.5.6 The Egyptian Water/Wastewater Regulatory Agency (EWRA) 
The Egyptian Water/Wastewater Regulatory Agency (EWRA) was instituted in 
2006 in accordance with the Presidential Decree No 136/2004. The 
establishment of EWRA was part of an overall reform plan in the water sector in 
order to rely less on government organizations and to put in place a sector that 
is driven primarily by the needs of its customers and which encourages more 
participation of the private sector. To this end, a new model for service delivery 
and regulation has emerged in which the state is no longer the owner and the 
operator of water utilities but the rule maker and the regulator of the sector. From 
this angle, instituting EWRA was an important move in order to regulate and 
manage water utilities on a competitive and commercial basis as well as 
protecting the rights of the consumers and the public interest in general. To fulfil 
its role as the sector regulator, the founding legislation has granted EWRA a 
broad mandate. The mandate of EWRA does not only cover technical and 
financial issues but it also extends to include economic and social aspects 
(Presidential Decree No 136/2004). Accordingly, the founding decree has 
assigned EWRA a comprehensive responsibility for regulating and managing the 
quality, cost, and price of water services in Egypt. In this respect, the EWRA, as 
a supreme authority, is exercising its powers in accordance with governmental 
laws and regulations at both national and local levels. The scope of the mandate 
covers not only the operations of governmental utilities but the tasks assigned to 
private actors as well. 
The broad legal mandate of the EWRA has been translated into an ambitious 
mission including the development and enforcement of water standards and 
regulations in order to guarantee the quality of provided services as well as the 
efficient cost of production and reasonable prices for end users. This mission 
should eventually lead to the sustainable development of the overall water sector 
in addition to an expansion in service provision and improvements at the level of 
service quality. In pursuing this mission, the EWRA has focused on achieving 
three main goals: higher levels of performance for water utilities, higher levels of 
cost recovery at the operational level and enhancing and encouraging self-
finance for water services. 
At the functional level, the statutory responsibilities of the EWRA are quite 
diverse. As a supreme authority in the water sector, the EWRA is responsible for 
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issuing and renewing licenses for water operators and service providers.  Added 
to this, in collaboration with water utilities the authority has to develop and 
approve the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the technical, economic, and 
financial areas. The EWRA is also responsible for developing the reporting, 
control and audit mechanisms for all water operators and service providers in 
addition to monitoring their compliance. The authority also technically assists 
service providers and water utilities in assessing costs besides evaluating, 
setting, and adjusting water tariffs. All tariff proposals have to be reviewed and 
approved by the EWRA in addition to all yearly targets, as presented in the five-
year plans prepared by each operator. Additionally, all water contracts, 
agreements, and economic feasibility studies of new projects have to be subject 
to the review and the approval of the authority during the formation and the 
implementation phase. Given the current transformation process facing the 
sector, the EWRA has also been assigned the task of determining the essential 
steps for transforming the Public Economic Authorities (PEAS) and companies 
working in the water sector into joint-stock companies.  
Organizationally speaking, the EWRA was established as an independent 
juridical entity and is headed by an executive director who holds the rank of first 
undersecretary. Because of the crucial role played by the EWRA in controlling, 
planning, developing and managing the sector, the respective minister acts as a 
chairman of the authority’s board (see Figure 7.2).  
As the figure illustrates, at the administrative and financial levels the Executive 
Director of EWRA is supported by a number of organizational units responsible 
for providing the required legal, technical and administrative assistance. The role 
of those units is key in helping the Executive Director handling agency-wide 
internal issues as well as managing relations and external matters with water 
stakeholders in the sector. In addition to the administrative and technical support 
provided by departments such as legal, IT, and the secretariats affairs, the 
Executive Director also manages two central departments: the central 
department for pricing and tariffs and the central department for standards, 
compliance and customer protection. 
The main role of the central department for pricing and tariffs is to provide the 
head of the EWRA with specialized and expert opinion on issues related to the 
costing and the pricing of water services. To this end, the mentioned department 
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has been assigned several tasks, including identifying methods for measuring 
costs and conducting cost and rated studies. The department is also required to 
review and assess all proposals for tariff adjustments submitted by water service 
providers and to provide the head of the regulatory agency with an expert opinion 
on these matters for determining water service prices. In order to ensure 
compliance with the defined tariffs and prices, the central department for pricing 
and tariffs has to coordinate with the central department for standards, 
compliance and customer protection. 
  
Figure 7.2: EWRA’s Organogram 
Source: EWRA website 
While issues of economic regulation and pricing are basically dealt with through 
the central department for pricing and tariffs, the central department for 
standards, compliance and customer protection plays two important roles: firstly, 
to monitor and ensure compliance of the regulated companies and secondly, to 
ensure customers’ participation in the decision-making and regulation-making 
processes as well as protecting their interests. To fulfil these two broad roles, the 
mentioned department has to undertake several functions. On the one hand, the 
department is responsible for developing, issuing, and monitoring water 
standards in order to ensure public health and environmental protection. In the 
case of non-compliance, the department has the right to propose penalties to be 
imposed on violators. For reporting purposes, the department is responsible for 
issuing regulatory accounting guidelines to facilitate comparisons among service 
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providers in terms of their performance indicators against the identified 
standards. The results of these performance comparisons should be included in 
a database on service providers’ performance in the sector. The department also 
plays a major role in reviewing the legality of contractual agreements and the 
fairness of service charges in addition to providing a legal advice to the regulator 
on legislative and judicial matters. As the body responsible for consumer 
protection, the department has the right to review water agreements between 
service providers and end-users to guarantee their fairness. Additionally, the 
department has the right to investigate customer complaints and to solve 
disputes via dispute settlement mechanisms.      
7.5.7 Other Water Stakeholders 
The analysis of policy documents of the Egyptian water sector shows that the 
sector is heavily dominated by powerful governmental players. Although the 
Egyptian Government has adopted and integrated a water management 
approach to manage water resources and despite being one of the major 
principles of such an approach, the participatory management principle has not 
been fully enacted. The role of non-governmental actors such as the private 
sector companies, the water NGOs and universities, is considerably limited. As 
reported by Svendsen (2010), the role of the NGOs is basically to act as 
mediators between water institutions and international donors. Added to this, 
water issues normally come as a second order matter of concern to many NGOs 
in Egypt. In other words, concerns about water issues are driven from other 
broader interests such as environmental protection and sustainable development 
in general.  As for the contributions of the universities, the same report has 
indicated that because of the different research centres affiliated with the 
powerful ministries such as the Agricultural Research Center working under the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation and the Environmental Research 
Institute under the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, those government 
institutions rely less on inputs from universities to shape water policy decisions. 
Added to this, the contribution of the private sector towards water resources 
development and management in Egypt is minimal because of the limited 
number of private sector companies and the heavy regulation of the activities of 
those organizations.   
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The story is a bit different with the newly emergent water users’ associations 
(WUA) particularly in the area of irrigation. The idea behind creating WUAs is to 
develop and adopt a participatory irrigation management approach in Egypt via 
increasing users’ participation in irrigation decisions as well as the design of 
irrigation systems. In other words, WUAs aim at balancing the supply side of the 
water equation represented by decision-makers, planners, managers and 
operators with the demand side represented by water users. As reported by the 
Global Water Partnership (2012), the creation of WUAs has resulted in an 
improvement in the overall environment of decision-making in the area of 
irrigation in addition to increasing the performance of the overall irrigation system 
due to the capacity building processes for water decision-makers, managers, 
operators and users. The quality input and contributions from the users even at 
a very early stage of designing water systems have resulted in an increase in 
water savings as well as crop production. Added to this, involving users in 
managing water irrigation systems has also stifled the resistance of water users 
during the different phases of implementing irrigation projects and has 
guaranteed project sustainability.  
Despite these positive signs for improving the effectiveness and the sustainability 
of irrigation governance systems due to users’ participation, many interviewees 
have warned that the results of this experience have to be taken with great 
caution given the very early stage of establishing WUAs. There are still many 
steps to be taken to institutionalize and formalize user participation in all water 
and wastewater governance arrangements. As a member of staff in the Irrigation 
Department at MWRI has noted, ‘the experience of WUAs and their role in 
managing irrigation systems needs to be very well-documented and shared with 
other water stakeholders in all sectors’ (Interview 18). This documentation of the 
process, according to his view, will help other stakeholders to learn from the 
experience of WUAs in the irrigation area and it will help those WUAs to learn 
from their own mistakes. On a different note, an expert in the field of water 
governance has also mentioned that ‘[...] more investments are needed to build-
up the capacities of WAUs’ leaders and staff and to train them in the areas 
wherein they lack crucial expertise’ (Interview 2).  Accordingly, such a capacity 
building exercise will help improve the quality of WUAs’ contributions and inputs 
to the water governance system in general.  
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For WAUs to be more effective, clear policy guidelines have to be in place with 
ongoing support from the government players in control of the overall game such 
as the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation. In this regard, a senior civil 
servant in the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation has stated that ‘the 
Ministry are keen on supporting the WUAs and enhancing their role and 
participation in water activities through keeping open channels of 
communications and providing the guidance and information needed to 
participating water stakeholders’ (Interview 11). At the same time, a similar 
exercise should conducted for the governmental units to train them on how to 
map-out and identify relevant stakeholders and how to approach them in order 
to guarantee their active participation during the different stages of designing and 
implementing water arrangements.  
Finally, the time taken and efforts made during the meetings and the other project 
related activities have to be appreciated and acknowledged by the governmental 
counterparts and the participating WAUs have to see some of their inputs and 
contributions reflected in the final water arrangements and decisions. As one 
expert in the water sector has put it, ‘one of the major pitfalls of such participatory 
governance mechanisms is that many government units put them in place under 
the pressures of the international donor. Participatory decision-making is one of 
the good governance indicators; however, if it is done in a ritualistic manner it 
can be counterproductive and in some cases destructive. The reason for this is 
that the participating stakeholders lose faith and credibility in the whole process’ 
(Interview 3).                   
7.6. Conclusion  
In this chapter, the national level governance of the Egyptian water sector has 
been explored in an attempt to map-out the key policy actors and to identify their 
roles and responsibilities in managing and regulating the water industry. The 
major milestones of the sector’s reforms and the resultant improvements and 
shortcomings of each wave of reform have been underlined in order to explain 
what drives water reforms in Egypt and the actions taken to deal with the main 
policy and regulatory issues. The legal and regulatory environment has also been 
mapped-out and analysed with the purpose of identifying the key legal and policy 
documents governing water stakeholders and identifying their expected 
contributions in relation to managing water resources in Egypt. 
208 | P a g e  
 
The analysis of the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks has indicated 
that the Egyptian water governance is quite complex. Since the very early days, 
many activities have revolved around the water flow through the Nile. In fact, the 
very existence of the Nile has shaped the structure of the Egyptian state 
throughout its history and can greatly explain the centralized nature of its 
regimes. The long history of controlling the Nile means that the water sector in 
Egypt has an extensive heritage and legacies from that past in terms of the 
institutions involved in water management or the policies and regulations 
governing the processes of water management and distribution. Following on 
from the historical background to the development of the Egyptian water sector 
and its consequent reforms, it can be concluded that this sector has two major 
characteristics: the institutional complexity and fragmentation of roles and 
responsibilities due to the absence of cohesive legal and regulatory environment.   
At the institutional level, the responsibility of managing water resources in Egypt 
is divided among different ministries and state agents. Those state actors 
completely dominate water governance and carry the responsibility of making 
and enforcing water policies and decisions with a minimal level of citizen 
participation or inputs from other non-state water stakeholders. Despite the 
various attempts to reform such a complex structure and to redesign the water 
sector in Egypt in a more integrated fashion, the results were very humble and 
the sector is still very much lacking clarity in relation to the roles and 
responsibilities of the involved actors. In such a chaotic institutional environment, 
a coordination mechanism is a must in order to make sure that there is not any 
duplication of activities and that roles and responsibilities are clearly identified 
and assigned.       
Institutional complexity is not necessarily a negative indicator in itself as some 
sectors are complex by definition and their operations require the involvement of 
many policy actors. The water sector in Egypt is a case in point. Nonetheless, if 
institutional complexity has not been managed through a cohesive regulatory 
and legal framework it can turn from being a blessing into becoming a curse. This 
is more or less the case of the Egyptian water sector, wherein the lack of unified 
water legislation has resulted in vagueness and duplication of responsibilities 
when it comes to which party is responsible for doing what. The long awaited 
water law in Egypt is still under formulation and until its promulgation, the sector 
209 | P a g e  
 
will continue to be operated according to the scattered legal documents and 
decrees discussed in this chapter. 
Another important institutional feature of the national-level water governance in 
Egypt, as the discussion has indicated, is the weak participation of the non-
governmental stakeholders in the governance arrangements. Most of the policies 
and decisions are characterised by a top-down approach, which excludes many 
important water stakeholders including private sector organizations, NGOs, and 
water users or marginalizes their role and input in the policy and decision-making 
processes. Such a top-down approach is not sustainable in the long run, 
particularly with the growing role of non-state actors in all fields of public 
policymaking including in the water sector. The Egyptian Government is calling 
upon the private sector and civil society organizations to take part in 
infrastructure development and service delivery. In this context, a participatory 
decision-making and policymaking and implementation mechanism is a must. It 
makes no sense for those actors to get heavily involved in implementing policy 
and decisions in which they have had no input. In other words, those actors have 
a different rationale for their operations and cannot be treated as a government 
department or units affiliated to the ministries in charge. In this respect, the 
creation of the WUAs was a good starting point. However, as indicated earlier, 
firstly, this model needs to be replicated in all water sectors and activities and 
not only for the irrigation sector, and secondly, all water stakeholders including 
civil society organizations, the private sector and the universities and research 
centres have to be activated and provided with channels to actively take part in 
all water governance arrangements.        
With the overall water sector so mapped-out and analysed in terms of its main 
institutional setting besides the governing legal and regulatory environment, the 
discussion in the next chapter will focus on assessing the functionality of the 
water governance arrangements in the Egyptian water sector. This will be done 
by looking at the main functions of water governance regimes and the level at 
which those functions are fulfilled by the key water players identified in this 
chapter. Looking at the operational and functional side of the water governance 
system in Egypt will allow the analysis and evaluation of existing water 
governance arrangements as well as the appropriateness of the adopted 
regulatory system. In that sense, the relation between agents and structures will 
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be unpacked and the operational gaps will be identified. Based on the evaluation 
of the current water structures and agents, the thesis will conclude by providing 
water policymakers in the country with a set of policy recommendations on how 
to improve water governance arrangements for the whole Egyptian water sector 
to work more efficiently. 
                          
CHAPTER 8: THE EGYPTIAN WATER GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN 
PRACTICE: THE INTERPLAY DYNAMICS BETWEEN AGENTS, AND 
STRUCTURES 
8.1 Introduction  
The relationship between policy structures and agents has been the focus of 
chapter 4. In the light of the theoretical discussion provided in that chapter, water 
governance can be regarded as a product of the interaction between water 
structures and water agents at different levels.  Based on this understanding of 
water governance, and with the main water agents and structures so identified 
and analysed in Chapter 7, the aim of this chapter is to bring into a sharper focus 
the interplay dynamics between water policy actors and institutions in order to 
shed light on the way in which the water governance system in Egypt works. The 
previous discussion of water agents and structures in Egypt has indicated that 
the responsibilities of managing and allocating water resources are divided 
among a complex web of actors at the central and the local levels. At the central 
level, several ministries led by MWRI play an influential role in forming and 
implementing water policies and decisions. Associated with these ministries is 
another complex setting of regional authorities responsible for manging specific 
sections of the water governance system. A number of non-governmental actors 
including donor agencies and civil society advocacy organizations play a 
marginal role in water management, planning and allocation in comparison with 
the dominant governmental actors. Considering the overall complex structure of 
water governance in Egypt, the question is how do water agents interact in such 
a fragmented environment? How are roles and responsibilities translated into 
actions? What are the coordination mechanisms? What are the challenges 
facing water stakeholders? How can such challenges be overcome?  
To answer these questions, it is necessary to assess the water governance 
system in Egypt from functional and practical angles. Such a functional analysis 
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will help in highlighting the interplay dynamics between agents and structures 
and assessing the impact of such dynamics on the overall functionality of water 
governance arrangements. This evaluation will allow an in-depth discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages of the existing governance arrangements as 
well as underlining the major issues facing the effective management of the 
Egyptian water resources.     
8.2 Assessing Water Governance Functions in Egypt   
Water governance has been perceived in the context of this study in accordance 
with Franks and Cleaver (2007: 11) as a political process which denotes ‘the 
system of actors, resources, mechanisms and processes which mediate 
society’s access to water’ (see Chapter 3). Following on from this understanding, 
an effective water governance system should perform some basic functions 
including: water sector organization and strategic planning, water resources 
management and allocation, in addition to regulating and monitoring the 
performance of all water players (see Table 8.1).  
As the table shows, any water governance system is expected to perform five 
basic functions in order to effectively manage and regulate water resources. At 
the sectoral level, water governance systems should assist in clearly designing 
and altering water institutions and structures in a manner that reflects precise 
allocation of the role and responsibilities among involved actors. Given the multi-
level complex governance structure in Egypt as previously discussed in chapters 
6 and 7, the coordination function of the system at the national as well as the 
regional levels becomes paramount. Added to this, modernizing the existing 
infrastructure and building-up the capacity of water institutions represents 
another significant function for the water governance system from a sectoral 
point of view.  
For water governance systems to work effectively, they should also adopt a 
strategic approach that focuses on proactive water decisions based on accurate 
projections of the future demand on water resources. To this end, collecting and 
timely use of water data is a critical factor for making long-term water polices and 
plans. With regard to managing and allocating current water resources, the water 
governance system should clearly define water rights and explain the way in 
which such rights can be transferred among users. This issue is quite 
controversial as the allocation decisions and the associated water rights may 
212 | P a g e  
 
result in conflicts among users (Gersfelt, 2007). Such a possibility calls for the 
establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism via which water conflicts can 
be resolved. An effective water governance system should also allow an optimal 
utilization of the existing water resources by putting in place the right mix of public 
and private arrangements. In this regard, incentivizing water actors, namely 
private water companies, is a key in the effective development and management 
of any water sector.            
 
Table 8.1: The Functions and Sub-Functions of Water Governance Systems 
Source: The Regional Water Governance Benchmarking Project (www.rewab.net) 
Smart and effective regulation is an integral part of any effective water 
governance system. An effective water regulator should be able to control and 
manage the sector by developing a framework which provides the right balance 
between incentives and sanctions. Additionally, an effective water regulator 
should be able to develop and enforce water standards and should also be able 
to monitor and control the behaviour of water players in a manner that leads to 
Organizing & 
Capacity 
Building  
Strategic 
Planning 
Water 
Allocation 
 
Water 
Resources 
Development & 
Management  
water 
resources 
Regulation and 
services 
 
- Creating and 
modifying an 
organizational 
structure 
-  Assigning roles 
and 
responsibilities 
-  Setting 
national water 
policy 
-  Coordinating 
and integrating 
among sub-
sectors, levels, 
and national sub-
regions 
-  Establishing 
linkages with 
neighbouring 
riparian countries 
-  Building public 
and political 
awareness of 
water sector 
issues 
-  Securing and 
allocating 
funding for the 
sector 
-  Developing 
and utilizing 
well-trained 
water sector 
professionals 
- Collecting, 
managing, 
storing and 
utilizing water-
relevant data 
-  Projecting 
future supply 
and demand for 
water 
-  Designing 
strategies for 
matching 
expected long-
term water 
supply and 
demand and 
dealing with 
shortfalls 
(including 
drought 
mitigation 
strategies) 
-  Developing 
planning and 
management 
tools to support 
decision-
making 
-  Awarding and 
recording water 
rights and 
corollary 
responsibilities 
-  Establishing 
water and water 
rights transfer 
mechanisms 
-  Adjudicating 
disputes 
-  Assessing and 
managing third 
party impacts of 
water and water 
rights 
transactions 
-  Constructing 
public 
infrastructure and 
authorizing 
private 
infrastructure 
development 
-  Forecasting 
seasonal supply 
and demand and 
matching the two 
-  Operating and 
maintaining 
public 
infrastructure 
according to 
established plans 
and strategic 
priorities 
-  Applying 
incentives and 
sanctions to 
achieve long and 
short term 
supply/demand 
matching 
(including water 
pricing) 
-  Forecasting 
and managing 
floods and flood 
impacts 
-  Issuing and 
monitoring 
operating 
concessions to 
water service 
providers 
-  Enforcing 
withdrawal 
limits 
associated with 
water rights 
-  Regulating 
water quality in 
waterways, 
water bodies, 
and aquifers 
(including 
enforcement) 
-  Protecting 
aquatic 
ecosystems 
-  Monitoring 
and enforcing 
water service 
standards 
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the protection of the public interest besides the rights of water users and 
consumers. To this end, monitoring water quality represents an important 
regulatory function, which may have a detrimental impact on public health in the 
cases where it is compromised.            
Taken together, the previously discussed five water governance functions can 
be very helpful in assessing how effective the existing water governance 
arrangements are in Egypt. During the interviews, the respondents were asked 
to generally evaluate the current water governance system and to reflect critically 
on its core functions and dynamics. The analysis of the interview material 
underscores the dominant role of MWRI in running the water sector. The Ministry, 
according to the majority of interviewees, is heavily involved in organizing, 
planning, allocating, developing, and regulating water resources. As clearly put 
by a water and sanitation expert in the field, ‘[…] by looking at the mandate of 
MWRI and its longstanding history in managing and regulating the water sector 
in Egypt, one can confidently conclude that MWRI is having a great impact on all 
water governance functions’ (Interview 22). This observation is supported by 
MWRI’s extensive network of affiliated departments and units involved in running 
key water activities including irrigation, ground water, and drainage services.  
In order to reflect fully on the perceived dominant role of MWRI, respondents 
from the Ministry were asked to describe the role of the Ministry in managing and 
regulating the overall sector in one word. The used terminology confirms the 
perceived dominance of the Ministry as words such as ‘central’, ‘important’, 
‘crucial’, ‘vital’ and ‘key’ were used to describe the role played by MWRI in 
running the water sector.  
In searching for explanations for the perceived importance of MWRI, 
respondents were asked to give some reasons of why there was such significant 
involvement of the Ministry in nearly all water functions. Explanations varied 
based on the affiliations of the respondents. For water experts and specialists in 
the water sector, the following reasons have been highlighted as explanatory 
factors of the domination of the Ministry (Interviews 2, 3, 22):  
 The historic role of MWRI and the way in which it shaped the evolution of 
the overall water sector; 
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 The importance of the water sector itself,  which requires a strong and an 
interventionist role of the government represented by MWRI in order to 
secure a water supply for water users and the rest of the economic 
sectors;  
 The weak participation of civil society organisations and the limited 
engagement of the private sector in water governance arrangements 
compared to MWRI and the other governmental players.  
Accordingly, the long-standing history of MWRI and the role it played in 
developing and regulating the water sector in Egypt (see Chapter 7) has 
legitimized – for the majority of water players - its current dominant role in 
managing and regulating water resources. Added to this, many respondents 
have emphasised the vitality of the water sector itself and the potential hazards 
for water users in the case of any poor management or negligence in monitoring 
water quality, for instance. As noted by a senior member of staff at the planning 
sector in MWRI, ‘the government cannot allow the water to drift; managing water 
resources and monitoring the quality of water is not an easy task. The 
government cannot entrust any other organizations to undertake this job but its 
own units such as MWRI and the rest of concerned ministries’ (Interview 12). 
From this perspective, such huge responsibility justifies the governmental control 
of the sector operations and functions via MWRI, in addition to the previously 
identified complex web of governmental actors.  
The dominant role of MWRI in the current water governance arrangements in 
Egypt is also facilitated by the weak participation and the limited capacities of the 
non-governmental actors such as the private sector and the NGOs. As reported 
by the Trade Council at the Embassy of Denmark (2014), despite the ongoing 
efforts to involve private investors in water governance arrangements via the 
public-private partnerships between the government and the private sector, the 
overall contribution of private water companies is still minimal and there is still a 
great potential for more collaboration between the government and the private 
sector.  
As mentioned by a senior civil servant in MWRI, ‘the government is keen on 
allowing the national and international private sector water companies a greater 
role in developing and operating new water projects’ (Interview 9). Such a 
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commitment has been materialised on the ground through concrete 
governmental actions. These actions have included:  
 The approval of the public-private partnership law in 2010;  
 The decision taken by the public-private partnership unit to revive 
previous plans for private sector participation in infrastructure 
development projects such as the Abu Rawash wastewater treatment 
plant;  
 The awarding of new projects to the private sector such as the US$ 148mn 
contract given to a consortium comprising Passavant-Roediger GmbH, 
Acciona, and Hassan Allam Sons to expand Al Gabal Al Asfar wastewater 
treatment plant in Cairo.  
Added to this, the government is also keen on modernizing the utilised water 
technology via contracts with the private sector. In this vein, the government has 
signed new contracts with General Electric to provide water equipment for a new 
plant in Ain Sokhna. 
The economic forecast for the Egyptian water sector is promising as water 
scarcity in the country opens new opportunities for private domestic and 
international infrastructure developers. The participation of the private parties 
can take different shapes such as building-up new facilities and deploying new 
technologies (Frost and Sullivan, 2011). As reported by the Trade Council of the 
Embassy of Denmark in Cairo (2014:2), the Egyptian Government has agreed to 
implement a number of water network and sanitation projects in the rural areas 
of the country, worth US$261mn, which will be spread out over 150 projects. 
These new projects offer opportunities for more tenders for private water and 
sanitation companies under the public-private partnerships format. However, the 
potential of the private sector participation in the Egyptian water sector has not 
been fully reached in areas such as developing and operating wastewater 
treatment plants and networks in addition to sewerage collection, sanitation and 
water desalination facilities.        
Looking precisely at the actual participation and engagement in the decision-
making and policy formulation process, it can be clearly noticed that the role of 
the private water companies is considerably limited in comparison to the potential 
roles those companies can play. With respect to the role of NGOs, as previously 
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mentioned apart from the role played by the Water Users Associations in the 
irrigation sector, the input from NGOs is insignificant and lacks real contributions 
toward setting the water policy agenda in the country or addressing the main 
water governance issues.                                     
Those who work for MWRI have drawn heavily on the experience of the Ministry 
and the availability of required skills and capacities for organizing, planning, 
developing, and regulating the water resources.  Members of staff in other 
ministries have also acknowledged the central role of MWRI in running all 
functions of the water sector. According to their views, the reason for this 
domination is the legal mandate of the Ministry, which is broad enough to give 
MWRI the right to be involved in and responsible for all water governance 
functions. As put by a water expert at the agricultural research centre in the 
MALR, ‘by law  MWRI has the obligation to monitor and manage all water 
functions and to act as an umbrella organization under which other government 
units work and coordinate their activities’ (Interview 5). In this regard, although 
the legal framework of water governance in Egypt is fragmented and diverse, it 
places many responsibilities on MWRI to manage and run nearly all water 
functions and these responsibilities are perceived by other water actors in the 
sector and greatly justify the key role of the Ministry in looking after the overall 
water governance system.  
At the same time, some respondents from other ministries as well as the 
regulatory agency have emphasized that in spite of MWRI’s leading role in 
managing and running the water sector, the Ministry does not stand alone or 
work in vacuum. Such a leading role needs inputs and contributions from other 
entities to be done properly. In other words, the mentioned water governance 
functions are all collective in nature. That means water stakeholders are involved 
at different levels, in different capacities, and with different forms of inputs and 
contributions. As stated by a senior civil servant in the MESA, ‘we all play a role 
but each according to its legal mandate and assigned responsibilities’ (Interview 
17). For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation has been 
identified by the interviewees as the second most influential actor in the Egyptian 
water sector. With regard to the five identified core water governance functions, 
the respondents have agreed that the MALR plays an active role in main areas. 
These areas include sector organization and planning in addition to water 
217 | P a g e  
 
resources development and planning. As for the role of the MALR in sector 
regulation, it is relatively limited compared with the role played by MWRI and the 
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, which stands out as a main partner in 
undertaking regulatory functions. Added to this, when it comes to the 
organization and the planning of the sector, MWRI has to listen to and work 
collaboratively with other ministries, including the Ministry of Housing, Utilities 
and Urban Development, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of State for 
Environmental Affairs. MWRI also has to receive inputs from the Holding 
Company for Water and Wastewater regarding the operation of water utilities.  
In contrast to the dominant role of MWRI and the rest of the governmental actors 
in running the water sector, the involvement of non-state stakeholders is 
relatively limited. Considering, for example, the role played by the universities 
and water research institutes, it can be noticed that several public and private 
universities in addition to a number of water research units, are involved in water 
related research projects in different ways and at different levels. The water 
sector provides students and researchers at the national universities with the 
data they need to research and investigate many water related issues. 
Nonetheless, such research efforts are scattered and lack an overall research 
agenda to guide research in the water sector. As noted by a senior academic at 
one of the national universities, ‘we normally encourage our post-graduate 
students to contact water authorities and to use their databases for their research 
projects. But the impact of the results of this research body on the way in which 
water resources in the country are managed is the least minimal impact’ 
(Interview 3). Given that many of these research projects are addressing real 
and pressing water issues, it has become a necessity for the government to 
organize the research efforts in this area and to encourage water stakeholders 
to sponsor and fund water research projects for the whole sector to benefit from 
its results.          
8.3 Regulatory Design, Rationale, Power, and Transfer Mechanism  
Unlike many water regulatory regimes in the Arab region - compare Jordan and 
Yemen - where regulatory developments and debates are still in their initial 
phases, the Egyptian water regulatory regime is fairly well-established (Saidam 
and Ibrahim, 2006).  In spite of the broad legal mandate of the sector regulator, 
however, many respondents have underscored its weak role (Badran, 2013). 
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According to its legal mandate, the Egyptian Water and Wastewater Regulatory 
Agency has been assigned different regulatory functions in the areas of 
economic as well as water quality arenas. In other words, the water sector 
regulator has to decide upon and manage all aspects related to the financial 
viability of water services in addition to monitoring and regulating other aspects 
related to the quality of water and wastewater services. These regulatory 
aspects, according to a senior member of staff at the Egyptian Water and 
Wastewater Regulatory Agency, differ from regulating and managing the actual 
water resources, which is the responsibility of MWRI (Interview 31). 
Consequently, according to his view, the ‘water service regulation’ is a more 
accurate way to describe the realm of the agency’s jurisdictions than the 
commonly used terminology of water regulation. In all cases, the water regulatory 
agency has to strike a fine balance between considering water as an economic 
resource and taking account of the social aspects and implications of this 
commodity.   
In comparison with the ministerial bodies involved in water regulation in Egypt, 
namely MWRI, the power of the regulatory agency seems considerably limited 
and purely confined to technical and economic actions. The broader decisions 
of water policies, which may have social implications, rest in the hands of the 
dominant ministries. As put by a senior regulatory member of staff:  
We are not a policymaking body. The core functions and competencies of the 
Egyptian Water and Wastewater Regulatory Agency revolve predominantly 
around technical and economic aspects such as setting water quality and 
operational standards for water and wastewater operators in addition to 
monitoring and enforcing these standards. Added to this, the agency plays a 
major role in setting and reviewing services tariffs in order to insure the continuity 
of provided services as well as the cost recovery of the operators.  By doing so, 
the regulator ensures an optimal overall performance of water utilities alongside 
its main function as a guardian for consumers’ interests. As a protector for the 
public interests the agency also acts as a disputes settling platform via which the 
disputants can resolve their conflicts and water disputes (Interview 27).      
This understanding of the role of the regulatory agency as a policy 
implementation tool and not as a policymaking tool has created an image of the 
agency as a dependent party. This means that in conducting its daily business, 
the agency is subject to and governed by whatever directions are received from 
the big players including the major ministerial and governmental bodies. In that 
sense, the perceived power of the regulatory agency by the water stakeholders 
is not as strong as the legal mandate of the agency states. In other words, the 
regulatory system in the Egyptian water sector reflects the case of a strong 
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formal but weak de-facto independence (Badran, 2017). At the formal level, the 
water laws and regulations reflect numerous powers assigned to the Egyptian 
water regulator. Nevertheless, considering the de facto independence of the 
regulatory agency, the way in which the regulator’s legal mandate is translated 
into actions in addition to its ability to influence water decision-making processes 
is questioned by water stakeholders (Maggetti, 2007). 
8.4. Why This Model? The Rationale behind the Regulatory Design   
A glance at the regulatory regimes in the MENA region reveals that different 
countries follow different regulatory approaches and designs (OECD, 2010). The 
water regulatory governance and regulation is still very much a governmental 
matter in countries such as Lebanon, wherein all issues related to water 
economic and social regulations are directly handled though government 
departments. Other countries including Algeria and Egypt have followed a 
different regulatory approach in order to manage the transformation and the 
modernization processes of their water sectors. The independent sector 
regulatory model has been selected by the sector policy makers in Egypt as the 
appropriate way forward for transforming and reforming the water sector 
(Badran, 2012; 2013). Therefore, it was instrumental at that stage of the research 
to understand the official justifications given by the interviewees for this model. 
The analysis of the interview material underlines the market structure, the nature 
of the water sector, and the ownership of the water operators and infrastructure 
as the main reasons behind adopting the sector regulator as the regulatory 
design for the Egyptian water sector.         
Considering the market structure, it was necessary from a regulatory point of 
view to separate the operational and regulatory aspects of water and the 
wastewater services provision. This step, as noted by a senior civil servant in the 
regulatory agency, ‘was essential to boost the sector-wide reform efforts’ 
(Interview 30). As discussed earlier in Chapter 7, the water market structure in 
Egypt is quite hierarchical and greatly dominated by government entities. These 
governmental bodies are responsible for both making and enforcing water 
policies and decisions. Given the complexity of the overall regulatory 
environment and the fragmented nature of the legal framework, (see Chapter 7), 
it was necessary to establish a new regulatory body in order to manage the 
economic and social aspects of service delivery. Added to this, during the 
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different phases of the water reform process, the Egyptian Government was keen 
on allowing the private sector a bigger role, namely in modernizing the existing 
water and wastewater infrastructure in addition to building up new projects in a 
partnership with the concerned government parties. From this angle, having a 
sector regulator for the water industry was thought to assure and encourage 
private investors.  
In that sense, establishing the EWRA was a governmental move to send credible 
policy commitment signals to water private investors (Gilardi, 2002). In other 
words, the creation of the independent regulatory agency was a means to an 
end, which was attracting the badly needed infrastructure and technology 
investments. This step was essential in order to assure private water companies, 
particularly in a country with a previous history in nationalising private industries 
in the 1950s and the 1960s. As clearly put by a regulatory member of staff at the 
EWRA:    
We have a history with nationalization of private projects and businesses during 
the 1960s. This history, besides the heavy-handed approach of state water 
organizations in handling water related issues, could scare private investors off 
if they do not see institutional guarantees for their investments. Such guarantees 
have been secured by the establishment of the sector regulatory agency 
(Interview 27).  
What can be inferred from this comment is that setting up the EWRA was a purely 
instrumental move by the Egyptian Government in an attempt to attract private 
investments for the purpose of modernising the archaic water facilities.         
The natural monopolistic nature of the sector is another justification for state 
intervention via regulation in Egypt. The water sector in Egypt as is the case with 
many other utilities is treated as a natural monopoly. That means water services 
carry certain characteristics that make them different from any other economic 
sectors. Chief among those features are the vitality of the services provided 
(water and sanitation), the lack of economic case for competition, and the huge 
and sunk cost associated with water investments. These natural monopolistic 
features of the water sector have long justified state interventions in order to 
maintain certain levels of service delivery and to make sure that water services 
are provided to all citizens, even those who live in remote areas. According to 
the majority of the interviewees, the creation of an independent regulatory 
agency in such an environment was vital for two main reasons. First, it 
encourages private water companies to invest in the sector and assure them that 
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their investments are safe and insulated from government interventions. Second, 
it serves to keep an eye on the behaviour of the private water companies and to 
make sure that they are not taking any decisions that may harm water users and 
consumers. As put by a senior advisor in the EWAR, “from a regulatory point of 
view, the regulatory equation has two parts: the private sector and the consumer. 
We need the private sector to modernise water facilities and technologies but we 
have to protect the interests of the consumer and end users. In other words, the 
private sector participation should not come at the expense of the water users 
and consumers” (Interview 29).             
The changing mode of utility governance in Egypt to rely more on private water 
company has presented another reason for regulating the sector. Under the 
traditional model of utility governance, the ownership rights of water facilities and 
infrastructure were solely assigned to the state. With water sectors’ reforms 
spreading worldwide, the situation has changed and private sector water 
companies have been given new opportunities to take part in developing the 
infrastructure and in some cases in service provision (compare the UK 
experience) (OFWAT, 2006). In the Egyptian case, the private sector 
participation in water services delivery has been described as being minimal. The 
major contribution of the private companies comes from improving the existing 
water facilities and building up new projects. To put it another way, as natural 
monopolies, some of the water industry segments should not be left in the hands 
of the private sector for fear that water private companies may utilize their 
monopolistic positions to exploit end users and increase the water services 
prices or provide poor quality services, for example. In that sense, the regulation 
of the private sector, as well as the rest of the involved non-state actors, has to 
be substantiated. The traditional model of state ownership needs to be replaced 
by a new arrangement wherein the state and the private sector work in 
partnership. As clearly put by a water expert, “we need to learn from other 
countries’ experiences especially those which have vibrant private regulated 
water companies” (Interview 26).       
8.5 Assessing Water Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanisms: a 
Good Governance Perspective 
In complex and fragmented water governance arrangements such as the 
Egyptian case, a valid question would be how decision-making rights are 
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allocated among the involved water policy actors and stakeholders. The previous 
discussion of the main policy actors and the roles and responsibilities they were 
assigned in the Egyptian water governance system has shed some light on this 
issue. It is quite evident from the analysis of the interview materials and the 
documentary analysis of the collected policy documents and reports that policy 
decision-making rights are respectively assigned to governmental actors. In 
other words, the existing water policy structures rely greatly on governmental 
agents and considerably less on the non-state actors.        
The discussion of good governance in Chapter 2 was helpful in identifying the 
main features of effective decision-making mechanisms in water governance 
systems (see Chapter 2). Following on from the provided notion of good 
governance, it can be concluded that an effective water decision-making 
mechanism should be participatory in nature, transparent, responsive, and follow 
the rule of law in order to achieve accountability. These good governance criteria 
were used as an analytic framework to encourage respondents to reflect on the 
qualities of decision-making processes in the Egyptian water sector. 
8.5.1 Participation in Water Decision-Making  
There is a growing understanding from the governmental actors involved in the 
water governance arrangements, particularly the members of staff at MWRI, that 
the government alone cannot do everything. As put by a technical director in 
MWRI, ‘water issues are becoming increasingly complex and involve many 
players. Therefore, the Ministry realised long ago in 2005 that an institutional 
reform is in order’ (Interview 9). A designated reform unit in MWRI was 
established under the name of the Institutional Reform Unit (IRU) in an attempt 
to discover new governance arrangements in order to better manage and plan 
water resources (MWRI, www.mwri.gov.eg). The scope of the proposed 
institutional reforms extends to cover many areas including a full reconsideration 
of the way in which roles and responsibilities for running the water governance 
system are allocated. The purpose of this revision of roles and responsibility was 
to find new venues wherein the non-state actors, namely the private water 
companies, can play a greater role. These ideas have been translated into a new 
policy document reflecting the vision and strategy for MWRI institutional reform. 
The vision and strategy document has emphasised that the full potential of the 
proposed water reforms can only be harnessed if the non-state actors, including 
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water users and private water companies, play a greater role in the water 
governance system alongside the traditional governmental agencies.       
8.5.2 The Transparency of Water Decisions  
The issue of transparency was regarded as a by-product of the participatory 
decision-making approach proposed by MWRI. For many of the interviewees, it 
is meaningless to try to encourage water stakeholders to take part in making 
water decisions and policies without providing them with the information they 
need. As clearly mentioned by a senior member of staff at MWRI, ‘it would not 
be fair to ask water users and private sector water companies to take part in 
making water decisions especially with regard to the new infrastructure projects 
and to keep them in the dark. We make as much information as we can available 
to the water stakeholders including end users and the private organizations’ 
(Interview 1). What can be understood from this quote and from the examination 
of the interview materials is that for the majority of the governmental water policy, 
actors’ transparency is all about making as much information and data as 
possible available and accessible by the water stakeholders. Nonetheless, 
information availability and accessibility represents only one aspect of 
transparency. This is the aspect most of the interviewees have focused on to 
show how transparent the water governance system in Egypt is. There are other 
aspects which are equally important to making data and information readily 
available on governmental agencies websites. These aspects include the 
transparency of the decision-making procedures, the transparency of final 
decisions, and the transparency of decision-making processes and results. 
These aspects of transparency did not appear in the viewpoints expressed by 
the respondents. 
Added to the above observations, and taking account of the long history of state 
monopoly of water services and infrastructure projects, transparency has been 
regarded by many government officials and other experts in the field as a process 
which may take a long time to be fully instituted. As stated by a water specialist:  
The concept of good water governance should be taken as an integrated unit. In 
other words, participatory decision-making, responsiveness, transparency, 
accountability and the rule of law should be introduced together because of the 
complementary nature of these elements. Having said that, we should not also 
forget the enabling environment for the successful implementation of the core 
principles of good water governance. [….]What precisely I refer to here is the 
overall democratic governance within which the principles of good water 
governance including accountability are embedded. Given the current 
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transitional period after the 25th of January 2011 revolution, I think many 
elements of this enabling environment are missing and we still have a long 
journey in order to fully embrace the democratic values and the principles of good 
water governance in the Egyptian water sector. (Interview 24)            
This observation is particularly important when we consider the idea of 
transferring governance models and best practices from certain jurisdictions to 
new environments. As the discussion on policy transfer in Chapter 4 has 
indicated, copying is one of the options available for policymakers when deciding 
upon which policy option(s) to select in order to address certain policy problems. 
Policy copying may take place for several reasons, chief among which are the 
isomorphic pressures from the surrounding environment. In this context, 
policymakers in certain jurisdictions may opt to copy other policy instruments and 
institutions voluntarily just because they are successful in their original 
environments. On the other hand, and this is quite evident in the case of many 
developing countries, policymakers have no choice but to adopt certain 
governance arrangements under the influence of the donor agencies and 
international financial institutions. Regardless of the way in which governance 
arrangements are transferred, the body of literature on policy transfer warns 
policy researchers and practitioners from ignoring the impact of the contextual 
factors on the success or failure or the transferred governance arrangements 
(see Chapter 4). 
By looking at the notion of good water governance, in addition to the core 
principles of good governance and the environment within which the concept was 
coined, it can be noted that many of the underlined democratic values are lacking 
in the governance of the Egyptian water sector. These democratic values are 
fully appreciated and embraced by all state and non-state players in all policy 
and decision-making arenas in western democracies. Consequently, in such an 
environment, one should not expect the water governance system to be fully 
transparent and open to all water stakeholders at all levels. Nevertheless, the 
efforts by MWRI to make the water decision-making and policymaking processes 
more open and more transparent are very much welcomed and should be 
enhanced and continued. In this regard, a water specialist has rightly commented 
on the implementation of good governance principles by stating that ‘it is a 
process and not an event’ (Interview 23).                                       
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8.5.3 The Accountability of Water Decisions  
A participatory and open water decision-making environment can be a double-
edged weapon. On the one hand, it can greatly facilitate the processes of making 
informed and responsive water decisions if and only if the overall system is 
managed effectively. On the other hand, when roles and responsibilities are not 
clearly defined and assigned to involve water stakeholders, the decision-making 
processes are chaotic and the results could be disastrous (Leitao and Mcallister, 
2010). The main reason for this is that in such a situation the accountability for 
actions and results will be totally lost. To put it another way, for participatory 
decision-making mechanisms to work effectively, the centralised authorities for 
making and implementing water policies and decisions previously assigned 
solely to ministerial bodies and other state agents have to be diffused downward 
and outward. This requires many decision-making powers to be delegated to 
state and non-state water stakeholders at sub-national levels [downward 
diffusion] in addition to assigning new roles and responsibilities for the new 
partners including private water companies, water users’ associations, and the 
water NGOs [outward diffusion]. Such decentralised arrangements for making 
water decisions add to the complications of accountability. With one or even a 
small number of governmental actors in control of the policy water decisions, it 
is easier to point at the parties responsible for wrong decisions and misdoings. 
However, having state actors working hand-in-hand with a whole web of other 
state and non-state actors certainly results in more complex governance 
arrangements and calls for a redefinition of the notion of accountability and even 
more for inventing new mechanisms to hold water policy actors accountable for 
their decisions and actions. 
An analysis of the interviews shows that this full and complex picture is not clear 
in the minds of some of the interviewed members of staff especially in the main 
ministerial bodies controlling the water sector governance. For instance, in a 
discussion regarding how the newcomers will affect the current water decision-
making setting and the roles played by the ministerial bodies involved, a 
respondent in the MALR kept referring to traditional mechanisms of 
accountability such as roles and responsibilities as stated in water laws, 
regulations and policy documents. In his words ‘it is all in the law’ (Interview 19). 
This institutional and legally bound understanding of accountability is important 
226 | P a g e  
 
but not sufficient to capture all possible forms of misconduct and to make the 
involved parties accountable for their actions. As noted by a water and sanitation 
expert, ‘the process of involving private water companies in the water 
governance and water decision-making processes should be designed and 
managed very carefully. The reason for this is that if anything goes wrong 
regarding the provided services, the end users will not point at the private party 
but they will hold the government accountable for selecting those companies in 
the first place’ (Interview 25). From this angle, delegating some of the water 
governance responsibilities to the non-state actors does not necessarily mean 
the government is no longer accountable for the decisions they make or for the 
consequences of their actions and operations. In other words, the ministerial 
bodies and other governmental water organizations involved in planning and 
managing the water sector in Egypt are now accountable for the decisions and 
actions taken by non-state actors although those actors are located outside their 
direct chain of command.         
8.6. Water Governance Issues and Challenges in Egypt 
Following on from explaining the interplay dynamics between water agents and 
institutional structures in the aforementioned section, the focus of the discussion 
will shift in this part to investigate the major water issues and challenges facing 
water policy actors in Egypt. As indicated in chapter 3, developing countries have 
some water governance problems in common that need special attention and 
consideration while designing and developing the architecture of water 
governance. Chief among those challenges and issues are poverty, gender, and 
sustainability (see chapter 3). Egypt is not an exception as it faces those issues 
when designing water policies and regulations. Nonetheless, the analysis of the 
interview materials and the review of the policy documents in the Egyptian water 
sector has shown that in addition to these shared water issues there is a set of 
other water concerns that preoccupy the minds of water policy agents.      
The discussion in chapters 6 and 7 has indicated that water policy decisions in 
Egypt are greatly influenced by actions and developments that go beyond the 
control of policy and decision makers at the national level. In this respect, 
international donors’ agendas and the threats of the upstream infrastructure 
developments are a case in a point. At the national level, the situation is not less 
complex in any shape or form. Water policy decisions are always influenced by 
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instructions coming from top-level policymaking agencies as well as the trade-
offs between social and political considerations on the one hand and the 
economic and commercial aspects of water as a commodity on the other. In this 
context, the investigation of the major policy issues and challenges can help in 
identifying the way forward and putting in place some policy recommendations 
in order to improve the overall water sector governance arrangements. 
The analysis of the interview data as well as the critical review of the previous 
literature and policy documents have underlined several water policy issues and 
challenges. These issues include: increasing water demands and water scarcity; 
depending on the Nile as the main source for fresh water; the trans-boundary 
nature of the water governance in Egypt; overpopulation and the growing 
demand for food; climate change and its impact on land and water use; the 
fragmented and complex water policy settings and regulatory environment; 
archaic water infrastructure (Wagd, 2008; Gad, 2017). It is worth noting in this 
regard that, the identified issues and challenges do not provide an exhaustive 
list of water governance issues in Egypt. These are the issues which appeared 
during the documentary analysis of the policy documents and the analysis of the 
interview material. Covering all policy issues and governance challenges goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter and therefore the focus will be primarily on the 
salient issues identified by water stakeholders.      
8.6.1 The Trans-Boundary Nature of Water Governance and the Challenge 
of Upstream Infrastructure Developments 
Strickert et al. (2016:50) have rightly noted that ‘[W]ater is essential for human 
development and the environment; however, its security is challenged by factors 
such as competing uses, over extraction, and divergent perspectives’. In that 
sense, one of the major challenges facing the Egyptian Government in general 
and the water policy makers in particular is the ongoing infrastructure 
developments taking place in the Nile Basin’s upstream countries, namely 
Ethiopia. The Egyptian water governance is a multi-level system wherein 
decisions and actions taken at the regional levels by upstream countries will 
affect water policies and decisions in Egypt.  From this angle, any construction 
projects and developments in upstream countries become a major concern for 
the Egyptian Government especially when these projects have the potential of 
decreasing the Egyptian share of the Nile water. In this context, the 
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establishment of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) constructed on 
the Blue Nile was not welcomed by the Egyptian Government. The 
commencement of the project in 2010 was regarded by many scholars and 
commentators as demarcating a new era in water governance relations in the 
Nile Basin (see, for example, Gebreluel, 2014; Salman, 2013). As noted by 
Tawfik (2015:2), the GERD is the largest dam constructed on the Blue Nile, from 
which 59% of the water reaching Egypt originates. That means a considerable 
reduction in Egypt’s share of the Nile water, which is very much needed because 
of the steady population growth and the increasing urbanization. Additionally, 
challenging the Egyptian historical rights in the Nile water means an alteration in 
the balance of power and hydro-politics of the Nile Basin (Verhoeven, 2011b). In 
other words, the new developments in the upstream countries put an end to the 
hegemonic era of Egypt. 
As stated by a water expert, ‘[…] the construction of the dam should be seen in 
the light of the overall power struggle and balance in the Nile Basin’ (Interview 
8). According to his view, it was not a coincidence for Ethiopia to announce the 
project in 2011. The timing of the project was a clear message to the Egyptian 
Government that cooperation projects will continue in the basin with or without 
Egypt. This move has been translated in practice into the signing process of the 
Cooperative Framework Agreement for the River Nile Basin (CFA) (see Chapter 
7). From this angle, the move by Ethiopia and the rest of the upstream countries 
represents a new tactic to challenge the long-standing Egyptian rights in the 
Nile’s water. It also aims at fundamentally changing the existing hydro-political 
configurations towards a new hydro-political regime that reflects the interests of 
all Nile Basin countries (Cascão, 2008). In response to the signing of the CFA, 
Egypt has frozen all hydropower cooperation projects with the Nile Basin 
countries, a move that has justified from the Ethiopian point of view the unilateral 
action with regard to the GERD. 
The size and the potential impact of the GERD is a major matter of concern for 
the Egyptian policymakers. As reported by the International Panel of Experts on 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in May (2013: 7), the GERD is designed 
with a storage capacity of 74 billion cubic metres and a power generation 
capacity of 6,000 MW. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the original plans 
and design of the dam have been changed to increase its storage capacity. This 
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change in plans and design has cast more doubt on the real intentions of the 
Ethiopian Government. To put it another way, the declared objectives of the 
project in terms of generating hydropower energy for industrial and 
developmental purposes can be questioned on the grounds that the huge size 
and storage capacity of the dam are not needed for this purpose. A more 
plausible explanation for the Ethiopian behaviour is the tendency by the 
Ethiopian side to gain more control of the water flow in the Nile. This point of view 
has also been shared by other scholars, who consider the upstream 
infrastructure developments as a means to fulfil the ambitious plans of the 
upstream countries, namely Ethiopia, to form a new hydro-political agenda in the 
Nile Basin via establishing new projects such as the GERD (Asempa, 2010).       
Given the size and the potential impact of the GERD on the Nile Basin, many 
scholars and water specialists have regarded the dam as a ‘game changer’ in 
the sense that it will change the current water governance arrangements in the 
Nile Basin and reshape relations and water rights allocations between upstream 
and downstream countries (Gebreluel, 2014; Salman, 2013). In other words, a 
new governance order in the Nile Basin is in the making. As such, the GERD 
threatens the Egyptian interests and poses a new challenge for Egypt’s historical 
hegemonic position (Tawfik, 2016). The way in which Egypt and Ethiopia have 
handled the issue of the GERD has added to the complications related to this 
situation (Zeitoun et al., 2014). On the one hand, Ethiopia has embarked on the 
establishment of the dam in a unilateral fashion considering that as a national 
governance issue which does not concern other parties. On the other hand, the 
Egyptian denial of the Ethiopian right to establish the dam has resulted in a more 
confrontational situation and polarization among the concerned parties.  
In this context, Tawfik (2015:2) has concluded that ‘Ethiopia's planning and 
implementation of the project, and Egypt's inconsistent response to it, have 
increased uncertainties about the benefits of the project to downstream 
countries, and even to Ethiopia, and fuelled the historical mistrust between the 
two countries’.  In an attempt to handle the stress around the GERD issue, the 
three Eastern Nile countries (Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan) signed the Declaration 
of Principles (DoP) on the GERD in March 2015 in Khartoum. The analysis of 
the DoP shows that the document is of a political rather than a technical nature. 
The DoP has deferred the agreement on the core issues up until the conclusion 
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of a series of technical studies, which will assess the potential impact of the dam 
project on Egypt and Sudan. In this context, the DoP only reflects the good 
intentions of the signatory states to work together to minimize the negative 
impacts of the project without clearly assigning any obligations to any party. 
The analysis of the DoP has also revealed that out of the ten principles included 
in the document none has referred to the historical Egyptian rights in the Nile 
water. The signatory states have addressed different issues including the 
importance of mutual collaboration on water issues, the fair allocation and 
utilization of the water, not to cause any harm to other countries, the collaborative 
management of the GERD, trust building, and the peaceful settlement of conflicts 
(Ahram Gate, 2015). These general principles are good but not sufficient to put 
an end to the conflict among the involved countries. As mentioned by a senior 
civil servant in MWRI when asked about the potential impact of the GERD on 
Egypt’s share from the Nile water, ‘for Egypt, water is a matter of life and death’ 
(Interview 13). Nonetheless, this very strong affirmation is not fully reflected in 
the political positions taken by the government officials.  
What is seen on the ground is that Ethiopia is going forward with its plans and 
the majority of constructions have already been completed. Added to this, the 
political gaming from the Ethiopian party is quite clear, as Ethiopia has recently 
declared that the results from the technical studies that everyone is waiting for 
will not be obligatory to the Ethiopian side (Ahram Gate, 2015).  As mentioned 
by a water expert with regard to commenting on the DoP, ‘the DoP is no more 
than a political statement that gives Ethiopia more time to get as many 
constructions as it can complete’ (Interview 32). According to this view, Ethiopia 
is playing a dangerous political game which will change the reality, and the way 
in which the Nile water is allocated and used in the future.  
Accordingly, the DoP does not take account of the future water needs of Egypt 
in the light of its growing population. The DoP does not include any concrete 
measures for trust building. Finally, yet importantly, the DoP focuses on the 
developmental needs of upstream countries, and their sovereign rights to use 
their water resources in order to fulfil those needs, while totally ignoring the 
regional water governance of the overall Nile Valley. Such an emphasis on the 
national water governance within each sovereign state without taking account of 
the impact of local water decisions on the overall water governance 
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arrangements at the regional level is expected to intensify water conflicts and 
increase the vulnerability of downstream countries, particularly Egypt. As such, 
the DoP has been regarded by water experts as a ‘minefield’ that has to be 
navigated carefully by the Egyptian officials (Interview 33). For instance, the DoP 
talked about the collaborative management of the dam and the collaboration 
among the three countries in the first filling process of the dam. Nonetheless, the 
DoP has given the owner of the project (Ethiopia) the right to change the timings 
and the procedures of the filling process of the dam after informing the two 
downstream countries (Tawfik 2016). Given the distrust and the historical 
tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, this principle is expected to create more 
water conflicts on the timings and the arrangements of the filling process of the 
dam. Having said that, it is essential to translate the ten principles of the DoP in 
the light of the overall rules of the international law.  As stated by an international 
law professor at Cairo University, ‘the DoP is broad and very general. The 
included principles can be interpreted in many different ways which may 
contradict with international law rules’ (Interview 34).                 
8.6.2 Natural Monopoly, Economic Regulation and the Challenge of 
Excessive Subsidisation and Water Pricing   
One of the major characteristics of water sectors is natural monopoly and 
inelasticity of water demand. That means unlike other economic commodities, 
the demand for water services does not respond to changes in water prices. This 
feature has been provided as a justification by governments in different countries 
to bring water industries under the direct control of the state. As put by Kandil 
(2003: 223), in water services, the monopoly level is naturally high due to the 
lack of substitute products. For example, it would be inefficient to have several 
competing irrigation networks in an agricultural area or water distribution or 
sewerage networks in a city. Consequently, the single service provider is in a 
dominant position, making it necessary to protect the consumer against 
monopolistic behaviour.  
The natural monopoly and the inelastic demand from water users has justified 
the subsidization of water prices. That means water service prices do not reflect 
the actual cost of production and service provision. In other words, water service 
prices are administrated by governments to benefit certain segments of water 
users (normally the poor and those who receive limited incomes) in order to 
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ensure safe and clean water provision. The difference between the production 
and service delivery cost on the one hand and the administrated prices on the 
other is most likely to be paid by the government in the form of a subsidy.  
The situation in Egypt is not different from what has been described above. The 
water industry has been regarded as a natural monopoly, which justifies the 
intervention of the state in service provision including the pricing of water 
services. As reported by Rohac (2013:2), one-third of Egypt’s public spending is 
directed annually toward subsidies. The overall figure of the annual water 
subsidy bill has reached 1.2 billion Egyptian pounds as clearly indicated by a 
senior civil servant in HCWW (Interview 10). The reason for this is that the actual 
production cost is almost double the subsidized prices at which water services 
are provided to end-users. Such a huge subsidy bill can no longer be paid by 
government and a reform process is in order.  
As a part of a comprehensive plan to reduce government subsidies in the water 
sector, the Egyptian Government embarked on a reform process in 2006, which 
included differentiating water prices according to the level of consumption. As 
reported by Ahram Online, on Thursday 1 May 2014, Egyptian households and 
water users with their consumption exceeding 10 cubic metres per month will 
have to pay LE0.36-LE0.67 per cubic metre compared to LE0.23 per cubic metre 
for those who consume less than 10 cubic metres per month.  By doing so, the 
poor people who come under the second category of water users will not suffer 
from the new water tariffs while those who can pay more for their water 
consumption will bear the majority of the cost (Interview 28). In spite of such a 
cautious approach to reduce water subsidization, the prices of water bills have 
been hiked since the implementation of the new water tariffs in June 2015.        
Since the early 1990s, there has been a general agreement among water policy 
analysts and scholars that water should be treated as an economic commodity, 
and therefore it has to have a monetary value assigned to it. Such an 
understanding was clearly reflected at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), in Rio de Janeiro and the resultant 
‘Dublin Statement’ in 1992.  Despite such an agreement on the overall principle, 
the pricing mechanism and the consequences of dealing with water on a purely 
economic basis are still problematic for many governments around the globe 
including Egypt. The major concern with regard to treating water as an economic 
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commodity is the trade-offs between its economic values and non-economic 
aspects. In other words, given the humanitarian, social and health related issues 
associated with water, the consequences of any mismanagement of this vital 
resource and its related issues, including pricing, could be severe for any regime.  
Consequently, any water pricing mechanism that aims at managing the demand 
and the supply sides of this economic good must construct a fine balance 
between water’s economic as well as social and human values. 
The question of what prices and tariffs should be assigned to water services 
represents one of the major aspects of water sectors’ economic regulation 
(Rezaee, 1999). Water regulators have to decide upon water charges and how 
much water companies can charge users in return for the provided services. In 
this regard, two major questions must be answered: firstly, how can water prices 
be determined given the overall political and economic situations? Secondly, 
how can water prices be implemented without affecting vulnerable communities? 
The answers to these questions are as political and social as they are economic 
in nature. The political risk and cost associated with answering these pricing 
questions the wrong way can cost political regimes dearly. High water prices can 
remove or limit people’s accessibility to water, which they see as a humanitarian 
right. In that sense, imposing high water tariffs and prices can result in riots and 
political unrest, which in turn creates an unstable society.       
The question of water prices is particularly relevant to Egypt because of the 
growing water shortage and the steadily growing population. As indicated 
previously, the demand on water services is increasing and it is expected to 
increase more in the future. At the same time, the amount of water available is 
decreasing and will decrease even more after the completion of the infrastructure 
projects built by the upstream countries. In the light of these facts, it has become 
necessary to come up with a system of water prices and tariffs that enables the 
government to reduce water demands and increase water supply in addition to 
the efficient allocation of water resources among the different types of users 
(Gersfelt, 2007). To this end, the importance of water sector liberalization and 
economic regulation, namely a water-pricing system, has come to the forefront. 
As noted by a senior regulatory member of staff in the EWRA, since 2004 the 
government has taken drastic steps to liberalize the water industry and to run the 
sector as a commercial sector in which water services have to be priced based 
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on demand and supply (Interview 21).  An increase in water tariffs was introduced 
and the prices increased from 12 to 23 piasters per cubic meter. Such a move 
by the government was strongly rejected by the population, who went out in 
streets in different parts of Greater Cairo to express their anger and to show their 
dissatisfaction with the new water prices and tariffs.      
When he was asked to comment on people’s reaction to the government’s 
decision to raise water prices, a senior member of staff at the HCWW said that 
‘[…] we fully understand how important water is especially to those who cannot 
afford to pay high prices. Therefore, we try to put in place a dual pricing system 
in which those who can afford to pay more for their consumption support those 
who can’t pay’ (Interview 10). This comment reflects the realization of the 
government officials that water is a social good which has to be kept available 
for the rich and the poor. However, the comment also implies that the 
government subsidization of water prices is expected to continue in order to 
minimize the impact of raising water prices on the people with limited incomes 
and the poor using government subsidies. Such an approach might contradict 
the view of water policy analysts and scholars that subsidization and cross-
subsidization are not for the benefit of water sector reforms.   
Economically speaking, all water services should be priced and paid for by water 
users at all stages of production and service delivery. Nonetheless, the user-pay 
principle and water pricing is a new concept for water users and stakeholders in 
Egypt. As stated by a senior member of staff at the EWRA, ‘[F]or a long time 
people were relying on government subsidization for water. The actual cost of 
production is above 60 piasters per cubic meter while it is priced at 23 piasters 
per cubic meter; the difference between the production cost and the low price is 
covered by government in the form of a subsidy’ (Interview 21). In this context, 
the government should pave the way for the introduction of water pricing 
systems. The gradual involvement of water users in taking responsibility for their 
consumption is an essential step for the success of any pricing policy.   
In this regard, a water policy analyst has emphasised that the ‘the gap between 
the cost of producing water services and the low prices at which water services 
are sold to the end users represents one of the major obstacles facing the 
modernization of the archaic water infrastructure’ (Interview 22). Added to this, 
at such low prices people have no incentive to rationalize their water 
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consumption and reduce their demands for water services. Consequently, ‘users 
must pay for their excessive consumption of water otherwise, the wasteful water 
practices will continue and the subsidization system will become 
counterproductive’ (Interview 28).  
In conclusion, when it comes to water pricing, any pricing regime has to take 
account of not only the economic but also the social and human value of such a 
vital commodity. A water-pricing regime should be comprehensive enough to 
cover the three main components of water as an economic commodity: cost, 
value and price. In other words, water tariffs and prices should reflect the 
management and production costs as well as the benefits that water users gain 
directly and indirectly. Final prices can be determined in the light of water costs 
and value to consumers. By addressing these three aspects, the full cost of water 
from economic and social aspects would be considered and taken into account 
when deciding upon water prices. This approach will also guarantee equity, 
efficiency and sustainability in water prices and tariffs. Additionally, pricing water 
at lower levels than the actual cost of production is not a sustainable approach 
in the long run as it increases users’ dependability on the subsidized prices as 
well as the overall cost of service delivery. To this end, a behavioural change is 
in order by illustrating to water users the gap between the cost required for 
producing water and the considerably low prices at which water services are 
delivered to them. Furthermore, the perception of water as a ‘free’ commodity 
has to be altered and people must realize that the continuation of wasteful water 
behaviour will result in a real crisis wherein the government will no longer be able 
to meet future demand.  Finally, an efficient water pricing policy would result not 
only in providing water services and improving service quality but also in utilizing 
the available water resources in an efficient manner. In other words, water-
pricing regimes should guarantee the best possible value of this scarce economic 
resource. For this to be done, the water prices should reflect all aspects of 
economic, social and humanitarian costs.     
8.6.3 The Fragmentation of Agricultural Land and the Challenge of Efficient 
Water Utilisation  
As noted in chapter 3, water sustainability is first and foremost an issue of good 
long-term planning and utilisation of water resources in order to meet the basic 
human needs. In that sense, sustainable water practices should allow as many 
236 | P a g e  
 
choices about fresh water to future generations (Knight et al., 2009: 349). 
Nonetheless, many of the agricultural and irrigation practices in Egypt reflect 
unsustainable and inefficient usage of water resources. Historically, Egypt was 
known as the ‘breadbasket’ of the ancient world. Agricultural land was seen as a 
source of wealth for major landowners who owned nearly 1/3 of the agricultural 
land during the 1920s and 1930s (Al-Desoky, 2007). The fertile land has also 
been regarded as a source for food production but not anymore. To date, the 
situation has changed and the land is no longer seen as a source of food 
production especially under the increasing pressures for arable lands resultant 
from urbanization and the growing population. Added to this, the Land Reform 
Law 178/1952 issued after the 1952 revolution and its consequent revisions have 
contributed to the fragmentation of agriculture land ownership. As reported by 
Nkrumah (2013), ‘An estimated 3.5 million farmers cultivate holdings of an 
average size of two feddans, or 0.84 hectares’.  The same conclusion was 
reflected in the results of the 1990 Egypt’s Agricultural Census organized by the 
General Department of Agricultural Census, of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Land Reclamation. The results of the census have indicated that there were 
‘three million small land holdings, almost 96 per cent of which were under five 
feddans’. Such a fragmentation of the agricultural land holdings in Egypt poses 
a direct challenge to the ability of water stakeholders, namely the governmental 
efforts to organize and manage water irrigation processes in an efficient manner.  
From this angle, the Egyptian agriculture sector is coming under pressure to 
rationalise irrigation practices and to make efficient utilization of water resources. 
In this regard, Allam et al., (2005) have noted that traditional water management 
and irrigation practices applied by farmers and landowners contribute to high 
water losses. As reported by Nkrumah (2013), ‘only 2% of the eight million 
feddans of cultivated land are irrigated by modern methods’.  The rest of the 
cultivated land is irrigated using traditional methods such as large scale, flood-
based irrigation, which requires increasing amounts of water and does not pay 
much attention to the water losses (The Arab Water Council, 2009: 3). Such 
traditional methods of water management in general and irrigation systems in 
particular have resulted in overall water losses of almost 29%, as mentioned by 
a water specialist at a leading Egyptian university (Interview 3). Consequently, 
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addressing such a misguided water management approach and practices is at 
the forefront of the government’s agenda.  
As noted by a senior researcher at the agricultural research centre in the MALR, 
the government is trying to handle this situation by providing awareness 
campaigns for farmers and water stakeholders in an attempt to encourage them 
to abandon such wasteful practices (Interview 5). Additionally, the government 
is also attempting to encourage the utilization of modern irrigation methods 
including using dripping irrigation systems especially in the new agricultural 
projects. Another approach to deal with the wasteful water practices in the 
agricultural sector followed by the Egyptian Government is to look at farmers and 
water users in general as partners in formulating water policies and decisions 
including those related to irrigation. As put by a senior official at the MALR: 
 […..] Many of our efforts and initiatives in the Ministry are geared to the task of 
optimizing water management and irrigation systems. In this respect, the MALR 
has realized that a collaborative decision-making and policy formulation system 
has to be put in place in an attempt to coordinate the diverse efforts of involved 
water stakeholders including water users. (Interview 14) 
Despite the governmental efforts and initiatives to raise the awareness of water 
stakeholders and to encourage the utilization of modern irrigation systems, the 
progress on the front of rationalizing water use is very modest for several 
reasons. From a historical point of view, water abundance has never been an 
issue for farmers, who find it hard to believe the whole story about water scarcity 
and the need for rationalization. Additionally, some of the provided solutions are 
not practical, especially for small farmers who find them extremely expensive 
ways to irrigate their land. In this context, dripping irrigation systems is a case in 
a point. The installation and maintenance cost of these systems exceeds the 
financial capacity of the majority of farmers. As bluntly put by a water specialist 
at MWRI: 
Dripping irrigation systems can be regarded as the way forward to make a more 
efficient use of irrigation water and to reduce water losses; however, we should 
not also forget that the installation and maintenance of these systems is costly 
and may go beyond the ability of small farmers and land owner to finance. 
(Interview 15)     
As such, installing and maintaining modern irrigation systems has proved to be 
costly in addition to its limited usability for irrigating certain types of crops. In 
other words, crops such as rice, which needs large amounts of water, do not lend 
themselves to new modern irrigation systems. The competition among economic 
sectors for water adds to the issue of water scarcity in agriculture and in turn 
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intensifies pressures on existing irrigation practices and systems. Economically 
speaking, water as a scarce resource should be allocated in an efficient manner 
that guarantees the best use and the best prices. Given the increasing movement 
from the rural to the urban areas in Egypt and the industrialization activities, 
those that are most likely to pay high prices for water are the industrial entities in 
the urban areas. That means less water allocation for agriculture. Having said 
that, it is worth mentioning the increasing competition and the growing demand 
for water as a scarce commodity provides only one side of the story. That means 
water scarcity is not only associated with these aspects of increasing demands 
and competition as it is also linked to the water losses resulting from the archaic 
infrastructure and wasteful water practices. As rightly noted by El-Fiki (2013:2), 
‘The water shortage we experience is not related to demand, but rather to poor 
infrastructure and management practices, which result in gross losses within our 
water systems’. In other words, the water crisis in Egypt is a symptom for a real 
malfunction and illness of the overall water governance system.         
Following on from the above discussion it can be concluded that the 
governmental efforts to address the issue of water losses resulting from the 
fragmentation of landownership and the wasteful practices of farmers and water 
users have provided little incentive for water stakeholders to engage actively in 
improving their attitudes towards water consumption and utilization. In other 
words, such an approach for dealing with water losses has not resulted in any 
sustainable water management practices. Therefore, future utilization of 
irrigation water in such a fragmented ownership environment calls for a holistic 
approach to manage and optimize existing irrigation practices and systems. 
Such an approach looks at water allocation and utilization as a cross-sectoral 
issue wherein the agriculture sector represents only one player among many 
others competing for the scarce water supply. In other words, farmers and small 
landowners should realize and consider the consequences of their inefficient 
water utilization for the entire sector as well as for the rest of the economic 
sectors. Added to this, a better management of the agricultural runoff can provide 
a new source of water and in turn reduce the level of pollution in the ground water 
and reduce the pressure on the limited amount of available water (Elewa, 2010). 
In this regard, a water specialist at the agro-economic research institute has 
emphasised that ‘the Egyptian Government has to widen its perspective when 
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dealing with the available water resources to include not only maximizing the Nile 
water but also the potential use and recycling of waste water, water desalination 
and extracting ground water’ (Interview 20). Achieving this aim means redirecting 
more water investments towards establishing new projects in the mentioned 
areas. Such an approach can be costly in the initial phases but, in the long run it 
can help provide new jobs and increase the available water resources.     
8.6.4 The Climate Change Impacts and the Challenge of Water Availability 
and Security 
Climate change or climate variability in terms of having weather cycles impacts 
on water related issues and governance (El-Rae, 2009). Chief among the areas 
that would be affected by weather variability are water availability and water 
security. Many reports and research findings have warned of the expected 
negative impacts of climate change in the MENA region particularly for the 
countries suffering from water shortages such as Egypt. For instance, the Arab 
Water Council (2009) has reported that climate change is expected to result in 
frequent droughts and floods. Added to this, climate change is also expected to 
result in a rise in seawater levels, which endangers the Nile Delta region. As 
mentioned in the report, ‘A sea level rise of one meter would flood a quarter of 
the Nile Delta, forcing about 10.5% of Egypt’s population from their homes. It 
also would hit Egypt’s food supply as nearly half of Egypt’s crops, including 
wheat, corn, and rice, are grown in the Delta’ (The Arab Water Council, 2009: 3). 
In that sense, climate change impacts add to the already difficult water 
management challenges in Egypt. The country is highly vulnerable to any 
changes in the water situation and policies should consider the potential 
escalation of existing regional water tensions and conflicts resultant from the 
climate change impacts. Given the complexity and uncertainty of the climate 
change issue and its various impacts on water issues such as availability, 
usability and security the question becomes how can decision-makers take a 
practical approach to dealing with this problem? In a general sense, such 
environmental issues do not lend themselves to individual or unilateral actions. 
Because of their trans-boundary nature, environmental issues including climate 
change require collaboration among all affected parties. This approach was quite 
evident in the way the Egyptian Government has reacted to the potential impacts 
of climate change. 
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In 2012, the Egyptian Minister for Water Resources and Irrigation welcomed the 
cooperation among the African countries to mitigate the negative impact of 
climate change and weather variability on the issues related to water availability 
and security. Addressing the delegates of the African participating countries on 
World Water Day, the Egyptian Minister confirmed the commitment of Egypt to 
work collaboratively with all concerned partners including the African Ministers’ 
Council on Water (AMCOW) and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) to put into 
effect the Strategic Framework for Water Security and Climate Resilience. As 
noted by Bahaa El-Din (2012:1), the strategic framework ‘provides guidance to 
countries on how to integrate water security and climate resilience into national 
development plans and investment decision-making processes, with a focus on 
prioritizing investment programs that can withstand the impacts of climate 
change under multiple scenarios’. The overall aim was to bridge the gap between 
science and policymaking in a way that allows the realization of the 
developmental goals in all concerned countries via transboundary cooperation.  
Such regional platforms for cooperation are important but not sufficient 
mechanisms for dealing effectively with the impacts of climate change on water. 
In other words, it is good to have strategic frameworks in order to align the 
different objectives of participating parties and to coordinate the activities and 
projects needed to reach the overall aim of the program. However, the way in 
which such a framework and the associated projects are implemented will reflect 
in the ability of each country to reach its goals. At the implementation level, 
learning and sharing experiences has to be emphasized. Furthermore, 
experiences as well as case studies have to be documented for the purposes of 
knowledge sharing and lesson learning. In this regard, the Arab Water Council 
(2009) reported that information and data collection and sharing provides one of 
the major policy challenges posed by climate change. In order to face this 
challenge, the collected data and information have to be properly organised, 
processed, and shared in a way that helps with the successful adaptation to this 
phenomena. That means, in the absence of collaboration in data gathering and 
documentation, knowledge transfer among involved parties will be difficult.    
On a different note, as rightly mentioned by a senior researcher at the 
environment research institute, collaborative efforts will be more productive if 
participating parties adopt a holistic integrated approach that looks at the issue 
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of water availability and security from a broad angle (Interview 4). In other words, 
instead of focusing on water governance arrangements at national levels, and 
considering the potential impacts of climate change on individual countries, the 
collaborative efforts should consider all available alternatives at all levels. This 
panoramic view of climate change and its impacts on water availability and 
security would enable the consideration of possible drivers that might put all the 
countries at an environmental risk. As rightly noted by an Environmental 
Economist at OECD, ‘One must think about all the other drivers that affect our 
use of water and exposure to environmental risk’ (Dominique, 2012: 3).  
The same logic applies to the coordination and implementation of climate change 
programs and projects among the participating countries. Unilateral actions and 
national programs would be less effective without taking into consideration the 
efforts and the projects established at the regional level. As noted by an expert 
in the national water governance benchmarking for sustainable water, by looking 
at the investments required to mitigate the impacts of climate change it can be 
noticed that water sector investment, particularly in Egypt, is quite limited 
(Interview 7). This shortage in water investments is expected to increase 
because of the climate change. To put it another way, climate change mitigation 
and adaptation projects require new investments in water sectors, which already 
suffer from the lack of investments. In order to address this issue, all affected 
parties should work collaboratively and coordinate their projects and activities. 
As stated by the CEO of the Climate Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), 
‘There is an existing deficiency in water investments. Climate change is likely to 
exacerbate the deficit, but if we set up different programs, separate programs, 
we won’t meet the MDGs’ (Bickesteth, 2012: 3). If we add the environmental 
considerations, the level of investments required will increase as the new 
projects and infrastructure developed to mitigate climate change effects should 
be resilient, green and have a minimal polluting impact on the environment.     
8.6.5 The Environmental Pollution and the Challenge of Controlling Water 
Quality  
Water quality is now a major concern for all countries around the world including 
Egypt (Gad, 2017: 40). The pollution of the surface and ground water provides 
one of the major water-related challenges in Egypt (Elewa, 2010).  Since the 
early 1980s, the Egyptian Government has taken several measures to monitor 
242 | P a g e  
 
and control water quality. Nonetheless, with the accelerated levels of 
urbanization and population growth, the levels of environmental pollution and in 
turn, its negative impact on water quality have dramatically increased in Egypt. 
The main sources of water pollution have been underlined by Abdel-Gawad 
(2004: 337) as follows: 
 Untreated or inadequately treated domestic and industrial wastewater 
 Improper use of fertilizers and pesticides  
 Solid waste disposal and unplanned urban and rural development  
 Polluting activities related to navigation and tourism 
These water pollution sources have collectively contributed to the rapid 
deterioration of water quality (Elewa, 2010). The severity of water quality decline 
depends among other things on the amount of flow, the pattern of use, population 
density, the extent of industrialization, the availability of sanitation systems, and 
social and economic conditions (EEAA, 2008; Abdel-Dayem, 2011: 184).  
The main sources of pollution are return flows from agriculture, domestic uses 
and industry, as well as solid waste. From an industrial perspective, the 
increased industrial activities, in combination with the lack of modern 
technologies needed to treat the industrial wastewater have resulted in increased 
levels of pollution in surface and underground water. The problem of water 
quality deterioration can be further complicated considering the lack of treatment 
facilities required to treat solid and liquid disposals resulting from industrial 
activities. As mentioned by Abdel-Dayem (2011: 185), ‘Not all industrial facilities, 
especially the small ones, are provided with wastewater treatment facilities’. The 
absence of the proper treatment of industrial waste results in an increase in the 
volume of waste and toxic contaminants discharged into the watercourses. As 
put by Abdel-Gawad (2004: 337), ‘[E]ffluents of industries such as pulp and 
paper, food processing, textile finishing and chemical synthesis typically 
generate heavy pollution loads’. Added to this, those who work for the different 
industrial estates do not receive a proper training on how to minimize the 
potential environmental hazards of their wastes before disposing of them into 
rivers and water lakes and canals. With the amount of industrial wastewater 
expected to increase in accordance with the predictions of MWRI’s officials 
(Interviews 4, 9, 11), the issue has become a major concern for water policy and 
decision makers.   
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The analysis of the interview material has indicated that in an attempt to minimize 
the negative impacts of industrial activities on water quality, the Egyptian 
Government has followed a two-fold approach. For new industrial projects, the 
government makes sure that they are located in new communities and industrial 
cities far from the Nile and encourage new industrial establishments to adopt 
modern treatment technologies. At the same time, for old industries which were 
established close to the Nile and other watercourses and discharge directly into 
those waterways, the government has taken several actions to ensure the 
compliance of those establishments with the environmental laws and regulations. 
In spite of these efforts, a senior member of staff at the Ministry of Environment 
has mentioned that there are still many violators. Those violators do not comply 
with the environmental laws and regulations by discharging their industrial 
wastes directly into water streams without proper treatment (Interview 17).        
In agriculture, the excessive use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides has also 
contributed to the deterioration of water and soil quality. In this context, a member 
of the Egyptian national committee for irrigation and drainage stated that ‘the 
harmful substances are concentrated in drainage water at considerably high 
levels, which makes it a major source of pollution to waterways and ground water’ 
(Interview 11). Additionally, the concentration of these harmful substances in 
food and fresh water can result in many health hazards for those who consume 
polluted products (Abdel-Dayem and Abdel-Ghani, 1992). In this context, Abdel-
Dayem (2011:185) has reported that ‘major pollutants in agricultural drains are 
salts, nutrients (phosphorus and nitrogen), pesticide residues (from irrigated 
fields), and pathogens (from domestic wastewater)’. When mixed with fresh 
irrigation water in water canals, these pollutants can cause major health issues 
for food consumers. Furthermore, when directly disposed into water streams 
drainage water can considerably contribute to the deterioration of water quality 
in affected areas. In an evaluative study of water quality in different regions of 
the country, the National Water Quality Conservation Unit (NWQCU) has 
concluded that water quality deterioration is a general issue in all investigated 
sites; however, the polluting substances differ in Upper Egypt from the northern 
parts of the country and the delta area. The analysis of the interview material has 
underlined several reasons behind the degradation of water quality. Chief among 
those reasons is the overutilization of fertilizers and pesticides. The subsidization 
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provided by the government has been underscored by a number of interviewees 
as the main reason behind the excessive utilization of fertilizers, pesticides and 
herbicides by farmers (Interviews 5, 11, 15). The prices of these elements are 
highly subsidized, which encourages farmers to overconsume and utilize them. 
Another reason for the overuse of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides is the poor 
pest management approaches and techniques followed by farmers. The main 
issue in this regard could be the lack of awareness on the farmers’ side on how 
to better use these substances in a responsible fashion, which minimizes their 
polluting effects. Given that the agricultural sector is the major water consumer 
in the country (see Chapter 7), it has become necessary to deal with the 
agricultural pollutants. Addressing this issue is crucial for controlling the ongoing 
degradation in water quality.  
At the domestic level, the rapidly growing population has had its effect on water 
consumption as previously indicated. The increase in water consumption means 
an increase in wastewater, which needs to be treated before being discharged 
in waterways. The problem is most of the wastewater is not properly treated-if 
treated at all- before being disposed of in water streams. As stated by Abdel-
Dayem (2011: 184), ‘the total wastewater flows generated by all governorates is 
estimated to be 3.5 BCM/year. Approximately only 1.6 BCM/year receives 
treatment’. The disposal of untreated wastewater into water streams results in 
degradation in water quality in addition to aggravating health hazards. 
Wastewater from domestic households is not the only source of pollution 
affecting water quality.  As mentioned by a senior member of staff at the MESA, 
solid wastes from domestic use can also be regarded as a source of pollution 
(Interview 17).  A considerable share of the collected solid waste finds its way to 
waterways and canals especially in the rural areas. The issue is being further 
complicated by the water users’ bad habits and behaviour, which contribute to 
the problem of water quality deterioration. Many of those practices, including 
dumping garbage and washing animals in water streams, are prohibited by the 
law. In this regard, a senior member of staff at MRWI has stated ‘law enforcers 
find it very difficult to bring this sort of behaviour under their direct control’ 
(Interview 9). Given the severity of the negative impacts of such behaviour on 
water quality, the process of law enforcement has to be reinforced. Those who 
violate water laws and regulation by polluting waterways in any shape or form 
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have to pay for the pollution they produce and to bear the consequences for their 
misconduct. Parallel to law enforcement, the government has to educate water 
users with respect to the potential impacts of their poor practices on their own 
health as well as the wellbeing of their children and the rest of the community.     
The previously discussed issues in relation to the degradation of water quality 
have led the Egyptian Government to change its water management approach 
and to pay more attention to water quality issues.  As noted by a senior member 
of staff in the HCCW, ‘traditionally the focus was primarily on manging the supply 
side of water resources by reallocating water supplies where needed. However, 
as the level of environmental pollution keeps increasing, we have turned our 
attention to focus more on water quality as well as quantity. […] There is no need 
for supplying the required amount of water with poor quality because it will not 
be usable’ (Interview 10). This shift from focusing on the supply side to be more 
concerned with quality of the produced water represents a turning point in the 
way the government and its apparatus regard water quality issues.  Added to 
this, the Egyptian Government has developed and put in place a water quality 
management program aimed at collecting water quality data and measures in 
order to serve as a scientific basis for sound water decisions and policies. In this 
context, Abdel-Gawad (2004: 335) has rightly noted that the water management 
program follows ‘an integrated approach to water quality data collection, 
analysis, interpretation, management and coordination’.  According to a member 
of the team working on the Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management 
Project (IIIMP), such an integrated approach in dealing with water quality issues 
is expected to assist in directing the governmental efforts in the areas of 
minimizing the social, environmental and economic negative impacts associated 
with the deterioration of water quality (Interview 15).    
Despite the ongoing governmental efforts to monitor and control water quality, 
the trend of pollution in many water bodies is still alarming. The increasing 
environmental pollution resulting from the industrial, agricultural and households’ 
activities has had a negative impact on the quality of water as well as on the 
possibility of treating and reusing wastewater. Water quality measures have 
shown that in many places all around the country the levels of bacteria in water 
resources are high compared to what is globally permitted. The situation 
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becomes even worse if we consider the closed water system in Egypt, which 
makes it more exposed to water quality corrosion (Abdel-Dayem, 2011).  
To sum up, the issue of water quality deterioration could cause irreversible 
damage to water resources and result in serious health hazards. From an 
economic point of view, poor water quality can render economic growth and 
development goals unattainable. Therefore, controlling water pollutants and 
improving water quality should be regarded as a multifaceted task that calls for 
the full cooperation among different stakeholders. The government cannot stand 
alone and face this issue for the reason that many of the polluting sources do not 
come under the direct control of its apparatus. Farmers, factory owners, and 
water users in general have to collaborate in order to address the issue of 
deteriorating water quality. In other words, an effective water quality 
management system is needed wherein policy, legal, institutional, regulatory and 
technical parties work side-by-side in a coordinated fashion to monitor and 
control the levels of environmental pollution and to minimize its negative impacts 
on water quality.   
8.6.6 Poor Water Infrastructure and the Challenge of Involving Water 
Private Companies 
Over the last 25 years, the Egyptian Government has spent more than US$11 
billion on water and wastewater plant construction (USAID, 2013:37). As noted 
by an international water expert, the government investments in developing  
water and wastewater infrastructure ‘is expected to continue but with more 
reliance and involvements of the private sector in the areas of finance, design, 
construction, maintenance as well as management and operation of water 
facilities’ (Interview 6). The government has identified the required investments 
in the water sector until 2037 in its National Master Plan (see Table 8.2).  
As the table indicates, at a general level, the opportunities of the private sector 
participation in providing water services are significant, particularly in the area of 
wastewater management and reuse (Soulie, 2013: 34-35). Despite such 
significant opportunities, the number of private companies involved in providing 
water services in general and wastewater services in particular is considerably 
limited. One of the major reasons behind the limited participation of the private 
sector is the non-encouraging overall regulatory and legal framework governing 
public private projects. The Egyptian Government has taken important steps in 
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order to address this issue and to encourage the participation of the private 
sector in water services provision. For instance, in an attempt to lay the 
foundation for privately financed and operated water projects in the wastewater 
and desalination sectors, the Egyptian Government approved the Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) law in April 2010 (Frost and Sullivan, 2011). Nevertheless, 
more needs to be done with regard to clarifying roles and responsibilities in 
addition to developing a proper risk assessment of the PPPs projects. In the 
absence of such mutual guarantees and safeguards, it will be prudent for the 
private sector companies to get involved in water projects.    
 
Table 8.2: Water and Sanitation Investments as Per the National Master Plan 
Source: USAID (2013: 31) 
The absence of basic infrastructure and services alongside the poor 
performance and inefficient operations of those in existence provides another 
reason for the humble participation of the private water companies in service 
delivery. As noted by a water specialist, ‘in many governorates some of the basic 
water infrastructure is still lacking. In rural areas, for instance, you can hardly find 
a well-connected sewer system’ (Interview 7). The absence of such basic 
infrastructure facilities makes it difficult for the private sector to take part in the 
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process of service delivery. Added to this, the inefficient operation of water 
treatment facilities contributes to the deterioration of water quality and the quality 
of all associated services.  
The issue of archaic and inefficient water infrastructure has been fully 
acknowledged in interviews from the governmental side. The analysis of the 
interview material shows that there is an overall agreement among respondents 
that the water sector in Egypt, especially on the infrastructure side, requires a lot 
of attention from water policy stakeholders. As noted by a senior regulatory 
member of staff in the EWRA, ‘the government alone cannot do everything; the 
collaboration of all interested parties and most importantly the private sector is a 
prerequisite for developing and modernising water infrastructure’ (Interview 21). 
In this regard, the respondents from the governmental side have indicated that 
the government has developed plans to extend the coverage of the basic water 
and sewerage system on a large scale to cover villages and urban areas 
(Interview 11). These new projects can be an opportunity for private sector 
companies to participate in developing new water facilities and modernizing 
existing water infrastructure. Nonetheless, without the appropriate incentive 
schemes in place, in addition to the lack of a clear and well-defined roles and 
responsibility, the participation of the private sector can be minimal. As clearly 
stated by the OECD (2010:2), ‘In the current context of credit constraint and 
tighter financial conditions, private developers are, however, likely to be more 
selective, demanding higher quality, more ‘bankable’ projects, with clearer forms 
of public support and risk-sharing’.  
The lack of basic water facilities, particularly in rural areas, has resulted in other 
problems especially for arable lands. As rightly noted by a senior water 
researcher at the MALR, ‘only 3% of the cultivated land is served by primary and 
secondary drainage systems’ (Interview 5).  Such an issue has a great impact 
on the quality of soil and the level of soil salinity. The absence of drainage 
systems results in high levels of soil salinity, which affects the quality of crops 
and the possibility of cultivating the land for future use (Interview 15).            
8.6.7 The Fragmentation of the Policy Environment and the Challenge of 
Institutional Coordination   
The discussion about water governance agencies and institutional structures in 
Egypt has indicated that water policies and decisions are made and implemented 
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in highly complex and fragmented legal and regulatory environments. As noted 
by Luzi (2010), many water issues and policy decisions and outcomes go beyond 
the principal government policy agents including the Ministry of Water.  This 
environment has become even more complicated by the involvement of non-
state actors in policy and decision-making, besides other water governance 
arrangements (Alnaggar, 2003). In complex policy settings wherein state and 
non-stated actors normally work side-by-side, the issue of coordination becomes 
paramount. In other words, the question of how water governance activities, 
processes and operations are organized and coordinated becomes a key to 
understanding the way in which each party contributes to the water governance 
functions. This question is also key to realizing how such contributions from state 
and non-state actors are channelled towards achieving the overall water policy 
goals. In this respect, El-Fiki (2013) has noted that ‘In a centralized system, what 
we would expect is cooperation across the board between the multiple ministries 
in charge. But the picture is quite different in Egypt’s case’. Given the different 
mandates and objectives of each ministry, all involved parties may end up 
pushing different projects in different directions, which complicates the task of 
cooperation and coordination.     
As indicated in Chapter 7, the National Water Resources Plan for Egypt (NWRP) 
provides the overall policy framework within which all policy actors - namely 
governmental ministries and agencies - play different roles and bear different 
responsibilities in relation to achieving the intended water policy goals. However, 
for the entire water governance system to work effectively, a coordination 
mechanism which guarantees the organization and the utilization of inputs 
coming from the involved actors to make timely and sound water decisions 
should be in place. To this end, a coordination body was created under the name 
of the National Water Resources Plan Coordination Panel (NWRP-CP). The 
main aim of the NWRP-CP, as noted by a senior civil servant in MWRI, is ‘to 
make sure that the intended policy goals identified in the National Water 
Resources Plan are achieved in accordance with the indicators stated in the plan’ 
(Interview 1). In that sense, the NWRP-CP acts as a decision support mechanism 
through which the needed information and technical support are provided to 
water policy actors at the central as well as the governorate and local levels (see 
Figure 8.1).  
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Figure 8.1: NWRP Coordination Platform for follow-up of the implementation 
Source: CEDARE (2014:46) 
As the figure illustrates, at the national/central level there are eight ministries 
included in the NWRP-CP: the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation 
(MWRI); the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP); the Ministry of Drinking 
Water and Sanitation Facilities (MDWSF); the Ministry of State for Environmental 
Affairs (MSEA); the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR); the 
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC); the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF); and the Ministry of Energy and Electricity (MOEE).   
MWRI is taking the lead with respect to the coordination and reporting of all 
ministerial activities. The NWRP unit affiliated with the planning sector in MWRI 
liaises with and coordinates the operations and functions of the other NWRP 
units in the mentioned ministries. At the same time, the first undersecretary in 
MWRI is responsible for coordinating and reporting the activities of the technical 
committee while the minister is assigned the same role at the level of the high 
ministerial committee (HMC). In addition to the eight ministerial bodies, two 
central agencies are also involved in the NWRP-CP: the Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and the Egyptian Meteorological 
Authority (EMA). The role of the CAPMAS and the EMA is to collect, organize, 
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and share information with other involved parties each in its respective domain. 
The same structure is replicated at the local levels wherein each governorate 
has to follow up the implementation of the NWRP via their NWRP units and to 
the undersecretary for water resources and irrigation.     
As reported by CEDARE (2014), the creation of the NWRP-CP has had a positive 
impact on different aspects of water governance including the capacity building 
of the staff in water facilities in addition to providing a framework for monitoring 
and evaluating the water governance system in Egypt. Nevertheless, some of 
the interviewees have cast some doubts about the ability of the NWRP-CP to 
cope with the changes in the water sector, particularly the participation of the 
non-state actors. In this regard, a water and energy specialist has noted that ‘the 
NWRP-CP is fit for the purpose of intra-ministerial coordination activities. But 
with the recent policy orientation of the government to involve private sector 
companies the membership of the NWRP-CP should be extended to include the 
newcomers’ (Interview 22). That means, as a platform for coordination, the 
NWRP-CP should be ready to receive, process, and feedback inputs from the 
private counterparts. In other words, the operational span of such a coordination 
mechanism should be flexible enough to accommodate the contributions coming 
from the private water companies and to respond to their demand for information 
that helps in planning their operations and activities. At the sectorial level, the 
Egyptian Government has endeavoured to facilitate the coordination process in 
the Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) sector by instituting an umbrella 
organizational ministerial body under the name of the Ministry of Drinking Water 
and Sanitation Facilities (MDWSF) in 2012.              
8.7 Conclusion  
For a water-scarce country like Egypt, all required actions have to be taken in 
order to ensure the best possible fit between water structures and agents. In this 
context, this chapter has brought into a sharper focus the water agents and 
structure in Egypt. The aim was to see how water policy agents interact around 
water related issues given the existing governance structures. To this end, the 
water governance functions in Egypt have been investigated in an attempt to 
unpack the water governance processes, roles and responsibilities, in addition 
to the way in which water agents transform their powers into concrete actions on 
the ground. The discussion in this regard has highlighted the leading and central 
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role of MWRI in contributing towards nearly all regulatory and operational 
aspects of Egyptian water governance. Nevertheless, in managing the water 
sector a complex web of mainly governmental policy agents interact to deliver on 
functions such as water resources organization, capacity building, strategic 
planning, and regulation. The discussion has also indicated that the role of the 
private sector and the rest of the non-state actors are quite limited compared to 
the potential scope for involvement and participation. The Egyptian Government 
has taken important steps in order to encourage more participation and 
involvement, particularly of private water companies in modernising the archaic 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, more is to be done on this front, as the potential of 
non-state actors’ participation has not been fully harnessed.   
By looking at the sector’s independent regulatory agency, it can be concluded 
that compared to the other powerful state organizations including MWRI and the 
MALR, the powers of the regulator appear considerably limited. The discussion 
and the analysis of the interview material has revealed in this regard that the 
creation of the EWRA was first and foremost an instrumental move by the 
Egyptian Government to secure more private investment and to attract private 
water companies. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the legal mandate 
for creating the EWRA has granted the agency all needed powers, which has 
secured its independence from the rest of the actors. Therefore, the regulatory 
agency can capitalise on such formal aspects of independence and play a more 
influential role in sector management and regulation.  
A glance at the water decision-making mechanism from a good governance 
perspective shows that the principles of participation, transparency, and 
accountability are partially embraced by water decision-making institutions. 
Nonetheless, there is still scope for more improvement and more involvement of 
non-state actors in policy and decision-making processes. Added to this, the 
transparency of all aspects associated with water policies and decisions should 
be fully secured. Finally yet importantly, the water policymakers should realize 
that the growing involvement of the non-state actors in water governance 
arrangements requires new accountability mechanisms. The vertical channels of 
accountability linked to the traditional governmental model of water policy and 
decision-making is no longer suitable to hold state and non-state actors 
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responsible for their actions in more or less  flat forms of water governance 
arrangements.        
The discussion in this chapter has also indicated that the water governance 
system in Egypt faces some fundamental challenges due to its transboundary 
nature. Added to this, at the national level, there are many water related issues 
which have to be properly handled. The deterioration of water quality, climate 
change and its impact on water availability and security, water pricing and 
subsidization are just some examples of water related issues and problems 
facing policy and decision makers in Egypt. The complexity of water governance 
arrangements and structures in addition to the multiplicity of water agents call for 
coordination mechanisms which channel all the efforts and resources and gear 
all actors towards realising the intended policy goals. The next concluding 
chapter will address the identified water governance challenges and provide 
some policy recommendations on how to deal with these challenges and in turn 
improve the performance of the overall governance structures.       
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1. Introduction 
Over the years, Egypt has become a country with limited water resources due to 
the rapid population growth as well as the increasing demands for water from all 
economic sectors. The situation has become more critical with the ambitious 
developmental plans pursued by the upstream countries, which have resulted in 
the establishment of more dams and water infrastructure up-Nile. The newly 
established water developments will add to the water shortage in Egypt and 
worsen the overall water crisis in the country. In this context, finding 
unconventional water governance arrangements to handle the water crisis in 
Egypt has become a necessity (El-Sadek, 2010). In other words, this study 
regards the water crisis in Egypt as a crisis of governance that calls for innovative 
solutions built upon well-thought through and integrated water resources 
management arrangements. Following on from this understanding, the study has 
posed a core research question: how to explain water governance arrangements 
in Egypt through the analysis of existing water structures as well as relationships 
and interaction between water structures and water agents? In order to address 
this question, the research has examined the existing water governance 
arrangements in Egypt and their ability to better utilise the scarce water 
resources in an integrated and efficient manner. The study has also investigated 
the reform efforts in order to identify the main drivers and to evaluate the efficacy 
of these reforms in addressing the critical water crisis questions and the water 
challenges facing the country. 
In examining water issues and governance arrangements in Egypt, the research 
was inspired by contributions from different theoretical and analytic accounts. 
Chief among those theoretical traditions are the accounts on governance, the 
debate on the structure-agency dilemma, and the writings on policy transfer and 
learning. The notion of governance and more precisely, the concept of MLG has 
been used as an analytic framework in order to investigate water governance 
arrangements and mechanisms at national and regional levels. Added to this, 
the contributions of the structure-agency debates were very useful in shaping the 
discussion in this study by distinguishing between the current water structures in 
Egypt as well as the ways these structures affect the water agency. The policy 
transfer and policy learning accounts were helpful in investigating the roots of 
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the current water governance arrangements in the studied case and the ways 
via which the existing model was transferred into the Egyptian context.  The 
amalgamation of these theoretical and analytic accounts have helped the 
researcher to see the overall ‘wood’ of water governance in Egypt instead of only 
focusing on the water agents and the way they interact or the ‘trees’.   
In this context, this study argues that a better understanding of the water crisis 
and the challenges facing water policy-makers in Egypt requires looking at and 
perceiving the whole situation as a problem of governance. At the end of the day, 
water issues, policies and practices result from the ongoing interaction between 
state and non-state actors at national, regional, and global levels. These 
interactions do not take place in a vacuum but the way in which water agents 
interact is governed by holistic water structures in terms of the existing national 
and international treaties, laws and regulations. The water structures in that 
sense define what can be done and what would be considered as violations of 
water governance arrangements. Added to this, water structures at global, 
regional and national levels greatly determine policy options and choices for 
policy-makers at national levels. In other words, water policies and governance 
arrangements at national levels reflect water structures and interactions among 
water agents at regional and global levels. Such an understanding of water 
governance could help us explain policy choices and decisions in areas such as 
water regulations and to underline the reasons for choosing certain model(s) to 
govern and regulate water sectors. This argument has far-reaching 
consequences for the way we conceptualize and perceive water related issues 
and challenges. In any given water governance system, policymakers face new 
challenges to come up with the best combination of governance arrangements 
which maximise the utilisation of existing water resources. Yet, there is little 
evidence on how best this task could be done.           
In this concluding chapter, a short synopsis of the theoretical and methodological 
framework will be provided first, followed by a discussion of the core findings of 
the research. The aim is to bring into a sharper focus the implications of this 
research for the practice of water governance, agents, and the overall water 
policy formulation and implementation in Egypt. The limitations of the study will 
be highlighted and the directions for future studies and research in the area of 
water governance will be underlined.  
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9.2. Water Governance, Structures, and Agents: A Synopsis of the 
Theoretical and Analytic Framework 
In the context of this study, water governance is perceived as a political process 
wherein different water stakeholders interact around water policy issues in an 
attempt to come up with sound decisions in order to face water challenges and 
collaboratively solve water problems (see chapter 3). The examination of water 
governance arrangements in Egypt was guided by three sets of interconnected 
apprehensions: theoretical, methodological, and empirical. These three drivers 
are to be fully explicated in this section. 
9.2.1. Understanding Water Governance: Theoretical, Conceptual and 
Substantive Issues   
Unpacking and exploring the notion of water governance has resulted in the 
examination of different concepts and theoretical constructs. At the conceptual 
level, the examination of the different meanings of governance leads to the 
conclusion that, as is the case with other social sciences terminology, this 
concept has no authoritative definition. In other words, governance is a 
complicated construct that can carry many different meanings depending on the 
context. From this theoretical standpoint, the study has focused on unpacking 
and analysing water issues using the notion of governance and inspired by the 
debate over the relationship between agency and structures. This theoretical 
endeavour of the study was a means to develop an analytic framework to use in 
examining and analysing water governance arrangements in Egypt. 
The developed theoretical and analytic framework has highlighted the main 
concepts and the way in which these concepts are related to each other. Moving 
from the broader to the narrower context, the study has discussed the notion of 
governance and the core elements of this concept. The examination of the 
different facets of the notion of governance, as well as the steering mechanisms, 
has indicated that the concept was firstly coined in order to denote the transition 
from state-centred approaches to more private governance (see Chapter 2). In 
this context, the study has instrumentally perceived governance as an analytic 
framework of analysis. It is a means for developing a better understanding of 
water challenges in addition to providing ways to improve existing policy 
practices and encouraging innovations in policy implementation. In other words, 
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governance was not treated in the context of this research as a panacea for all 
water policy ills. Instead, the study looks at governance as an analytic and 
theoretical lens via which policy scholars can unpack and analyse complex water 
policy processes and government arrangements. 
Following on from this understanding and conceptualization of governance, 
‘water governance’ was defined in Chapter 3. The water crisis was framed as an 
issue of governance, which underlines a political multi-party and 
multidimensional interactive process. This conceptualization of water 
governance as a political process has called for a detailed discussion of a host 
of closely related issues including the core institutional components of water 
governance systems. At the heart of the water governance institutional settings 
come water laws, policies, and management plans. Added to this, the discussion 
of water governance has emphasised major strategic issues such as 
sustainability, gender, and poverty. Considering all these issues from a 
governance point of view it can be concluded that, the top-down and command-
and-control approaches for managing water sectors are no longer suitable to 
manage water crises at the present time. Government agents such as water 
ministries and bodies have to work hand-in-hand with all water stakeholders in 
order to ensure a wise management approach for water resources. Additionally, 
water policies and laws have to be redesigned to be more reflective of and more 
responsive to issues such as suitability and development. In short, water 
governance and shared planning and management of water resources provide 
an effective policy instrument to design and implement water policies that are 
gender-sensitive, produce more equality in the society and address the needs of 
the poor and most vulnerable.     
9.2.2. Understanding Water Governance: A Structure-Agent Perspective        
For further analysis of water governance regimes, the study has brought the 
debate over structures and agency to the heart of the discussion (see Chapter 
4). That was needed in order to make sense of water governance regimes, which 
include different types of water agents using the existing water structure as 
springboards for interaction around water issues. This theoretical debate has 
contributed to the distinction between water structures and agents at different 
levels of governance including national, regional and global spheres. At the end 
of the day, a better understanding and explanation of water governance in any 
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given context requires a sound and clear answer to the question of how water 
policy decisions are arrived at. The debate over the nature of the relationship 
between water agents and structures was very enlightening in addressing this 
point. Water policy decisions are not made in a vacuum but they are normally 
formulated with water institutions in mind including water laws and regulations. 
These institutional contours form the structures within which water policy agents 
of all types including water policymakers and decision-makers interact in a 
dialectal fashion in order to set up water governance arrangements. As such, 
any attempt to use a unidimensional approach to explain water governance will 
not be sufficient to capture the full dynamics and rationale behind water 
decisions. In other words, the dialectic between water agents and water 
structures provides a means for looking at the trees (water policy agents) but 
without losing sight of the overall forest (existing water structures).           
9.2.3. Understanding Water Governance: Water Governance Arrangements 
in Egypt 
The Egyptian water sector provides a thought-provoking empirical field for this 
study to investigate water governance issues and arrangements for several 
reasons. Chief among those reasons is the need to unpack and reshape and 
existing water governance arrangements in the light of the emerging and ever 
growing difficulties facing water policymaking at the current time. In that sense, 
the conceptualization of water issues and policy problems from governance and 
structure-agency perspectives was paramount for analysing the case of water 
governance in Egypt. The developed analytic framework was utilized to map-out 
the main water agents and major water structures in the Nile Basin. The hydro-
politics of the Nile Basin was discussed in Chapter 6 by looking at the River Nile 
as an example par excellence of a transboundary water governance regime.  The 
local, regional, and international dimensions of the Nile governance have been 
explicated in terms of the existing water structures (treaties) and the role of water 
agents in forming and implementing them. The Nile governance analysis has 
indicated that governance arrangements at national levels in Egypt are shaped 
largely by the existing water structures, namely at regional levels. Furthermore, 
the discussion in has concluded that the water governance of the Nile Basin is 
characterized by regional tensions between the Nile riparian countries, which 
makes cooperation among them difficult if not impossible. Adding to this, many 
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of those countries, such as Egypt and Ethiopia, have a long history of conflicts 
and distrust. In such a hostile context, the discussion in this chapter has 
concluded that basin-wide collaborative governance mechanisms need to be 
established to govern the allocation and management of waters in the basin. 
Such a mechanism will help bridge the gap in opinions between upriver and 
downriver countries. At the same time, and for such a mechanism to work 
effectively, the overall archaic water institutions and treaties have to be revisited 
and reconsidered in order to reflect the current reality of water governance in the 
Nile Basin. The absence of such measures will result in more escalations of 
tensions in the Nile Basin and will stand as a hurdle in the face of any 
collaboration between the Nile riparians.        
Moving from the regional water governance to the national level, the developed 
theoretical and analytic framework has also proved helpful in mapping-out water 
agents and structures in the Egyptian water sector.  The main water policy actors 
(agents) in Egypt were identified in Chapter 7 alongside the roles and 
responsibilities associated with their functions. The analysis of the existing water 
agents and structures in Egypt has demonstrated that many of them have come 
into being as a result of the ongoing water reforms. Nonetheless, such reforms 
have produced a complex and multi-part water governance system with central 
and influential roles for government water agencies. Two main features of the 
current water governance arrangements in Egypt were identified: institutional 
complexity and fragmentation of roles and responsibilities. Institutionally 
speaking, different ministries and state bodies assume the responsibility of 
managing and allocating water resources in Egypt. The level of non-state water 
stakeholders’ involvement in making and enforcing water policies and decisions 
is considerably limited. Added to this, the fragmentation of the legal and 
regulatory environment in terms of the absence of a unified water legislation has 
further complicated the scenery and produced more confusion and uncertainty 
about water governance responsibilities. In such fragmented and complex water 
governance arrangements, the study has underlined the importance of setting-
up a coordinating mechanism in order to avoid the overlapping in jurisdictions 
and roles. Added to this, the discussion has emphasised the need to move away 
from the top-down approach of making water policies and decisions. A 
participatory approach wherein non-state as well as state water stakeholders in 
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Egypt can play a role in making and implementing water policies and decisions 
would produce better results in terms of governance arrangements.    
The mapping-out exercise of water agencies and structure in Egypt has paved 
the way for a more in-depth analysis of the interplay dynamics between these 
two parties, as  discussed in Chapter 8 of the study. The discussion has focused 
on examining the ways in which water agencies and water structures come into 
play when delivering the core functions of the water governance system. By 
investigating five main functions: organization and capacity building; strategic 
planning, water allocation; water resources development and management; and 
water resources regulations the discussion has concluded that the overall 
governance is dominated by government agencies, namely MWRI. All regulatory 
and functional aspects are tightly controlled by this ministerial body and its 
affiliations. In spite of the major steps taken by the Egyptian Government to allow 
more participation of non-state water stakeholders, the participation of those 
actors, namely the private water companies and advocacy organizations, has not 
reached its full potential. The discussion has also indicated the limited power 
exerted by the sector’s regulator, the EWRA, in comparison to the dominating 
ministerial bodies such as MWRI and the MALR. The analysis of the interview 
materials and the discussion of the regulatory independence of the newly 
established sector regulator has highlighted a gap between the legal mandate, 
which granted the regulatory agency the required prerogatives to function 
independently, and the ability of the new regulator to translate such a mandate 
into actions in real life when dealing with water issues (see Badran, 2012). The 
overall assessment of the interplay dynamics between water agency and 
structures in the Egypt has demonstrated a partial adoption of the core principles 
of good governance when it comes to making and implementing water decisions 
and policies. Nevertheless, the empowerment and involvement of non-state 
agents will result in more collaborative governance wherein the issues of 
transparency and accountability can be properly addressed.                        
9.2.4. Understanding Water Governance: The Methodological Drivers 
At the methodological level, the central undertaking of this thesis has been to 
examine the case of water governance in the context of Egypt as a single case 
study for the reasons explained in the methodological section (see Chapter 5). 
In that sense, the empirical effort of the study has focused on unpacking and 
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analysing the water governance arrangements in Egypt in addition to identifying 
existing water structures. The empirical analysis also aimed at mapping-out 
local, regional, and global interactions among the water agents. To this end, a 
wide range of policy documents and written materials were consulted in addition 
to conducting elite interviews with water policy and decision-makers in Egypt in 
order to produce primary and secondary data for empirical analysis. Hence, from 
an empirical perspective, the researcher has been interested in mapping-out the 
core water policy agents and structures involved in the water governance 
arrangements in the Egypt. Additionally, searching for better settings and more 
efficient ways to utilize the scarce water resources represented another empirical 
motive for this research. In this context, with the intention of providing a 
contextualisation for the water governance arrangements in the Egyptian water 
sector, the institutional as well as the structural elements have been investigated.  
Put together, these three sets of research drivers have provided a coherent and 
thorough investigation of water governance at theoretical, analytic, and empirical 
levels. In that sense, the study bridges the gap between practice and theory by 
providing a comprehensive wording of the specific problem phenomenon. By 
assimilating the conceptual and theoretical investigation alongside the empirical 
inquiry of the context of water governance in Egypt, this thesis provides an 
inclusive examination of the Egyptian water governance in terms of its structures 
and agents.  
9.3. Understanding Water Governance: the Major Contributions of the 
Study  
In order to inform the ontological, epistemological and methodological basis of 
the thesis, the governance analytic framework is combined with theoretical 
insights form structure-agency accounts. By combining theoretical and empirical 
enquiry, this work attempts to contribute to and advance beyond the existing 
literature in three ways. First, it offers one of the first attempts to organise an 
empirical in-depth case study analysis of the water governance arrangements in 
Egypt using a multi-level structure-agency framework. Second, it provides a 
systematic examination and mapping-out of the new water governance systems 
in Egypt. Third, it presents a rigorous evaluation of the impact of water 
governance regimes at the regional and international levels on water policy 
decisions at the national level. 
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In that sense, this thesis contributes to the area of water governance and water 
policies at different theoretical and empirical levels. At the theoretical level, the 
study provides an innovative approach for conceptualizing water issues and 
analysing water policies. The provided approach integrates the notion of 
governance as an analytic construct in addition to the structure-agency 
theoretical debate in an attempt to capture the full dynamics of water governance 
systems. In this regard, the water crisis was introduced and framed as an issue 
of governance. Water issues have been studied from different social, economic, 
and environmental perspectives and by using different techniques and methods. 
However, framing the water crisis from a governance perspective has helped the 
researcher to address not only the substantive issues related to water 
management but also to capture the dynamics and the politics involved in water 
policy processes and management arrangements.  
The governance component in the developed theoretical framework offers new 
insights into the study of water policies. Governance, as indicated earlier, is a 
relatively novel analytic construct with unique characteristics. Its explanatory 
powers are yet to be fully discovered by testing this framework through 
investigating real life policy problems and issues. To this end, a solid foundation 
has to be established by considering the unique features of the governance 
approach and the extent to which these features can be integrated with other 
theoretical and analytic tools. This research provides a step on that path by 
integrating the governance notion and the structure-agency theoretical approach 
in an attempt to unpack and elucidate water governance in Egypt.   
The utilization of the notion of governance as an analytical tool has provided a 
great deal of flexibility in dealing with the phenomenon under investigation. Water 
resources management and allocation is a complex process, especially where 
the main source of water is shared among more than one country. By doing so, 
the study contributes to the current theoretical and analytical debate concerning 
the explanatory power of governance and MLG in examining and elucidating 
complex policy settings including water governance systems. From this angle, 
the applicability of the governance notion at multi-levels has facilitated the task 
of analysing water governance arrangements in the studied case at regional as 
well as national levels. Hence, in the context of this research, it can be concluded 
that governance as an analytic framework is best suited to analyse water policy 
263 | P a g e  
 
issues and governance measures. It provides a rigorous analytic tool that helps 
to capture the dynamics of water governance systems at multiple levels.  
Integrating the agency-structure debate with the governance as an analytic tool 
has also contributed to a better examination of the interplay dynamics between 
the agents and the structures of the water governance system in Egypt locally 
and regionally. The provided synthesis and a review of the literature on the 
agency-structure dilemma and the accounts on governance as an analytic 
construct have produced a novel approach and theoretical lens to examine water 
issues and governance arrangements. A complex topic such as water 
governance calls for complex and integrated theoretical and analytic frameworks 
which bring together the different aspects of the examined phenomena and 
capture the full picture of agents and structures as well as the interplay dynamics 
among them. Hence, instead of focusing on one aspect of the water crisis, one 
of the major theoretical contributions of this research is the more rounded 
approach followed, in which water governance, water structures and water 
agents have been brought together under investigation in an attempt to illustrate 
their theoretical foundations and the connection between them. In that sense, it 
can be emphasised that understanding the theoretical relationship between the 
main elements of water governance systems represents a crucial step for 
designing effective water governance mechanisms and deciding upon critical 
and strategic water policy issues. 
Added to the above, the development of the theoretical framework in this study 
has opened several new avenues for investigation. At the conceptual level, the 
deconstruction of complex concepts such as governance, good governance, 
water governance, water structures and water agents has contributed to a clearer 
understanding of water related issues, especially when we apply them to 
describe the water governance arrangements in the investigated case study. The 
holistic governance approach and theoretical perspective in dealing with water 
policy issues, together with the focal analytic point of structure-agency debate 
have enabled the investigation of water governance arrangements in Egypt and 
provided a better visualization of the reality of the Egyptian water sector in terms 
of its agents, structures, processes, and politics. Such a vivid picture of water 
governance arrangements was captured at regional as well as local levels.        
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Applying the notion of governance to the study of water policies also makes 
several contributions to this field in particular. On the one hand, it has helped the 
research to arrive at a better and deeper understanding of the theory and practice 
of making water policies and decisions. Furthermore, adopting a governance 
perspective has exemplified the highly political nature of water governance as an 
activity that involves state and non-sate actors working collaboratively to 
develop, manage and allocate water resources effectively. The notion of 
governance also highlights the potential roles that non-state water stakeholders, 
namely the private water companies, can play in water governance owing to the 
important resources that they have at their disposal. At the level of water 
governance processes, the governance approach has been very helpful for 
comprehending water management and decision-making processes as political 
tournaments that include different rounds between the involved water 
stakeholders. In each round, water stakeholders make strategic choices that 
affect their net outcomes of games. This dynamic comprehension of water 
governance arrangements allows for a deeper and improved understanding of 
water governance systems and their lively nature.    
The holistic and integrated nature of the developed theoretical and analytic 
framework has provided the base for more profound investigations of water 
governance arrangements in the Egyptian context. One of the major empirical 
contributions of this research is derived from the fact that it is one of the first 
studies at the PhD level, if not the first, to examine thoroughly and in-depth the 
water governance system in Egypt considering local as well as regional water 
structures and agents. From this angle, the study provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the Egyptian water sector using a variety of first-hand data and 
secondary resources. This rich and thick description of the Egyptian water sector 
can be beneficial for academics, water policy-makers and practitioners in the 
field of water management. From this angle, this research offers insights on the 
practice of water governance in Egypt and provides an alternative approach 
which focuses more on the role of the non-state water stakeholders in the new 
water governance arrangements. At the same time, the study offers a valuable 
learning tool and a rich inventory of techniques for water policy scholars, 
practitioners, and policymakers.    
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For public policy scholars, this work contributes to the theoretical and conceptual 
debate over governance and its applicability for unpacking and analysing public 
policies. It also brings to the forefront the debate about agency and structures 
and how the dialectic relationships between these two elements explains the 
formation and implementation of water governance arrangements. The 
integrated nature of the developed theoretical framework in terms of putting 
together governance and structure-agency perspectives can inform the policy 
analysis in relation to governing water processes as well as the role of agency in 
making and enforcing water policies and decisions.  Added to this, the empirical 
analysis in this research provides deep insights into the reality of water policy-
making and implementation in Egypt. It also provides a map of the major 
contours of this sector in terms of the main water agents and the governing 
structures, besides the ways in which water agents and structures interact 
around water policy issues and decisions. Such working knowledge is 
fundamental for understanding the way in which water governance 
arrangements function in Egypt.  
For policy-makers, the study contributes to the practice of water policymaking 
and implementation by offering a more people-centred and participatory 
approach for forming and undertaking water governance functions. In that sense, 
the results of this research may improve the way in which policy and decision-
makers in the Egyptian water sector perceive water issues and act upon them. 
The governance notion draws their attention to the new reality of making and 
implementing water policies and decisions wherein the government has to work 
hand-in-hand with the rest of non-state water stakeholders in order to develop 
and implement policies and decisions. In other words, in a water governance 
system, ministries and other governmental bodies are just one type of policy 
actor and represent one type of interest among other stakeholders who take part 
in setting-up and implementing governance arrangements. The role of the non-
state actors in water policymaking and implementation is ever growing and 
ignoring this fact may result in policy failure and dysfunction at the water 
governance system level. In that sense, this thesis contributes to the practice of 
policymaking and implementation by bringing non-state water stakeholders to 
the centre of making and enforcing water policies and decisions. That in turn 
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improves the overall democratic qualities of the water governance system and 
results in more people-centred and ecologically friendly water policies.   
For water managers and practitioners, the study provides a detailed account of 
the main actors as well as their roles and responsibilities in relation to developing, 
managing, and allocating water resources. Providing such a holistic picture can 
be beneficial for water managers in understanding and integrating the different 
parts of the system in order to develop better water management strategies and 
techniques. Additionally, this research highlights the political nature of water 
governance and the importance of paying attention to the existing water 
structures. Ignoring this dynamic nature of water governance, and overlooking 
the politics involved in water governance arrangements might lead to wrong 
managerial decisions and affect the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the 
water governance systems. In other words, understanding the overall 
governance structures within which water managers and practitioners are 
embedded is reflected in the way they develop, steer and manage the water 
resources at their disposal. As such, this thesis contributes to the ongoing debate 
on how to formulate water strategies and how to better manage the water 
resources at hand in a way that addresses, takes account of and improves water 
accessibility and gender equality. In other words, this research provides insights 
on how water managers and practitioners can set up a water governance system 
that guarantees clean, safe, affordable water. It is worth mentioning in this regard 
that the provided framework does not provide solutions to all water policy and 
water management issues but it adds a few new tools to the practitioners’ toolbox 
to be used in certain situations as they see fit. 
9.4. Implications and Policy Recommendations for Water Policymaking and 
Water Governance Practices in Egypt 
Using a governance/structure-agency analytic and theoretical framework, this 
study has aimed at contributing to the theory and practice of water policymaking 
and water governance. The water sector in Egypt was analysed as a single case 
study in order to underline the main water agents as well as water structures 
alongside the ways those agents and structures interact to develop and 
implement water governance arrangements (see chapters 4 and 5). The sectoral 
analysis and the analysis of the interview material has indicated that the Egyptian 
water sector has undergone a profound reform process. In collaboration with 
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water stakeholders, the Egyptian Government has developed and put in place 
several initiatives to reshape the archaic water policies and institutions. Many of 
the embraced initiatives have yielded positive results. These results contributed 
to the evolution of a relatively better water governance system and practices. 
Nevertheless, there are still important areas for further improvements at the 
institutional and regulatory, technical and operational, and governance levels. In 
this respect, and following on from the examination of water governance 
arrangements in the case of the Egyptian water sector, this section will provide 
a set of policy recommendations in an attempt to address technical, operational, 
legal, regulatory and water policy issues. 
9.4.1. Implications and Policy Recommendations: Water Institutions  
As indicated earlier in chapters 7 and 8, the governance of the Egyptian water 
sector is primarily dominated by the presence of powerful and influential 
government water bodies. In such a context, any reform program or any attempt 
to change existing governance arrangements has to be very carefully planned 
and to take into consideration the recommendations to follow: 
 Securing ongoing political support. Political support and the buy-in of 
the influential water governance institutions can make or break any reform 
initiative in the Egyptian water sector. Therefore, any reform initiative 
should be done in consultation with and the approval of the government 
water agencies, in particular MWRI and the MALR. Such political support 
is paramount for the institutionalization of the reform activities and 
processes. To put it another way, revamping existing water governance 
arrangements and mechanisms requires a new infusion of adequate 
capital investment alongside political commitment and support. Such a 
political will is required to ensure the success of any reform program and 
to face the institutional weaknesses and lack of good governance 
components in current water policy practices. 
 Combating the revolving-door effect. The water sector is of a highly 
technical nature and reflects largely the features of closed communities. 
In this context, water engineers are rare commodities and there is a high 
demand especially for highly qualified ones in the market. This demand 
creates a state of instability within water organizations, wherein water 
experts and engineers will move to other entities providing better offers. 
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Losing personnel affects the overall performance of water agencies and 
their ability to undertake their functions in the water governance system. 
This problem was quite evident with government water institutions such 
as EWRA, which tends to lose personnel to private water companies. 
Such low retention levels of the agency’s employees was one of the 
factors that crippled the organization.  Such a revolving door effect also 
takes place in government, when public officials occupy more than one 
position in different water government bodies. To give an example, the 
Executive Director of the EWRA serves also as an assistant to the Minister 
for International Cooperation. Such a dual role may facilitate pushing the 
regulatory agenda when dealing with the minister in charge. Nonetheless, 
such a dual role can also compromise and reflect negatively in the 
autonomy of the regulatory agency.          
 Building staff capacities and skills. In dealing with government water 
institutions, experts and stakeholders from the private sector have echoed 
the same concerns about the level of competency exhibited by 
government officials (see chapters 7 and 8). Some major areas of 
shortcomings have been underscored, in particular the ability of 
employees to communicate in English as well as the lack of some basic 
knowledge and applications of computer software. These shortcomings 
have to be addressed by the water government bodies through 
collaboration with other stakeholders to develop and deliver training and 
educational programs to their employees. In other words, building 
employees’ capacities should be a high priority for water institutions, 
including ministries and regulators, in order to make sure that they have 
the same level of competency and skills acquired by their counterparts in 
the private sector. If PPPs are going to form the engine for water sector 
reforms, government water institutions have be well equipped with high 
calibre staff members who are on top of their game when they deal with 
the private and other non-state counterparts.  
 Providing coordination mechanisms. As discussed earlier, the existing 
institutional framework suffers from a lack of coordination between the 
involved water institutions. In a complex and fragmented institutional 
environment such as the one explicated in Chapter 7, coordination 
becomes the name of the game especially among the big governmental 
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players. The mapping-out exercise has resulted in a complex web of 
relations among numerous governmental entities including the Ministry of 
Water Resources and Irrigation, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Environment and 
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy in addition to 
other water stakeholders. Each one of those ministerial bodies works 
under a separate mandate, which assigns the minister in charge certain 
responsibilities in steering respective subsectors in the water industry. In 
the absence of an intra-ministry coordinating body, the possibility of 
contradicting directives and overlapping activities becomes much higher. 
A good model to mimic in this respect is the PPP central unit under the 
Ministry of Finance, which has resulted in better coordination for all PPPs.  
 Developing better governance mechanisms for water decision-
making processes. The current central top-down approach for making 
water decisions is no longer suitable to cope with the reality of changing 
water governance in Egypt. A bottom-up, participatory approach that 
accommodates the contributions of water stakeholders of all types is 
needed wherein government institutions work side-by-side with private 
and non-state water agents in order to develop and implement water 
governance arrangements. The new governance model should be leaning 
more towards power delegation and decentralization of water decision-
making activities. Go-alone strategies have to be completely avoided in 
dealing with water governance issues as they increase rejections and 
resistance to any proposed reforms. Additionally, the role of the private 
and non-state water stakeholders has to be enhanced via consultation 
processes via which those actors can express their opinions and concerns 
in relation to the proposed reforms before being implemented. This 
participatory multi-party decision-making mechanism will result in better 
water policy design and more effective implementation of water reforms. 
To this end, the role of private water agencies, water NGOs and 
universities, has to be improved in water policy and decision-making 
processes. The institutional analysis of the water sector in Egypt has 
indicated that the participation of those actors in water governance is 
considerably limited and therefore needs to be increased to ensure the 
full utilization of the overall water governance resources.         
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9.4.2. Implications and Policy Recommendations: Water Management and 
Operation  
The analysis in this thesis has demonstrated that the Egyptian water sector is 
shifting from having abundant water resources to being a system characterized 
by water deficit and scarcity. That means it is time for the water policymakers to 
pay more attention to the issue of water governance. For the water experts and 
the rest of water stakeholders, it is time to take a deeper look at how best to 
exploit the remaining volume of that scarce resource. Hence, considering water 
governance challenges domestically and internationally, it can be safely 
concluded that the current practices related to the management and operation of 
the Egyptian water sectors have be revisited and reconsidered to reflect the new 
reality of water scarcity. To this end, the study recommends the following actions:         
 Reforming the current tariff structure. The earlier discussions have 
emphasised the fact that water is a rare economic commodity and it has 
to be perceived and treated as such by all water stakeholders (see chapter 
7). In this respect, it would be difficult to sustain any water reforms without 
restructuring current water tariffs to reflect the actual cost of production. 
In other words, maintaining the existing low tariffs for water services will 
not be helpful in changing wasteful water practices among stakeholders. 
Therefore, it is recommended in this regard to continue tariff reforms 
guided by the experiences of other countries which have succeeded in 
developing effective pricing mechanisms and putting in place efficient 
water tariff structures. The role of EWRA is paramount in this respect as 
the sector’s economic regulator. A regulatory framework is needed, which 
provides a tariff level and structure that encourage higher access to 
services without jeopardizing financial stability for water users namely the 
poor and women (see chapter 3). Nevertheless, as of now, water tariffs 
are determined by the Cabinet’s High Committee on Policy and Economic 
Affairs with almost no role of the sectors’ regulator. Given state 
responsibilities in the special sphere, and driven by the social protection 
of water users, tariffs are set in the light of political rather than economic 
and efficiency considerations.  In this respect, the study recommends the 
development and implementation of a pricing mechanism that takes 
account of the needs of the water utilities and at the same time guarantees 
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consumers’ rights especially the poor and women (see chapter 3). The 
role of the EWRA in setting water tariffs has to be enhanced dramatically 
as the sector’s regulator and it has to work collaboratively with water 
stakeholders on developing such a pricing mechanism. Whatever pricing 
mechanisms and tariff structures are put in place for water services, they 
have to be fully justified to end-users and reviewed periodically. 
Otherwise, the implementation of the new tariffs will be faced with high 
resistance from water stakeholders. A participatory approach might help 
in developing a sustainable tariff system that reflects the economic cost 
but at the same time meets the needs and demands of water users.   
 Balancing a public services ethos with commercial considerations 
in water utilities. Focusing on the idea of cost recovery and efficiency 
gains from an economic perspective is new to public officials in water 
utilities. More often than not, the public officials in HCWW perceive end-
users as recipients of water services provided and heavily subsidized by 
the state. In other words, water users are not seen by public water utilities 
as customers who have to pay for the services they receive. Such an 
understanding of the nature of water services and the obligation of the 
state to adequately provide them to end-users have been developed and 
shaped over time and supported in many cases by the ways of pricing 
water services and public utilities’ behaviour in handling water rights and 
other issues. In this context, any attempt by the state to move away from 
this common ethos of water public services to a new model wherein 
commercialization and cost recovery are the main pillars will face 
resistance, not only from end-users but also from the utilities staff. Having 
said that, it is recommended to gradually embark on a cultural change in 
public water utilities wherein in the old notion of the state special 
protection of water users is balanced with the new government’s 
commitments with regard to economic efficiency, commercialization and 
providing economically viable water services. The process of pricing water 
services has to be fully shielded from political interference by government 
agencies under any form of legal and social rights in order to justify setting 
‘social’ water tariffs.           
 Managing the demand-side. One of the major challenges facing the 
water sector in Egypt is to bridge the gap between the scarce water 
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resources and the mounting demand for water from all economic sectors 
and households. To this end, a sustainable approach that focuses on 
demand-side management strategies could be helpful in rationalizing 
water usage by concerned stakeholders. The current water practices and 
strategies focus on the supply side and try to find new ways to increase 
water supply particularly to sectors with high levels of demand such as 
agriculture. Given the global water crisis previously discussed in chapter 
3, alongside the water shortage that is facing and will continue to face 
Egypt in the future, focusing on the supply side would not be helpful. 
Sustainable water governance systems require sound planning and good 
management of water resources on both demand and supply sides (see 
chapter 3). The efforts on managing the supply side have to be 
complemented with efforts to reduce the existing demand for water. In 
other words, for such a balanced approach to be effective, all water 
sources including conventional and non-conventional sources have to be 
fully developed and utilized in an efficient manner to meet the increasing 
demand for water (ICARDA, 2011). However, at the same time, it is 
equally important to rationalize water practices and to reduce the demand 
for water by combating wasteful practices in industry and agriculture. It is 
worth mentioning in this regard that the approach followed by MWRI to 
integrate demand-side, water resources development and environmental 
protection in its planning model is a step in the right direction. However, 
this approach has to be sustained and systematically followed by other 
water organizations.  
 Maintaining and modernizing water facilities. From a governance 
perspective, private investments can play a major role in modernizing and 
maintaining water infrastructures (see chapter 2). Yet, the analysis of the 
water sector in Egypt has indicated that many of the existing water 
facilities require modernization. Most of the water facilities have plans for 
maintenance and modernization. Nonetheless, these plans have been 
delayed for several reasons such as the lack of required resources and 
the weak political commitment to such improvement plans. Ignoring the 
maintenance and improvement plans results in water losses in a system 
suffering greatly from water shortage and the ever-increasing demand for 
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water. In other words, overlooking the dire needs of existing water facilities 
for maintenance means undermining the utilization efficiency.          
 Providing reliable measures and data and developing performance-
oriented systems. As indicated in Chapter 7, the lack of data and 
accurate measures represents one of the main challenges facing water 
managers, planners, and policy-makers in Egypt. The very basic data 
about water usage, for example, in the municipal and industrial areas is 
lacking. Added to this, measures of water quality and levels of pollution 
are not accurate and up-to-date (Hussona, 2014). These are just 
examples but the lack of information and data were highlighted on several 
occasions during the interviews by different types of stakeholders as one 
of the main constraints to making sound and efficient water decisions. The 
quality of managerial and policy decisions is contingent on the quality of 
the data used to produce them. As such, timely, up-to-date, and accurate 
information is paramount for evidence-based, scientific and efficient water 
policy and managerial decisions. Water utilities’ performance data has 
also to be fully utilized in order to measure the performance of water 
agencies against services and performance standards. In this respect, 
having a transparent performance indicator system in place will help the 
sector regulator and water stakeholders to assess the performance of 
water companies. However, the regulatory officials confirmed during the 
interviews that performance measures are used to monitor the 
performance of water utilities. Nonetheless, the absence of a clear 
incentive or sanctioning scheme linked to this process has weakened the 
ability of the regulator to influence water utilities behaviour. To this end, it 
is recommended that a link should be established between water utilities’ 
performance and the distribution of water subsidies received from the 
government. It is worth noting in this regard that current water governance 
settings and practices have the upper hand in the areas of setting, 
monitoring, and measuring water quality and utility performance 
standards to water bodies other than the sector’s regulatory agency. For 
instance, the HCWW has the upper hand when it comes to setting and 
measuring performance standards for the affiliated water utilities. At the 
same time, the responsibility of developing and monitoring the water 
quality standards are assigned to the Ministry of Health. This observation 
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supports the conclusion that the EWRA does not function in its full 
capacity as the sector’s regulator and these distortions in regulatory 
powers have to be fully corrected in the new water law.                       
 Developing a holistic approach in managing water resources. The 
water crisis is multifaceted and calls for an all-inclusive approach for 
effective water management and operation. In this respect, water issues 
and challenges should not be addressed in a stand-alone fashion. On the 
contrary, an integrated approach in identifying, planning, and handling 
those issues would be more productive. In other words, the water sector 
in Egypt is in need of effective Integrated Water Resources Management 
practices which put together the different pieces of the water crisis puzzle 
in an attempt to factor them all into the proposed solutions. Such a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to managing water resources 
would provide water strategies that go beyond the easy and comfortable 
solutions which focus primarily on the idea that the Nile is the only water 
resource in the country and tackle the water problems at hand with 
innovative solutions. Added to this, a holistic and comprehensive 
approach to water management would suggest an accurate assessment 
of current and future water resources in terms of availability, location, 
quality, and demands from water stakeholders. Some of the institutional 
basis for such a system are already in place including the National Water 
Resources Plan for Egypt (NWRP) and the Integrated Water Resources 
Management Plan prepared by The Ministry of Water Resources and 
Irrigation issued in 2005. Such an institutional base is important but not 
sufficient to transform water management practices in the sector. The 
implementation is faced with many challenges which need to be 
addressed. Chief among those challenges is the business-as-usual 
mentality and culture prevailing in water institutions. This way of thinking 
hampers the efforts of thinking out of the box and developing new 
solutions to water problems. Added to this, the lack of a clear institutional 
vision and concrete mechanisms for full water stakeholders’ participation 
means some elements of the overall picture are missing, which stands as 
an obstacle in the face of developing integrated water management 
practices. Such challenges need to be addressed with legal and 
275 | P a g e  
 
regulatory developments that ensure full and efficient utilization of all 
types of water resources.           
9.4.3. Implications and Policy Recommendations: Legal and Regulatory 
Environments 
The analysis of the legal and regulatory framework of the Egyptian water sector 
has underlined the complex and the fragmented nature of the legal and 
regulatory environment. Such complexity and fragmentation are reflected in the 
weak and sub-optimal operations of the water governance system. In this 
context, legal and regulatory reforms are considered integral components in any 
mega water reform program. For the water governance system in Egypt to work 
effectively, water regulations and the overall legal and regulatory environments 
have to be reconsidered and redesigned.  Water laws need to be unified and 
simplified in a way that helps the effective formation and implementation of water 
policies. In this context, the study suggests the following actions: 
 Continuing and completing water legal reforms. The discussion in 
chapter 3 has underlined the importance of the overall legal and regulatory 
environment for water governance systems by focusing on the 
relationship between water policies and water laws. The analysis of the 
case study though has flagged the fragmentation of the legal environment 
in the Egyptian water sector as one of the major hurdles facing reform 
efforts and negatively impacting the effectiveness of current water 
governance arrangements. A comprehensive water law has been drafted 
as previously indicated, wherein some of the legal and governance water 
issues have been properly addressed. One of the main benefits of having 
this new law in place is the clear assignment of regulatory powers to the 
EWRA. For instance, the sector’s regulator will have the power to issue 
licenses to the water subsidiaries. This in turn will enhance the overall 
governance of the licensing process and increase the transparency as 
well as the accountability of those water facilities for delivering specific 
outputs. In this context, the examination of the interview data has 
underlined a major concern related to the incomplete legal and regulatory 
reforms in the sector. That is the sector’s institutional complexity will 
continue increasing with different water agencies playing diverse 
regulatory and operational roles at the same time. The relationship 
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between the EWRA and the Egyptian National Organisation for Potable 
Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD) is a case in point. Due to the 
lack of adequate separation between regulatory and operational 
functions, both agencies are assigned regulatory duties and report to the 
same minster. Such an overlapping of regulatory and operational water 
bodies’ responsibilities has to be addressed in the new legal and 
regulatory institutions. Additionally, the legal and regulatory framework of 
the water sector should secure the separation of functions and roles at the 
levels of water policy-making, economic and social regulations, and water 
operations and service delivery.    
 Developing a better understanding of regulations based on the idea 
of shared water governance. During the interviews, water experts and 
government officials provided different notions and diverse interpretations 
of ‘regulation’. For most of the government officials, water regulation is 
nothing but a new layer of rules which govern the water sector. In other 
words, the concept of regulation as an interactive process wherein 
regulatory rules are made and implemented by all water stakeholders and 
based on shared water governance was clear enough in their minds. Such 
a narrow interpretation of the concept of regulation is reflected in the ways 
those government actors perceive their role in the overall water 
governance system and the roles of other stakeholders. Consequently, a 
common understanding of what is meant by water regulation among all 
stakeholders is in order. Focusing on the final products - regulatory rules 
- is not enough to capture the full dynamics of water regulation. As 
indicated earlier, water governance is of a political nature and ignoring 
water processes and interaction among water stakeholders is like 
focusing on the trees and ignoring the wider water governance forest. 
Added to this, perceiving water regulation from a process perspective will 
help in fostering the participation of non-state actors in water governance 
and acknowledging their potential effects on regulatory outcomes.          
 Providing and enhancing the institutional guarantees for the 
regulatory independence of EWAR. At the time being, the sector’s 
regulator, as has been illustrated earlier, is acting as a technical office in 
the big shadow of the other government institutions. In this regard, it is 
highly recommended that for water reforms to be sustainable and fruitful 
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and for the sector’s regulator to act independently from all water 
stakeholders including government water agencies (Badran, 2017). In 
other words, for EWAR to fulfil its role in the newly established governance 
structures, it has to be fully shielded from any form of political interference 
by the powerful dominating water bodies. EWAR also has to act 
independently from the regulated industry and has to avoid regulatory 
capture by powerful international and national private water companies. 
For a newly established regulatory agency, this task is far from being 
easy, as regulatory independence has to be reflected in all decisions and 
actions. In this regard, it is recommended that the financial independence 
of the EWRA has to be strengthened in order to ensure the autonomy of 
decision-making and the ability to act independently from all water 
stakeholders. As it stands at the moment, the EWRA is fully funded by 
government. Nonetheless, the regulatory agency can ensure its financial 
autonomy by using the money collected from non-compliant companies in 
addition to the funds secured from issuing and renewing water licenses to 
sustain its financial independence. In all cases, a long-term commitment 
to enhancing in-house regulatory capacities and organizational 
development in EWRA will result in increasing the confidence and trust 
from water stakeholders in the new regulator and produce behavioural 
change at the operational levels of water players. Without such a 
commitment to enhance the regulatory power of EWRA, the ability of the 
agency to regulate the water sector may wither and the possibilities of 
regulatory capture may increase.                   
 Addressing information asymmetry. In relation to the regulated water 
facility, the EWRA as it stands now suffers from information lack and the 
absence of reporting mechanisms. Such an information asymmetry 
makes the sector’s regulator ill equipped to effectively address major 
regulatory issues. To put it another way, water facilities can hold 
information about the different operational aspects including production 
and distribution, which are crucial for making sound and timely regulatory 
decisions. In such an asymmetrical situation, the EWRA is highly 
dependent on the regulated water facilities for receiving information. This 
interferes with its ability of EWRA to respond effectively to the water 
issues. In this regard, formally instituted reporting mechanisms from all 
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private water companies and utilities can help in addressing the 
information asymmetry between EWRA and the regulated industry. 
Additionally, the EWRA has to develop a system to effectively validate 
and handle the flow of information received from the regulated companies. 
Having too much information can be as counterproductive as having no 
information at all, especially in the absence of the required analytics to 
deal with the received data. It is also recommended that the EWRA should 
not rely on the reports sent by the regulated water companies. As the 
sector regulator, he should have the right to undertake site visits and to 
access all water companies’ filing systems in order to verify the reposted 
information. The EWRA could also seek unification of reporting 
mechanisms by following international standards to report information 
from the regulated water companies. The international financial standards 
are a case in point when it comes to reporting financial data and relevant 
information about water companies’ financial performance.              
 Enforcing water and environmental regulations and controlling non-
utility providers. The discussion in chapter 7 has indicated that the levels 
of water pollution due to the disposal of industrial companies and the 
malpractice from the agricultural sector have become a major concern for 
environmental and water policy scholars and practices. Disposing of such 
hazardous substances directly into the Nile water without a proper 
treatment degrades the quality of the water and increases the chances of 
health hazards and illnesses. To restrain these practices, environmental 
and water regulators have to work hand-in-hand to effectively monitor and 
enforce regulations and sanctions for violating parties. Lenient 
enforcement would result in more violations taking place and more 
deterioration in water quality, which in turn increases the economic cost 
of treating contaminated water to the level of becoming drinking and 
potable water safe for end-users. If needed, new regulations and laws 
have to be developed with harsher sanctions in order to deter violators 
from breaking the law and polluting the water sources. The regulatory 
agency should also pay close attention to the growing role of the non-
utility service providers. The role of those entities currently is limited to the 
poor and scattered areas. Nonetheless, the poor provision of water and 
sanitation services may result in an increase in the number and 
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importance of those actors. Working illegally, those actors are always 
associated with numerous forms of misconduct. For instance, in poor 
areas where there is a considerable lack of water and wastewater 
services, non-utility providers tend to exploit customers by charging high 
prices for the services they deliver. The activities of those actors have to 
be legalized and regulated by the EWRA in order to protect water users 
from exploitation and prevent any practices that might result in health 
hazards to end-users. This will not be an easy task for the sector regulator 
as the interviewed regulatory members of staff have agreed that it would 
be difficult to control the behaviour of those actors given the scattered and 
sporadic nature of their operations and the absence of basic water and 
sanitation services in the areas where they function.          
 Strengthening the EWRA’s regulatory powers. From a historical point 
of view, the regulation of the water sector was merely perceived as a 
function of oversight aiming at monitoring water quality in order to reduce 
any health hazards for end-users (see chapter 7). This narrow 
interpretation of water regulation is no longer suitable to handle the 
different aspects of water reforms in Egypt. In addition to water quality, 
there is more focus now on the economic efficiency of water utilities and 
the quality of water services in general. In other words, with the 
commercialization of the water sector, and in order to handle water 
structural reforms in Egypt in a better manner, the regulatory powers of 
the EWRA have to be extended to cover major economic as well as social 
areas. As mentioned previously, EWRA is more of a technical body than 
a fully-fledged regulator of the sector. In this regard, and in order to 
function as a regulator for the water sector, new powers have to be 
granted to EWRA. As the water regulatory body, EWRA has to be 
empowered and mandated to monitor the performance of the water 
facilities and measure such a performance against a set of technical, 
commercial, financial and economic standards. The embedded 
information asymmetry in the water governance system hampers the 
efforts of the regulator to fulfil this task. Additionally, the analysis of the 
interview material has underscored some areas of concern shared by the 
interviewed regulatory members of staff at the EWRA. Chief among those 
concerns were the weak power of the regulator in imposing fines on the 
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noncompliant water facilities in addition to the inability of the EWRA to 
issue water licences or to design and impose service tariffs. Current water 
utility licenses are issued in accordance with applicable decrees and 
legislation in the absence of a unified framework for licensing water 
services providers. The new water law is expected to grant the power of 
licensing water operators as well as the right to renew and revoke their 
license to the EWRA. However, until this projection becomes a reality, the 
regulatory powers of the sector’s regulator will continue to suffer from 
major weaknesses. In the meantime, and given the aforementioned 
shortcomings, it can be concluded that the EWRA is in need of a 
comprehensive program to build-up the capacity of its members of staff in 
different economic and social areas of water regulation. Furthermore, the 
regulatory powers of the agency have to be clearly mandated to the 
EWRA in the new long-awaited water law.               
9.4.4. Implications and Policy Recommendations: National and Regional 
Water Governance Settings  
Introducing the notion of governance in the Egyptian water sector is still relatively 
new and the relationships between water agents and structures have not yet 
been clearly determined. Nonetheless, the discussion of the water crisis from a 
governance point of view has demonstrated that the water crisis in Egypt 
provides an abundantly clear example of a crisis in governance. At the domestic 
level, several governance issues require the attention and intervention of water 
policy and decision-makers. At the same time, and considering the 
transboundary nature of the Nile water system, another set of water governance 
issues needs to be addressed. In this regard, the following actions are 
recommended by this research:    
 Increasing water consumers’ awareness. Any success in developing 
and enacting sustainable water reforms will be dependent largely on the 
acceptance of the water users to change their perceptions and behaviour 
in dealing with available water resources. Focusing on technical 
improvements in managing and operating water facilities will partially 
address the water shortage faced by stakeholders in Egypt. However, 
utilizing advanced water technologies will not provide remedies for all 
water problems. Improving the operational and managerial aspects of 
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water governance has to be accompanied by behavioural change at the 
level of the water users. Such behavioural change cannot be realized 
without public campaigns designed to educate, inform, and raise the 
awareness among water users and underscore the main water issues and 
the ways to deal with them. A collaborative effort between concerned 
government agencies and the water NGOs can be fruitful in raising public 
awareness and changing consumer behaviour. The directed message 
should be clear and convincing to consumers by focusing on showing the 
positive impacts of saving water and rationalizing water consumption for 
all stakeholders in the society. It is worth mentioning in this regard that 
changing the existing conceptions about water and consumption patterns 
and behaviour means creating a new culture among end-users. Such 
cultural and behavioural change requires persistence and continuous 
effort from all involved parties. Sporadic efforts will not be helpful in 
changing people’s behaviour and wasteful practices.    
 Enhancing the overall qualities of the water governance system. The 
notions of governance, good governance, and water governance as 
presented in chapters 2 and 3 have underlined transparency and 
accountability among the main elements of good water governance 
systems. Nonetheless, the analysis of the decision-making mechanisms 
in the Egyptian water sector has demonstrated that the core elements of 
good governance such as transparency and accountability have not been 
fully embraced and systematically maintained throughout the governance 
system’s operations. Transparency is paramount when it comes to the 
legitimacy of water decisions and proposed reforms. For instance, the lack 
of transparency in awarding PPP concessions to the private water 
companies may raise fundamental issues related to corruption. However, 
transparent concession processes mean the fair treatment of all bidders 
and legitimize the decisions made by government water bodies regarding 
the projects at hand. Additionally, with the private water companies on 
board building and operating new water facilities using different PPPs 
models have become a common practice. Moreover, considering the 
growing involvement of other non-state actors in making and 
implementing water policies and decisions in the water sector, it is 
essential to draw clear lines of accountability. It is essential to clearly 
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identify the roles and responsibilities which hold all involved parties 
accountable for their actions. Lack of accountability may undermine the 
overall system and make involved water agents prone to opportunistic 
behaviour that might harm other water stakeholders such as end-users.      
 Coordinating donors’ activities and programs. As noted in chapters 6 
and 7, the Egyptian water sector has received considerable donations and 
technical support from different types of developmental organizations 
including the OECD, the UNDP, and the USAID. This aspect reflects the 
role of international water governance level in influencing water policy 
practices at national and regional levels (see chapters 2 and 3). Having 
all those donors working at the same time and trying to reform and 
modernize the water sector requires an effective coordination mechanism 
that ensures the best utilization of the provided resources. As indicated in 
the sectoral analysis, the water issues are numerous and the reform areas 
in the sector are multiple. Without the proper coordination mechanism in 
place, it is highly possible that efforts could easily overlap and the 
outcomes of donations would not be optimal. In this context, it is essential 
to have a clear reform agenda and to devote the provided assistance 
accordingly. Prioritizing sector reform needs will help donors in developing 
their programs and make sure they build upon each other’s efforts to 
ensure sustainable and efficient water reforms. Some of the donor-driven 
reform agenda has been criticized by water experts during the interviews 
for being heavily reliant on consultancy and having little to do with building 
in-house expertise or developing local solutions to water problems.        
 Empowering non-state water stakeholders. In water governance 
systems, all types of stakeholders contribute different kinds of resources 
and expertise (see chapters 2 and 3). Each constellation of actors plays 
to their strength. For instance, government actors use law making and 
policymaking powers allocated to them to regulate the overall governance 
operations. At the same time, private water companies, for example, 
possess the resources, the technology and the capital needed to 
modernize and build up new water projects and facilities. Relationships 
among the governance system’s members are of an interdependent 
nature. That means each type of actor needs the other for the overall 
governance system to work effectively. Having said that, it is needless to 
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emphasise how important non-state and private water stakeholders are 
for the functionality of the water governance system in Egypt. Unlike the 
current situation (see chapter 7), those new policy players need to be fully 
empowered in the sense that they are given the opportunity to use the 
resources they have at their disposal to benefit the water governance 
system and to make profits and return on the investments they make. This 
will result in a win-win situation wherein all parties contribute to and benefit 
from the system. In this context, more partnerships with the private sector 
are needed in order to provide the needed investment for establishing the 
new projects. At the same time, the relationship with other water 
stakeholders, namely consumer groups, should not be neglected. The 
EWRA, as the protector of public interests, should reinforce its ties with 
consumers and make sure that their voices are echoed in regulatory and 
policy decision-making processes. As of now, and as reported by water 
experts in the interviews, the regulatory agency is focusing on handling 
customers’ complaints. This could be a good approach to identify and 
react to the sector’s main issues. Nonetheless, a proactive regulatory 
approach is recommended wherein the EWRA seeks input from end-
users regarding the intended policy and regulatory goals. In this regard, 
conducting public consultations could be an efficient regulatory tool in 
order to ensure the participation of water customers and other water 
stakeholders in making regulatory policies and decisions.              
 Thinking globally and acting locally.  The discussion of policy learning 
and lessons drawing in chapter 4 has indicated that policy-maker may 
learn from the experiences of other countries. It is clear from the analysis 
of the water sector regulation in Egypt that the regulatory design adopted 
is modelled based on the independent sector regulatory model such as 
the experience of the water sector regulator in England and Wales 
(Ofwat). Such an observation has been supported by the evidence 
gathered from the analysis of the interview materials and the other 
examined water policy documents. For example, the regulatory members 
of staff have confirmed the technical links with Ofwat and stated that some 
of them have visited Ofwat and attended training there. It is worth noting 
in this respect that the accounts on policy learning and lesson drawing 
have concluded that there is a possibility for policymakers in a specific 
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context to learn from the experience of other jurisdictions (see chapter 4). 
This is not to support the idea of copying institutions, ideas, and policy 
solutions to address water issues at the local level. The idea here is for 
water policy and decision-makers to look globally and to search for best 
practices; but they have to evaluate the suitability and compatibility of the 
identified ideas, models, and solutions to deal with water issues 
domestically.  As the discussions indicated earlier, despite being modelled 
based on the Ofwat model, the EWRA lacks numerous regulatory powers, 
which the Ofwat fully enjoys as the sector’s regulator in England (see 
chapters 7 and 8). In this context, it is good to look for lessons to be 
learned from other jurisdictions. However, such lessons and experiences 
have to be localised. In other words, Egypt has no shortage of water 
experts; nonetheless, the complexities of the water crisis require the 
collaboration and integration of all efforts to develop customised locally 
driven solutions to the water governance problems.  
 Coordinating efforts and plans with upstream Nile riparians. As noted 
in chapters 2 and 3, water crisis is perceived as a problem of governance 
that calls for the collaboration of stat and non-state actors at global, 
regional and national levels. Such a multilevel analytic framework is 
particularly relevant to examine the transboundary nature of water 
governance in the Nile basin. One of the major features of the water 
governance in Egypt is the transboundary nature of the governance 
system as the Nile, which is the main source of water in Egypt, cuts across 
different countries and political jurisdictions (see Chapter 6). This feature, 
in particular, makes the overall governance of the Nile highly political and 
sensitive to the water politics among the Nile Basin countries. On the one 
hand, Upper Nile countries have the right to manage their own water 
resources the way that helps them in achieving their developmental goals. 
At the same time, and considering that most of Egypt’s water is produced 
outside its own boundaries, accepting this argument means for water 
policy-makers accepting a considerable reduction in the country’s share 
from the Nile water, which will hamper the developmental plans of Egypt. 
In such a complex governance setting, a common understanding of the 
nature of the system and the ways in which it affects involved parties is 
paramount for developing coordination mechanisms and shared visions 
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and plans.  In other words, for all parties to win a new governance system 
must be developed away from short-term, self-centred, and narrow 
perspectives and centred on mutual benefits for all countries. To this end, 
and considering the recent crisis between Egypt and Ethiopia with regard 
to the establishment and operation of the Grand Renaissance Dam, a 
cooperative and win-win solution would require developing a common 
understanding of the Nile governance and forming a shared vision 
regarding the use of its water resources. On the one hand, Egypt has 
acknowledged Ethiopia’s right to develop the dam and to pursue it 
economic development plans. On the other hand, and given the gravity of 
the water shortage situation in Egypt and potential impact of the dam on 
water availability, Ethiopia has to come to an agreement with Egypt on 
how to minimize the negative impacts of the dam. It also has to provide 
an insurance policy to the Egyptian Government assuring the full 
cooperation between the two parties during droughts and other water 
crises. Added to this, the benefits from establishing the dam in terms of 
power generation should be shared among the Nile Basin countries, 
namely Egypt, to compensate for the potential negative consequences.       
9.5. The Limitations of the Research and Opportunities for Future Studies 
This study has developed an integrated approach using governance and 
structure-agency theoretical accounts in order to investigate water governance 
issues in the context of the Egyptian water sector. In this context, it is worth noting 
that any attempt to investigate water governance arrangements and to address 
the question of water crises in Egypt has to grapple with many conceptual, 
theoretical, and methodological difficulties. At the conceptual level, introducing 
the notion of governance as a new policy tool and a novel mechanism for making 
and implementing water policy decisions in an environment dominated primarily 
by giant government entities such as MWRI and the MALR was not an easy task 
at all. The history of Egypt reflects the very central nature of the country, with 
government entities having the upper hand when it comes to managing and 
allocating the water resources. This central role of government institutions has 
been sustained and reinforced over centuries. In such a context, it is hard to 
convince the dominant government water agents to share responsibilities and 
tasks with non-state water stakeholders, namely citizens and the private sector. 
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It was clear from the analysis of the interview material that government agencies 
in charge of water management in Egypt do not want to lose control to the new 
players from the private sector.  
At the theoretical level, the research has suffered from the lack of academic 
accounts using new theoretical frameworks of analysis such as governance to 
study the processes of making and enforcing water policies and regulation in the 
Egyptian context. This field is dominated by technical reports mainly from an 
engineering point of view with very little attention devoted to the analysis of water 
governance issues and policy processes. The study has attempted to use such 
a lack in the academic literature to its favour by developing the provided 
integrated approach for analysis and applying it to study the current water 
governance issues and arrangements in Egypt using an MLG perspective. In that 
sense, the research at hand offers an attempt to bridge the gap between theory 
and practice in the area of making water policies and setting up water 
governance systems.      
At the methodological level, one of the major challenges was scheduling and 
conducting the elite interviews. Despite the fact that the researcher was keen on 
having all the interviews scheduled in advance, many of them were subject to 
last minute changes due to the busy schedule of the interviewees. During the 
interviews, the researcher was keen on establishing a common conceptual 
ground among all interviewees. This was done by briefly introducing some major 
concepts such as governance and non-state policy actors in a simple fashion. 
The aim was to make sure that the interviewees all had the same understanding 
of these concepts when talking about water governance issues and the role their 
agencies play in managing water resources. It is also worth mentioning in this 
regard that the researcher found it difficult in some interviews to keep the 
interviewees focused on the question at hand, as they tended to reflect more on 
their experiences to highlight their achievements. Government officials also 
rejected the request to record the interviews, therefore, the researcher had to 
take shorthand notes and extend the notes after the interview in a fully 
documented record.    
The investigation of water governance in Egypt has underlined some new 
avenues for future research. In the field of water policymaking and 
implementation, more focus on the growing role and influence of non-state actors 
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in water governance is required. The existence of non-state actors in 
policymaking and implementation in many policy domains has become a fact. 
Nonetheless, the potential roles and the forms of participation by such actors are 
still in dire need of academic examination and investigation. This area of scientific 
enquiry will result in a body of research that provides the proper guidance as well 
as a sound understanding of the responsibilities of the private actors in the 
overall water governance system. Added to this and from a governance 
standpoint, more enquiry in the areas of accountability, transparency and rule of 
law is in order. Examining these areas will help highlight the shortcomings in the 
current water governance arrangements in addition to proposing new strategies 
to enhance those core elements of good governance.  
From a methodological point of view, the researcher would have liked to extend 
the boundaries of the study to include other sectors or to compare similar water 
governance settings in other countries. However, given the limitations of time 
and resources, the single case study research design was preferred at this stage 
with future intentions to incorporate a comparative perspective. One of the major 
shortcomings of the single case study approach is the limited ability to generalise 
the results of the study (see chapter 5). Nonetheless, for a comparative analysis 
to be fruitful it has to be founded on a solid base of rich data and information. 
This thick description of water sectors can be produced via single case studies, 
which look in depth into the practice of water governance in specific contexts. 
Having said that, the plan at the post-doctoral level is to continue the enquiry in 
the area of water governance by conducting a series of comparative analyses 
considering water governance regimes in other countries of the region.             
To conclude, it remains to be seen how the water governance system in Egypt 
will look like in the years to come. Nonetheless, with little doubt one can easily 
predict an ever-growing role for private water stakeholders of all kinds in 
developing and managing available water resources. It is my belief that this new 
reality of water governance requires imaginative solutions to water issues. It also 
calls for a full implementation of the core principles of good water governance, 
particularly the participatory decision-making and accountability mechanisms.      
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APPENDICES  
Appendix1: Interview Question Guide 
 
Q1 Who are the actors involved in managing the water sector in Egypt? 
Q2 Who in your opinion are the most influential actors when it comes to make 
water policy decisions? 
Q3 How sustainable do you think the existing water governance system is? Does 
it help in addressing pressing issues such as gender considerations and poverty? 
Q4 Do you think involving non-state actors in water decision-making processes 
helpful? Why?   
Q5 Do you think the independent sector regulator was the best policy option for 
managing the water sector in Egypt? Why? 
Q6 Do you think donor agencies which were involved in the reform process have 
somehow influenced the decision regarding which reform model to adopt? 
Q7 What factors do you think decision makers take into account when selecting 
reform models and policy options? 
Q8 Do you think the adopted model (IRA) suits the existing structures in the 
Egyptian water sector? Why? 
Q9 Was the decision of adopting the IRA model based on the study of other 
countries’ experiences? 
Q10 How effective the IRA model is in securing the participation of all 
stakeholders in the Egyptian water governance system? 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
Do you think there is anyone else I should talk to in your organization about 
my research? 
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 دليل أسئلة المقابلات الشخصية
 في مصر؟ المياههم برأيك الفاعلون الرئيسيون في منظومة حوكمة  من-ا
 
 وجهة نظرك، من هم الفاعلون الاكثر تأثيرا في عملية صنع القرارات الخاصة بسياسات المياه في مصر؟ من-2
 
حة النظام القائم مع القضايا المل في مصر بالاستدامة؟ هل يتفاعل المياهاي مدي تتمتع منظومة حوكمة  الي-3
 كقضية الفقر والنوع الاجتماعي بفاعلية؟
 
ي مصر ف المياهتعتقد بأن مشاركة الفاعلين غير الحكوميين في عملية صنع القرارات الخاصة بسياسات  هل-4
 أمر مفيد؟ لماذا؟
 
 في مصر من قبل هيئة مستقلة هو المياهتنظيم وإدارة قطاع  علىتعتقد ان تبني النموذج التنظيمي القائم  هل-5
 النموذج الأفضل لإدارة هذا القطاع؟ لماذا؟
 
وجهة نظرك، هل أثرت الجهات المانحة المشاركة في عملية تطوير واعادة هيكلة القطاع في عملية تبني  من-6
 نموذج بعينه من قبل صانعي القرار؟ 
 
 لة؟لهيئة المنظمة المستقاعتقادك، ما هي العوامل التي اخذها صانع القرار بعين الاعتبار عند تبني نموذج ا في-7
 
المؤسسية الموجودة بقطاع المياه في  والأبنيةتعتقد ان نموذج الهيئة المنظمة المستقلة يتناسب مع الأطر  هل-8
 مصر؟
 
بشأن تطوير وإعادة هيكلة قطاعات  الأخرىتعتقد بأن صانع القرار المصري قد استفاد من خبرات الدول  هل-9
 ؟ المياه
 
 في مصر؟ ما هي الايجابيات والسلبيات؟  المياهتقيمك لمنظومة حوكمة  ، ما هواخيرا-01
 .شكرا لك علي حسن تعاونك
   هناك اي شخص آخر في المنظمة يمكن ان يفيدني في موضع دراستي؟تعتقد ان  هل
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